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Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ 
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε· 
πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, 
πολλὰ δ' ὅ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν, 
ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων. 
 
‘Tell me, O Muse, of that many-sided hero who travelled far and wide  
After he had sacked the famous town of Troy.  
Many cities did he visit, and many were the people  
With whose customs and thinking he was acquainted; 
 Many things he suffered at sea while seeking to save his own life  
And to achieve the safe homecoming of his companions.’ 
 
HOMER, Odyssey, opening passage 
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Abstract 
Purpose  
Airports are complex sociotechnical systems at the heart of one of the most 
crucial modes of transportation in the modern world: civil aviation. The importance 
of air transportation in contemporary economies has grown steadily over many years 
and is expected to continue growing in the immediate future. As complex 
sociotechnical systems and critical infrastructures in the service sector, airports are 
particularly prone to developing vulnerability and incubating conditions for the 
outburst of safety and security disruptions. These have the potential to lead to major 
crises. According to the crisis management literature, to which the present research 
adhered, crises derive from the incubation, manifestation, and development of latent 
conditions in organisational contexts. Detection of weak signals is deemed crucial in 
preventing a local disturbance from escalating to a catastrophic event. Stemming 
from these conceptual foundations, this research explored potential determinants of 
organisational vulnerability to safety and security disruptions in Australian airports 
as complex sociotechnical systems. Organisational vulnerability in airports was 
expected to be created by the combination of a series of individual and organisational 
factors potentially enacted by airport organisations. Notably, vulnerability was 
deemed to develop through specific pathways possibly leading to a range of 
disruptions in the safety or security fields of operations and from these, to major 
crises. Despite the growing importance of airports as critical infrastructures and work 
systems, little attention has been given to their organisational vulnerability in current 
research. This is especially true with regards to the role of human interaction with 
system components and organisational context in determining safety and security 
performance.  
Methodology  
Embracing a constructivist research paradigm, this investigation adopted a 
single case study design with an embedded approach. Data collection was conducted 
in three international Australian airports and focused on airport management 
organisations. Four units of analysis were singled out (leadership level, corporate 
management level, operational management level, and security screening 
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providers/Australian Federal Police) and three areas of operation identified 
(Landside, Landside/Airside and Airside). The elaborated case study was nurtured by 
means of qualitative methods. Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted, 
around forty organisational documents were examined, and approximately twenty-
one hours were spent in field observation. A purposeful sampling technique drove 
the selection of the interviewees, the observed contexts, and the analysed documents. 
Information emerging from data collection was organised and analysed against the 
macroergonomic approach of sociotechnical systems. Recurring themes were 
identified and classified and their analysis yielded information on safety and security 
disruptions and organisational vulnerability in the explored aerodromes. The adopted 
research design was validated against the qualitative validity criteria of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. The adopted research design 
enabled this thesis to address highlighted gaps in the literature. Under-explored areas 
of investigation that paved the way to further research on organisational vulnerability 
in complex sociotechnical systems were examined. 
Findings  
In order to enhance understanding of the individual and organisational 
precursors of organisational vulnerability, this investigation first had to identify what 
the possible consequences of vulnerability in airports were. Research Question 1 was 
therefore aimed at casting light on the most common and relevant safety and security 
disruptions potentially occurring in the explored airports. Study One of the present 
research provided an empirically tested taxonomy of disturbances to normal business 
operations with a safety- or security-related nature. Fifteen macro-categories were 
classified and described in detail, based on information drawn from the interviewees’ 
arguments, from the analysed documents, and from the observed operational 
contexts. Findings from Study One were used as the foundations for Study Two, 
which was articulated in two sub-questions. Research Question 2a constituted the 
core of this research and revolved around the identification of the individual and 
organisational factors that have the potential to determine organisational 
vulnerability in airports. Findings were organised around the categories of the 
macroergonomic approach to work system analysis. Individual, task, tools and 
technology, environment and organisational factors (the latter divided in turn in 
communication, culture, policy, structure, implementation, and strategy factors) 
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emerged as potential contributors to the overall systemic vulnerability in the explored 
airports. Consistent with findings from the crisis management literature, specific 
pathways of vulnerability were localised, along which macroergonomic factors 
potentially aggregate and create holes in the airport organisations and their defences. 
If these pathways are not detected and defences are by-passed, safety and security 
disruptions, and potentially, major crises, may occur. In order to provide a practical 
contribution towards the improvement of safety and security systems in the explored 
airports, Research Question 2b was then examined. Based on the collected data, 
operational suggestions were produced to limit the impact of organisational factors of 
vulnerability and prevent safety and security disruptions from occurring. 
Significance and contribution 
 This research provides an enhanced understanding of organisational 
vulnerability in airports as complex sociotechnical systems. Findings emphasise that: 
The examined Australian airports are complex sociotechnical systems that 
have the potential to incubate intrinsic factors of organisational vulnerability 
stemming from the practices, attitudes, and behaviours executed by airport 
organisations. In turn, organisational vulnerability has the potential to lead to 
the manifestation and development of safety and security disruptions, which, in 
extreme cases, can escalate into major organisational crises. 
From a theoretical perspective, an empirically tested taxonomy of safety and 
security disruptions in Australian airports was elaborated in order to lay the 
foundations towards a better understanding of organisational vulnerability. In so 
doing, this thesis contributes to the literature on crisis management by expanding 
knowledge regarding the crisis incubation mechanisms and focusing on vulnerability 
as a crucial causal factor of crises. The holistic perspective embraced by adopting the 
macroergonomic approach has provided a more comprehensive understanding of the 
organisational and inter-organisational precursors of vulnerability. The 
appropriateness of this approach in sociotechnical investigations on complex work 
systems’ performance has been supported. However, an improved version of the 
aforementioned approach has been elaborated as a result of the findings emerging 
from this research, and a revised macroergonomic approach has been illustrated. 
Furthermore, the discussion on safety and security functional areas in Australian 
airports paved the way to the practical suggestions elaborated in the final part of this 
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document. The significance of the present investigation for airport management 
practitioners is evidenced through the contribution of the following operational 
suggestions: review of risk assessment documents, incident reporting systems, and 
integration with the classified safety and security disruptions categories; Safecurity 
approach in Landside and Airside operations in airports; and suggestions for 
intervention in the fields of training of general aviation and low cost business model. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
‘Non quia difficilia sunt non audemus, sed quia non audemus difficilia sunt.’ 
‘It is not because things are difficult that we don't dare,  
It is because we don't dare that things are difficult.’ 
 
SENECA, Moral Letters to Lucilius, Letter CIV, 26 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In modern societies, the economic and social relevance of airports is growing, 
together with the number of passengers. More travellers utilise aviation as a means of 
transportation and modern aerodromes are becoming fundamental in ensuring 
movement of people and goods within and across countries. The increasing 
importance of contemporary airports entails a growing concern towards the factors 
that can hamper aeronautical operations. Therefore, the need to address the 
organisational vulnerability (OV) to safety and security disruptions (SSD) of airports 
becomes a crucial priority in modern societies.  
The main objective of the present investigation is to improve the crisis 
prevention measures implemented in Australian airports. In order to do so, this thesis 
aims to expand the existing knowledge on the concepts of OV and SSD. In 
particular, specific SSD are examined as the potential product of the OV existing in 
the observed Australian airports. In turn, OV is deemed to be potentially generated 
by a number of individual and organisational factors intrinsic to the practices, 
attitudes, and behaviours executed in the explored aerodromes. 
In order to introduce the study of OV and SSD, key concepts stemming from 
the crisis management literature are illustrated in this chapter. Definitions of crisis, 
risk, disruption, safety and security, and vulnerability constitute the conceptual 
foundations of this investigation. Arising from these theoretical concepts, two 
research questions were formulated around specific gaps identified in the relevant 
literature. By addressing such questions, this thesis expects to provide theoretical, as 
well as practical contributions in the fields of crisis management, sociotechnical 
systems’ analysis, and Australian civil aviation. A single case study approach was 
adopted, nurtured by qualitative data collection methods, namely semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, and field observation. 
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All of these concepts are addressed in this introductory chapter, whose 
structure is illustrated in Table 1.1: 
Table 1.1: Structure and Topics of Chapter One 
Section Purpose and Topics 
1.1 Introduction Introduction 
1.2 Research Background and Underlying 
Definitions 
Basic definitions and concepts 
1.3 Research Questions Formulation of the addressed research 
questions 
1.4 Research Significance Illustration of the contributions 
1.5 Overview of the Adopted Methodology Review of the methodology 
1.6 Thesis Outline Snapshot of the research 
1.7 Summary Summary 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND UNDERLYING DEFINITIONS 
The importance of air transportation has been growing steadily over many 
years. Figures from the World Bank (2015) show that the number of carried 
passengers in all airports worldwide has increased from approximately 1.97 billion in 
2005 to around 3.21 billion in 2014 (up 63% in less than 10 years, see Figure 1.1). 
By 2032, the number of carried passengers is expected to rise by 106% (6.63 billion). 
Air transport is currently a major contributor to global economic prosperity, as the 
following figures demonstrate (Air Transport Action Group, 2014). Aviation’s global 
economic impact amounts to 2.4 trillion USD. If aviation were a country, it would 
rank 21st by GDP. The aviation industry supports around 3.4% of global GDP and 
58.1 million jobs worldwide. Forecasts suggest that aviation will produce 5.8 trillion 
USD in economic activity and support around 103 million jobs by 2032. 
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(elaborated from World Bank, 2015) 
 
Figure 1.1: Air Passengers Carried in Worldwide Airports, Trend 
 
The number of passengers transiting via Australian airports has increased 
dramatically, from about 45 million in 2005 to around 68 million in 2014 (up 51% in 
less than 10 years, see Figure 1.2). By 2032, this number is expected to grow by 
nearly 67%, for a total of almost 114 million passengers (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport, 2012). From an economic perspective, the aviation 
sector has a significant impact on Australian GDP, contributing 32 billion AUD 
(2.6% of the national GDP) (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012). Aviation supports 
312,000 jobs in the country, with air transport job productivity per employee 
(measured in terms of gross value added - GVA) significantly higher than that of the 
rest of economy (around 205 AUD/employee vs. 113 AUD/employee) (Deloitte 
Access Economics, 2012). 
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(elaborated from World Bank, 2015) 
 
Figure 1.2: Air Passengers Carried in Australian Airports, Trend 
 
Increasing demand for aviation services exerts remarkable pressure on the 
airport infrastructure. Economic factors are not the only ones influencing the 
relevance of air transportation in the modern world. The social role of civil aviation 
is also crucial in today’s life. Airports are at the heart of this fundamental mode of 
transportation. As highlighted by several sociologists, airports are the core of the 
modern mobility system, which is part of the current culture of societies. 
Globalisation, no-boundary attitude, continuous flow of people and freight, and long-
distance travel for leisure and work seem to be the rule today, rather than the 
exception in people’s mindset (Knox, O'Doherty, Vurdubakis, & Westrup, 2008).  
The importance of airports is witnessed by their classification as critical 
infrastructures (Australian Government, 2009b), or: 
‘…physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered 
unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or 
economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct 
national defence and ensure national security.’ (Australian Government, 2010) 
The operational environment of modern airports is under constant pressure 
from multiple stakeholders, whose interests often conflict. Compliance to safety and 
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security regulations, economic goals, and the time factor coexist in the airport 
context and are managed by different actors, belonging to different organisations. 
Thus, decision-making in airports can be highly improvised and not exclusively 
made in accordance with established regulations. Several factors increase the 
complexity of decision-making in airports (Kirschenbaum et al., 2012). First, there 
are cognitive aspects, such as the different cultural background of the employees, or 
the various preconceptions that workers have about specific occurrences. Second, 
there are structural aspects, such as the multiple organisational levels and 
stakeholders, or the variety of potential external threats to aviation operations. As a 
result, decision-making in airports is found to be largely influenced by the way in 
which actors interpret rules and protocols governing their working environment 
(Kirschenbaum et al., 2012). Decisions made in airports primarily impact the 
organisation that sits at the intersection of the varied interests and groups of players, 
the airport operator. This fundamental aviation actor is in charge of different tasks: 
ensuring safe and secure operations, sustaining aviation business, monitoring the 
environmental impact of airport operations, liaising with governmental agencies in 
charge of regulating civil aviation, etc. Managers (airport management1) and officers 
working for the airport operator are on the frontline in their role as facilitators of, and 
supervisors of, airport activities. Planning and coordination are challenging duties in 
this articulated environment, especially in situations of disturbances to normal 
business operations. Ultimately, airports are complex sociotechnical systems2 where 
human and technical infrastructures, and complex and interdependent groups of 
decision-makers, are in place to ensure safe and secure operations (Kirschenbaum et 
al., 2012). 
A common factor for all airports is that they are vulnerable to operational 
failures, which in turn have the potential to escalate into full crises. A crisis can be 
defined as: 
                                                 
 
1 The present thesis refers to airport operator and airport management as synonyms. 
2 Complex sociotechnical systems are here defined as systems composed by a technology sub-system 
including tools and technology but also the work organization, and a social sub-system, encompassing 
individuals, teams and management. (Carayon et al., 2015). 
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‘…a low probability, high-consequence organizational event that threatens the 
most fundamental goals of an organization.’ (Mitroff, Pauchant, & 
Shrivastava, 1988, p. 84)3 
A crisis can occur at any airport at any time, stem from either internal or 
external sources, be linked to man-made or natural factors, and may result in 
devastating long term consequences. Events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks (2001) 
and Moscow airport terrorist attack (2011), or the SARS (2002-2003) and H1N1 
(2009) health crises directly hit airports or the aviation system at large. Other events, 
such as Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the Japanese earthquake (2011), had an 
indirect impact on airports and aviation in general. All of these occurrences have 
poignantly highlighted the importance and necessity for airports to manage their 
level of vulnerability to operational risks. For the purposes of this investigation, risk 
is defined as: 
‘…a function of the probability of an event occurring and the consequences of 
that event…’ (D. Smith & Elliott, 2006, p. 8)4 
Given the nature of aviation operations, safety and security risks have a 
particular relevance in airports. Extensive literature has been produced in the attempt 
to elaborate agreed definitions for safety and security, in particular, in the field of 
critical infrastructures protection (Avizienis, Laprie, Randell, & Landwehr, 2004; 
Burns, McDermid, & Dobson, 1992; Nolan, 2014; Piètre-Cambacédès & Bouissou, 
2013; Piètre-Cambacédès & Chaudet, 2010; Schoitsch, 2005). In the present thesis, 
the basic definition proposed by Piètre-Cambacédès and Bouissou (2013, p. 111) has 
been adopted. Security refers to ‘…risks originating from, or exacerbated by, 
malicious intent.’ Safety on the contrary refers to ‘…accidental risks (without 
malicious intent)’. 
In recent years, studies on safety and security risks have been multiplying, 
ultimately demonstrating the need for constant progress in theories and practices 
towards the achievement of more safe and secure aeronautical operations. Some 
studies have clearly singled out evident areas for improvement in the network of 
                                                 
 
3 Crisis management literature focuses on the process of managing crises and is extensively discussed 
in Chapter Two of the present thesis. 
4 The conceptual foundations of risk are further discussed in Chapter Two, as they constitute one of 
the fundamental tenets of the present thesis. 
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Australian airports. For example, in the field of safety, Australia’s State Aviation 
Safety Program (Australian Government, 2012a) and the Aviation Safety Regulation 
Review (Australian Government, 2014) have reviewed the current situation of 
aviation safety governance in Australia and elaborated intervention strategies to 
strengthen the safety regime. In the field of security, the so-called Wheeler Review 
(Wheeler, 2005) addressed several weaknesses in the Australian security screening 
model and provided regulatory and practical suggestions to enhance security 
screening provisions (e.g., hardened cockpit doors, introduction of air security 
officers on specific flights, etc.). 
Australia’s track record in aviation accidents or security issues is free from 
major entries in terms of human and financial loss, especially when compared to 
other countries (Australian Government, 2014; Wheeler, 2005). In spite of this, as 
anywhere else in the world, minor, local disruptions do regularly occur that present 
the potential to escalate to larger crises. In the field of safety, examples vary from air 
crashes to accidents involving ground vehicles, bird strikes, technical failures, etc. In 
the field of security, instances include breaches in perimeter fences, sterile area 
violations, prohibited items, etc. The present thesis investigates these commonplace 
disruptions and unveils the ways in which they may incubate, manifest, and develop. 
As a central tenet of this investigation, disruptions to airport operations have been 
defined as follows: 
‘Irregular operations…generated by internal and external factors that often 
cause the system (airport) to significantly deviate from its original plan and 
severely affect its performance.’ (Yu & Qi, 2004) 
Disturbances, events, interruptions, crises, emergencies, and disasters can all be 
considered disruptions, in that they reflect the need for airport organisations to 
deviate from planned business-as-usual operations into a business-not-as-usual state 
(Devine, 2014). Irregular operations is another concept utilised in the literature to 
describe these events, which have the potential to ‘…disrupt normal flight schedules, 
causing problems for airports, airlines, and passengers.’ (Corzine, 2013, p. 4). An 
accurate taxonomy of these types of events is still absent in the literature, which 
seems more prone to providing guidelines and solutions to, rather than classifications 
and descriptions of, these disturbances: ‘Causes of Irregular Operations events can 
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include extreme weather, natural disasters, reduction of airport facility capacity, 
aircraft mechanical problems, labor issues, and others.’ (Nash et al., 2012, p. 10).   
The basic difference among these various concepts refers to their magnitude 
and severity. From a practical perspective, this difference has a significant impact, as 
it shapes the way in which airport organisations react to the disruptive events. 
However, as the present study focuses on the contributing factors for these irregular 
operations, airport organisations’ reactions are secondary and the use of the all-
encompassing term disruptions is justified. 
The present thesis did not consider all possible disruptions occurring to airport 
operations (e.g., economic, financial, etc.), rather only those that involve safety 
and/or security consequences. From the previous definitions, SSD were conceived in 
this investigation as disruptions having safety-related implications (accidental, non-
malicious) or security-related implications (malicious or potentially malicious). 
Three key issues emerged from a review of the literature on safety and security in 
airports. First, Australia enjoys the positive reputation of being a ‘lucky country’ in 
terms of aviation safety and security (Braithwaite, Caves, & Faulkner, 1998). 
Second, safety and security in Australian airports predominantly attract interest of 
governmental reviews aimed to improve existing legislation and practices. This is 
witnessed by the nature and characteristics of governmental documents, such as the 
aforementioned Australia’s State Aviation Safety Program (Australian Government, 
2012a), Aviation Safety Regulation Review (Australian Government, 2014) and 
Wheeler Review (Wheeler, 2005). Third, academic literature lacks comprehensive 
studies addressing the whole spectrum of safety and security events potentially 
occurring in airports. SSD are complex phenomena involving a large range of 
instances, with limited research investigating them in an all-encompassing way 
(Enoma & Allen, 2007; Enoma, Allen, & Enoma, 2009). Complete inventories of 
safety and security incidents in airports are missing in the literature. In general, 
safety and security events are investigated separately, with studies focusing on 
specific issues of airport operations (e.g., aviation safety, wildlife management, 
natural hazards, Workplace Health and Safety, human errors, etc., in the field of 
safety; security screening processes, staff security, criminal activities, terrorism, etc., 
in the field of security). 
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The first objective of this research was therefore the examination of how SSD 
could incubate, manifest, and develop in Australian airports. This investigation 
yielded a classification of SSD providing details on the safety and security risks and 
disruptions typical of airport operations. This task was particularly ambitious; the 
potential number and extent of investigated SSD was significant, especially 
considering the physical and institutional complexity of airports. This taxonomy was 
nonetheless essential to the achievement of the second objective of the present thesis: 
an assessment of OV to SSD in Australian airports. 
An extensive discussion on the concept of organisational vulnerability is 
contained in Chapter Two. At this stage, it is nonetheless worth providing a first, 
operational description of this concept, crucial in the present investigation. In a 
complex sociotechnical system, OV is (Gheorghe & Vamanu, 2004; Kröger & Zio, 
2011): 
‘…the capacity of groups of interacting elements, having an internal structure 
and comprising a unified whole, to be affected by disruptions.’ 
This research focuses on the individual and organisational factors of 
vulnerability, namely the practices, attitudes, and behaviours executed by airport 
organisations, which present the potential to generate SSD. These factors range from 
human to technical (Carayon, 2006; Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007) and characterise airports as complex sociotechnical systems (Bouchon, 2006; 
Camastral, 2014; Devine, 2014). Put simply, this thesis investigates the conditions 
under which airports may be considered responsible for their own misfortune and 
achieve sub-optimal levels of safety and security, or create crises for themselves. In 
order to conduct a holistic assessment of vulnerability factors and to not neglect any 
potential determinant of OV, this thesis adopted an all-encompassing approach to 
analyse airports as sociotechnical systems.  
Due to its suitability with the objectives of this study, this dissertation 
embraced the macroergonomic approach (MeA) as an interpretive lens for the 
research. The MeA is indeed a widely used analytic tool for exploration of complex 
sociotechnical systems’ performance (Carayon, 2006; Carayon et al., 2013; Carayon 
& Smith, 2000; Haro & Kleiner, 2008; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2001, 2002; Kleiner, 
2004, 2008; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; 
Meshkati, 2002b; M. J. Smith, 2002). The MeA singles out the following 
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components (or levels) as determinants of complex work systems’ performance: 
individual, task, tools and technology, environment, and organisation (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). It therefore provides a general 
representation of OV as a sociotechnical phenomenon potentially leading to SSD. 
A clarification of the dynamics and mechanisms that govern OV in airports 
constituted the basis for the third, and last, goal of this research: the production of 
practical suggestions for further improvement of safety and security provisions in 
Australian airports. Intervention strategies intended to limit the impact of OV on 
safety and security performance in airports were recommended as part of a structured 
assessment of vulnerability. These practical solutions for improvement aimed to 
intervene on practices, attitudes, and behaviours enrooted in airport organisations’ 
modus operandi. Despite the large number of organisations involved in airport 
operations, the airport operator in its role as a facilitator of, and supervisor of, 
aviation operations was considered the primary recipient of these suggestions. The 
airport management function of airports is the focus of the present study. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to gain a better understanding of the underexplored 
phenomenon of organisational vulnerability in complex sociotechnical systems 
(Lewis, 1999; McEntire, Gilmore Crocker, & Peters, 2010). In order to do so, this 
research explores the ways in which SSD may incubate, manifest, and develop in 
Australian airports. The theoretical background underlying the present investigation 
can be summarised as follows: 
As complex sociotechnical systems, Australian airports have the potential to 
incubate internal factors of organisational vulnerability stemming from the 
practices, attitudes, and behaviours put in place by airport organisations. 
Organisational vulnerability may in turn potentially lead to the manifestation 
and development of safety and security disruptions, which, in extreme cases, 
can generate major organisational crises. 
OV was investigated in this thesis starting from its consequences. At first, 
potential SSD were explored and classified in order to unveil the ways in which they 
incubate, manifest, and develop in airports. By doing so, this dissertation aims to cast 
light upon the crisis incubation process, whose nature and characteristics are yet to 
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be fully investigated in the literature (D. Smith, 1990b, 2005). The first research 
question addressed in this thesis (RQ1, Study One) revolved around the 
comprehension of the types, nature, characteristics, and relevance of SSD. 
RQ1 (Study One): What are the most common and relevant safety and 
security disruptions to normal business operations in Australian airports? 
The size, complexity, and structure of the explored airports were meant to 
entail heterogeneous types of disruptions. The presence of various subsystems (e.g., 
check-in areas, concourse, retail areas, security checkpoints, boarding gates, etc., for 
Landside operations; and apron, parking bays, taxiways, runways, outside perimeter, 
etc., for Airside operations) was deemed to translate into a significant number and 
variety of disturbances to normal operations. The focus of this research was on daily, 
commonplace disturbances and not on rare, exceptional events. While the latter have 
received extensive attention in the literature, the former still need additional research, 
as emphasised by several authors (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1978; Weick, 1990). 
In addressing RQ1, it was necessary to single out macro-categories of SSD 
around which collected data could aggregate. At that stage, a description of the single 
occurrences was expected to provide an additional series of categories revolving 
around recurring themes in the macro-categories. Extensive coverage of the possible 
safety and security disturbances in the explored airports was therefore achieved and 
preliminary knowledge towards OV investigation gained.  
The second research question (Study Two) was derived from the results of 
Study One and directly addressed the issue of OV, which requires further 
exploration, according to the existing literature (Cardona, 2004; Kraemer, Carayon, 
& Clem, 2009; McEntire, 2001, 2003; Pearson & Clair, 1998). RQ2 was divided into 
two sub-questions aimed at unveiling potential individual and organisational 
determinants of OV (RQ2a), and suggestions for improvement to tackle OV and 
prevent SSD from occurring. 
RQ2a (Study Two): How do individual and organisational factors contribute 
to generating the safety and security disruptions highlighted in Study One and 
increase the level of organisational vulnerability in the explored airports? 
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RQ2b (Study Two): How can the impact of the highlighted individual and 
organisational factors of organisational vulnerability be limited and safety and 
security disruptions be prevented in airports? 
RQ2a was the core of the present investigation. In order to address it, the 
macroergonomic approach was utilised as an interpretive framework (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Collected data were organised around the 
MeA and individual and the organisational determinants of OV underlined. As for 
RQ1, macro-categories of macroergonomic factors were first identified to allow data 
to be combed through and aggregated around recurring themes. The analysis was 
then further polished in order to highlight sub-categories of macroergonomic factors 
and ensure an accurate examination of all the potential antecedents of OV. The MeA 
was therefore tested in the airport environment, which constitutes a premiere in the 
literature. A revised version of this interpretive framework was produced in order to 
address its limitations and pave the way for further macroergonomic research in 
complex sociotechnical systems. Identification of the macroergonomic factors for 
OV was not the only goal underlying RQ2a. These determinants were in fact 
highlighted and re-organised in groups of potential, contributing factors. This 
provided evidence regarding the theoretical stance of the ‘pathways of vulnerability’ 
(Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; D. Smith, 2004, 2005), according to which crisis 
incubation occurs along specific corridors of antecedents that aggregate and escalate 
towards crises’ outburst. 
RQ2b was the last research question in this investigation. It was intended to be 
the first step towards an enhancement of the safety and security systems in the 
explored airports, based on the findings and conclusions of this thesis. This research 
question addressed the practical suggestions for improvement in the areas identified 
as problematic in RQ1 and RQ2a. Either through directly facing the highlighted SSD 
or tackling the factors for OV, these suggestions for improvement were produced to 
provide operational solutions for safety and security in the field of airport 
management. Further empirical and theoretical testing of such solutions is required; 
however, the results proposed by the present thesis constitute a starting point towards 
enhanced safety and security performance in airports. 
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1.4 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
As illustrated in the previous section, the main objective of this thesis was to 
gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that characterise OV as a determinant 
of SSD in airports. The academic literature underlying this investigation stems from 
the major fields of crisis and risk management, and complex sociotechnical systems. 
In particular, the present research studied OV as a stage of the crisis escalation 
model illustrated in the crisis management literature (D. Smith, 2005) by adopting, as 
an interpretive framework, the macroergonomic approach proposed in the complex 
sociotechnical systems theory (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Despite the solid theoretical background that these two research areas provide, 
knowledge gaps have been highlighted in both, which this dissertation addresses. The 
theoretical contribution of this thesis is complemented by its practical relevance, 
derived from the proposed operational solutions to better face OV in airports. Table 
1.2 combines the research questions around which this study revolved with the 
relevant gaps in the literature and the applied strategies for improvement. 
 14 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Table 1.2: Gaps Addressed in the Literature and Contribution of the Present Research 
 Research Question Gap in the literature Contribution by the present research 
 
RQ1 (Study One): What 
are the most common and 
relevant safety and 
security disruptions 
(SSD) to normal business 
operations in Australian 
airports? 
Prior research has highlighted the 
need for further exploration of the 
crisis incubation mechanisms to 
improve crisis prevention and 
mitigation (D. Smith, 1990b, 
2005). Focus on ordinary (and 
not exceptional) events is 
recommended (D. Smith & 
Elliott, 2006). 
Study One of this thesis laid the 
foundations for enhanced 
understanding of crisis incubation 
from an organisational vulnerability 
(OV) perspective. This thesis was 
intended to produce a detailed 
description of commonplace SSD 
occurring in the explored airports. 
 
 
RQ2a (Study Two): How 
do individual and 
organisational factors 
contribute to generating 
the SSD highlighted in 
Study One and increase 
the level of OV in the 
explored airports? 
Literature on sociotechnical 
systems has emphasised the need 
for further research on the 
organisational nature of crises. 
Studies on the interaction 
between human and systemic 
features are deemed to expand 
existing literature (Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Clem, 2009; 
Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1978; Weick, 
1990). Research focusing on 
vulnerability as the key factor for 
crises is expected to complement 
the traditional hazard-dependent 
approach (Lewis, 1999; McEntire 
et al., 2010), especially when 
adopting a holistic perspective 
(Cardona, 2004; McEntire, 2001, 
2003; Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
Study Two of this research adopted 
an organisational perspective in the 
study of vulnerability to SSD by 
examining practices, attitudes, and 
behaviours of airport organisations. 
Individual and organisational factors 
for vulnerability were addressed 
through the all-encompassing lens of 
the macroergonomic approach 
(MeA). In this way, comprehension 
of OV as a potential contributor to 
organisational crises was enhanced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ2b (Study Two): How 
can the impact of the 
highlighted individual 
and organisational factors 
of OV be limited and 
SSD prevented in 
airports? 
In spite of not addressing a 
specific gap in the literature, 
RQ2b integrated comprehension 
of OV by investigating the 
potential for improvement in the 
practices, attitudes and 
behaviours executed by airport 
organisations. 
  
Study Two of the present thesis also 
discussed practical suggestions for 
improvement aimed to: prevent, or 
mitigate the consequences of, the 
SSD underlined in Study One; and 
reduce the impact of the individual 
and organisational factors for OV 
highlighted in the first part of Study 
Two. 
 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE ADOPTED METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative research methodology was chosen to enable investigation of the 
research questions of this thesis. This methodology was primarily selected given the 
exploratory nature of the present study (Babbie, 2013). Qualitative research 
facilitates a better comprehension of little-understood phenomena by recognising 
categories of meaning and producing assumptions for future research (Marshall & 
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Rossman, 2011). Qualitative research is a ‘…broad approach to the study of social 
phenomena…’, which is ‘…pragmatic, interpretive, and grounded in the lived 
experience of people.’ (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, pp. 2-3).  
In this thesis, organisational vulnerability was considered a social phenomenon 
enrooted in the practices, attitudes, and behaviours of airport organisations. This 
exploration had strong pragmatic implications, as it built knowledge from 
participants’ experiences in the context of reference (Australian airports). In 
particular, this investigation focused on three hierarchical levels (leadership, 
corporate management, and operational management) within airport management 
functions in order to provide a holistic overview of participants’ perspectives.5 
Furthermore, interpretation conducted by the researcher was considered crucial in 
reconstructing the meaning that staff members, through their direct exposure in 
airports, bring to OV. This last point in particular justified the adoption of a 
constructivist research paradigm, which argues that explored reality is elaborated by 
actors’ interaction and that the investigator’s role is crucial in making sense of 
complex phenomena (Crotty, 1998). A qualitative research approach was appropriate 
to this thesis’ methodological fit, which was intermediate (Edmondson & Mcmanus, 
2007), in that, adopted concepts were drawn from a relatively young body of 
knowledge (organisational vulnerability in complex sociotechnical systems). Lastly, 
qualitative research methods are the privileged research techniques utilised by 
studies that embrace the macroergonomic approach to complex sociotechnical 
systems, as the present thesis does (Hendrick, 2004b; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002; 
Newman, 2002; Stanton, 2005). 
A case study approach was selected as a research strategy for this investigation. 
The present thesis met the three criteria utilised by Yin (2009) to opt for a case study 
approach. First, the research questions were exploratory and formulated as ‘how’ (as 
well as ‘what’) type questions. In fact, they addressed articulated issues by producing 
hypotheses for future research. Second, the investigator had no direct control on the 
explored phenomena. Third, investigated facts were contemporary or located in the 
immediate past experience of participants. Furthermore, case studies are deemed to 
produce intensive analysis of ‘bounded systems’ (Stake, 2008, p. 120) by 
                                                 
 
5 A fourth level focused on security screening providers/Australian Federal Police was also examined 
for a more complete investigation. 
 16 Chapter 1: Introduction 
emphasising developmental factors with regards to the context (Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
This dissertation considered airports to be bounded systems and investigated OV as 
an evolutionary factor (OV incubates, manifests, and potentially escalates into 
crises), in relation to the context of airport organisations. 
A single case study with an embedded approach (Yin, 2009) was produced as a 
result of the present investigation. One of the reasons for adopting a single case study 
approach was that, in case of multiple cases, the confidentiality of the investigated 
airports could have been hampered by the need to provide enough details about the 
aerodromes. A further reasons for this choice was that the examined organisations 
belonged to a single industry (airport operators within the Australian civil aviation) 
and were therefore considered representative of Australian airports. The embraced 
approach was defined embedded in that three units of analysis (leadership level, 
corporate management level and operational management level6) across three main 
areas of operations (Landside, Landside/Airside, Airside) were investigated. This 
approach was intended to highlight differences in the perspectives and approaches 
adopted by the participants. In particular, understanding of, and meaning around, the 
mechanisms that govern OV in airports were expected to vary according to the units 
of analysis and/or areas of operations to which the participants belonged. 
A purposeful sampling strategy was utilised to select the three data collection 
sites of this research. Three Australian airports, servicing both international and 
domestic passengers, were chosen within the sample subscribing to the Airports of 
the Future research project, of which the present thesis was a component. Purposeful 
sampling enables selection of detailed information around specific cases that in turn, 
enhance a better comprehension of the phenomena under examination (Patton, 2002). 
The airport operators managing the three aerodromes (also referred to as airport 
management) were the focus of the present investigation. Their identity has been 
kept confidential due to the commercial sensitivity of the information. 
Semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and field observation were 
adopted as data collection methods. Purposeful sampling was utilised to select 
respondents in the interviewees and documents to be examined. To do so, a key 
contact was identified within airport management in order to support the researcher 
                                                 
 
6 See note 4. 
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in the sampling process and provide the richest and most relevant information 
sources. For the purpose of completeness, document analysis and field observation 
were used to integrate information predominantly drawn from the semi-structured 
interviews. The research questions around which the present thesis revolved were 
administered simultaneously to the respondents, who were free to probe beyond the 
answers. 
Data analysis was then conducted on Study One and Study Two in order to 
provide a first level of results (macro-categories of SSD, Study One; and macro-
categories of macroergonomic factors for organisational vulnerability, Study Two). 
Analysis was then replicated to provide a second level of results (recurring themes in 
Study One and Study Two). Results from the two studies respectively inform 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five of the present dissertation. 
The validity of this piece of qualitative research was ensured through the 
criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Shenton, 2004). Furthermore, ethical clearance was 
obtained prior to data collection under the supervision of the QUT Human Research 
Ethics Committee, with particular reference to the sensitivity of information 
pertaining to safety and security issues. 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
The present thesis produced an assessment of organisational vulnerability to 
SSD in Australian airports as complex sociotechnical systems. The research is 
illustrated in the following chapters of the present document: 
Chapter One – Introduction illustrates an overview of this thesis by 
highlighting its theoretical background and summarising its key components in terms 
of research questions, significance, and methodology. 
Chapter Two – Literature Review localises the present investigation within 
prior, relevant academic literature to establish the conceptual foundations of this 
study. Discussion provided in this chapter revolves around the crisis escalation 
model and the crisis management literature in order to highlight the theoretical 
research from which this thesis was elaborated. Chapter Two then analyses the 
concept of organisational vulnerability and discusses its conceptual constituents. 
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Chapter Three – Theoretical Framework, Research Questions and Research 
Methodology lays the foundations of the broader theoretical context of this 
investigation, the sociotechnical systems theory. It illustrates the interpretive 
framework utilised to examine the airports and highlight individual and 
organisational determinants of OV, the macroergonomic approach. The research 
questions addressed in the present thesis are underlined and corresponding gaps in 
the literature identified. The chapter is concluded with a detailed description of the 
adopted research methodology, including the research paradigm, strategy, design, 
data collection methods, validity criteria, ethical considerations, and methodological 
limits. 
Chapter Four – Results: Safety and Security Disruptions (RQ1) constitutes an 
illustration of the findings emerging from Study One (RQ1). This chapter casts light 
on the potential safety and security disturbances to normal business operations by 
identifying the most common and relevant, classifying them, and providing a detailed 
description of the ways in which they may incubate, manifest, and develop. 
Chapter Five – Results: Macroergonomic Factors of Organisational 
Vulnerability (RQ2a) and Potential for Improvement (RQ2b) provides a discussion 
of the findings that emerged from Study Two (RQ2a and RQ2b). Collected data are 
organised around the five macroergonomic categories (Individual Factors, Task 
Factors, Tools and Technology Factors, Environment Factors and Organisational 
Factors, RQ2a), described in detail. Practical suggestions for improvement are 
investigated in every category (RQ2b). The chapter concludes with an overview of 
the pathways of vulnerability unveiled in Study Two. 
Chapter Six – Discussion and Conclusion establishes the connections among 
the previous chapters by associating the SSD that emerged from Study One (RQ1) 
with the macroergonomic antecedents and related suggestions for improvement 
highlighted in Study Two (RQ2a and RQ2b). By so doing, this document addresses 
the gaps existing in prior academic literature and expands knowledge of OV in 
complex sociotechnical systems as airports. Several recurring themes are also 
discussed that provide practical suggestions for improvement based on this 
investigation’s results. Limitations and the potential for future research (in other 
Australian and foreign airports and in complex sociotechnical systems other than 
airports) are discussed at the end of the chapter. 
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1.7 SUMMARY 
Contemporary airports are critical infrastructures and complex sociotechnical 
systems that constitute one of the foundations of mass transportation in modern 
societies. Due to their importance and the complexity of their components (e.g., 
technology, governance structure, human performance, etc.), airports seem 
particularly prone to crises. This has led academic research to call for further studies 
focusing on the organisational determinants of crises in modern airports. A need for 
thorough investigations on commonplace SSD occurring in modern airports has been 
particularly emphasised. The present thesis embraces this perspective and aims to 
address gaps in the literature revolving around the concepts of crisis incubation, 
commonplace disruptions in aviation operations, OV, and individual and 
organisational determinants of vulnerability. Thus, two research questions were 
formulated that explore the concepts of SSD (RQ1), OV (RQ2b) and potential for 
improvement in these fields (RQ2b). A qualitative methodology was adopted and a 
case study approach embraced, in order to provide an illustration of the explored 
phenomena that could develop in the typical Australian airport. Semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, and field observation were the elected data collection 
methods. 
As is shown in this introductory chapter, the present thesis embraces a number 
of theoretical stances, whose basic concepts require further clarification. This is 
deemed to lay the theoretical foundations of this research and guide the reader 
through the different chapters of this dissertation. The following chapter reviews the 
relevant literature and provides a detailed description of the bodies of knowledge 
utilised in the present study. In particular, crisis management, risk management, and 
sociotechnical systems theory are illustrated, together with an overview of the 
organisational context under scrutiny, Australian airports. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and 
Theoretical Framework 
‘Tout dans mes œuvres est issu du sentiment de certitude  
que nous appartenons, en fait, à un univers énigmatique.’ 
‘Everything in my work comes from this feeling of certainty 
that we actually belong to an enigmatic universe.’ 
 
RENE MAGRITTE  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter outlines and discusses the theoretical foundations of this 
thesis. Prior academic literature is investigated in order to establish the conceptual 
position of this research along the relevant theoretical continuum. Concepts 
pertaining to the research questions (RQs) illustrated in Chapter One are reviewed 
and defined. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the theoretical and practical gaps 
relevant to the present research and contextualises the theoretical approach taken in 
this study. Three main bodies of literature (crisis management, risk management, and 
sociotechnical systems theory) are introduced in order to define the theoretical 
foundations of this research. In addition, a discussion of the organisational context of 
Australian airports is presented by reviewing their governance models and the most 
relevant stakeholders involved in airport operations.  
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the aforementioned bodies of literature and 
indicates how they are used in this dissertation. 
Table 2.1: Bodies of Literature Reviewed in this Chapter 
Body of literature Topics Purpose Section
Crisis 
Management 
Definitions of crisis and 
crisis management 
To illustrate the organisational 
crisis process and identify the 
focus of the present investigation 
2.2.1 
Crisis 
Management 
Approaches to crisis 
management
To review prior research on crisis 
management
2.2.2 
Risk Management Definitions of risk and 
vulnerability 
To summarise theoretical 
knowledge on the concept of 
vulnerability 
2.3 
Sociotechnical 
Systems Theory 
Macroergonomic 
approach to 
sociotechnical systems 
To define the interpretive 
framework utilised in this thesis 
2.4 
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Crisis, risk, and vulnerability are three fundamental concepts in the present 
investigation and provide the theoretical basis to understanding organisational 
vulnerability (OV) in airports. This chapter clarifies key definitions stemming from 
theories of organisational crises and crisis management literature. In so doing, the 
focus of the present investigation is established on the initial stages of a crisis, the 
crisis incubation phase. The theoretical grounds of vulnerability are then analysed by 
examining how the definition of this concept derives from the notion of risk, 
emphasising the need for an ontological and epistemological reflection on 
vulnerability. Australian airports as sociotechnical systems are the context in which 
the present study was conducted. As a consequence, the sociotechnical systems 
theory provides the interpretive framework of reference for the present thesis. 
Among the different models of sociotechnical systems, the macroergonomic 
approach (MeA) was selected as the most appropriate for the purposes of this study. 
Two research questions were addressed in this thesis, revolving around the concepts 
of SSD (RQ1), organisational vulnerability (RQ2a) and suggestions on how to tackle 
disruptions and vulnerability (RQ2b). 
The structure of the present chapter is illustrated in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Structure and Topics of this Chapter 
Section Sub-section Purpose and Topics 
2.1 Introduction  Introduction 
2.2 Review of the Crisis 
Management Literature 
2.2.1 Organisational Crises Definition of organisational 
crises 
 2.2.2 Crisis Management Definition of crisis 
management 
 2.2.3 Literature Overview Review of literature on crises 
 2.2.4 A Crisis Management 
Perspective 
Illustration of the perspective 
of this study 
2.3 The Concept of 
Vulnerability 
2.3.1 Theory of Risk Definition of risk as a key-
concept in vulnerability 
studies 
 2.3.2 What is Vulnerability? Ontological stance 
 2.3.3 How do we Build our 
Knowledge on Vulnerability? 
Epistemological stance 
 2.3.4 A Synthetic Conceptual 
Stance 
Synthesis of the theoretical 
stance 
 2.3.5 The Manifestation of 
Vulnerability 
Pathways of vulnerability 
2.4 Complex 
Sociotechnical Systems 
Theory 
2.4.1 Exploring Complex 
Sociotechnical Systems 
2.4.2 The Macroergonomic 
Approach 
Theory of sociotechnical 
systems 
Introduction of the 
interpretive framework 
2.5 Australian Airports as 
Sociotechnical Systems 
2.5.1 Structure of Australian 
Airports 
Key aviation definitions 
 2.5.2 Governance of 
Australian Airports 
Key institutions in airports 
 2.5.3 Airport Management 
Functions 
Focus on the airport operator 
2.6 Research Questions 
and Conceptual 
Framework 
2.6.1 Research Questions The addressed RQs 
 2.6.2 Conceptual Framework The adopted conceptual 
stance 
 
2.7 Summary  Summary 
 
2.2 REVIEW OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
In order to understand how organisational crises unfold and what crisis 
managers can do to prevent them from happening or reduce their impact, this section 
focuses on two main research areas: the nature of organisational crises (how do 
crises unfold?) and crisis management practices (what can crisis managers do about 
crises?). After providing basic definitions of these concepts, the present section 
explores several models proposed in the literature to describe organisational crises 
and crisis management. Two models are selected, discussed, and combined in order 
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to provide a comprehensive vision on the stages that characterise modern 
organisational crises and the intervention strategies that crisis managers can 
implement in each of these stages. This provides further clarity on the focus of the 
investigation of the present research, namely the incubation stage of organisational 
crises. 
2.2.1 Organisational Crises 
From a conceptual perspective, academic literature on the notions of 
organisational crisis and crisis management has predominantly striven to provide 
answers to the following questions: 1) What theoretical definition can be provided 
for these two concepts? and 2) By what characteristic stages are they typically 
composed? The theoretical shift from 1) to 2) implies the acknowledgement in the 
literature that organisational crises and crisis management are dynamic processes 
characterised by specific phases or stages (Rosenthal, 2003) and not static concepts. 
Two main elements in the literature are presented in this sub-section: definitions of a 
crisis and the stages in the development of crises. 
Definition of organisational crisis. A key goal of this chapter is to clarify the 
notion of organisational crisis as the theoretical starting point of the present 
investigation. Several authors have proposed a number of nuances of the concept of 
crisis. Table 2.3 summarises the most relevant. 
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Table 2.3: Selected Definitions of Organisational Crisis (Definition Adopted in this Thesis in 
Italics) 
Author(s) Definition of Organisational Crisis 
(Milburn, Schuler, 
& Watman, 1983, 
p. 1144) 
Demand or threat on the organization which either prevents the 
organization from attaining its goals or actually removes or reduces an 
organization’s ability to attain its goals, that the organization seeks to 
resolve because the outcomes at stake are important and the resolution 
strategy is uncertain.  
(Mitroff et al., 
1988, p. 84) 
A low probability, high-consequence organizational event that 
threatens the most fundamental goals of an organization. 
(Rosenthal, Hart, 
& Charles, 1989, p. 
10) 
A serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and 
norms of a social system, which, under time pressure and highly 
uncertain circumstances, necessitates making critical decisions. 
(Shrivastava, 1994, 
p. 237) 
Disruptive situations characterized by urgency of decision, large 
impacts, and system restructuring. 
(Pearson & Clair, 
1998, p. 60) 
A low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the 
organisation and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and 
means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made 
swiftly. 
(D. Smith & 
Elliott, 2006, p. 7) 
A damaging event or series of events that display emergent properties 
which exceed an organisation’s abilities to cope with the task demands 
that it generates and has implications that can affect a considerable 
proportion of the organisations as well as other bodies. 
(Drennan & 
McConnell, 2007, 
p. 2) 
A situation or episode in which different actors and groups seek to 
attribute meaning to a particular set of circumstances which pose 
extraordinary threats to an individual, institution and/or society. 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 
13) 
A threatening condition that requires urgent action. Effective 
emergency action can avoid the escalation of an event into a disaster. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter One, this thesis adopts Pearson and Clair’s definition 
of organisational crisis (1998, p. 60), considered one of the most comprehensive in 
the literature (Crandall, Parnell, & Spillan, 2010). This definition emphasises the 
ambiguity of causes that characterise organisational crises and that constitute a 
central tenet in crisis anticipation, a core element of this study: 
‘A low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the 
organisation and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of 
resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly.’ 
Stages of a crisis. Although exhaustive, the previous definition of crisis does 
not provide details on the ways in which a crisis incubates, manifests, and ceases in 
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modern organisations. In an attempt to define the stages that characterise 
organisational crises, a wealth of studies have proposed different frameworks that 
describe the typical life-cycle of a crisis. These frameworks differ in terms of nature, 
number, and characteristics of the identified stages, but share the ultimate goal of 
providing a comprehensive illustration of the crisis process, as indicated in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Review of Literature of the Stages of a Crisis (Model Adopted in this Thesis in 
Italics) 
Author(s) Stages of a Crisis 
(Turner, 1976, p. 391) Initial Beliefs and Norms, Incubation Period, Precipitating 
Event, Onset, Rescue and Salvage, Full Cultural Readjustment 
(Richardson, 1994, p. 46) Pre-Crisis, Crisis Impact, Recovery 
(Shrivastava, 1994, p. 239) Crisis Preconditions, Accidents, Damage Escalation, Crisis 
(Fink, 1996, p. 17) Prodromal Crisis, Acute Crisis, Chronic Crisis, Crisis 
Resolution 
(Elliott, Smith, & 
McGuinness, 2000, p. 19) 
Pre-Crisis, Crisis Event, Post-Crisis 
(D. Smith, 2005, p. 312) Crisis of Management, Operational Crisis, Crisis of 
Legitimation, Post-Crisis Learning 
 
 
In order to gain better understanding of organisational crises as complex 
phenomena, the crisis escalation model illustrated by Smith (2005) is adopted in this 
thesis.  
Smith’s crisis escalation model. This model constitutes an evolution of the 
framework introduced by Turner (1976) and maintains its core focus on the 
incubation stage of crises. A number of reasons justify the adoption of Smith’s model 
over the other frameworks illustrated in Table 2.4. First, this model has been used in 
the literature to provide an illustration of the typical phases in which an 
organisational crisis develops (De Noni, Orsi, & Pilotti, 2010; Lalonde & Roux-
Dufort, 2010; Lindström, 2012). Second, this model provides a comprehensive 
description of the stages of a crisis, by illustrating them in four phases: crisis of 
management, operational crisis, crisis of legitimation and post-crisis learning. This 
approach fits with the developmental perspective of organisational crises (Jaques, 
2010a) adopted in this thesis and widely accepted in the literature (see, among others, 
Devine, Barnes, Newton, & Goonetilleke, 2013; Elliott et al., 2000; Jaques, 2010a; 
Jaques, 2010b; D. Smith, 2000). In particular, a crisis unleashes from the interplay of 
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specific conditions across the system. The managerial practices executed in modern 
organisations are among these conditions and have the potential to lead to disruptions 
to normal business operations that can escalate into major events. Third, the 
framework presented by Smith emphasises the importance of the crisis of 
management phase, which aggregates the prodromal conditions to the development 
of a crisis and is the central focus of research in the present investigation. Although 
acknowledged in the literature, the relevance of the crisis incubation stage clashes 
with the limited examination it has had so far (Jaques, 2010a; D. Smith, 1990b). 
Fourth, the crisis escalation model directly addresses the importance of how crises 
incubate by focusing on systemic vulnerability (Lalonde & Roux-Dufort, 2010) and 
introducing the concept of pathways of vulnerability7, which has been extensively 
discussed in the literature (Drennan & McConnell, 2007; Jaques, 2010b; Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Lindström, 2012; Renn, 2008; D. Smith, 2004). By so 
doing, this model complements the more traditional approach regarding why crises 
incubate. Pathways of vulnerability are deemed to manifest as corridors leading to 
specific disruptions in normal business operations (De Noni et al., 2010; Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Clem, 2009). This stance is adopted in the present investigation, 
emphasising the importance of casting light not only on crises’ determinants, but also 
on the ways these align and interact.  
According to the crisis escalation model, in the crisis of management stage, a 
set of latent conditions (Reason, 1990) for the generation of organisational crises 
develops through managerial practices. These conditions usually take the form of 
embedded ‘failure pathways’ (D. Smith, 2005, p. 314), which reside in 
organisational processes and procedures. These pathways of vulnerability may stay 
in a dormant state until conditions for failure align (Reason, 1990, 1997) and 
limitations in control mechanisms emerge (D. Smith, 2000, 2005). At this stage, a 
triggering event unleashes the actual crisis. The latent potential for crisis is not 
immediately identifiable, but early signals can be present in organisations that warn 
against the possible escalation of events (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). This phase 
corresponds to the crisis incubation defined by Turner and Pidgeon (1978). 
Managerial functions (e.g., decision-making, oversight, etc.) have a major role in 
                                                 
 
7 See also  D. Smith (2000). 
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crisis incubation, although this is often neglected in the literature (D. Smith, 2005). 
At this initial stage, decisions made at the managerial level create the conditions for 
organisational controls to be by-passed (D. Smith, 1990a, 1990b, 1995). In order to 
better illustrate this model, consider the following, hypothetical situation. In an 
airport, an airline staff member leaves the security doors open behind them. This 
condition, coupled with airport operator’s tacit tolerance, may constitute a latent 
antecedent for an organisational crisis. 
The second stage of the model is called operational crisis and identifies the 
moment where a crisis manifests and becomes evident within the organisation (D. 
Smith, 1990a). At this stage, a triggering event (Pearson & Clair, 1998) usually 
unleashes the potential for the crisis accumulated in the previous stage. Traditionally, 
organisations tend to raise their attention threshold when triggers have manifested 
and the crisis becomes evident (D. Smith, 2005). Thus, extensive effort is put into 
intervention intended to limit the consequences of the unfolding crisis. In the 
aforementioned example of the airport, the operational crisis manifests when a 
malicious individual utilises the open security door to access the security restricted 
area, steal a vehicle on the apron, and drive it onto the main runway. 
The third stage is the crisis of legitimation. In this phase, the crisis becomes 
visible to the external world by attracting media and governmental attention. Fink 
(1996) argued that one of the key characteristics of organisational crises is their 
likelihood to fall under close media and governmental scrutiny. This is deemed to 
jeopardise the company’s reputation and magnify the long-term impact of the crisis. 
Failure to re-secure legitimacy with stakeholders may also push organisations back 
into the operational crisis stage (D. Smith, 2005). In the hypothetical airport context 
described above, an instance of crisis of legitimation unleashes when the malicious 
individual manages to drive their vehicle into an airplane taking off and causes an 
aviation incident. 
In the last stage of the crisis escalation model, organisational reaction to the 
fully emergent crisis is completed. Organisations can put in place post-crisis learning 
and gain a better understanding of the crisis by making sense of the unfolded chain of 
events (Weick, 1990, 1993, 2010; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). Knowledge 
and experience from the past are built into this phase for the organisation to prepare 
for future crises (Elliott & Smith, 1993; Elliott et al., 2000; Van Der Voort & De 
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Bruijn, 2009; Weick, 1993). Post-crisis learning does not always lead to positive 
outcomes for organisations, which may fail to learn from past events. Subsequently, 
conditions for a new crisis to occur are created (Sipika & Smith, 1993; Weick, 1993) 
and the crisis escalation cycle gains new momentum. Post-crisis learning is a mere 
option, as organisations are not always capable of translating their mistakes into 
lessons for the future. An example of a missed opportunity for post-crisis learning is 
the airport operator that, after the aircraft incident described above, continues turning 
a blind eye to airline staff members leaving the security doors open behind them. 
2.2.2 Crisis Management 
In the stance adopted by the present investigation, a crisis is a process 
characterised by a series of stages. As in a living being, a crisis develops through 
specific stages. In each of these stages, crisis managers can implement their 
countermeasures to prevent the crisis from escalating further or reduce its impact 
when this is unavoidable. In order to clarify the role of crisis managers in the face of 
a crisis, two main elements are presented in this sub-section: definitions of crisis 
management and stages in the development of crisis management.  
Definition of crisis management. In management disciplines, organisational 
crises have attracted significant attention by research, with the primary aim of 
reducing the impact of crises on organisations. Crisis management is then an 
umbrella name to indicate the efforts produced by organisations to prevent crises 
from occurring or to limit their impact when they occur. As in the case of 
organisational crises, a wealth of studies have tried to define the notion of crisis 
management. Some of the most relevant definitions are summarised in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5: Selected Definitions of Crisis Management (Definition Adopted in this Thesis in 
Italics) 
Author(s) Definition of Crisis Management 
(Preble, 1997, 
p. 773) 
Attempts to identify and predict areas of potential crises, the development 
of actions and measures designed to prevent crises from occurring or from 
an incident evolving into a crisis, and minimizing the effects or disruption 
from a crisis that could not be prevented. 
(Pearson & 
Clair, 1998, p. 
61) 
Systematic attempt by organisational members with external stakeholders 
to avert crises or to effectively manage those that do occur. 
(Lagadec, 
2007, p. 1) 
The art of dealing with a specific breakdown and/or severe potential 
turbulences in a complex system. 
(UNISDR, 
2009, p. 13) 
Crisis management involves plans and institutional arrangements to engage 
and guide the efforts of government, non-government, voluntary and 
private agencies in comprehensive and coordinated ways to respond to the 
entire spectrum of crisis needs. 
(Crandall et 
al., 2010, p. 2) 
The discipline that aims to trying to keep crises from occurring or to 
mitigating or softening the impact of the crises when they do occur. 
(Herbane, 
2010, p. 979) 
The organisation and coordination of activities in preparation for, and 
response to, events that prevent or impede normal organisational 
operations (thereby threatening its most important goals). 
 
Consistent with the adopted definition of organisational crisis, this research 
embraces the notion of crisis management illustrated by Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 
61): 
‘Systematic attempt by organisational members with external stakeholders to 
avert crises or to effectively manage those that do occur’. 
The focus of this investigation is on the ways in which organisations can avert 
crises. Thus, in the stance adopted by this study, organisational efforts are deemed to 
converge on the earliest stages of a crisis and the initial phases of crisis management 
are considered crucial. 
Stages of crisis management. Similar to the crisis escalation model, crisis 
management is articulated in different stages that researchers have described in 
various ways. Table 2.6 provides an overview of some of the crisis management 
frameworks present in the literature. 
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Table 2.6: Review of Literature on the Stages of Crisis Management (Adopted Model in 
Italics) 
Author(s) Stages of Crisis Management 
(Mitroff et al., 1988, p. 103) Detection (Prevention/Preparation), Damage 
Limitation, Repair (Short and Long Term), 
Assessment 
(Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 53) Signal Detection, Prevention and Preparation, 
Containment and Damage Limitation, Recovery, 
Learning 
(Boin & Hart, 2003, p. 1) Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Reconstruction 
(D. Smith & Elliott, 2006, p. 309) Pre-Event Escalation, Crisis Inflection, Initial Task 
Demands Generated, Secondary Task Demands 
Generated, Final Task, Post-Event 
(Drennan & McConnell, 2007, p. 
31) 
Prevention, Preparedness, Response, 
Recovery/Learning 
(Crandall et al., 2010, p. 8) Landscape Survey, Strategic Planning, Crisis 
Management, Organizational Learning 
 
The present investigation adopts Pearson and Mitroff’s perspective (1993) 
according to which crisis management revolves around the following five stages: 
signal detection, preparation/prevention, containment/damage limitation, recovery, 
and learning. This model is called the five phases of crisis management in the 
literature (Devine, 2014).  
Pearson and Mitroff’s crisis management model. Three main reasons justify 
the adoption of Pearson and Mitroff’s model to describe the stages of crisis 
management. First, this framework is adopted in the literature as a synthetic model to 
describe the individual phases of a crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Elsubbaugh, 
Fildes, & Rose, 2004; Sui Pheng, Ho, & Soon Ann, 1999; Wooten & James, 2008). 
Second, Pearson and Mitroff’s (1993) framework emphasises the importance of the 
signal detection and prevention/preparation stages. This reflects the focus of the 
present investigation on the comprehension of the mechanisms that characterise the 
first stages of a crisis. Signal detection in particular is deemed to be a crucial phase in 
which organisations should identify early warning signals and separate them from 
‘…the barrage of noise which is part of daily business.’ (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 
52). In this way, preconditions for crises’ occurrence can be best understood and 
organisations can elaborate solutions for crisis prevention (Devine et al., 2013). 
Diagnostic efforts by organisations to detect and face crisis determinants are 
concentrated in these early stages of the crisis escalation process (Lalonde & Roux-
Dufort, 2010; D. Smith, 1990a, 2004, 2005). Third, this framework best parallels the 
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crisis escalation model illustrated by Denis Smith (2005), as the stages of both 
models present corresponding elements. A combined overview of both models is 
therefore expected to provide a more complete perspective on crises’ dynamics and 
crisis management intervention strategies.  
A combined approach. Denis Smith’s crisis escalation model (2005) is 
therefore paralleled with Pearson and Mitroff’s Five Phases of Crisis Management 
(1993). The first two stages of Pearson and Mitroff’s framework go under the names 
of signal detection and preparation/prevention and correspond to the crisis of 
management stage in Smith’s model. Signal detection indicates the possibility for 
organisations to capture early signals (D. Smith, 2005) left by impending crises. The 
latent conditions for crisis developing in the crisis of management stage can only be 
detected by organisations that manage to separate them from the looming noise of 
normal business (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). In the aforementioned example of the 
airport security doors left open by airline staff members, signal detection takes place 
when the airport operator notices this complacent behaviour and actively intervenes 
to stop it.  
Preparation/prevention represents organisations’ ability to face crises by 
preventing them from occurring, or at least by containing their immediate 
consequences. This stage parallels the crisis of management phase in Smith’s model. 
However, it also characterises the transition towards the following operational crisis 
phase, as it overlaps the triggering event that unleashes the crisis. Creation of crisis 
teams or crisis training and crisis simulations are examples of practical steps to 
ensure preparation/prevention (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). An airport operator 
installing a magnetic alarm that triggers when security doors are left open is an 
example of a countermeasure adopted at this stage of the crisis management process. 
In the same hypothetical scenario of the intruder accessing the aircraft parking bays 
(triggering event) through the open security door, another example of 
preparation/prevention is the intervention of a security officer trained to stop the 
malicious individual. 
The third phase of crisis management is called containment/damage limitation 
and occurs when the crisis reaches its operational stage. At this point, the crisis is 
evident within the organisational boundaries and involved actors operate in order to 
limit the immediate consequences of the critical event. The primary goal of this stage 
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is to avert crisis contagion or domino-effects (Bouchon, 2006; Lagadec, 2007; 
Lagadec & Rosenthal, 2003) to other parts of the system. Timely action is required in 
this phase and the chronological dimension of decision-making is of utmost 
importance (D. Smith, 1990a). Recalling the hypothetical example of the security 
breach at the airport, containment/damage limitation is performed by the police who 
block the malicious individual just before they manage to drive the stolen car onto 
the runway. 
The fourth stage of the five phases of crisis management model is called 
recovery and parallels the crisis of legitimation stage in the crisis escalation model. 
At this point, the critical event has overtaken the organisational boundaries and 
attracted media attention (D. Smith, 2005). Short and long term recovery from the 
impact of the crises have to be ensured (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). In order to do so, 
minimal operations to recover and conduct business have to be performed. 
Prioritising the most fundamental tasks is a key factor for success in this phase. 
Instant intervention by first response teams following the hijacker running their car 
into an aircraft is a situation of immediate recovery referring to the airport scenario. 
Such an intervention is aimed at restoring acceptable health conditions for the 
involved passengers (short term recovery, first response team) and operability of the 
main runway for the travelling public (medium/long term recovery, fire brigade). 
In the last stage of the crisis management process described by Pearson and 
Mitroff, learning becomes an option for involved organisations at the end of the 
critical event. This phase overlaps the post-crisis learning stage of Smith’s crisis 
escalation model as it addresses the need for organisations to make sense of the past 
events, in order to be crisis-prepared in the future (Mitroff et al., 1988). In the 
example of the airport accident previously illustrated, the airport operator’s reaction 
to the crisis is complete when the hijacker is arrested, passengers are salvaged, and 
damage is contained. Post-crisis learning takes place when the airport operator 
identifies the issue of the security doors left open by staff members and implements a 
countermeasure to prevent this from happening again. Improved supervision of 
airline staff members by the airport operator may also be part of this stage. 
The comparison between the crisis escalation model (D. Smith, 2005) and the 
five phases of crisis management (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) has provided an 
overview of the crisis phenomenon, as well as the activities that organisations 
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execute in order to prevent crises or limit their consequences. This combined 
overview is one of the theoretical contributions of the present research and is 
represented in Table 2.7, which also summarises the illustrative examples utilised in 
this section. 
 
Table 2.7: Crisis Escalation Model and Five Phases of Crisis Management 
Crisis 
Escalation 
Model (D. 
Smith, 2005) 
Hypothetical Airport 
Example 
Five Phases of Crisis 
Management (Pearson 
& Mitroff, 1993) 
Hypothetical 
Airport Example 
Crisis of 
Management 
Flight assistants leave 
external security doors 
open behind them. 
Signal detection The airport operator 
notices the 
complacent habit by 
flight assistants and 
intervenes. 
  
Preparation/prevention An alarm is 
installed that detects 
security doors left 
open. 
Operational 
Crisis 
A malicious individual 
uses the open door to 
access the apron, steal 
a vehicle and drive it 
towards an aircraft 
taking off. 
Containment/damage 
limitation 
The malicious 
individual is 
stopped by the 
police just before 
driving the stolen 
car into an aircraft. 
Crisis of 
Legitimation 
The vehicle hits the 
aircraft on the runway 
and causes a major 
incident. 
Recovery First response team 
and fire brigade 
intervene to save 
involved passengers 
and restore 
runway’s 
operability. 
Post-crisis 
Learning 
Flight assistants 
leaving security doors 
open behind them are 
investigated and 
punished by the airport 
operator. 
Learning Airport operator 
addresses the issue 
of flight assistants 
leaving the security 
doors open behind 
them. 
 
2.2.3 Literature Overview 
Historical background of crisis management literature. As a developmental 
process, an organisational crisis is characterised by a sequence of stages that have the 
potential to lead to catastrophic consequences. However, crisis managers can 
intervene in every phase of a crisis and prevent it from occurring or mitigate its 
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consequences, when unavoidable. In academic research, discussions regarding 
organisational crises and crisis management have been predominantly produced 
within a specific body of literature, crisis management. This body of literature, 
characterised by different schools of thought, is extensively reviewed in the present 
sub-section. 
Interest into the causes of organisational crises and large-scale disasters 
bloomed in the 1980s and 1990s following some major accidents that involved 
complex industrial systems, such as the Seveso disaster (Italy, 1976), Three Mile 
Island accident (USA, 1979), Bhopal disaster (India, 1984) and Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster (Soviet Union, 1986). These events attracted massive attention and polarised 
researchers’ efforts towards possible solutions (D. Smith & Elliott, 2006). Thus, 
specific literature regarding organisational crises began to develop.  
Due to the various approaches adopted in producing crisis research, the crisis 
management body of literature has been described as ‘…ill-defined, resembling a 
hodge-podge quilt of specialist academics…’ (Boin, 2004, p. 175). In order to give 
order to this fragmented scenario, two main streams can be identified within the 
crisis management literature (Herbane, 2010; Sinclair, 2009). The first revolves 
around the concept of reliability and is dominated by the normal accident theory 8 
and the high-reliability theory9. The second focuses on the role of organisations in 
the different phases of the crisis management process (from prevention through to 
recovery and learning) and is characterised by the following approaches: disaster 
recovery planning (DRP), crisis management approach (CMA), and business 
continuity management (BCM). Table 2.8 depicts the two streams of literature 
previously mentioned. The present section is intended to outline the second stream of 
perspectives, within which this research is located. 
                                                 
 
8 The normal accident theory appears in Charles Perrow’s book Normal Accidents (1999). This theory 
affirms that accidents are inevitable due to modern technological systems’ interactive complexity and 
tight coupling. The former refers to the uncertainty deriving from system components’ unanticipated 
and non-linear interaction. The latter indicates a systemic property according to which components 
lack spatial and temporal patterns of buffering. 
9 The high-reliability theory revolves around research conducted at the University of California, 
Berkeley, by a group of academics including La Porte, Rochlin, Roberts, Weick and Consolini 
(Sinclair, 2009). This theory is derived from the normal accident theory’s assumptions and proposes 
proactive measures for organisations to survive crises by increasing their resilience, or ‘…capacity to 
cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back.’ 
(Wildavsky, as cited in Manyena, 2006, p. 437). 
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Table 2.8: Streams of Literature in Crisis Management 
Crisis Management Literature 
Stream 1 
Theories of Reliability 
Stream 2 
Approaches to Crisis Management 
Normal 
Accident 
Theory 
High-reliability 
Theory 
Disaster 
recovery 
planning 
Crisis 
management 
approach 
Business continuity 
management 
 
Disaster recovery planning (DRP). A particular approach that emerged in the 
literature, focused on the post-crisis phase, is the DRP approach (Herbane, Elliott, & 
Swartz, 2004). This perspective is intended to be a reactive model to respond to 
crises and facilitate the after-crisis recovery stage. Natural disasters and IT failures 
are the major focus of research conducted following this approach. Determinants of 
these critical events are perceived as being beyond organisational control, allowing 
researchers and practitioners to concentrate their efforts exclusively on post-event 
interventions. 
In spite of its practical insights and valuable function, the DRP approach has 
received criticism (Elliott, Swartz, & Herbane, 2010). First, its reactive nature limits 
its scope and prevents it from providing organisations with tools for crisis 
prevention. Second, DRP’s focus on technical issues excludes non-technical 
determinants of crises, which are nonetheless typical of complex systems. Third, its 
focus on the recovery stage causes organisations to divert efforts and resources from 
crisis prevention and mitigation, and neglect their role as crucial crisis management 
activities. Following criticism to DRP, calls for a more comprehensive, holistic 
approach to organisational crises began developing in the literature (Pearson & Clair, 
1998). 
Crisis management approach (CMA). Within the broader crisis management 
literature, CMA emerged from the mid-1980s, with 80% of CMA publications 
appearing after 1985 (Pauchant, 1988). As its name illustrates, this perspective 
stresses the importance of addressing all the phases of the crisis escalation model by 
strengthening the activities carried out at each stage of the crisis management process 
(signal detection, preparation/prevention, containment/damage limitation, recovery 
and learning). Compared to the DRP, which basically focuses on the recovery stage 
of crisis management, the CMA adopts a more far-reaching, holistic perspective. 
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Thus, the CMA can be defined as an all-encompassing perspective, rather than a 
focused approach, and tends to be identified with the stream of literature it belongs 
to, crisis management literature. 
The more far-reaching perspective adopted by the CMA is evident when 
compared to the DRP. While the latter focuses on the recovery stage, the CMA 
potentially embraces all stages of the crisis escalation model, from crisis of 
management to post-crisis learning. According to the CMA, organisational crises are 
systemic in nature. Their root causes permeate the whole organisation and cannot be 
limited to technical factors. Thus, the CMA advocates a sociotechnical perspective in 
the analysis of crises, recognising the importance, not only of organisational design 
and strategies, but also of culture and perceptions in the development of crisis 
conditions (Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney, & Pearson, 1989).  
The CMA has been defined as a strategic activity (Mitroff et al., 1989). Indeed, 
it embeds the development of capabilities to cope with crises into long-term 
organisational goals, following the idea that organisations ‘…are simultaneously 
systems of production and of destruction…’ (Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miglani, 
1988, p. 297) and crises affect key organisational goals. Unlike the DRP, the CMA 
takes a proactive perspective, as it acknowledges the chance to prevent a crisis from 
occurring or at least to mitigate its impacts, once triggered. The CMA encompasses 
all of the crisis escalation and management stages in an attempt to plan and 
implement solutions to prevent crises from cascading into worse consequences. 
Positive elements have been associated with the CMA in the literature. In 
particular, its holistic value, practical approach, and rational perspective on crises 
have been acknowledged as important steps forward (Sinclair, 2009). However, some 
of the CMA’s key elements have been identified as potential limitations and 
therefore criticised. The rational perspective adopted by the CMA limits the scope of 
its validity to expected events. In fact, rational planning seems inappropriate when 
used to face the complexity and uncertainty that characterise crises incubating in 
modern organisations (Boin & Hart, 2003; Dayton et al., 2004; Lagadec, 2007). 
Learning from past experiences enables crisis managers to plan for future events 
when these follow the same escalation process as the known ones. However, 
empirical observation shows that modern catastrophes are enrooted in unnoticed 
details, unexpected events, and unforeseeable circumstances (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
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2007). As a consequence, ‘…text-book techniques and tools…’ (Sinclair, 2009, p. 27) 
typical of the CMA become inappropriate and fail in their goal of anticipating causes 
of future crises.  
Business continuity management (BCM). In order to go beyond the CMA’s 
limits, researchers and practitioners have acknowledged the need for ‘outside the box 
crisis management’ (Lagadec, 2007, p. 4) and new approaches to broaden the scope 
of anticipatory planning (Lagadec & Rosenthal, 2003). The September 11 terrorist 
attacks in particular highlighted the importance of dealing with unexpected events 
and new threats (Herbane, 2010; Lagadec & Rosenthal, 2003; Rosenthal, 2003; D. 
Smith & Elliott, 2006). After that event, the conventional wisdoms of the CMA 
needed to be revised from both a safety and a security perspective. The BCM 
perspective evolved to respond to such instances, although a neat distinction between 
the CMA and the BCM may not be easy to draw (Herbane et al., 2004).  
Both the DRP and the CMA can be considered antecedents of the BCM. The 
former shares its origins in the IT management area with the BCM, while the CMA 
has established the BCM’s basic assumptions (e.g., centrality of the crisis incubation 
and prevention stages, sociotechnical approach, holistic perspective, etc.) (Herbane, 
2010; Sinclair, 2009). The basic difference between the DRP and the BCM lies in the 
emphasis they place on the stages of a crisis (Herbane et al., 2004). As previously 
discussed, the DRP focuses on the recovery phase (post-crisis), whereas the BCM 
and the CMA emphasise the centrality of the crisis incubation and prevention stages 
(pre-crisis).  
Historically, the BCM has burgeoned from CMA literature. It has addressed 
the need within crisis management literature for improved mitigation strategies 
aimed to guarantee business operations in situations of crisis. Indeed, authors have 
emphasised the need for crisis management theory and practice to better balance 
crisis prevention with resilience (Sinclair, 2009). In the framework of the CMA, the 
BCM has a specific focus on organisational resilience10 (Drennan & McConnell, 
2007; Elliott et al., 2010; Herbane, 2010; Sinclair, 2009). The BCM is a proactive, 
holistic approach to ensure organisational functionality in a situation of crisis. Its 
conceptualisation has reached relevant maturity, to the point that the BCM is today 
                                                 
 
10 See note 8. 
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established as an international standard, under the aegis of an international regulatory 
body, the International Organisation for Standardisation - ISO (Estall, 2012; ISO, 
2012).  
Similar to the CMA, the BCM adopts a sociotechnical perspective to crises, 
stressing the importance of organisational culture, managerial perceptions, and 
governance structure in the crisis incubation process. In this way, the BCM 
emphasises that not only external, but also internal threats in organisations play an 
important role in crisis development (Drennan & McConnell, 2007). The perspective 
adopted by the BCM is proactive, multidisciplinary, and focused on both soft and 
hard skills. Furthermore, the importance of stakeholders as key players in ensuring 
the continuity of businesses is acknowledged with particular emphasis in the BCM 
literature (Sinclair, 2009). The holistic approach embraced by the BCM advocates an 
organisation-wide perspective for the identification of causes, preparation, and 
response to crises (Elliott et al., 2010). 
When considered altogether, the DRP, CMA, and BCM represent three 
approaches within crisis management literature that share several commonalities, but 
have also relevant differences. Table 2.9 summarises these. 
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Table 2.9: Approaches to Crisis Management 
Approaches to Crisis Management 
 
 
Focus Areas 
Disaster Recovery 
Planning 
Crisis Management 
Approach 
Business Continuity 
Management 
    
Concept of accidents Exceptional Normal Normal 
    
Approach to crises Reactive Proactive Proactive 
    
Critical stages in the 
crisis escalation 
cycle 
Recovery Whole crisis 
escalation cycle 
Whole crisis escalation 
cycle 
    
Strategies in crisis 
management 
Recovery Anticipation Resilience 
    
Organisational 
focus 
IT Organisation-wide Organisation-wide 
    
Nature of threats External, technical Internal and 
external, 
sociotechnical 
Internal and external, 
sociotechnical 
    
Asset protection 
priority 
Hard assets Hard and soft assets Hard and soft assets 
    
Focus of 
intervention 
Expected events 
(recovery planning) 
Expected events 
(planning for all 
crisis stages with a 
focus on prevention) 
Unexpected events 
(planning for 
continuity) 
(elaborated from Herbane et al., 2004; Sinclair, 2009) 
 
 
Similarities in the crisis management approach and business continuity 
management translate into a number of practical assumptions that shape how these 
two perspectives conceive the crisis escalation cycle, and in particular, the concept of 
disruption as defined in Chapter One (Drennan & McConnell, 2007; Elliott et al., 
2010; Herbane et al., 2004; Sinclair, 2009). 
 Organisational crises are normal events generated by disruptions in normal 
business operations; 
 Disruptions do not necessarily result in crises, if managed properly; 
 Organisations can incubate conditions for the development of disruptions; 
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 Disruptions can have social, as well as technical features (sociotechnical 
approach); 
 The nature of disruptions is systemic in that they involve the whole complex 
system. Thus, organisations must face disruptions in a systemic way; 
 Managers have the potential to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from disruptions; 
 Not only the core business, but also the broader stakeholder network can be 
impacted by disruptions. 
In synthesis, the CMA and the BCM perspective share common views on 
organisational crises. Similarities between the two approaches have led researchers to 
utilise crisis management and continuity management interchangeably (Herbane et 
al., 2004). The present thesis recognises that the BCM constitutes an evolution of the 
traditional CMA with a focus on resilience. Conversely, the CMA stresses the 
importance of crisis anticipation and prevention. The common conceptual 
background shared by the CMA and the BCM constitutes the theoretical habitat in 
which the present investigation developed.  
In particular, this thesis considers safety and security disruptions (SSD) to be 
normal events and adopts a proactive approach to crises that revolves around the 
whole crisis escalation process. The focus of this investigation is on the airport 
organisation in its entirety and threats to safety and security are considered from a 
sociotechnical viewpoint. Anticipation and crisis prevention are utilised as 
preferential crisis management strategies, whose focus is on expected events 
(although potential, e.g., SSD). 
2.2.4  Crisis Management Perspective 
The theoretical foundations of this investigation are enrooted in the definitions 
of organisational crisis and crisis management. These concepts stem from the 
relevant literature on crisis management, which is dominated by three perspectives: 
disaster recovery planning, crisis management approach, and business continuity 
management. These three outlooks provide the conceptual framework of reference 
for the present thesis. The concepts of organisational crisis and crisis management 
need to be summarised and operationalised in order for this dissertation to offer a 
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practical contribution into the study of organisational vulnerability (OV) in 
Australian airports. 
This thesis adopts a crisis management perspective to study OV to potential 
safety and security disruptions (SSD) in sociotechnical systems such as airports. 
From a practical viewpoint, modern organisations tend to consider crisis 
management practices from the perspective of the BCM and contingency planning 
approaches to face different crisis scenarios (Elliott et al., 2010). In spite of BCM’s 
value in ensuring business continuity, and in a situation of crisis, the literature (in 
particular the work of Denis Smith) has highlighted an important limitation intrinsic 
to the BCM approach: it does not prevent crises from occurring (D. Smith, 1990b, 
2005). The focus of the BCM is indeed more on planning for continuity than on 
crisis incubation. For this reason, the academic literature has acknowledged that 
crisis management as a practice and theory should move away from a contingency-
based approach and further concentrate on the crisis of management stage of the 
crisis escalation model (D. Smith, 2005). At this stage, signal detection and 
preparation/prevention are crucial activities for anticipating crises or limiting their 
impact (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). In their seminal work, Turner and Pidgeon (1978) 
highlighted how organisations can internally incubate crisis conditions as a by-
product of routine managerial processes. In organisations, management is therefore a 
key factor in creating the resident pathogens (Reason, 1987) that can bypass the 
existing organisational defences. Thus, managers should first acknowledge the limits 
inherent to their organisations in order to prevent crises (D. Smith, 2005). 
Other important gaps need to be filled in the crisis management literature. 
Research focusing on root-causes of modern crises has predominantly revolved 
around extreme events that attracted massive attention from the media and civil 
society. Examples of these ‘post-hoc crisis evaluations’ (D. Smith & Elliott, 2006, p. 
101) include investigations exploring sensational organisational disasters, such as the 
already mentioned disasters of Seveso (De Marchi & Ravetz, 1999), Three Mile 
Island (Hopkins, 2001), Bhopal (Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987; Weick, 
2010) and Chernobyl (Pidgeon, 1991; Reason, 2000), as well as the space shuttle 
Challenger disaster (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Vaughan, 1989, 2009), the Exxon 
Valdez disaster (Harrald, Marcus, & Wallace, 1990), Hurricane Katrina (Banipal, 
2006; Gutmann, Daniels, Kettl, & Kunreuther, 2011) or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 43 
(Chomsky, 2011; Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Halliday, 2002). These crises had 
relevant impacts in terms of human and economic losses. However, they can be 
considered rare events and crisis prevention frameworks built on these unlikely 
catastrophes raise concerns regarding predictive validity (D. Smith & Elliott, 2006).  
Focus on normal adverse events. Normal adverse events could potentially not 
be suitable for analysis based on such frameworks. In particular, the mechanisms 
through which commonplace disturbances escalate into major events remain unclear. 
The turning point where critical events have the potential to lead to large-scale 
disruptions has been defined in the literature as the ‘point of inflection’ (Handy, 
1994, p. 77) or ‘tipping point’ (Gladwell, 2000), a concept further elaborated as 
‘managing ahead of the curve’ (D. Smith & Elliott, 2006, p. 309). Managing ahead 
of the curve refers to the point in the crisis incubation process where a common 
disruption may be either brought back under control or escalate further into a major 
crisis. Retrospective academic research on organisational crises has traditionally 
revolved around exceptional events in which the full crisis is generated, not 
completely clarifying the ways in which this happens (Lalonde & Roux-Dufort, 
2010). This approach to the concept of crisis stems from the dichotomy between a 
crisis as an event and a crisis as a process (Lalonde & Roux-Dufort, 2010), in which 
‘more regular fragilities’ intrinsic to modern organisations should be taken into 
account (Pearson, Roux-Dufort, & Clair, 2007, p. 225). Therefore, researchers in 
crisis management have advocated for further studies on the incubation phase of 
more common disruptions potentially leading to major crises (Lalonde & Roux-
Dufort, 2010; D. Smith & Elliott, 2006). Similarly, but from a different perspective, 
scholars in the field of resilience engineering (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2007; 
Lay, Branlat, & Woods, 2015; Wilke, Majumdar, & Ochieng, 2015) have proposed 
to further investigate ‘what went right’ (Safety II) besides ‘what went wrong’ (Safety 
I) (Hollnagel et al., 2007, p. 382), further stressing the need to examine 
commonplace events. The present investigation aims at providing additional 
knowledge on commonplace disruptions by exploring the concept of OV. 
Exploring organisational vulnerability. In theory and practice, OV is deemed 
to be an important subject for investigation in risk management, as it involves any 
organisation dealing with some form of risk. In the literature, OV is acknowledged as 
a key factor in crisis incubation (Turner & Pidgeon, 1978) and indicates the 
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propensity of modern organisations to develop conditions for disruption. OV can be 
conceived as a dynamic pattern (Goldspink, Kay, & Hills, 2010), whose determinants 
have been studied in the literature in an attempt to produce ‘lists of contributory 
failures’ (Shrivastava, 1994, p. 238) and in practice, improve risk management 
provisions within organisations.  
OV implies that systemic disruptions are triggered in modern organisations: 
internally by the technological, human, and organisational context of reference; 
externally by environmental influences (Shrivastava, 1994). Thus, vulnerability is 
inherently produced by organisations and is a crucial element in crisis incubation. 
Calls for re-examination of the concept of vulnerability as the key causal factor of 
crises (Lewis, 1999) and for renewing understanding of crises, based on vulnerability 
analysis, have recently multiplied (McEntire et al., 2010). Furthermore, literature 
related to crisis management has increasingly been criticised for not considering the 
roles of human interaction with system components and the organisational context of 
crises (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1978; Weick, 1990). These 
interactions among the components of the airport system are one of the core targets 
of the present investigation. 
Based on the assumptions previously discussed, a more complete definition of 
OV than the one provided in Chapter One, is as follows: 
'Result of flawed organisational policies and individual practices whose 
origins are deeply rooted within early design assumptions and managerial 
decisions' (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009, p. 510).  
Flawed individual practices and inappropriate organisational policies may lead 
to disruptions, functional failures, or incapacitation when exposed to a hazard or 
threat (Kröger & Zio, 2011). In order to account for the variety of factors impacting 
on OV, a sociotechnical approach is deemed to be an adequate tool to grasp the 
relevance of the individual and organisational factors of vulnerability aside from the 
technical ones. As mentioned before, the crisis management perspective advocates a 
sociotechnical approach in the study of determinants of organisational crises (Mitroff 
et al., 1989).  
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The literature review on crisis management conducted in this section has 
emphasised three key elements that constitute the theoretical foundations of the 
present research: 
 The focus on pre-crisis stages, in particular crisis incubation, should be 
enhanced in the literature and practice of crisis management; 
 Further attention should be paid to commonplace crisis prevention, rather 
than to the study of exceptional crises; 
 OV is a key feature in crisis incubation.  
This research adopts a crisis management perspective on the study of how OV 
has the potential to generate SSD, which can in turn lead to organisational crises. 
This perspective focuses on the crisis of management stage of the crisis escalation 
model (D. Smith, 2005) and examines practical ways to improve signal detection and 
prevention within the crisis management phases (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). 
Furthermore, the approach embraced by this investigation is considered to be best 
suitable for exploration of common business interruptions (e.g., SSD). These 
disruptions are deemed to be the potential  result of OV generated by individual and 
organisational factors in airports, which can be best analysed by utilising a 
sociotechnical perspective (Mitroff et al., 1989).  
Embedded in the crisis management literature, this thesis is expected to expand 
knowledge on crisis management by: 
 Adopting a proactive attitude vis-à-vis organisational crises, which are 
deemed to be possibly prevented or at least mitigated; 
 Primarily focusing on the crisis of management phase of the crisis escalation 
model; 
 Utilising anticipation and prevention as elected crisis management 
techniques; 
 Focusing on sociotechnical factors for crisis incubation internal to the 
explored organisations (airports); 
 Investigating expected events and building up knowledge by learning from 
past experiences (focus on certainty). 
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In order to build a conceptual framework for the exploration of OV, a more 
operational definition of this notion is needed. To do so, the next section puts the 
adjective organisational aside and focuses on vulnerability as a concept, by retracing 
its theoretical components, from both an ontological and an epistemological 
perspective. The purpose of the following section is to answer the following 
questions:  
 Ontological stance: What is vulnerability? 
 Epistemological stance: How do we build our knowledge about vulnerability? 
2.3 THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY 
This thesis embraces a crisis management perspective and focuses on the 
preliminary phases of a crisis, where latent conditions may develop in organisations 
that increase the chances for major disruptions to occur. The present section 
addresses the key concept investigated in this thesis, the notion of organisational 
vulnerability (OV), from both an ontological and an epistemological perspective. 
Illustrating the concept of vulnerability from an ontological perspective entails a 
reflection on its intrinsic nature and characteristics. This is expected to provide an 
answer to the question: What is vulnerability? Similarly, examining vulnerability 
from an epistemological perspective involves a discussion on the ways in which 
knowledge around this concept can be created by researchers. This is meant to 
address the question: How do we build our knowledge about vulnerability? Before 
focusing on the previous questions, the following sub-section contains a reflection on 
the theory of risk as the founding context for the notion of vulnerability. 
2.3.1 Theory of Risk 
Definition of risk. The concept of vulnerability is enrooted in risk management 
literature. An explanation of the theoretical foundations of the concept of risk is 
therefore essential to establish the working context adopted in the present research. 
The etymology of the term risk is highly uncertain. One of the most agreed traditions 
dates back to the classical Greek word ρίζα (riza), which means ‘root, stone, cut of 
the firm land’. According to this lesson, risk would therefore derive from a nautical 
expression indicating something to avoid while in the sea (Harper Jr & Templeton, 
2005).  
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The word risk currently has a variety of meanings in many languages (Latin: 
resicum/risicum; Italian: rischio; French: risque; Spanish: riesgo; etc.), which all 
make reference to a potentially dangerous situation. The concept of risk has been 
used in different manners and contexts (finance, management, social sciences, 
ecology, etc.) and many different meanings have been provided to identify it (Renn, 
2010; Shrivastava, 1995). When confronted with such a wealth of nuances, most 
authors take the definition of risk for granted. The notion of risk has become so 
familiar in both theory and practice, that ‘…its conceptual underpinnings have been 
lost to conscious scrutiny.’ (Heyman, 2010, p. 17).  
From a theoretical perspective, a key dilemma is highlighted in the literature on 
risk management (T. Aven, 2010; Terje Aven, Renn, & Rosa, 2011). ‘Is risk an 
objective, scientifically knowable entity?’ or ‘Is it a subjective, socially constructed 
concept?’ In other words, ‘Is risk a natural phenomenon, ontologically identifiable?’ 
or ‘Is it an interpretive phenomenon, only definable by means of epistemology?’ 
Scientific research traditionally faces this dilemma (Babbie, 2013), which stems from 
the debate opposing ontological realism and social constructivism (Marechal, 2010). 
According to the former, reality exists regardless of human perceptions as a state of 
the world. Risk is therefore an objective entity. On the contrary, according to the 
latter, reality is socially constructed and entirely depends on people’s perceptions. 
Consequentially, risk exists only because people perceive it. 
In order to clarify this dichotomy, it is useful to analyse two basic definitions 
of risk and see what their main conceptual components are. Rosa (2003, p. 47) 
defines risk as:  
‘...a situation or event where something of human value (including humans 
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain’.  
Similarly, the International Risk Governance Council (Renn, 2008, p. 3) 
suggests that risk can be defined as:  
‘...an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to 
something that humans value’.  
Two crucial concepts are emphasised in these definitions: 1) uncertainty of 
events or consequences; and 2) human values at stake (Terje Aven et al., 2011). 
These two notions shape the definition of risk. For example, driving a car at 150 
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km/h on a highly congested highway increases the chances for the driver to incur a 
fatal accident. In this situation, the uncertainty of events is represented by the fatal 
accident and human values at stake are identified with the driver’s health and safety. 
The previous assumptions raise the following conceptual question: ‘To what 
extent does risk exist independently from an assessor’s perceptions?’ In the example 
of the car crash, the event fatal accident can be described as a state of the world 
(Terje Aven et al., 2011), as it exists regardless of an individual’s perceptions. The 
idea of uncertainty itself can be considered as ontologically determined and not 
individually constructed, as no one would deny that future events and consequences 
are unknown, regardless of an assessor’s judgement. As a consequence, risk as an 
expression of uncertainty regarding events, without judgments, can be conceived as 
an ontological reality (Terje Aven et al., 2011). 
A number of definitions of risk provided in the literature also involve the 
concept of probability, considered either as a quantitative calculus (frequentist 
probability), or as a qualitative judgement (subjective probability) (Ale, 2002). 
Recalling the example of the driver on the jammed highway, the frequentist 
probability of having a fatal accident in similar conditions is determined by statistical 
calculus, while the subjective probability is given by the driver’s perception about 
the likelihood that they will experience a crash. Either way, it is clear that 
considering the probabilistic side of the concept of risk adds a judgemental aspect to 
its ontological nature. The perceptions of the assessor (the driver) come into play to 
determine the way in which knowledge of the concept of risk is constructed. 
Uncertainty is an ontological reality, which becomes an object of assessment when 
considered a probability. In this sense, uncertainty and probability are two sides of 
the same token (see Figure 2.1). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Concept of Risk and its Relation to Uncertainty and Probability 
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As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the process leading from uncertainty to probability 
is driven by the elaboration of knowledge (social constructivism11), which is possible 
through considering individuals’ perceptions, together with objective reality. 
Although eminently theoretical, the previous line of reasoning has important 
practical implications for the present thesis: it paves the way to the definition of risk-
related activities (‘what can we do about risk?’). Risk can be conceived as a state of 
the world (uncertainty), which can be operationalised by introducing some sort of 
individual judgement (probability). The operationalisation of risk is the theoretical 
basis for activities aimed at exploring and understanding it and comes under the 
umbrella name of risk analysis (Yoe, 2012). Risk has to be described (risk 
assessment), communicated (risk communication), and treated (risk management) in 
a pathway that progressively adds cognitive features to the initial ontological 
definition.  
Risk assessment. Basic risk assessment describes risk as the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an event entailing a range of consequences. The quasi-equation 
expressing this relation is the following (Talbot & Jakeman, 2011): 
Risk = Probability x Consequences (A) 
This quasi-equation constitutes a basic tenet in risk assessment. The 
multiplication symbol does not refer to a mathematical, quantitative combination of 
terms, but rather to a quali-quantitative combination of probability and 
consequences. This explains the use of quasi-equation (Talbot & Jakeman, 2011). 
Similar to (A), other quasi-equations express risk by using different 
parameters, such as: 
Risk = Threat x Harm (B) 
(B) uses the concepts of threat, which indicates a measurement (semi-
quantitative or qualitative) of the level of likelihood, and of harm, which identifies 
the impact resulting from the given threat (Talbot & Jakeman, 2011). The complexity 
of the concept of risk is witnessed by the numerous examples of contextual 
expressions similar to (A) and (B) with which academic literature abounds (Agrawal, 
                                                 
 
11 See Costantino (2008) for further details on this. 
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2009; T. Aven, 2012; Gibson et al., 2006; ISO, 2009; Talbot & Jakeman, 2011; Yoe, 
2012). 
The examination of (A) and (B) is intended to help conceptualise two basic 
elements in risk analysis: risk agent and risk absorbing system (T. Aven & Renn, 
2009).  
Risk agent. A common trait that characterises the definitions of risk examined 
thus far is that they consider probability and consequences from an external 
perspective. Risk is defined by the probability of the occurrence of consequences 
caused by an external agent to a specific entity. According to this, the risk agent (the 
entity that directly causes the negative outcome in the affected subject) has a 
fundamental role in the determination of the overall risk for a given subject. In the 
case of a terrorist attack, the risk agent can be a hijacker or an arsonist. In the case of 
a natural disaster, it can be a tornado or an earthquake. In the case of an 
organisational disaster, it can be faulty technology or a careless employee, etc. In 
spite of its relevance in the determination of the overall level of risk, the risk agent is 
not the only factor to be considered. An important role is also played by the subject 
that undergoes the risk (or the negative outcome directly caused by the risk agent). 
Risk absorbing system. The risk absorbing system (T. Aven & Renn, 2009) 
can possibly limit the impact of a risk agent by reducing the probability of 
occurrence, or by containing the severity of consequences. Conversely, it can also be 
designed or managed in a way that increases the chances for an accident or attack to 
occur. In the case of a terrorist attack, the risk absorbing system could be the design 
or operation of an airport or a train station, which could reduce risks by enabling 
defensive tools, or increase them by inappropriately managing these defences. In the 
case of a natural disaster, the risk absorbing system could be a city or an entire 
region, which by design or nature could decrease the severity of an earthquake due to 
its engineered infrastructures. Alternatively, the risk absorbing system could increase 
the severity of the natural event due to its lack of adequate infrastructures. In the case 
of an organisational disaster, the risk absorbing system could be the organisation 
itself, which could properly train its employees to reduce the likelihood of accidents, 
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or vice versa increase such likelihood, by merely not providing any training to their 
staff.12  
After having defined some basics concepts in the risk management literature, 
namely risk, risk agent, and risk absorbing system, a conceptual illustration of 
vulnerability is now possible from both an ontological (What is vulnerability?) and 
an epistemological (How do we build our knowledge about vulnerability?) 
perspective. These topics are addressed in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.2 What is Vulnerability? 
 Definition of vulnerability. This sub-section explores the conceptual tenets 
underlying the study of vulnerability. The present research built the definition of 
vulnerability based on two fundamental concepts drawn from the risk management 
literature: risk agent and risk absorbing system.  
Any risk absorbing system has a given degree of vulnerability that indicates the 
extent to which the system reacts to the stress induced by the risk agent (T. Aven & 
Renn, 2009). In the case of high-vulnerability systems, the stress produced by the 
risk agent is amplified by the risk absorbing system. Characteristics of the latter 
increase the likelihood for the adverse event to occur (probability) or make its impact 
more detrimental (consequences). In the case of low-vulnerability systems, the stress 
produced by the risk agent is muffled by the risk absorbing system. Characteristics of 
the latter decrease the probability for the adverse event to occur or make its 
consequences less serious. 
(A) can now be expressed as follows: 
Risk = Probability x Consequences x Vulnerability (C) 
All parameters in (C) are directly proportional to the overall level of risk and 
can be illustrated as in Figure 2.2:  
 
 
                                                 
 
12 Despite the use of the term risk absorbing systems (T. Aven & Renn, 2009) it would probably be 
more appropriate to refer to these as risk undergoing systems, as they are not always designed or 
operated to effectively absorb risks (in the sense of deflecting or mitigating risks). As the previous 
examples illustrated, the very nature and design of these systems could actually magnify the 
likelihood and consequences of risks and be a catalyst for risk agents. 
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Figure 2.2: An Illustration of Risk and Vulnerability 
 
Etymologically, vulnerability derives from Latin vulnus (wound) and indicates 
the propensity of a subject to be wounded. Historically, researchers’ interest in the 
concept of vulnerability began rising in the area of disaster management, a field of 
study parallel to the crisis management literature. Investigations into vulnerability 
burgeoned in an attempt to respond to the traditional hazard-centric approach13 to 
disasters (Bouchon, 2006). This approach reflects the conventional view on the 
concept of risk, as described by the dichotomy of risk agent – risk absorbing system. 
The hazard-centric approach exclusively focuses its analysis on the risk agent and 
contends that disasters are determined by an external entity enabling a particular 
hazard (McEntire et al., 2010). From this, the activity of preventing, preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from disasters is uniquely focused on the risk agent 
(external hazard). The inherent characteristics of the risk absorbing system are 
disregarded.  
The hazard-centric approach shows some evident limitations. In fact, empirical 
observation of disasters highlights that hazards are not the only element to take into 
account in the case of calamitous events. Even low intensity hazards have the 
potential to unchain major consequences. Conversely, high intensity hazards can 
have negligible impacts. An explanation of such an apparent contradiction resides in 
the nature of the risk absorbing system. Indeed, the magnitude of a disaster is also 
determined by inherent characteristics of the subject threatened by a specific hazard, 
in a word, by its vulnerability (Bouchon, 2006). The relevance of the concept of 
vulnerability is then extended to the broad crisis management literature as one of its 
                                                 
 
13 The concept of hazard can be considered a synonym of threat and refers to ‘something that has the 
potential to impact an asset adversely if not controlled or if deliberately released or applied’ (Talbot 
& Jakeman, 2011, p. 306). 
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central tenets, and the vulnerability approach is acknowledged as an evolution of the 
hazard-centric approach (Bouchon, 2006). 
The example depicted in Table 2.10 is presented to illustrate the differences 
existing between the hazard-centric and vulnerability approaches in the crisis 
management literature. 
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Table 2.10: Hazard-Centric Approach vs Vulnerability Approach in Crisis Management 
A Terrorist Attack in an International Airport (hypothetical scenario) 
 
An important international airport is attacked by a group of armed terrorists, driven by 
political motivations. Once in the hub, the armed terrorists threaten passengers and staff and 
ask to speak to politicians in order to obtain favours. The terrorists manage to isolate the 
airport and start negotiating with the authorities by means of cell phones. During the 
negotiations, police Special Forces intervene and manage to arrest the terrorists with no 
casualties and only minor injuries. After the crisis is contained, government analysts are 
asked to examine how such an attack was possible. The specialists are divided in two groups 
in order for the government to contrast and compare their opinions.  
Specialists’ observations on the event are summarised as follows: 
 
GROUP A (Hazard-Centric Approach) GROUP B (Vulnerability Approach) 
- The high number of involved terrorists 
was crucial to determining the initial 
success of their action. 
- Terrorists were motivated by exceptional 
ideological reasons in the dramatic 
political situation the country was facing. 
- Terrorists were effectively armed and 
most of them were found to be on drugs 
when performing the attack. 
- Detailed plans and maps of the airport 
were found in the terrorists’ 
headquarters, which leads to the 
suspicion of espionage. 
- Terrorists made use of cutting-edge 
technology to perform their attack and 
communicate with authorities. 
- Intervention by Special Forces was 
crucial to containing the crisis. 
- At the moment of the attack, airport 
security was highly under-staffed, due to 
a contemporary strike in the sector. 
- An undergoing project of the expansion 
of the airport made the perimeter fences 
weaker and harder to patrol, allowing the 
terrorists easier access to the precinct. 
- The geographic position of the airport, 
on a peninsula relatively far from the 
city, eased isolation of facilities by the 
terrorists. 
- Due to the concurrent summer holidays, 
during the attack most of passengers 
were families with children, further 
reducing authorities’ negotiation 
capacity. 
- Intervention by Special Forces was 
crucial to containing the crisis. 
 
 
In the short case described in Table 2.10, the views represented by the two 
groups of specialists reflect the dichotomy between the hazard-centric approach 
(group A) and the vulnerability approach (group B) to crisis management. While the 
former focuses on the external hazard and its characteristics, the latter examines the 
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features of the subject hit by the hazard in order to determine its vulnerability. The 
illustrated example refers to a security issue; however, the two perspectives can be 
equally applied to safety concerns. In analysing the consequences of a hurricane on a 
coastal population, a hazard-centric approach would focus on the intensity and 
magnitude of the hurricane, while a vulnerability-approach would examine the 
characteristics of the affected population (poverty, average age, previous experience 
with similar events, etc.). The present thesis adopts a vulnerability approach in the 
assessment of potential safety and security disruptions (SSD) in Australian airports 
by focusing on the characteristics of the risk absorbing system (the airports).  
At this stage, further digression on the definition of vulnerability is necessary 
in order to gain a better understanding of the basic components of vulnerability in 
airports. As stated previously, due to its topical nature, the concept of vulnerability is 
highly debated in crisis management literature. Nevertheless, consensus around its 
definition has not yet been reached (T. Aven, 2007; Bouchon, 2006; Einarsson & 
Rausand, 1998; Füssel, 2007; McEntire et al., 2010) and a number of different 
interpretations have been provided in the literature (Table 2.11). 
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Table 2.11: A Review of Definitions of Vulnerability 
Author(s) Definition 
Blaikie et al. (1994) A characteristic of a person or group in terms of their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural 
hazard. 
  
National Security 
Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee 
(1997) 
A function of access and exposure. Vulnerable systems are exposed 
and accessible, and therefore susceptible to natural hazards, as well 
as wilful intrusion, tampering or terrorism. 
  
Emergency 
Management 
Australia (1998) 
The degree of susceptibility and resilience of the community and 
environment to hazards. 
  
Buckle (2000) A broad measure of the susceptibility to suffer loss or damage. The 
higher the resilience, the less likely damage may be, and the faster 
and more effective recovery is likely to be. Conversely, the higher 
the vulnerability, the more exposure there is to loss and damage. 
  
Gheorghe and 
Vamanu (2001) 
The susceptibility and resilience/survivability of the 
community/system and its environment to hazards. Vulnerability is a 
function of susceptibility, resilience, and the environment. 
  
International Strategy 
for Disaster 
Reduction (2001) 
A status resulting from human action. It describes the degree to 
which a society is either threatened by or protected from the impact 
of natural hazards. 
  
Nilsson et al. (2002) Vulnerability exists as a result of a collection of risks and the ability 
of a society, local municipal authority, company or organisation to 
deal with and survive external and internal emergency situations. 
  
National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
(2002) 
Susceptibility of resources to negative impacts from hazard events. 
  
National Waterworks 
of Rural America 
(2002) 
Vulnerability assessment is the identification of weaknesses in 
security, focusing on defined threats that could compromise its 
ability to provide a service. 
(Ezell, 2007, p. 572) 
 
 
The definitions provided in Table 2.11 clearly differ in terms of nature, field of 
application, and key characteristics. Vulnerability can refer to a person, group, 
community, infrastructure, organisation, etc. Similarly, it can be conceived as 
susceptibility, survivability, degree of exposure, probability, and even resilience. 
Such a variety of interpretations reflects the historical evolution of the concept of 
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vulnerability. Traditionally, three main stages characterise the theoretical 
development of the notion of vulnerability (Bouchon, 2006): 
1. In the first stage, vulnerability is exclusively considered from a technical 
perspective. It is considered to be uniquely determined by the degree of loss 
and damages deriving from a hazard. Social dimensions of vulnerability are 
ignored. 
2. The second stage expands the previous definition and accounts for the degree 
of exposure to hazards. Loss and damages are a function of the degree of 
exposure to hazards (Dow, 1992). Different elements can determine 
exposure, for example the spatial location of the affected system. 
3. The final stage further elaborates on the first two definitions and refers to 
vulnerability as the internal characteristics of the element at risk. From a 
technical point of view, loss and damage become a function of the resistance 
capacity of the technical system. Similarly, from a social perspective, they 
become a function of the resilience capacity of the considered human system. 
This last stage adopts a sociotechnical approach in assessing vulnerability 
and takes into account the social factors, apart from the traditional, technical 
ones. 
The development of the previous definitions of vulnerability can be 
summarised in two main categories (Bouchon, 2006), which constitute the ontology 
of vulnerability: 
 Hazard-dependent vulnerability. Vulnerability is assessed as the amount of 
damage experienced by a system after being affected by a hazard. 
Vulnerability is mainly interpreted as an indicator of outcome, rather than an 
evaluation of the state of a system prior to a critical event. 
 Hazard-independent vulnerability. Vulnerability is assessed as an internal 
state of a system, which exists regardless of external hazards. Vulnerability is 
predominantly interpreted as an indicator of input, in that it has an impact on 
the amount of damage experienced by a system affected by a hazard.  
The hazard-independent vulnerability may be conceived as a determinant of the 
hazard-dependent vulnerability, with the former being an input and the latter an 
output in the crisis process (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: Hazard-Independent and Hazard-Dependent Vulnerability 
 
 
The present sub-section has clarified the nature and characteristics of the key 
concept investigated in this thesis, vulnerability. In so doing, an answer to the 
question ‘What is vulnerability?’ has been provided. Light needs to be cast on the 
ways in which researchers and practitioners can increase their knowledge about this 
concept. Different epistemological stances exist in the literature that offer answers to 
the question ‘How do we build our knowledge about vulnerability?’ These stances 
are addressed in the following sub-section in order to find the most suitable approach 
to gain a better understanding of vulnerability determinants. This is in turn expected 
to shape the research methodology embraced by the present thesis and illustrated in 
Chapter Three. 
2.3.3  How do we Build our Knowledge About Vulnerability? 
A number of studies have analysed the concept of vulnerability in crisis 
management literature, from an epistemological perspective. Vulnerability is a 
complex concept, as it tends to assume different meanings according to the context in 
which it is analysed. It is conceivable as a conceptual cluster (Füssel, 2007, p. 156) 
having different meanings according to the: 
 Policy context in which it is used. Examples of this involve studies on social 
disasters, ecological threats, economic hazards, etc. In particular, the 
vulnerability to threats associated with global climate change has received 
extensive attention by researchers and practitioners (Brooks, 2003; Cutter, 
1996; Klein & Nicholls, 1999; Moss, Brenkert, & Malone, 2001; UNISDR, 
2004). According to this cluster of definitions, knowledge of the concept of 
vulnerability is impossible if isolated from the specific context of application. 
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 Nature of the vulnerable subject (e.g., individual vulnerability, organisational 
vulnerability, infrastructural vulnerability, etc.). Considering the concept of 
vulnerability from the perspective of the nature of the vulnerable subject 
implies isolating vulnerability from the policy context of usage and focusing 
on the characteristics of the vulnerable subject. According to this nuance, 
vulnerability may refer to individuals, organisations, complex systems, etc. 
Knowledge and exploration of the concept of vulnerability are possible 
regardless of the policy context of application. 
The different dimensions of analysis through which the concept of 
vulnerability can be examined translate into a variety of approaches that can be 
utilised to explore vulnerability. In particular, these approaches differ according to 
whether vulnerability is considered to be hazard-dependent or hazard-independent 
(1) and whether it is considered in a given policy context or as referring to the nature 
of a specific subject (2). Figure 2.4 recaps this overview and provides practical 
examples for applying these different perspectives. 
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Figure 2.4: Perspectives on the Definition and Study of Vulnerability with Practical 
Examples and Focus of the Present Research (highlighted) 
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elements of the considered system. Vulnerability can be seen as a component of the 
overall systemic resilience (Bouchon, 2006) and measuring and assessing a system’s 
vulnerability indirectly means measuring and assessing its resilience capacity. The 
importance of the concept of resilience has been noted by numerous authors, whose 
research is considered a milestone in the crisis management literature (Boin & van 
Eeten, 2013; Laporte & Consolini, 1998; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al., 
2008). In particular, the notion of resilience engineering has been proposed by 
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numerous authors as a potential expansion of the more traditional resilience approach 
(Righi, Saurin, & Wachs, 2015), with a specific focus on safety management 
(Hollnagel et al., 2007). Due to its focus on safety, resilience engineering was not 
adopted as the preferential conceptual framework for the present thesis, which 
conceptualises a combined safety-security perspective. In general, exploration of 
organisational resilience lies outside the scope of the present thesis, as a vulnerability 
approach is deemed more suitable to a focus on crisis incubation. Resilience 
constitutes nonetheless an extensive body for future research, as proved by other 
recent studies conducted within the aviation area (Camastral, 2014; Devine, 2014).  
An additional justification for the stance adopted in the present research has 
been provided by answering the question underlying the epistemology of 
vulnerability: How do we build our knowledge about vulnerability? At this stage, it is 
therefore possible to combine the ontological nature and intrinsic characteristics of 
vulnerability with the perspectives embraced to understand it. This synthetic 
framework constitutes the fundamental conceptual model of organisational 
vulnerability utilised in the present thesis, as illustrated in the following sub-section.  
2.3.4 A Synthetic Conceptual Stance 
The crisis management perspective has been identified as the most appropriate 
stance for the purposes of this dissertation, intended to expand knowledge on the 
concept of vulnerability. To achieve this goal, the conceptual foundations of 
vulnerability have been investigated (ontological stance) in order to examine its 
components from a theoretical perspective. Finally, the ways in which 
comprehension of vulnerability can be achieved (epistemological stance) have been 
emphasised. 
At this stage, the conceptual exploration of vulnerability is complete and the 
adjective organisational can be combined back with it, in order to shape the core 
tenet of this study. Organisational vulnerability is examined from a crisis 
management perspective adopting a hazard-independent approach, focusing on the 
nature of the vulnerable subject (airports as complex sociotechnical systems or 
organisations), regardless of its policy context (Figure 7). The following reasons 
justify this stance: 
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 Within the crisis management literature, the present study adopts a 
perspective that focuses on the crisis of management stage of the crisis 
escalation model (D. Smith, 2005), where latent factors develop that 
produce conditions for crises to occur (crisis incubation). These factors 
constitute the basic elements of OV. 
 The perspective embraced by this thesis is an organisation-wide, 
sociotechnical approach to assessing vulnerability factors and 
anticipating their crisis-triggering effects (signal detection and 
preparation/prevention) (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). 
 A hazard-independent perspective focusing on the nature of the 
vulnerable subject excludes hazard-specific and policy-specific 
investigations, which largely depend on single cases. On the contrary, the 
suggested perspective enables a holistic approach. This provides better 
generalisability and fills the acknowledged need in the literature for 
studies advocating a holistic perspective on the organisational causes of 
crises (McEntire, 2001, 2003). 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the conceptual perspective underlying this research. 
Figure 2.5: Conceptual Stance of the Research 
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According to the stance adopted in this thesis, OV of airports is studied 
regardless of the possible hazards (hazard-independent approach), by focusing on 
the key components of airports as complex sociotechnical systems (nature of the 
vulnerable subject). In order to do so, it is necessary to explore the organisations 
involved in airport operations (organisation-wide focus). This analysis is meant to 
proactively anticipate (proactive approach and anticipation) those disruptions that, 
when escalating, may lead to a crisis in the explored airport (crisis of management 
and crisis incubation focus). 
At this stage, it is useful to recall the definition of organisational vulnerability 
embraced by the present research:  
'Result of flawed organisational policies and individual practices whose 
origins are deeply rooted within early design assumptions and managerial 
decisions' (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009, p. 510). 
According to this definition, four elements are deemed to be key constituents 
of OV: organisational policies, individual practices, early design assumptions, and 
managerial decisions. These four features of complex systems have social and 
technical origins. Therefore, a sociotechnical approach is considered to be the best 
solution for exploring such features impacting on the OV of airports. Before 
illustrating how sociotechnical systems like airports are described in the present 
thesis, a final element in the definition of OV is integrated in the next sub-section. 
The concept of pathways of vulnerability (De Noni et al., 2010; Kraemer, Carayon, 
& Clem, 2009; D. Smith, 1990a, 2004, 2005) is intended to explain how OV arises in 
complex systems. 
2.3.5 The Manifestation of Vulnerability: Pathways of Vulnerability 
The central tenet of the present thesis is that airports as complex sociotechnical 
systems are characterised by individual and organisational factors that may 
contribute to an increase in the overall OV. In an attempt to describe how 
vulnerability originates in complex systems, research has noted that particular 
incubation patterns seem to develop in organisations (Perrow, 1999; Reason, 1997; 
D. Smith, 2000, 2005; Turner, 1976). According to this perspective, vulnerability 
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develops following specific pathways14, in which human and organisational factors 
converge and create holes in the system (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; D. 
Smith, 2004, 2005). Interestingly, vulnerability conditions develop latently,15 until 
triggering events expose them. At this stage, if effective defences are not in place, or 
the level of tolerance of controls is exceeded, the ultimate result is the generation of a 
crisis (D. Smith, 2005). In every moment of an organisation’s life, multiple 
vulnerability pathways may occur. Most are neutralised by organisational defences 
(e.g., safety and security systems elaborated following systemic vulnerability 
analysis); however, some may find the way through such defences, where systemic 
holes align, resulting in a crisis. Pathways of vulnerability have the potential to 
remain latent in a system until:  
1. A triggering event activates them, producing systemic disruptions; or 
2. Organisational interventions (defences) break the link that leads to systemic 
disruptions.  
In the conceptual framework embraced by the present research, pathways of 
vulnerability are charted by the interplay of individual and organisational factors 
within the considered sociotechnical system. The nature and the characteristics of 
these factors shape the types of pathways produced in the system. Recent research 
(Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009) has produced an original taxonomy of four 
different categories of vulnerability: design, implementation, configuration, and 
operational. Authors have listed a series of individual and organisational factors 
deemed to contribute to these categories of vulnerability. Finally, by means of a 
causal network analysis, researchers have associated the examined factors with the 
different categories of vulnerability. Findings have highlighted that distinct 
individual and organisational factors intended as multiple stressors (D. Smith, 2005) 
contribute to the creation of a single pathway of vulnerability (Kraemer, Carayon, & 
Clem, 2009). 
The present research endorses the concept of pathways of vulnerability and 
assumes, based on the reviewed literature, that individual and organisational factors 
of vulnerability may gather in airports through specific patterns. These patterns may 
                                                 
 
14 Or ‘Windows of Vulnerability’, as defined by Dow (1992, p. 147) 
15 The concept of crisis incubation, see Turner and Pidgeon (1978). 
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then lead to the creation of distinct types of vulnerability, which could eventually 
cause systemic crises in airports. One of the goals of this thesis is to identify these 
pathways and provide empirical evidence of their existence. 
The present chapter has provided definitions for organisational crisis and crisis 
management and reviewed the most common approaches to crisis management in the 
literature in order to establish the adopted perspective, the crisis management 
approach. The theoretical foundations for the concept of vulnerability were discussed 
by reviewing the notion of risk and emphasising the relevance of the risk absorbing 
system in a hazard-independent assessment of vulnerability.  
At this stage, an interpretive framework to ‘read’ and interpret how 
organisational vulnerability incubates and develops in airports is necessary. In 
particular, an exploration of Australian airports as complex sociotechnical systems 
requires a model for vulnerability assessment that accounts for the human-machine 
interface characterising these systems (Meshkati, 2002a). For this purpose, the 
present thesis reviews the body of literature relevant to the complex sociotechnical 
systems theory. Different models are presented and compared in order to identify the 
most appropriate. The macroergonomic approach is singled out as the most adequate 
model for vulnerability assessment in Australian airports. 
2.4 COMPLEX SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
2.4.1 Exploring Complex Sociotechnical Systems 
The sociotechnical systems theory originated in the 1950s from research 
conducted at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in London (Hendrick & 
Kleiner, 2002; Kleiner, 2008). The term sociotechnical system was coined by Trist 
and Bamforth (1951), who studied the coal mining industry in Wales and explored 
the composition of work systems. Trist and Bamforth highlighted the presence of 
four components in any work system: the work system design, the technological 
subsystem, the personnel subsystem, and the external environment. These elements 
interact in a ‘synergistic combination’ (Carayon et al., 2015, p. 550) and are 
characterised by mutual interdependence, which revolves around three main features 
(Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002): joint causation (events in one of them have a causal 
impact on the others), joint optimisation (optimisation of one component results in 
sub-optimising the overall work system), and joint design (a fit among the 
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components’ design is needed to reach an optimal structure for the overall work 
system). The central tenet of the sociotechnical approach is the concept of fit. In 
order for the work system to perform in the best possible way, its design needs to be 
compatible with the psychosocial and skill characteristics of the workforce 
(personnel subsystem), with the characteristics of the external context (external 
environment), and with the employed technology (technological subsystem) 
(Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002). 
Literature about sociotechnical systems is characterised by a recurring element, 
the variety of descriptive frameworks utilised. Numerous authors have attempted to 
classify components of sociotechnical systems. The result of such attempts is an 
extensive series of descriptive models of sociotechnical systems that take different 
names. Each defines work systems as constituted by various components, differing in 
number and nature and usually ranging from the individual to the external 
environment levels. Table 2.12 provides an overview of these models. 
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Table 2.12: Models of Sociotechnical Systems and their Components 
Author(s) and model Components of the sociotechnical system 
(Pasmore, 1988; Trist, 1981) 
Sociotechnical Systems Theory 
- Social system 
- Technical system 
- Environment  
(Carayon & Smith, 2000; M. J. Smith & 
Sainfort Carayon, 1989) 
Carayon and Smith’s model of work 
system 
- Individual 
- Tasks 
- Tools and technology 
- Physical environment 
- Organisational conditions 
(Rasmussen, 1997, 2000) 
Rasmussen’s model of sociotechnical 
system 
- Productive processes or the work 
performed by operators and workers 
- Staff involved in planning the work 
- Management who plans operations and 
supplies resources 
- Company that interacts with various 
regulations 
- Regulators and associations 
- Government 
(Moray, 2000) 
Concentric circles model of sociotechnical 
system 
- Centre: individual behaviour, physical 
devices, physical ergonomics 
- External layers: team and group 
behaviour, organisational and 
management behaviour, legal and 
regulatory rules, societal and cultural 
pressures  
(Rizzo, Pasquini, Di Nucci, & Bagnara, 
2000) 
SHELFS (Software-Hardware-
Environment- 
Liveware) model 
 
- Software (formal and informal rules) 
- Hardware (equipment) 
- Environment (political, economic, 
social and legal) 
- Liveware (workers) 
- Liveware (other people in the system) 
(Wilson, 2000) 
Wilson’s model of interactions 
- People’s interactions with: 
- Other people 
- Remote agents 
- Structure, policy and roles 
- Supply chain 
- Environment 
- Task 
- Hardware and software 
- Society, finance, and politics 
(Hendrick & Kleiner, 2001; Kleiner, 
2004) 
Hendrick and Kleiner’s model of work 
system sub-systems 
- Personnel sub-system 
- Technological sub-system 
- Internal environment 
- External environment 
- Task and organisational design 
(Vincent, 2003) 
Vincent’s model of work factors 
influencing clinical practice and adverse 
events 
- Institutional factors 
- Organisation and management 
- Work environment 
- Team 
- Individual staff member 
- Task 
- Patient 
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(Booher, 2003) 
HIS Model (Human-Systems Integration) 
- Human factors and ergonomics 
- Safety 
- Manpower 
- Personnel 
- Survivability 
- Training 
- Health hazards 
(Leveson, 2011) 
STAMP Model (Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modelling and Processes) 
- Hierarchical safety control structure 
(engineering development, 
manufacturing, operations, external 
stakeholders) 
(adapted from Carayon et al., 2015, pp. 551-553) 
 
 
Pasmore and Trist’s model. The model elaborated by Pasmore and Trist 
(Pasmore, 1988; Trist, 1981) was at the dawn of the sociotechnical systems theory 
and provides a first reflection on how the structure and design of organisations may 
affect their performance. Following the work of Trist and Bamforth on the 
interaction of technological and sociological factors in work systems (1951), 
Pasmore and Trist elaborated a pioneering, rudimentary model of sociotechnical 
system focused on work groups (Walker, 2015). This model, which is reputed too 
simplistic for the purposes of the present thesis, was then further developed in order 
to provide a more complete framework for understanding how sociotechnical 
systems operate.  
Rasmussen’s model. The model proposed by Jens Rasmussen (1997, 2000) has 
been embraced as a framework for risk management in complex sociotechnical 
systems. Acknowledged as one of the first academics to provide a framework 
combining both the social and the technical systems in an explanatory way (Carayon 
et al., 2015), Rasmussen elaborated a model that moved away from the traditional 
engineering chain-of-events. Rasmussen’s model of sociotechnical system includes 
the influence of social and managerial factors on a specific event produced as a result 
of the work system’s operations. This framework has been utilised in different ways 
in the human factors and ergonomics literature. Examples include the use of 
Rasmussen’s model as the conceptual foundation for an accident modelling 
procedure (Leveson, 2011; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002) or as an analytic tool to 
conduct a comparative analysis of two public health outbreaks (Hrudey, Huck, 
Payment, Gillham, & Hrudey, 2002; Woo & Vicente, 2003), or a significant 
industrial accident (Hopkins, 2000). As these examples show, Rasmussen’s model 
(similarly to other accident causation frameworks) is particularly suitable to identify 
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ex-post the causes of a safety-related event that actually occurred. This excludes from 
applicability potential events (as opposed to actual ones) and security-related 
instances (actual and potential), a large portion of an airport’s risk management 
system. Despite its innovative nature, Rasmussen’s model has been criticised in the 
literature, in that it places the most emphasis on system operations (e.g., productive 
processes, company interactions, etc.), to the detriment of system design (Carayon et 
al., 2015). 
Apart from the aforementioned focus on actual events and safety-related 
occurrences, several other elements make Rasmussen’s model unsuitable for the 
purposes of the present research. First, its limited focus on system design clashes 
with the definition of organisational vulnerability adopted in the present study. 
Second, Rasmussen’s model particularly emphasises external layers of 
sociotechnical systems, such as the governmental layer and regulatory bodies. 
Despite civil aviation being generally recognised as a highly-regulated industry 
(Forsyth, 2013; Littlechild, 2012; Yadav & Nikraz, 2014), the present research 
focuses on the work system component of sociotechnical systems. Reaching out to 
the number of (national and international) governmental and legislative actors 
influencing civil aviation operations in Australia would in fact water down the focus 
on the airport work system and move the centre of attention away from the airport 
management functions. Third, Rasmussen’s model has been predominantly used in 
the literature to elaborate accident modelling procedures in order to investigate the 
chain of events behind some major accidents. In the present thesis, a classification of 
commonplace SSD (RQ1) is considered instrumental to examining the factors that 
could potentially increase the organisational vulnerability of the explored airports 
(RQ2a). As Therefore, the use of an accident causation model was considered 
inappropriate for the purposes of this investigation. 
Moray’s model. As with Rasmussen, Moray (2000) proposed a model of 
sociotechnical systems composed of vertical layers, where the key focus is on the 
interaction between levels (Carayon, 2006). Moray in particular emphasised the need 
for traditional human factors and ergonomics to reach out to new disciplines in order 
to provide a more complete overview of the functioning mechanisms of complex 
organisations and, in general, of modern societies. In particular, he suggested going 
beyond the traditional ‘human-centred sociotechnical design’ (Moray, 2000, p. 858) 
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and including cultural, economic, and political factors in the assessment of complex 
systems’ performance. Moray’s holistic approach has been utilised in the literature to 
support the idea that all ‘generic’ elements of a work system should be assessed 
when considering the performance of complex organisations (David, 2005, p. 190). 
Moray’s model has been utilised in particular to investigate how cultural factors 
interact with other system elements and influence the systemic performance (Strauch, 
2010) or, similarly to Rasmussen (2000), as a model to identify root-causes of human 
errors in sociotechnical systems (Reinach & Viale, 2006). This model has received 
particular attention in the field of human-automation interaction, where it has been 
used to explore the factors behind operators’ complacency in highly automated tasks 
(see for example, Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005). 
Moray’s framework of sociotechnical systems predominantly emphasises the 
relevance of cultural, economic, and political factors in its assessment of the 
performance of sociotechnical systems. As in Rasmussen’s model (2000), this 
contrasts with the present investigation’s focus on the factors that are more strictly 
related to airports as complex work systems. Airports are characterised by a large 
number of internal actors and organisations and examining all of their numerous 
external layers (society, economics, politics, etc.) would entail a potentially infinite 
investigation. Moray’s model was therefore considered unsuitable for the present 
study. 
SHELFS model. Rizzo, Pasquini, Di Nucci, and Bagnara (2000) proposed the 
SHELFS model of sociotechnical systems, adapted from similar, previous 
frameworks (Edwards, 1972; Hawkins, 1988). This model organises work systems 
around four categories: software, hardware, environment, and liveware. The ultimate 
purpose of analyses conducted with the SHELFS model is the enhancement of safety 
in the explored sociotechnical systems (Carayon et al., 2015). A review of the 
existing literature on the SHELFS framework demonstrates that this approach is 
unsuitable for the objectives of the present thesis. First, its origins stem from a very 
specific context, as the SHELFS originated from an analysis of the railway 
transportation system in Italy. Second, its main focus is on supervisory activities 
carried out in sociotechnical systems where operators’ duties and tasks are overseen 
by other colleagues. The underlying assumption is that all business processes can be 
mapped and deviation from standard performance is mainly the result of a lack of 
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supervision. In the present thesis, organisational vulnerability is supposed to be co-
generated by factors other than inappropriate supervision, which makes the SHELFS 
model too narrow for the present investigation. Third, an extensive review of the 
literature demonstrates that the aforementioned framework has been scarcely used in 
the literature to conduct complex sociotechnical system analysis. Its use in the 
present thesis was therefore discarded.  
Wilson’s model. Wilson produced extensive research in the fields of human 
factors and ergonomics and can be considered one of the most eminent scholars in 
the sub-discipline called participatory ergonomics (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Taveira 
& Smith, 2006; Wilson, 1991, 2000). According to this stance, operators should be 
actively involved in planning and controlling their work activities in order for work 
systems to produce better outcomes. Therefore, the model of sociotechnical systems 
elaborated by Wilson (2000) revolves around the interaction between humans and the 
surrounding environment, ranging from internal organisational layers to the external 
societal levels. These interactions have the potential to contribute to the performance, 
safety, health, quality of working life, and goods or services produced (Carayon, 
2006). Wilson’s model predominantly focuses on the study of the interactions 
between operators and other elements of the sociotechnical system. This places the 
individual worker at the heart of the model, in a bottom-up approach to the 
comprehension of work systems. End users are considered indispensable elements in 
the resulting ergonomic methodology (Taveira & Smith, 2006). As a result of its 
focus on the operators’ performance and their interaction with the surrounding 
system, Wilson’s model was deemed unsuitable for the purposes of the present 
investigation. This thesis instead adopted a managerial perspective on the factors of 
organisational vulnerability and therefore required a broader interpretive framework. 
Vincent’s model. Moving from Reason’s classification of human errors (1997), 
Vincent elaborated a model of contributory factors that can affect the safety of 
clinical practice, including both active and latent failures (Carayon et al., 2013; 
Vincent, 2003; Vincent, Taylor-Adams, & Stanhope, 1998). One key element in 
Vincent’s model of work factors influencing clinical practice is the role of the 
patient. The complexity and seriousness of their condition, language, communication 
skills, personality, and social factors all impact the clinical performance of operators 
in relation to the aforementioned patient (Vincent, 2003). From Vincent’s model, 
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which predominantly focuses on the human error that may originate from inadequate 
surrounding conditions (e.g., organisational culture, resources, team dynamics, etc.), 
a series of studies on the safety of clinical practice have burgeoned (Dean, Schachter, 
Vincent, & Barber, 2002; Gawande, Zinner, Studdert, & Brennan, 2003; Leape, 
2002; Sexton et al., 2006). Several reasons limit the scope of application of Vincent’s 
model to the present research. First, academic literature has demonstrated the validity 
of Vincent’s model in the healthcare sector. The same result has yet to be achieved in 
the case of airports as complex sociotechnical systems. Second, the role of the patient 
in influencing the investigated clinical performance is crucial in the aforementioned 
model. This makes the framework less viable in the case of airports. Third, Vincent’s 
model investigates human errors as a result of active and latent failures in clinical 
practice. In the present thesis, the focus is not on the human error, rather on the 
organisational factors that can contribute to generate SSD in airports. 
Booher’s model. The framework produced by Booher (2003) also revolves 
around the activities carried out by the user in the complex work system, 
emphasising in particular the role played by the human-system interaction in 
contributing to the overall performance. This model constitutes an elaboration of the 
manpower and personnel integration management and technical program 
(MANPRINT) implemented by the US Army in 1986 (Booher, 2003). This 
framework aims to provide ‘…systems integration of people, technology and 
organization.’ (Booher, 2003, p. 7). However, applicability of human-systems 
integration to sociotechnical systems largely depends on the degree of complexity of 
the latter. In particular, Booher produced a classification of the complexity of some 
sociotechnical systems, ranging from level F (less complex, e.g., a bicycle) to level A 
(most complex, e.g., the Department of Transportation). The author suggests that, for 
the systems belonging to the levels C, B and A, ‘Human Systems Integration 
technology is not itself far enough along to make significant changes that will help 
make these levels perform more effectively’ (Booher, 2003, p. 9). Airports are not 
included in Booher’s taxonomy, but at level D, the first for which human-system 
integration is deemed suitable, the air traffic control room of an airport sits as an 
example. Based on this classification, airports are deemed to be too complex 
sociotechnical systems to fully benefit from an application of the human-system 
integration model. Booher’s model is therefore considered not appropriate to conduct 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 73 
an assessment of the factors that impact on the organisational vulnerability of 
airports. Another limitation of this framework leads to the same conclusion. In its 
formulation, Booher’s model is intended as a blueprint to design and implement ex-
ante the operations of complex sociotechnical systems and not as an instrument to 
detect ex-post the potential systemic disruptions and their determinants. The present 
research is an assessment of the organisational vulnerability found in the explored 
airports. As a result, the adopted interpretive framework needs to have a diagnostic 
value, rather than a prescriptive approach. 
STAMP model. By developing Rasmussen’s stance on accident event chains 
(1997), Leveson (2011) produced a model of sociotechnical systems called STAMP 
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes). As the name indicates, this 
framework provides a model of accident causation based on systems theory rather 
than on reliability theory. The difference is conceptual, as well as practical. 
Accidents are considered control problems, rather than as failures in the different 
components of a sociotechnical system (Carayon et al., 2015). Work systems are 
organised in hierarchical levels, where each level is more complex than the 
preceding one. Throughout the system, the levels progressively increase their 
complexity and are characterised by emergent properties. Safety is one of these 
properties and is considered the result of the interactions among systemic 
components, controlled by means of constraints imposed by the higher levels onto 
the lower ones (Leveson, 2011). The STAMP model postulates that safety accidents 
are not just component failures or human errors, but result from sub-optimal control 
of safety-related constraints among the levels in the system (Carayon et al., 2015). 
As in the case of the models previously described, the STAMP framework has been 
utilised in the literature to understand the root causes of some significant systemic 
accidents. In several papers, a comparison among the STAMP and other similar 
models was conducted in order to assess the most appropriate framework for 
systems-based accident analysis. These papers highlighted some of the limitations of 
the STAMP model, which make it unsuitable for the purposes of the present 
investigation. In their analysis of the Mangatepopo gorge tragedy, Salmon, 
Cornelissen, and Trotter (2012) argued that the STAMP is more suitable for 
identification and classification of technical control failures rather than human 
decision-making and organisational flaws. Furthermore, the three authors expressed 
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their concerns about this model’s ability to grasp the impact of environmental 
conditions on a safety accident. The present research examines organisational 
vulnerability as a by-product of flawed organisational practices and subsequent 
decision-making, in a scenario where the environmental factors play a significant 
role. In their investigation on the root causes of the Grayrigg train derailment, 
Underwood and Waterson (2014) argued that despite the completeness of analysis 
that the STAMP model enables, this model requires a time-consuming background 
analysis of the systems affected by a safety-related event (in order to review the 
control systems in place) and does not yield a clear graphical representation of the 
examined accidents. Its practical validity is therefore questioned. The present 
research has limited resources and a review of all the control systems in place in the 
explored Australian airports would largely exceed them. Finally, in their exploration 
of the causes leading to a safety accident in the oil and gas industry, Altabbakh, 
Alkazimi, Murray, and Grantham (2014) concluded that the value of the STAMP 
model resides in its focus on ‘…enforcing safety constraints behaviours, rather than 
preventing failures…’ (Altabbakh et al., 2014, p. 118). Furthermore, the STAMP 
model ‘…exceeds conventional accident causation methods…’ (Altabbakh et al., 
2014, p. 118) but requires extensive information to be implemented, such as 
organisational hierarchy, underlying policies, standards and regulations, detail about 
how activities are performed, etc. One of the fundamental objectives of the present 
thesis is to gain better understanding on the mechanisms that characterise 
organisational vulnerability, in order to expand the potential for preventing failures. 
Two other limitations support the argument that the STAMP model is not appropriate 
for the purposes of the present investigation. First, similar to many other accident 
causation models (Booher, 2003; Rasmussen, 1997; Rizzo et al., 2000; Vincent, 
2003), STAMP predominantly focuses on safety-related events and seems to exclude 
security-related disruptions from investigation. This limits its applicability to the 
present research, which revolves around the concepts of SSD. Second, as an accident 
causation model, the STAMP framework is specifically valuable in retracing ex-post 
the causes of an accident, rather than providing ex-ante indications about the factors 
that could lead to a disruption. The latter is one of the objectives of the present 
investigation, which further suggests adopting a different interpretive model than 
STAMP. 
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For the reasons previously illustrated, the models of sociotechnical systems 
described in the present section are not suitable for the purposes of the present 
investigation. Table 2.13 provides an analytical overview of their characteristics, 
emphasising their fields of application and their limitations. 
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Table 2.13: Analytical Description of some Models of Sociotechnical Systems 
Model Nature Focus of attention Limitations 
(Pasmore, 1988; 
Trist, 1981) 
Sociotechnical 
Systems Theory 
Pioneering 
model of 
sociotechnical 
systems 
Work groups Rudimentary model of 
sociotechnical systems 
(Rasmussen, 1997, 
2000) 
Rasmussen’s model 
of sociotechnical 
system 
Accident 
causation 
model 
Safety of systemic 
operations 
Limited focus on system 
design and focus on 
external layers of society 
(Moray, 2000) 
Concentric circles 
model of 
sociotechnical 
system 
Sociotechnical 
systems 
model 
Human-automation 
interaction and 
external layers of 
society 
Focus on cultural, 
economic and political 
factors and less on 
managerial functions 
(Rizzo et al., 2000) 
SHELFS (Software-
Hardware-
Environment- 
Liveware) model 
Sociotechnical 
systems 
model 
Safety in the 
sociotechnical 
systems 
Context-specific, focus on 
lack of supervision and 
scarcely tested 
(Wilson, 2000) 
Wilson’s model of 
interactions 
Sociotechnical 
systems 
model 
Human-system 
interaction with a 
bottom-up approach 
Focus on the operator’s 
performance 
(Vincent, 2003) 
Vincent’s model of 
work factors 
influencing clinical 
practice and adverse 
events 
Accident 
causation 
model for 
clinical 
practice 
Safety accidents in 
healthcare as a result 
of human error 
Context-specific and focus 
on patient 
(Booher, 2003) 
HIS Model (Human-
Systems Integration) 
Sociotechnical 
systems 
model 
Human-system 
integration to 
enhance safety 
Not suitable for complex 
sociotechnical systems and 
not diagnostic value 
(Leveson, 2011) 
STAMP Model 
(Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modelling 
and Processes) 
Accident 
causation 
model based 
on systems 
theory 
Safety issues as a 
result of failures in 
control systems 
Focus on technical control 
failures, environmental 
conditions disregarded, 
time-consuming, focus on 
safety 
  
 
In order for the present study to gain a better understanding of the factors that 
may impact organisational vulnerability in Australian airports, a holistic framework 
focusing on organisational characteristics and design of complex work systems is 
required. In the 1980s, researchers and practitioners started emphasising that the 
traditional human factors and ergonomics interventions were yielding unsatisfactory 
results, as they were neglecting the influence that the overall organisational structure 
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had on work systems’ performance (Taveira & Smith, 2006). The foundations for a 
new sub-discipline within the human factors and ergonomics theory, the 
macroergonomic approach, were laid.    
2.4.2 The Macroergonomic Approach (MeA) 
Background. Recognised as a sub-discipline in the human factors and 
ergonomics field of research, the macroergonomic approach has been utilised in the 
literature as a tool to analyse, design and evaluate work systems (Hendrick & 
Kleiner, 2002). Indeed, this approach ‘…provides the ergonomist with an 
appreciation for the larger system…’ (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002, p. 3), by extracting 
‘…clues of higher-level influence on lower-level phenomena.’ (Carayon et al., 2013, 
p. 11). The primary objective of the MeA is to optimise the design of a work system 
by intervening on its sociotechnical features (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002). In order to 
better understand the context of the usage of this framework, an explanation of its 
development is necessary.  
The MeA originates in the human factors and ergonomics theory, which aims 
to explore human performance and its capabilities and limitations in the context of a 
specific work system. The final objective of human factors and ergonomics studies as 
a science and a practice is to improve health, safety, comfort, productivity and 
ultimately, quality of life (Hendrick, 1991). The perspective adopted by human 
factors and ergonomics looks at the human-system interface technology, namely the 
principles, guidelines, specifications, methods, and tools that drive the relationship 
between human and system components (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002). This 
relationship is performed at five levels (Hendrick, 1998; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2001, 
2002): 
1. The human-machine interface is explored by hardware ergonomics; 
2. The human-environment interface is explored by environmental 
ergonomics; 
3. The human-software interface is explored by cognitive ergonomics; 
4. The human-job interface is explored by work design ergonomics; and 
5. The human-organisation interface is explored by macroergonomics.  
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As the previous list shows, macroergonomics was developed as an evolution of 
traditional human factors and ergonomics perspectives. The first four types of 
interface refer to an individual level, or at best to a sub-system level, and are often 
grouped under the name of microergonomics. Conversely, the fifth category focuses 
on the overall work system level and is called the macroergonomic perspective (Haro 
& Kleiner, 2008; Hendrick, 1991; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002)16. Managerial factors 
associated with work systems are the focus of study for this emerging sub-discipline 
of human factors and ergonomics.  
Overview of the Macroergonomic Approach. The new perspective adopted by 
the MeA is motivated by practical and theoretical reasons. The underlying goal 
behind the MeA is to go beyond the 10-20% performance improvements typically 
achieved through human factors and ergonomics, up to the 60 – 80% reached 
through the new approach established by the MeA (Kleiner, 2008, p. 461). From a 
more theoretical perspective, the MeA can be defined as a ‘top-down sociotechnical 
systems approach to the design of work systems’ (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002, p. 3; 
Taveira & Smith, 2006). According to the MeA, work is intended as any form of 
human effort or activity. In its traditional formulation, the sociotechnical systems 
approach is a way to describe a work system as composed of different elements, 
human and non-human (namely job design, hardware and software, internal and 
external environments, and organisational design) (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002). 
Although the MeA derives most of its theoretical foundations from the traditional 
sociotechnical theory (Murphy, Robertson, & Carayon, 2014; Taveira & Smith, 
2006), a key element differentiates it from the latter. Originally, in its first 
formulation as a reliability engineering theory, the sociotechnical systems theory 
adopted a bottom-up approach that revolved around the workstation as the building 
feature in the organisational design. According to this stance, the optimisation of 
work systems’ performance should therefore primarily be achieved at the level of the 
primary work system (the single workstation), in order for it to become a property of 
the whole organisation (Trist, 1981). The MeA, in contrast, embraces a top-down 
perspective where the organisational design shapes human performance. Decisions 
                                                 
 
16 Hendrick (1991) in particular is considered the founder of the MeA (Haro & Kleiner, 2008; Taveira 
& Smith, 2006). 
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made at the macro-level (the organisation) are a pre-requisite for decisions made at 
the micro-level (the workstation). 
The perspective adopted by the MeA is integrative in that it taps knowledge 
from a number of research areas such as sociotechnical systems, organisational 
psychology, human factors and ergonomics, systems engineering, and social 
psychology (Murphy et al., 2014).  The MeA expands the traditional focus on work 
design proposed by the human factors and ergonomics theory by reaching out to 
higher systemic levels and by examining the relationships among the various sub-
systems in an organisation (Taveira & Smith, 2006). The identification and definition 
of these sub-systems is one of the central tenets of the MeA, as it shapes the way in 
which the examined work system is analysed. Hendrick and Kleiner (2001) and 
Kleiner (2004) proposed a framework for the analysis of complex work systems 
composed of the following elements: personnel sub-system, technological sub-
system, internal environment, external environment, and task and organisational 
design. Although emphasising the role of the organisational level in shaping the 
work system’s performance, this framework does not provide enough details on its 
constituents. On the contrary, the macroergonomic model elaborated by M. J. Smith 
and Sainfort Carayon (2000; 1989) and further developed by Carayon and M. J. 
Smith (2000) and by Kraemer and Carayon (2007) emphasises the role that 
organisational factors have in shaping a complex work system’s performance. 
According to this framework, complex sociotechnical systems are constituted by the 
following main components: individual, task, tools & technology, environment, and 
organisational factors. The organisational factors are in turn divided into the 
following constituents: communication, culture, policy, structure, implementation, 
and strategy.  
This thesis adopts the MeA to explore determinants of organisational 
vulnerability in Australian airports as complex sociotechnical systems. Reference to 
the MeA is therefore intended to describe a sociotechnical system as composed by: 
Individual. At this level, a number of features relating to people’s attitudes 
contribute to establishing how the work system operates. These can be (but are not 
limited to) physical health status of workers, skills and abilities, as well as personal 
limitations, etc. 
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Task. This component of a work system is related to the duties individuals are 
expected to perform. Accordingly, elements such as job demands (i.e.: work 
pressure, etc.), job content (i.e.: challenge, repetitiveness, etc.), and job control (i.e.: 
supervisory activity, etc.) have an impact on workers’ performance and eventually, 
on how the system works. 
Tools & Technology. This level refers to the characteristics of tools and 
technology used by the workforce. When not adequate, tools and technology may 
impact on workers’ performance. Ergonomics largely deals with this category. 
Environment. It has been demonstrated that the physical context in which 
workers operate has an impact on their performance. Elements such as noise, air 
quality, lighting, or workplace layout all affect workforce’s effectiveness in 
achieving their goals. 
Organisation. This level refers to the surrounding organisational context and to 
how it ultimately determines work system’s functioning mechanisms. It is the 
broadest in the taxonomy, as it involves the following sub-levels (with non-
exhaustive examples): 
Communication. How the organisation enhances information-sharing among 
workers and between operators and management. 
Culture. How organisational values, behaviours, and artefacts have an impact 
on workers’ performance. 
Policy. How organisational regulations and guidelines are appropriate to 
enhance good performance by workers. 
Organisational structure. How governance mechanisms drive the workforce to 
the achievement of organisational goals. 
Implementation. How practically organisational policies are implemented. 
Strategic issues. How organisational strategy impacts on workers’ 
performance. 
According to the MeA, the interplay among the five components of the work 
systems can possibly create conditions leading to systemic vulnerability. The MeA 
acknowledges that this process follows specific patterns, according to the pathways 
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of vulnerability mentioned in Chapter Two (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; D. 
Smith, 2004, 2005).  
Applications of the MeA. The MeA is extensively used in the literature to 
investigate the sociotechnical components of vulnerability in complex work systems. 
In their study on experts in computer and information security, Kraemer, Carayon 
and Clem (2009) categorised several human-related and organisational factors 
reputed to create specific pathways of vulnerability, through the computer and 
information security functional area of different organisations. The 66 factors 
indicated by respondents in the focus groups were aggregated into nine thematic 
areas: external influences, human error, management, organisation, performance, 
resource management, policy issues, technology, and training. Results have shown 
that usually underestimated organisational behaviours have a positive impact on the 
level of vulnerability perceived by experts in the explored organisations. The 46 
pathways singled out by the researchers were found to lead to four different types of 
vulnerability in the computer and information security area: operational, design, 
implementation, and configuration.  
In another study on computer and information security, Kraemer and Carayon 
(2007) made use of the MeA to highlight human-related and organisational factors 
ultimately leading to human errors and violations of end users and network 
administrators. Forty-five categories of intentional and unintentional errors were 
classified by the investigators as potentially generating vulnerabilities and security 
breaches in the explored organisations. The researchers then reviewed the work 
system elements contributing to the errors. Reflecting the MeA categories, 
individual, task, workplace environment, technology, and organisation factors 
emerged as potentially generating sub-optimal performance in employees (e.g., 
human errors, violations, etc.). In conclusion of their study, Kraemer and Carayon 
reiterated that enhanced understanding of work system factors of vulnerability can 
enable better defences against errors and violations.      
In her research on health care and IT organisations, Carayon (2006) examined 
how design, implementation, and operation of complex sociotechnical systems have 
the potential to influence the products and services produced by those systems. In 
health care and IT in particular, levels of patient safety and information security can 
be impacted by the interplay of organisational and inter-organisational factors. 
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Furthermore, these factors migrate across organisational, geographical, cultural, and 
temporal boundaries due to the growing number of entities involved in their 
generation. The resulting picture is characterised by increased complexity and a more 
urgent need for the integration of the different dimensions of sociotechnical systems. 
In order to anticipate the impact of sociotechnical system factors on safety and 
security performance, an inter-disciplinary approach is recommended that combines 
expertise achieved in different domains. Organisational factors as precursors of 
safety and security issues in complex sociotechnical systems can be fruitfully 
explored by means of the MeA, which enables a holistic approach encompassing the 
different individual and organisational levels. 
Finally, in their research on macroergonomic factors impacting patient safety 
and quality of healthcare services, Carayon et al. (2013) highlighted how 
macroergonomics, as a branch of human factors and ergonomics, has the potential to 
yield a significant contribution to health care quality and patient safety. In particular, 
the authors of this research emphasised how the macroergonomic approach can be 
fruitfully embraced in the investigation of ‘…job stress and burnout, workload, 
interruptions, patient-centered care, health information technology and medical 
devices, violations and care coordination…’ (Carayon et al., 2013, p. 4). 
Furthermore, macroergonomic studies are deemed to enhance a better understanding 
of microergonomic issues by placing them into the larger organisational and 
sociotechnical scenario. The aforementioned piece of research shows that 
macroergonomic interventions produce tangible improvement in a work system’s 
well-being and performance. 
Literature on macroergonomics as a perspective, a methodology, and a sub-
discipline in human factors and ergonomics is vast (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002) and a 
complete review is outside the scope of the present thesis. Thus, the brief overview 
of selected academic research adopting the macroergonomic approach conducted in 
the present sub-section is not exhaustive and is intended to provide some exemplar 
cases of the application of this model in the field of complex sociotechnical systems 
analysis. Table 2.14 further expands the context of usage of the macroergonomic 
approach by reviewing additional pieces of research adopting a similar perspective, 
in a synthetic way. Reviewed research is limited to cases in which the 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 83 
macroergonomic approach was utilised as an interpretive framework to gain a better 
understanding of factors impacting on the performance of a variety of work systems. 
 84 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
Table 2.14: Illustrative Cases of the Use of the Macroergonomic Approach in the Literature 
Author (Year) Field of 
Application 
Use of the 
Macroergonomic 
Approach 
Main Conclusions 
(Meshkati, 
2002b) 
Large-scale 
industrial safety 
accidents 
Interpretive 
framework for root 
cause analysis 
A holistic, totally 
integrated, and multi-
disciplinary approach to 
system design and 
operation is recommended 
to ensure safety in large-
scale sociotechnical 
systems. 
(Meshkati, 
2002a) 
Aviation safety 
(technology 
transfer) 
Interpretive 
framework to 
investigate cultural 
factors affecting 
aviation safety 
Technology transfer 
involving the aviation 
industry of two different 
countries should take into 
account cultural differences 
between the countries. 
(Imada, 2002) Work-related 
injuries in a 
petroleum 
manufacturing 
company 
Interpretive 
framework to 
investigate human and 
organisational factors 
and plan interventions 
Traditional interventions 
such as training, awareness, 
ergonomics, and technical 
safety programs are 
insufficient in reducing 
injuries and accidents. A 
macroergonomic approach 
would effectively 
complement such 
interventions. 
(Carayon, 
2006) 
Health care and IT 
organisations 
Interpretive 
framework to 
investigate human and 
organisational factors 
The design, 
implementation, and 
operation of complex 
sociotechnical systems have 
the potential to influence 
the products and services 
produced by those systems. 
(Kraemer, 
Carayon, & 
Sanquist, 
2009) 
Security screening 
systems 
Interpretive 
framework to 
investigate human and 
organisational factors 
Security screening systems 
can be improved by 
focusing on three 
macroergonomic elements: 
organisational and job 
design, role of human errors 
and violations, and alarm 
system effectiveness. 
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(Carayon et 
al., 2013; 
Kraemer & 
Carayon, 
2007; 
Kraemer, 
Carayon, & 
Clem, 2009) 
Computer and 
information 
security 
Interpretive 
framework for root 
cause analysis 
Human errors and 
violations of end users and 
network administrators are 
generated by human and 
organisational factors in 
computer and information 
security, such as 
communication, security 
culture, policy and 
organisational structure.
(Kraemer, 
Carayon, & 
Clem, 2009) 
Computer and  
information 
security  
Interpretive 
framework to 
investigate human and 
organisational factors 
Usually underestimated 
organisational behaviours 
have a positive impact on 
the level of vulnerability 
perceived by computer and 
information security 
experts. 
(Carayon et 
al., 2013) 
Health care quality 
and patient safety 
Interpretive 
framework to 
investigate human and 
organisational factors 
Macroergonomic 
interventions have the 
potential to contribute to an 
improvement of the quality 
of health care and reduce 
risks associated with patient 
safety. 
(Murphy et al., 
2014) 
Safety climate in 
complex 
sociotechnical 
systems 
Framework for 
integrative 
interventions in 
complex 
sociotechnical systems 
Safety climate is a leading 
indicator of safety that 
should be complemented 
with a macroergonomic 
approach to design work 
systems. This enhances 
workers’ safety perception. 
 
The synthetic review provided in Table 2.14 emphasises the variety of 
applications that the macroergonomic approach has in the literature. Used as an 
interpretive framework for targeted interventions in complex sociotechnical systems, 
or as a model to conduct root cause analysis, the macroergonomic approach polarises 
researchers and practitioners’ focus on the organisational levels of complex work 
systems. 
MeA in the present thesis. This model was considered the most appropriate to 
conduct the present research, for several reasons. First, it is holistic in nature. It could 
therefore be used as an appropriate tool to address an acknowledged gap in the 
literature, which particularly lacks studies adopting a holistic perspective on key 
determinants of vulnerability (Cardona, 2004; McEntire, 2001, 2003). In addition, 
the MeA utilises knowledge gained in other disciplines to promote learning about 
work systems in order to perform better human factors and ergonomics (Kleiner, 
2008). Second, as previously mentioned, this model has previously been used in 
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studies adopting a method of analysis similar to that of this research. Third, the 
value-added contribution inherent to the MeA is the focus on the organisational level 
of work systems (Kleiner, 2008). Furthermore, the MeA considers the organisational 
level as a shaping cloud to which all other components (individuals, tools & 
technologies, tasks, environment) refer. For this reason, the MeA was particularly 
fitting with the managerial focus adopted in the present thesis. Fourth, the MeA is 
considered ‘…a useful orientation for nonlinear process understanding and emergent 
properties of work systems and systems of systems’ (Kleiner, 2008, p. 465). Airports 
as complex sociotechnical systems are deemed to feature emergent properties that 
aggregate with organisational factors to create vulnerability and crisis incubation. 
Fifth, the MeA directly refers to the concept of pathways of vulnerability, which is 
one of the key theoretical elements of the present study (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 
2009; D. Smith, 2004, 2005). Sixth, this conceptual framework is a valid 
compromise between broad analysis and detailed exploration of factors generating 
vulnerabilities into systems.  
One limitation emerging from an analysis of the MeA as applied in the 
literature refers to the limited detail that this interpretive framework provides on 
some of its components. In particular, the MeA marginally discusses the relevance of 
human resource practices, which are scattered throughout the macroergonomic 
categories. M. J. Smith and Sainfort Carayon (1989, p. 76) included elements such as 
‘…training and time to acclimate…career development…possible job loss…’ within 
the organisational level, together with other non-HR related practices (e.g., 
technology and job stress). Similarly, Carayon and M. J. Smith (2000) adopted the 
conceptual model of complex organisations elaborated by Galbraith (1995), 
according to which organisations are composed by people, strategy, structure, 
rewards, and processes. Within the people component, elements such as ‘…human 
resource policies of recruiting, selection, rotation, training and development…’ are 
included (Carayon & Smith, 2000, p. 658), but further details about their relevance, 
function, and classification are not provided. HR practices are therefore considered a 
component of the organisational level, and not a standalone macroergonomic 
category. Finally, in their application of the MeA to the field of computer and 
information security, Kraemer and Carayon (2007) included training as a component 
of the individual factors, downsizing the impact that organisational HR practices 
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have on the performance of the explored work systems. The present research 
therefore expects to provide a more detailed illustration of the relevance that HR 
practices have on the safety and security performance produced in the explored 
airports. As discussed in Section 2.5 of the present chapter, modern airports are 
sociotechnical systems that make extensive use of complex technology. In these 
systems, the human-machine interaction is expected to play a crucial role in shaping 
the safety and security performance (ICAO, 2011; Knox et al., 2008). As a result, HR 
practices (and training in particular) are expected to play a relevant role in 
influencing the safety and security performance of the examined aerodromes. The 
human-machine interaction enacted by the investigated airport organisations is 
deemed to be impacted by the ways in which these organisations manage their 
recruitment strategies, HR and soft skills development, and training practices. This 
thesis therefore expects to provide a better understanding of how HR practices can be 
integrated into the adopted MeA (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007; M. J. Smith & Sainfort Carayon, 1989). 
The review of the scholarly literature that utilises the macroergonomic 
approach as a tool to analyse, design, and evaluate the work system has emphasised 
two other main gaps that the present research is expected to address. First, the MeA 
has been predominantly utilised with reference to safety disruptions deriving from 
accidental events, where human intent did not play a relevant role. Studies adopting a 
MeA to investigate the human and organisational determinants of security-related 
disruptions are rare in the literature, with few exceptions focusing on the field of IT 
security (Akhgar et al., 2014; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Kraemer, Carayon, & 
Clem, 2009) or on the performance of security screening systems (Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Sanquist, 2009). The present investigation presents an innovative 
approach in that it considers SSD altogether, as a potential by-product of flawed 
individual and organisational practices, attitudes and behaviours. This is deemed to 
expand the macroergonomic literature by providing a new application for the MeA. 
Second, the macroergonomic literature lacks studies focusing on airports as complex 
sociotechnical systems. In the past, the MeA has been adopted to analyse root causes 
of aviation accidents, with particular reference to the human-machine interaction 
existing between operators and aviation technology (Meshkati, 2002a). However, a 
macroergonomic investigation into how the human and organisational features of 
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airports may impact their performance in terms of safety and security has yet to be 
conducted. The present research therefore adopts a MeA to describe airports as 
complex sociotechnical systems where vulnerabilities may arise from systemic 
factors ranging from individual behaviours to organisational attitudes.  
This research was conducted in the context of Australian airports, which was 
examined in depth in order for the investigator to gain familiarity with its key 
features. The structure, design, and governance mechanisms of Australian airports 
are illustrated in the following section, which explores the physical, legislative, and 
social environment in which OV develops. Airports’ proneness to vulnerability is 
also examined in order to illustrate the theoretical framework of this thesis, contained 
in Section 2.6. 
2.5 AUSTRALIAN AIRPORTS AS COMPLEX SOCIOTECHNICAL 
SYSTEMS 
Australian airports were chosen as the object of investigation in this study. The 
importance of airports as crucial hubs in global transportation systems is fully 
acknowledged, not only in practice, but also in the literature (Graham, 2003; Wells & 
Young, 2004). Australia is no exception, and statistics clearly show that Australia’s 
network of airports is critical to the country (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012). This 
section presents an overview of the physical and institutional context underlying this 
complex organisational environment. Thus, the following sub-sections are dedicated 
to illustrating Australian airports’ physical layout, their institutional and governance 
systems, and their key characteristics. In spite of Australia’s immaculate track record 
in terms of safety and security disruptions (SSD), some of the general characteristics 
of airports seem to have the potential to increase vulnerability. 
2.5.1 Structure of Australian Airports 
In Australia, the diffusion of the airport network largely reflects the size of the 
nation. There are around 250 airports in the country, receiving regular public 
transport and more than 2,000 smaller airfields and landing strips (Deloitte Access 
Economics, 2012). International airports are defined as those where international 
flights arrive or depart (Australian Government, 2009a), and these are located in 
Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Gold Coast, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth, and 
Sydney. These aerodromes, together with Canberra and Alice Springs, constitute the 
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11 largest airports in the country and produce about 87% of the overall passenger 
traffic (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012). All other airports are considered regional 
airports. 
From a physical point of view, an airport (or aerodrome) is described as:  
‘A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and 
equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, 
departure and surface movement of aircraft.’ (ICAO, n.a., p. 10).17   
This definition refers to the facilities used for aviation purposes and includes 
not only airport buildings, terminals, and runways, but also the surrounding land 
controlled by the airport operator. This land is delimited by the airport perimeter 
fences or physical boundaries (Australian Government, 2004). The airport precinct 
can be divided into two main zones, the Landside area (LS), primarily referring to 
the passenger side of the airport (public transport, taxi zones, car parks, terminals, 
etc.) and the Airside area (AS), primarily referring to the aircraft side of the airport 
(outdoor areas, taxiways, runways, etc.).  
The distinction between these two zones is not always clearly defined. Some 
institutions and authors consider the boundary between LS and AS to be the security 
screening points within the terminal building (Bradley, 2010; ICAO, 2006). 
According to this definition, LS comprises all areas accessible by the general public 
without access control, whilst AS includes all areas for which access control is 
required. The front-of-house car parks or access roads (outdoor) and the security 
screening points (within the terminal) are the boundaries of the LS. Conversely, the 
security screening points (within the terminal) and the security fences (outdoor) are 
the boundaries of the AS. Other institutions and authors identify the LS/AS boundary 
as the point where passengers access (or disembark) the aircraft. Depending on the 
operational agreements in place, this can be on the so called airbridges (or jet 
bridges), in cases of bridge boarding, or directly on the apron, in cases of tarmac (or 
rear-stair) boarding (Eurocontrol, 2006). 
                                                 
 
17 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is the United Nations specialised agency in 
charge of promoting the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation by setting 
standards and regulations for aviation safety, security, efficiency, and regularity. In particular, ICAO 
establishes universally accepted standards (standards and recommended practices) that regulate all of 
the technical and operational aspects of international civil aviation, including aviation safety and 
security (ICAO, 2011). 
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The main difference between these two groups of definitions resides in the size 
of the LS and the AS. According to the second definition, the LS includes the whole 
terminal building, whereas according to the first, the AS includes the part of the 
terminal building comprised between the security screening point and the 
passengers’ access to the aircraft. This area is called the sterile area, as access is 
regulated and certain items are prohibited for security reasons (Australian 
Government, 2005). The sterile area is a restricted buffer zone, access to which is 
filtered through the security screening points. As the name itself indicates, the sterile 
area works in a similar way to a restricted ward in a hospital. Access of non-sterile 
individuals or objects may result in cross-contamination and has to be avoided at all 
times. In the case of breaches to the sterile area (and when contamination cannot be 
definitely excluded) the buffer zone has to be locked down and all individuals or 
objects cleared again before operations can be restored.  
The Australian legislation attributes the exact definition of LS and AS to the 
single airport, according to the specific operator’s Airside Vehicle Control Handbook 
(Australian Government, 1997). However, in general the Australian model adopts the 
definition according to which the boundary of the LS coincides with the external 
boundary of the terminal building. Thus, the sterile area fully falls within the LS and 
is classified as a Landside security zone, access to which is restricted and controlled 
(Australian Government, 2005). In the AS there are also restricted and controlled 
areas, called Airside security zones. One of these, the security restricted area, 
includes the area used for passengers boarding (or disembarking) aircrafts. Access to 
security zones is granted to travelling passengers or to personnel that: 1) hold a valid 
Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC); and 2) have a lawful operational need 
to be in the given security zone (Australian Government, 2005). 
There are two types of ASIC granted at Australian airports. The red ASIC 
allows access to both the LS and AS security zones of an airport. The grey ASIC 
grants access only to the LS security zones (Australian Government, 2005). A third 
type of access card is called Visitor Identification Card and allows access to all 
security zones, but only upon escort and supervision by an adequate ASIC holder 
(Australian Government, 2005). 
In airports, AS operations predominantly take place on the ramp, which is 
defined as:  
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‘…the area intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or 
unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance’ 
(ICAO, n.a., p. 11).  
In the present thesis, ramp, apron, and tarmac are used as synonyms (Airport 
Council International, 2008) and in general indicate the area next to the terminal 
building where aircrafts are parked, serviced, boarded, or disembarked. The ramp can 
be considered a bounded environment where specific rules exist that regulate the 
presence of operators, use of vehicles, and ground operations in general. In 
particular, the apron can be compared to a road section with definite road rules. 
These rules are established in the Airside Drivers Handbook of each airport and are 
similar in nature to general road rules, with speed limits, markings and signage, 
infringement regulations and penalty systems. Use of AS vehicles is regulated by the 
Australian legislation (Australian Government, 1997) by means of two principal 
instruments: the Authority to Drive Airside (ADA) and the Authority to Use Airside 
(AUA). These documents are issued by the airport operator. In order to be operated 
AS, a vehicle must be provided with an AUA, which certifies some compulsory 
requirements (e.g., a current maintenance program, safety inspections, liability 
insurance, etc.) Drivers of AUA vehicles must hold a regular ADA, which constitutes 
a special driving licence to operate vehicles for AS operation. The ADA is issued to 
the driver by the airport operator upon fulfilment of specific conditions (e.g., 
possession of a valid ASIC, successful testing and training program, knowledge of 
AS rules and regulations, etc.) The Authority to Drive Airside are divided into 
different categories according to the different AS areas for which they authorise 
driving. Drivers cannot operate vehicles in AS areas not included in their ADA. 
Infringement of AUA and ADA regulations may entail penalty points or fines for the 
drivers. In extreme cases, an ADA may be temporarily or permanently withdrawn, 
preventing a driver from operating vehicles AS.  
AS operations usually involve a large number of workers directly employed by 
the airport operator and the airlines, or by sub-contractors such as ground handling 
companies. Other examples of AS operations are taxiways and runways maintenance 
(e.g., paving), lighting inspections, bird and wildlife management, etc. AS operations 
are usually coordinated by the Airside Operations Centre managed by the airport 
operator. Ramp operations are a large part of AS operations and include among 
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others, aircraft taxing and parking, aircraft servicing (fuelling, de-icing, cleaning, 
etc.), baggage handling, cargo operations, etc. Ramp operations are particularly 
critical in terms of safety and security, due to their proximity to the aircrafts, because 
of the use of critical equipment (ground service equipment, such as airbridges, tugs, 
pushbacks, etc.) and due to the presence of dangerous material (e.g., fuel). Figure 2.6 
provides an overview of LS and AS areas in an Australian airport. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Australian Government, 2005, p. 60) 
 
Figure 2.6: Typical Layout of an Australian Airport 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the area comprised between the public access 
roads to the airport and the boundary with the AS is considered LS. This area 
includes the airport public car parks, business activities located front-of-house, and 
the whole terminal building, as well as the sterile area (which is a particular LS zone 
subject to security screening and access control). The front-of-house airport 
perimeter is the boundary of the LS. At the same time, the area comprised between 
the boundary with the LS and the back-of-house perimeter fence is considered AS. 
This area includes the apron, runways, taxiways, and surrounding land of the airport. 
The back-of-house airport perimeter is the boundary of the AS. 
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2.5.2 Governance of Australian Airports 
In order to better highlight and analyse the factors that contribute to SSD in 
Australian airports, an overview of the underlying governance system is considered 
essential. This is indeed reputed crucial to illustrate players and actors operating in 
Australian airports. From a taxonomic point of view, Australian airports can be 
grouped into four main categories, according to their ownership arrangements 
(Australian Airports Association, 2012). 
1) Privatised airports. They are leased by the Commonwealth on a long-term 
basis to private sector companies, which operate them commercially under 
regulations established by the Airports Act 1996. 
2) State and local government owned regional airports. The majority are 
operated by local governments. However, some are contracted to be 
operated by private companies on the behalf of governments. 
3) Defence owned airports. These airports are for military use, however, five 
of them have a joint use agreement, which enables use for civil aviation 
purposes. 
4) Privately owned airports/airstrips 
 
All nine international airports (and all 11 major airports) are privatised 
airports.18  
The basic difference in the governance system of the four categories of airports 
stands in their complexity. The bigger the airport, the more complex the institutional 
frameworks and the higher the number of involved stakeholders. Airport managers 
should in fact be able to maintain a balance among conflicting stakeholders’ claims 
on airport resources (Carney & Mew, 2003). Furthermore, the privatisation process 
has led to a scenario dominated by public-private partnerships, where contrasting 
interests range from public value production (e.g., regular public transport) to profit 
making (e.g., retail and restaurants). The resulting organisational context is 
characterised by different layers of interdependent governance functionality (Barnes, 
Camastral, & Devine, 2011).  
                                                 
 
18 Darwin is a defence owned airport enjoying a joint use agreement to be operated by private 
companies and perform civil aviation duties. 
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The compliance layer refers to the regulatory stakeholders who act in 
Australian airports. Despite airports being privatised, a regulatory framework is 
operated by governmental organisations. The operational layer is where AM acts 
and holds its role as a coordinator of operations, directly or by means of contractors 
(security companies, ground handling companies, etc.). As a pivotal hub in the 
stakeholder network of airports, AM is in charge of balancing contrasting interests by 
enhancing collaboration among the airports’ key actors. The commercial layer 
consists of all shops and commercial activities existing in terminals, as well as the 
airlines. The main objective of these actors is to make a profit. 
 In order to provide the reader with the necessary information to understand 
the mechanisms that regulate operations at Australian airports, a brief overview of 
the involved organisations, services, and businesses is provided. 
Compliance level: 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (Department). The 
Department is in charge of advising the Australian Government on the policy and 
regulatory framework for Australia’s airports and the aviation industry, including 
safety regulations. The Department also administers aviation security through the 
Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Australian Government, 2004). While the 
Department is responsible for managing the aviation security regulatory framework, 
airport screening staff are employed by the individual airports, airlines, and private 
security organisations (Australian Government, 2009a). The Department also 
undertakes economic and environmental regulation of aviation. Together with 
Airservices Australia and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the Department 
has signed a Memorandum of Understanding creating a tripartite structure to manage 
the country’s engagement and compliance to International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) regulations (Australian Government, 2014). 
Office for Transport Security (OTS). The OTS is located within the 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and is the Australian 
Government’s preventive security regulator. The OTS is in charge of both aviation 
and maritime industry security (Australian Airports Association, 2012) and its tasks 
include, among others: transport security intelligence; transport operations; transport 
security policy, planning, and regulation; audit, compliance, and security measures; 
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provision of a nationally consistent approach; and compliance to international 
standards (Australian Government, 2015). 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). The CASA was established in July 
1995 as Australia’s independent safety regulator. Its main objective is to elaborate 
the regulatory framework that maintains, enhances, and promotes civil aviation 
safety (Australian Government, 2014). The CASA is responsible for aviation-related 
regulations that directly affect aerodromes in terms of safety provisions. The 
spectrum of regulated matters is broad and includes, among others, categories and 
safety certification of aerodromes, rescue and firefighting services, bird and animal 
hazards, safety inspections, and lighting checks, etc. (CASA, 2015).  
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The ATSB is an independent 
authority whose main purpose is to investigate transport accidents and other safety-
related events. The ATSB’s main function is to improve safety and public confidence 
in the aviation, marine, and rail modes of transport. It is not a function of the ATSB 
to sustain blame or provide a means for determining liability in the case of accidents. 
The ATSB does not investigate for the purpose of taking administrative, regulatory, 
or criminal action, but to reduce the risk of future accidents and incidents (ATSB, 
2015). 
Operational level: 
Airport management/airport operator. Airport management constitutes the 
managerial level of the airport operator, who may be from the public or private 
sector, according to the airport ownership arrangements.19 Airport management has 
the ultimate responsibility for airport operations and is usually one of the security 
screening authorities of the airport. To perform its duties, airport management may 
sign contracts with specific service providers (e.g., cleaning, facility management, 
security, customer service, etc.). Airport management has a coordination role among 
the stakeholders and actors involved in daily airport operations. Due to its centrality 
in the airport context, airport management (or airport operator) is the main 
focus of investigation in the present research. 
                                                 
 
19 In the present thesis, Airport Management and Airport Operator are used as synonyms. 
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Airservices Australia (Airservices). Airservices’ role sits on the edge between 
the compliance and the operational level. This actor is indeed the regulatory authority 
for traffic control, but also has relevant operational functions such as airspace 
management (e.g., air traffic management), aeronautical information, 
communications, radio navigation aids, aviation rescue and firefighting. Airservices 
is fully owned by the government and is the exclusive provider for civil air 
navigation services. Airservices mainly sustains its operations by applying charges to 
the aviation industry (Australian Government, 2014). 
Australian Federal Police (AFP). The AFP provides a uniformed policing 
presence at the nine major Australian airports. The general policing issues attended 
include: ‘investigating minor criminal matters; patrols; enforcing Commonwealth 
law, including the application of local state/territory laws; taking reports of 
offences; making arrests; conducting interviews; subsequent judicial processing.’ 
(Australian Federal Police, 2015). 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs) and 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Immigration). International 
airports are required to perform customs and immigration services. In order to protect 
Australian citizens and businesses, goods and travellers are processed and their 
documents and passports checked to ensure their compliance to customs and 
immigration laws (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012). From July 2015, Customs and 
Immigration were consolidated into a single Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 2015). 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) – Biosecurity. 
Following dissolution of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service in 2012, 
the Department of Agriculture is now responsible for the defence of the country’s 
agriculture and environment through its biosecurity service. The DAFF provides 
biosecurity inspection and quarantine for international passengers, cargo, mail, 
animals, plants, and animal or plant products arriving to Australia. The DAFF 
performs quarantine controls at Australian borders to minimise the risk of exotic 
pests and diseases entering the country (Department of Agriculture Fisheries and 
Forestry, 2015). 
Security screening. In civil aviation, certain items are prohibited on board 
aircrafts due to their potential to be used to disrupt operations and cause extensive 
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damage to people or assets (Department of Infrastructure Transport Regional 
Development and Local Government, 2009). Security sterile areas are thus created in 
airports to identify a physical barrier and a buffer zone past which prohibited items 
are not allowed. Prohibited items are regulated in Australia in different ways 
according to whether international or domestic passengers or carry-on or checked-in 
bags are involved. The preservation of secure operations throughout the international 
civil aviation network largely depends on the effective implementation of security 
regulations in all involved airports. A security breach in one aerodrome may 
determine a security breach in another. Currently, the Australian aviation security 
regulations impose security screening on the majority of Australian airports, but not 
all of them.20 Around 4% of domestic passengers in Australia take off from 
unscreened airports (Australian Government, 2015). Similarly, Australian regulations 
impose security screening for international flights transiting through the country. In 
spite of the general rule according to which all international flights are subject to 
screening at the airport of origin, Australia assumes that its screening standards and 
regulations may differ from the ones adopted in other countries. As a result, security 
screening for international flights is also conducted on Australian soil according to 
Australian standards, in order to ensure absolute security of operations. 
Detection of prohibited items may take place in two different areas: at the 
security screening points (passengers and carry-on bags) or through the baggage 
handling system (checked-in bags). As a general principle, restrictions are stricter at 
the security screening points than at the baggage handling system. Thus, some items 
that are not allowed through the security screening points (then in the cabin of the 
aircraft) may be allowed on board, if placed in checked-in bags. The underlying 
reason for this last point is that some items are reputed dangerous only if 
immediately available to the passengers. Hence, the baggage handling system 
screens and blocks only those items that are reputed intrinsically dangerous, such as 
so-called improvised explosive devices.  
As the key Australian government adviser on transport security, the Office for 
Transport Security is the reference institution in airport security screening. The 
                                                 
 
20 Current regulations state that only airports performing regular public transport involving aircrafts 
with a maximum take-off weight of 20,000 kg or more are obliged to undertake security screening of 
their passengers (Department of Infrastructure Transport Regional Development and Local 
Government, 2009). 
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Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 - the Act (Australian Government, 2004) is the 
overarching law that provides the Australian aviation security framework, by 
adopting ICAO’s international standards (Department of Infrastructure Transport 
Regional Development and Local Government, 2009). The Aviation Transport 
Security Regulations 2005 (Regulations21) (Australian Government, 2005) establish 
the operational details to implement the security regime constituted by the Act 
(Department of Infrastructure Transport Regional Development and Local 
Government, 2009). 
In each airport, the security screening authorities (SSA) (usually the airport 
operator, the airlines, etc.) adopt a transport security program which delineates, 
among others, the standard operating procedures to conduct the screening, in 
accordance with the directions established by the Act and the Regulations. The SSA 
are appointed by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and are 
responsible for the screening process. The SSA may perform screening directly or 
employ one or more sub-contractors working as security screening providers (SSP). 
The SSP are commercial actors delivering an operational service. The relationship 
between security screening authorities and security screening providers is regulated 
by commercial arrangements where screening performance of the latter is managed 
by the former. The SSP compete for contracts at airports and the SSA apply charges 
to cover the cost of screening (Department of Infrastructure Transport Regional 
Development and Local Government, 2009). 
As for the security screening points, the SSP play an important role in 
Australian airports by ensuring that prohibited items are not allowed in restricted 
areas, neither carried by passengers nor placed in their carry-on bags. The AFP may 
be involved in the most relevant cases. The SSP operators can request intervention 
by the AFP by activating duress alarms22 available in the proximity of the security 
screening points. Walk-through metal detectors, x-ray machines, body scanners and 
explosive trace detection swab tests are the most commonly used tools and 
equipment in prohibited items detection. Hand held metal detectors and pat down 
search (or frisking) are used as complementary techniques for prohibited items 
                                                 
 
21 In particular, Regulation 4.17 – Methods, Techniques and Equipment to be used for screening. 
22 Duress signals are alarms located in various parts of the airports and are activated by staff members 
in order to request AFP intervention in case of necessity. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 99 
detection, especially when the walk-through metal detector has identified a suspected 
item.  
Commercial level: 
Airlines. Due to their size (in terms of staff members and revenues), airlines 
are one of the most relevant commercial actors in airports. However, they also have 
fundamental operational roles. Airlines are in charge of the basic service of 
passenger transportation. In so doing, they are required to abide by safety and 
security regulations enforced in the airport. Airlines can be security screening 
authorities at airports and employ contracted security screening providers to perform 
related duties. Furthermore, airlines may employ other contractors in order to 
perform transport-related services (e.g., ground handling, baggage management, 
customer service, etc.). 
General commercial activities. This category covers the broad spectrum of 
shops, retail, and service providers not directly related to the aviation transport 
service. These activities include, but are not limited to, food and beverage, retail, 
duty free, car hiring, taxi service, public transport, hotels and accommodation, etc. 
Their presence at airports is regulated with regards to safety and security provisions. 
Aviation transport-related commercial activities. This category includes the 
commercial activities and services directly related to aviation transport (e.g., ticket 
service, ground handling, passenger service, cargo facilitation, baggage management, 
etc.) External contractors hired to carry out AS works (pavement repairs, building 
activities, IT network maintenance, etc.) are included in this category. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the governance structure of airports and provides an 
overview of the relationships existing among the different entities operating at 
Australian airports. 
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Figure 2.7: Functional Context of Australian Airports 
 
The present thesis focuses on the operational level of the investigated airports, 
with a particular emphasis on the role of airport management, as the pivotal hub of 
airport governance. In ensuring safe and secure operations, airport management 
interfaces with actors at the other functional levels. In particular, airport management 
enforces regulations coming from the CASA (safety matter) and OTS (security 
matter) and ensures compliance by other actors (e.g., airlines, general commercial 
activities, transport-related activities, etc.). In performing its security management 
duties, airport management makes use of security screening providers and 
coordinates efforts with the AFP. Furthermore, it supports Biosecurity, Immigration 
and Customs in their roles. Finally, airport management guarantees that airlines and 
other business-oriented actors (e.g., shops, retail, restaurants, etc.) operate in an 
environment favourable to their businesses. 
2.5.3 Airport Management Functions 
A number of involved organisations, the presence of private and public actors, 
and underlying governance framework contribute to creating a complex scenario for 
aviation operations in Australian airports. In the present investigation, this context 
has been selected to conduct an exploration of organisational vulnerability to 
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potential SSD. The review of the literature and the examination of the aerodrome 
environment conducted in the previous sections has highlighted three characteristics 
that make airports in general prone to developing vulnerability and possibly 
incubating conditions for crisis. Airports are: 1) complex sociotechnical systems; 2) 
critical infrastructures; and 3) part of service sector. 
Airports as complex sociotechnical systems. Complex sociotechnical systems 
are characterised by the interaction between human and technical components. In this 
dichotomy, human actors are the most susceptible element to failure, as confirmed by 
several studies (Amin, 2002; Anderson & Felici, 2012; Reason, 1997). Researchers 
have indeed found that 80% of organisational accidents are caused by human-related 
factors, while only the remaining 20% by technological failures.23 This thesis focuses 
on the sociotechnical factors of crises, specifically due to their importance as 
vulnerability components in airports. 
The social side of airports’ complexity stems from their institutional and 
organisational structure. Globally, major airports are saturated with social 
complexity. The overview of Australian airports’ structures and governance systems 
outlined in the previous section clearly supported this statement. Airports are defined 
as ‘spaces of flows’ (Knox et al., 2008, p. 869) characterised by movement of people, 
goods, and services. According to the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), ‘…modern aviation is one of the most complex systems of interaction 
between human beings and machines ever created.’ (ICAO, 2011). The interaction 
referred to by ICAO is typical of complex sociotechnical systems, where single 
components (in the case of airports: check-in area, security screening points, 
boarding gates, ramp, baggage collection area, etc.) act as a unified whole (the 
airport system). Complex sociotechnical systems consist of connected sub-systems, 
where specific characteristics develop that make systemic dynamics difficult to 
predict (Buuren, Boons, & Teisman, 2012).24 Social complexity is not the only type 
of complexity found in airports. Aviation largely relies on complex, interconnected 
technologies such as IT infrastructures, air traffic control systems, airlines’ 
communications, x-rays and body scans, etc. Technological complexity increases the 
                                                 
 
23 The so-called ‘80:20 rule’ (Reason, 1997). 
24 These characteristics include fragmentation, non-linear behaviours, self-organisation, path 
dependency, coevolution, and instability (Buuren et al., 2012). 
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chances for accidents to occur, especially in systems where reliance on technology is 
high (Perrow, 1999; Reason, 1997). Technological risk is a situation that emerges 
when technical artefacts are utilised in circumstances where their operation can 
unchain an emergency (Anderson & Felici, 2012). This thesis only indirectly 
addresses technological complexity, with an exclusive focus on how the use of 
complex technologies may affect workforce’s performance.  
The stance adopted in the present work considers complexity to be a key 
feature of airports. Researchers have highlighted that when complexity increases, 
vulnerability does too (Lukasik, 2003). As a consequence, one of the most crucial 
objectives of this thesis is to simplify complexity. In order to achieve further 
knowledge of the organisational vulnerability of airports as complex sociotechnical 
systems, the present research explores airports’ sub-systems to better understand how 
they could contribute to the overall level of vulnerability. In so doing, the present 
work mainly investigates the individual and organisational components of airports’ 
complexity. Technological complexity is only considered in the way in which it 
impacts individual and organisational performance. 
Airports as critical infrastructures. Airports are considered critical 
infrastructures and as such are: 
‘…so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact 
on the deface or economic security of any state: electric power, gas and oil 
production and distribution, telecommunications, banking and finance, water 
supply systems, transportation, health care, emergency and government 
services, food supply…’ (European Commission 2004, as in Bouchon, 2006, p. 
7).  
As critical infrastructures, airports may have the potential to trigger large-scale 
emergencies, according to the cascading effect25 that characterises the complex 
networks in which they are located (De Bruijne, Van Eeten, Roe, & Schulman, 
2006). For example, a security disruption causing an international airport to 
temporarily shut down can impact the global aviation transport network, provoking 
extensive delays in other aerodromes. Thus, protection of airports as critical 
                                                 
 
25 The cascading effect is also referred to as contagion or domino-effect in the literature. See Bouchon 
(2006), Lagadec (2007) and Lagadec and Rosenthal (2003). 
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infrastructures is a milestone priority in modern, ‘always on’ economies (De Bruijne 
et al., 2006, p. 233). Australia is no exception, as highlighted in numerous 
governmental documents released in recent years (Australian Government, 2009b, 
2010; Wheeler, 2005). The present research ultimately intends to contribute to the 
protection of critical infrastructures by exploring the potential vulnerabilities of 
airports and unveiling how these vulnerabilities could lead to SSD. This activates 
practical suggestions for improvement in the safety and security systems of the 
explored airports. 
Airports as part of the service sector. Airports as complex sociotechnical 
systems and critical infrastructures mainly host activities related to the service sector. 
Service sector organisations intrinsically constitute a hot spot for safety and security 
issues, as they have a particular potential for the generation of vulnerability, 
especially through their routine managerial processes (D. Smith, 2005). Several 
characteristics of the service sector seem to highlight a condition of intrinsic 
vulnerability: labour intensive operations; high integration and engagement with 
customers’ groups; the presence of mixed components from both public and private 
sectors; increasing scale of operations over time; wide range of performed activities; 
and some specific cultural factors (D. Smith, 2005).  
Airports play a critical role in ensuring the transportation of a large amount of 
passengers; are characterised by an extensive use of, and reliance on, technology; are 
the centre of crucial border security functions; and host a large variety of profitable 
businesses stemming from many different industries. The perspective adopted by this 
research to investigate vulnerability focuses on the services and activities produced 
by airport management, with particular attention to the safety and security of the 
airport infrastructure. 
As complex sociotechnical systems and critical infrastructures belonging to the 
service sector, airports constitute an intrinsically fertile environment for the 
development of organisational vulnerability. Airport management (or airport 
operator) is the focal point of airports, for various reasons. First, systemic 
components in airports largely rely on each other and a failure in a specific 
component is likely to entail failures elsewhere in the system. Airport management 
has the ultimate role of ensuring that this does not happen. Second, services 
administered in airports massively involve external contractors, making command 
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and control functions harder to perform in an effective way. Airport management is 
in charge of supervising and verifying these external relations in order to preserve the 
safety and security of the airport. Airport management sits at the intersection of the 
sociotechnical complexity of the airports as critical infrastructures and service sector 
organisations (see Figure 2.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: The Role of Airport Management in the Airport System 
 
 
The present thesis explores how organisational vulnerability could lead to SSD 
by examining airport management functions at both managerial and operational 
levels. An enhanced understanding of the role and purposes of airport management is 
indeed deemed crucial to unveiling the mechanisms that may increase vulnerability 
in airports. The following sub-section summarises the conceptual framework and the 
research questions that guided this research. 
2.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The present chapter has laid the foundations of this thesis by exploring the key 
concepts emerging from the relevant literature, which can be grouped into three main 
bodies: 1) crisis management literature; 2) organisational vulnerability; and 3) 
complex sociotechnical systems theory. Furthermore, this chapter has illustrated the 
structure and governance of Australian airports. Concepts emerging at the 
intersection of the three aforementioned bodies of research constitute the theoretical 
background of the present study. Table 2.15 provides an overview of such concepts 
and emphasises the gaps emerging from the literature review conducted in this 
chapter. 
 
THE AIRPORT SYSTEM 
Service sector organisation  
Airport Management 
Critical infrastructure Complex sociotechnical  system 
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Table 2.15: Key Elements Emerging from the Bodies of Literature and Research Gaps 
Addressed by this Thesis 
Body of 
Literature 
Key elements Application to this 
thesis 
Research gaps Authors 
Crisis 
Management 
Definitions of 
organisational 
crisis and crisis 
management 
Focus on the crisis 
incubation stage 
Need for an 
approach that 
enhances crisis 
prevention and 
improves 
understanding of 
crisis incubation 
mechanisms. 
(Jaques, 
2010a; D. 
Smith, 
1990b, 2005) 
Stages in the 
crisis escalation 
model and crisis 
management 
model 
Focus on the crisis 
prevention stage 
Need to focus on 
commonplace 
SSD rather than 
on exceptional 
crises. 
(D. Smith & 
Elliott, 2006) 
Organisational 
Vulnerability 
Ontological and 
epistemological 
perspectives on 
the concept of 
vulnerability 
Organisational 
vulnerability 
investigated from an 
hazard-independent 
perspective, focusing 
on the nature of the 
vulnerable object 
Need to consider 
vulnerability as 
the key causal 
factor of crises. 
Need to 
complement the 
traditional hazard-
dependent 
approach to crises. 
(Lewis, 
1999; 
McEntire et 
al., 2010) 
Complex 
sociotechnical 
systems theory 
Interpretive 
model on the 
components of 
complex 
sociotechnical 
systems  
Macroergonomic 
approach exploring 
individual, task, tools 
and technology, 
environment, and 
organisational 
elements of complex 
sociotechnical 
systems  
Need to better 
consider the role 
of human 
interaction with 
system 
components and 
organisational 
context of crises 
in a sociotechnical 
context. 
(Kraemer, 
Carayon, & 
Clem, 2009; 
Starbuck & 
Milliken, 
1988; Turner 
& Pidgeon, 
1978; 
Weick, 
1990) 
Need for a holistic 
approach to study 
vulnerability 
determinants and 
reach out to 
organisational and 
inter-
organisational 
factors. 
(Cardona, 
2004; 
Kraemer, 
Carayon, & 
Clem, 2009; 
McEntire, 
2001, 2003; 
Pearson & 
Clair, 1998) 
 
 
In order to address the gaps emerging from the review of the literature 
conducted in the present chapter, this investigation has formulated research questions 
(RQ1, RQ2a and RQ2b), as illustrated in the following sub-section. 
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2.6.1 Research Questions 
 The present thesis revolves around the following conceptual processes: 
 Airports as complex sociotechnical systems have the potential to incubate 
crisis conditions deriving from potential SSD to normal business 
operations. 
 These disruptions can be generated by organisational vulnerability (OV) 
potentially developing in airports as a result of individual and 
organisational factors. 
 These factors can be grouped into five main macroergonomic categories: 
individual, task, tools & technology, environment, and organisation. 
 Interventions on the aforementioned categories may mitigate the 
development of vulnerability factors and provide enhanced safety and 
security in airports. 
Figure 2.9 illustrates the aforementioned conceptual process. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Conceptual Process Underlying the Development of Safety and Security 
 
In order to identify potential OV precursors in airports, this investigation 
reverses the process that leads to consequences and initially addresses the latter. 
First, the potential impact of vulnerability is analysed. A list of the most relevant 
disruptions to normal business operations is therefore produced. Second, by 
assuming that the emerging disruptions are potentially caused by vulnerabilities in 
the airport system, the present research investigates these vulnerabilities’ individual 
and organisational origins. Third, this study examines the existing countermeasures 
in place in the explored airports to avoid or face the aforementioned vulnerability 
Potential mitigating factors 
Disruptions 
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factors. In so doing, this research aims to provide guidance and practical suggestions 
for an improvement of the overall safety and security conditions in the airports. In 
order to empirically test the previous underlying conceptual process and gain a better 
understanding of the OV in complex sociotechnical systems, the following two main 
areas of investigation are proposed in the present thesis: 
RQ1: What are the most common and relevant safety and security 
disruptions to normal business operations in Australian airports? 
 The first purpose of the present investigation is to work towards the 
prevention of minor disruptions that might lead to greater events. Thus, both actual 
(minor) and potential (major) SSD are explored in the present research, depending on 
the research participants’ responses and the data emerging from the document 
analysis and observation. In particular, the perceptions of the respondents in the 
semi-structured interviews constituted the main source of information in the present 
thesis. Indeed, RQ1 is formulated to focus on commonplace, operational 
consequences of vulnerability, as well as on potential, major organisational crises. 
This enables an assessment of the potential for disruption intrinsic to OV in the 
explored airports.   
Minor disruptions to normal business operations can happen in Australian 
airports and can include events such as the presence of unattended bags, erroneous 
screening procedures, breaches in the sterile area, disruptive behaviours by 
passengers, etc. (Department of Infrastructure Transport Regional Development and 
Local Government, 2009; Wheeler, 2005) or bird strikes, minor accidents on the 
tarmac, technical issues, etc. (Australian Government, 2012a, 2014). These 
disruptions may be related to security or safety and can be generated by OV in the 
airport system. Vulnerability is in turn potentially originated by individual and 
organisational factors. The perspective adopted in this thesis is holistic in nature and 
RQ1 is no exception. In fact, this research question addresses all potential disruptions 
to normal operations reputed to be most common and relevant. The need for this 
holistic perspective in crisis management emerged from the literature (Cardona, 
2004; McEntire, 2001, 2003; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Similarly, a comprehensive 
study on SSD in Australian airports is still missing in the literature. 
 108 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 RQ2a: How do individual and organisational factors contribute to 
generating the safety and security disruptions highlighted in Study One and 
increase the level of vulnerability in the explored airports? 
RQ2b: How can the impact of the highlighted individual and organisational 
factors for organisational vulnerability be limited and safety and security 
disruptions prevented in airports? 
 Once the SSD are identified and analysed in Study One, RQ2a aims to 
examine the process that potentially leads from individual and organisational factors 
through systemic vulnerability to the aforementioned disruptions. Then, RQ2b 
intends to cast light upon the potential for vulnerability reduction in the explored 
airports. As supported by academic literature reviewed in the present chapter, this 
thesis assumes that individual and organisational factors may impact on the overall 
systemic vulnerability of airports, making them more prone to disruptions to normal 
business operations and, in rare cases, to potential crises. As a consequence, RQ2a 
and RQ2b focus on the determinants of the disruptions emerging from RQ1. 
 In RQ2a, the macroergonomic approach is the interpretive framework utilised 
to underline and analyse such determinants (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & 
Carayon, 2007). These determinants’ potential contribution to OV is investigated in 
an attempt to retrace the pathways in which they combine and create possible 
conditions for disruptions (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; D. Smith, 2004, 2005). 
In addition, the MeA is tested for appropriateness in the evaluation of OV in the 
context of airports. RQ2a intends to address important gaps emerging from the 
literature review conducted in the previous section. Individual and organisational 
factors are indeed explored in an attempt to better understand the role of human 
interaction with system components and organisational context of crises (Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1978; 
Weick, 1990). Furthermore, vulnerability determinants are examined in order to 
achieve an improved comprehension of crises based on vulnerability analysis, 
overcoming the traditional hazard-dependent approach and filling an acknowledged 
gap in the literature (Lewis, 1999; McEntire et al., 2010). 
 Once the individual and organisational factors of OV are clarified, this thesis 
moves on into an exploration of the potential countermeasures to cope with the 
aforementioned factors. RQ2b has the most practical implications in the overall 
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research. The enhanced understanding of disruptions potentially occurring in airports 
(RQ1) and of their determinants (RQ2a) enables the production of new suggestions 
for improvement to better face the SSD and the OV (RQ2b).  
These potential countermeasures are expected to act in two directions:  
 Breaking the link between SSD and pathways of vulnerability (for 
example, by creating new organisational defences such as increased 
training provisions, external consulting, internal audit and control, 
improved technology, etc.); 
 Breaking the link between organisational factors and the creation of the 
pathways (for example, by decreasing the level of OV, operating on its 
individual and organisational determinants). 
The suggestions produced by answering RQ2b provide a draft overview of 
what could be improved in terms of safety and security in the explored airports. Once 
the theoretical framework of this research is tested in other circumstances (for 
example, in complex sociotechnical systems similar to airports), practical 
interventions to better safety and security provisions in airports will be produced. 
2.6.2 Conceptual Framework 
 In order to reorganise the fundamental lines of reasoning upon which this 
research is based, the present section provides an overview of the conceptual 
framework underlying this study of organisational vulnerability in airports as 
complex sociotechnical systems (see Figure 2.10). 
1. The first stage of the framework illustrates how potential disruptions in the 
explored airports may originate from vulnerabilities. In the present research, 
the focus of this phase is on understanding the most common and most 
relevant SSD occurring in the observed airports (RQ1). This first stage 
constitutes the basis for the following ones.  
2. According to the stance adopted in the present research, vulnerabilities may 
produce disruptions in airports through specific pathways (Kraemer, Carayon, 
& Clem, 2009; D. Smith, 2004, 2005). 
3. In order to clarify the link between disruptions and pathways of vulnerability, 
the present research makes use of the macroergonomic approach (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007) to explore the individual and 
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organisational key determinants of vulnerability (RQ2a). Airports are 
considered complex work systems composed by the following dimensions of 
analysis: individual, task, tools & technology, environment, and organisation. 
The organisational level is in turn examined through the following lenses: 
policies, communication, strategy, culture, structure, and implementation. As 
suggested in recent research (Carayon, 2006), such a holistic approach is 
deemed to be particularly effective to explore key determinants of 
vulnerability in complex sociotechnical systems. By examining systemic 
components in airports, the present research highlights which individual and 
organisational factors have the potential to create pathways of vulnerability. 
4. Finally, the present study provides an enhanced understanding of what 
countermeasures are in place in airports to face the disruptions emerging from 
RQ1. Based on this, practical suggestions for improvement are drawn for 
strategic-decision makers to reduce vulnerability in airports (RQ2b). These 
suggestions have two potential goals. First, they can break the link between 
disruptions and pathways of vulnerability (for example, by creating new 
organisational defences). Second, they can break the link between 
organisational factors and the creation of the pathways (for example, by 
decreasing the overall level of vulnerability). 
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Figure 2.10: Conceptual Framework of the Thesis 
 
2.7 SUMMARY 
The present chapter outlined the scholarly literature relevant to this 
investigation, revolving around three main bodies of research: crisis management 
literature, organisational vulnerability, and complex sociotechnical systems theory. 
Basic definitions of organisational crisis and crisis management have been provided 
in order to identify the focus of the present research on the initial stage of crises, the 
crisis incubation phase. In this phase, latent conditions develop in organisations that 
create the potential for SSD. Considered altogether, these conditions constitute the 
organisational vulnerability of the explored systems. Organisational vulnerability is 
the fundamental tenet of the present research and its conceptual foundations have 
been examined in this chapter by reviewing the risk management literature. 
Australian airports have therefore been considered risk absorbing systems and 
vulnerability assessed from a hazard-independent perspective.   
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The discussion also presented a detailed illustration of the institutional and 
operational context in which this study was conducted. The governance structure and 
physical layout of the typical Australian airport were widely analysed. This paved the 
way towards the assessment of airports as complex sociotechnical systems conducted 
in the remainder of the chapter. The macroergonomic approach was demonstrated to 
be an appropriate interpretive framework of reference through which the potential for 
organisational vulnerability in Australian airports can be assessed. Chapter Three – 
Research Methodology discusses the research design adopted in this investigation. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
Ό δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ. 
‘A life without enquiry is not worth living for a human being.’ 
 
PLATO, Apology of Socrates, 38a 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the methodology adopted in this 
research to collect, analyse, and report data on organisational vulnerability (OV) in 
the explored airports. Stemming from a constructivist research paradigm with an 
intermediate methodological fit, this investigation adopted a qualitative approach and 
utilised the following data collection methods: semi-structured interviews, document 
analysis, and field observation. These methods are typical of qualitative research, 
where richness of information is fundamental in achieving sufficient knowledge of 
the investigated phenomena. A single case study with embedded units of analysis on 
Australian airports is the product of this research. Collection, analysis, and 
management of data are characterised by strict confidentiality and anonymity, given 
the commercial in confidence nature of the involved information. The structure of the 
present chapter is illustrated in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Structure and Topics of Chapter Three 
Section Purpose and Topics 
3.1 Introduction Introduction to Chapter Three 
3.2 Constructivist Research Paradigm Definition of constructivist research 
3.3 Qualitative Research Methodology and 
Intermediate Fit 
Definition of the adopted methodology and 
fit 
3.4 Research Strategy: Case Study Case study approach to study Australian 
airports 
3.5 Single Case Study Design with Embedded 
Approach 
Examination of units of analysis and areas 
of operation 
3.6 Selection of the Airports The investigated data collection sites 
3.7 Data Collection Methods Adopted methods 
3.8 Semi-structured Interviews Interviews with airport management 
3.9 Field Observation Field observation in airports 
3.10 Document Analysis Analysis of organisational documents 
3.11 Data Management and Analysis Data analysis process and data storage 
3.12 Evaluation of the Research Design Qualitative criteria for evaluation of this 
thesis 
3.13 Ethics Ethical clearance and ethical issues 
3.14 Methodological Limitations Limitations of the present study 
3.15 Summary Summary of the contents of Chapter Three 
 
3.2 CONSTRUCTIVIST RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Crotty (1998, p. 3) stated that a research paradigm (or theoretical perspective) 
identifies ‘...the philosophical stance that lies behind our chosen methodology...’ and 
‘...our view of the human world and social life within that world...’.  A research 
paradigm is essentially shaped by three main elements: an ontological perspective 
(the way in which the researcher sees the world), an epistemological perspective (the 
way in which the researcher believes knowledge can be shaped), and a 
methodological perspective (the way in which the researcher investigates reality). 
According to the differences in the aforementioned perspectives, four main groups of 
research paradigms are classified, as shown Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: The Four Main Research Paradigms in Social Sciences 
 
Feature 
Positivism Realism Constructivism 
(Interpretivism) 
Critical Theory 
Ontology Reality 
constituted 
by the 
empirical 
world 
Reality is imperfectly 
apprehensible by 
means of 
probability/tendency  
Reality exists 
independently of 
our cognition 
Reality is 
socially 
constructed and 
is shaped by 
social, 
economic, 
ethnic, political, 
and 
cultural/gender 
values 
     
Epistemology Objectivism: 
findings of 
empirical 
research are 
considered 
true 
Modified 
Objectivism: findings 
are probably true 
Subjectivism: 
knowledge is 
relative to a 
specific 
situation. 
Findings are 
created 
according to the 
adopted 
methodology  
Subjectivism: 
findings are 
shaped by the 
ontological 
values 
     
Preferred 
Methodology 
Quantitative: 
experiments 
and surveys 
Mixed Methods: case 
studies, convergent 
interviews 
(qualitative) and 
structural equation 
modelling 
(quantitative) 
Qualitative: 
hermeneutical 
and dialectical 
methods that 
make the 
researcher 
participate in the 
investigated 
reality (grounded 
theory, case 
studies, etc.) 
Qualitative: 
dialogic and 
dialectical 
methods by 
which the 
researcher 
influences the 
social world 
where 
participants live 
(adapted from Healy & Perry, 2000, p. 119) 
 
 
This thesis adopted a constructivist paradigm according to which social reality 
(in this case, organisational vulnerability) is created by the interaction of social actors 
(Crotty, 1998). The underlying assumption of constructivism is that social sciences 
require a specific method for exploration. Researchers should focus on understanding 
the interpretations that social actions can have according to the unit of analysis being 
studied (Giedymin, 1975). This emphasis on understanding phenomena, rather than 
explaining them, stems from the difference between natural and social sciences and 
is referred to as the interpretive turn in the philosophy of science (from which 
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Interpretivist, see Costantino, 2008). First developed in France in the 1960s by the 
pioneering work of Piaget and Bachelard (Marechal, 2010), the constructivist school 
of thought adopts a relativistic ontology according to which not only one, but many, 
socially constructed realities exist. Knowledge about these realities is built within the 
inquiry process itself, where the researcher and the participant (dialectic approach) 
construct understanding of phenomena. Constructivism does not propose a single 
methodology in science, instead adopting a number of different methods, considered 
valid in casting light on the diverse perspectives involved in the area of investigation. 
Qualitative research emphasising grounded theory, case studies, observation, and 
interviewing is typical of the constructivist approach (Costantino, 2008). 
This study adhered to the constructivist perspective because the explored 
reality is believed to be produced by actors’ interaction. In particular, this thesis 
assumed that airport management interacts with other organisations (airlines, ground 
handling companies, retailers, Australian Federal Police, etc.) and executes specific 
practices, attitudes, and behaviours typical of the airport system. Thus, OV and 
safety and security disruptions (SSD) may be generated under specific conditions 
that were the object of study of the present investigation. As a constructivist piece of 
research, this thesis embraced a subjectivist epistemology position. Knowledge about 
the explored phenomena is gained based on the context of investigation and on the 
adopted methodology. This thesis investigated the specific environment of Australian 
airports by means of a qualitative methodology and aimed to enhance the general 
comprehension of OV in the aviation sector. 
3.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
INTERMEDIATE FIT 
Qualitative research is defined by Marshall and Rossman (2011, p. 2) as 
‘…pragmatic, interpretive, and grounded in the lived experiences of people…’ and as 
a ‘…broad approach to the study of social phenomena…’ (2011, p. 3). Denzin and 
Lincoln (2008, p. 4) stressed the importance of the pair researcher-context, which 
characterises qualitative research, and suggested that ‘…qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena 
in terms of the meanings people bring to them.’ 
Due to its qualitative nature, the present research was conducted in a 
naturalistic setting (Australian airports); drew on multiple methods (interviews, 
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document analysis, and field observation, see below); focused on the context 
(airports’ operating environment); was emergent and evolving (the understanding of 
concepts such as OV emerged throughout the investigation); and was fundamentally 
interpretive, in that knowledge was created by the researcher’s interpretation 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). 
Different aspects justified the adoption of a qualitative methodology. First, in 
the traditional definition of exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive purposes of 
scientific research (Babbie, 2013; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) the present 
thesis assumed an exploratory perspective. A qualitative method is the most 
appropriate for exploratory research. Exploratory studies are intended to investigate 
little-understood phenomena, identify unexplored categories of meaning, and 
elaborate hypotheses for future research (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).  
Second, the literature review conducted in Chapter Two suggested that the 
understanding of this thesis’ key concept (OV in complex sociotechnical systems) is 
yet to be completed. This is reflected in the way this study’s research questions were 
formulated.26 A particular emphasis was placed on how the investigated phenomena 
evolved in their setting, on what the most recurrent categories of meaning were for 
the involved social actors, and on how these categories interacted (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011). Qualitative techniques are considered very useful in describing 
composite phenomena and revealing the context in which they take place (Trochim 
& Donnelly, 2008). Furthermore, they enable understanding and description of 
complex processes. On the contrary, quantitative techniques are more suitable to 
measure and analyse the causal relationships existing between variables (and not 
processes, Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 14). 
Third, Sub-section 2.4.2 demonstrated that previous research adopting the 
macroergonomic approach (MeA) has embraced qualitative methods and techniques, 
as illustrated in several papers (Carayon, 2006; Kleiner, 2008; Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009). From this, qualitative research can be seen 
as the elective methodology for studies adopting the MeA (Hendrick, 2004b; 
Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002; Newman, 2002; Stanton, 2005). 
                                                 
 
26 See Sub-section 2.6.1 for further reference. 
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Fourth, the concept of methodological fit in research provides further 
justification for the methodological choices operated in the present study. Edmonson 
and McManus (2007) identified a continuum of three archetypes of methodological 
fit in scientific studies, according to the state of existing theory and research: 
nascent, intermediate, and mature. Nascent theory is aimed at suggesting tentative 
answers to open-ended inquiries about unexplored phenomena. Mature theory, in 
contrast, is characterised by a significant, pre-existing body of knowledge on well-
developed constructs and hypotheses, which need to be empirically tested. 
Intermediate theory sits somewhere in the middle and is intended to suggest 
relationships between concepts ranging from completely new to well-established. 
The methodological fit used in the present investigation lay in an intermediate 
position. As highlighted in Chapter Two, prior theory and research in the field of OV 
are not just nascent, but are not fully mature either. Concepts used in the present 
investigation were drawn from a relatively young body of knowledge (e.g., OV, 
pathways of vulnerability, complex sociotechnical systems, etc.) and the adopted 
interpretive framework (MeA) also required further testing in different research 
contexts.  
The intermediate fit of this research implied specific methodological 
consequences, according to Edmonson and McManus’ framework (2007, p. 1160). 
First, in the present thesis, the goal of data analysis was an exploratory testing of new 
propositions and constructs. Service disruptions in airports needed to be further 
understood, especially given the different perceptions that the social actors involved 
in AM have. In addition, OV is an under-explored concept in airports and an 
enhanced comprehension of its constituents and the way they develop (pathways of 
vulnerability) was necessary.  
Second, this thesis sought to achieve a better understanding of complex 
sociotechnical systems’ vulnerability, complementing existing bodies of work (crisis 
management literature, complex sociotechnical systems research, and OV studies 
adopting the MeA). The findings of this research can be tested for robustness by 
means of a more explanatory method, for instance, by making use of surveys and 
adopting a quantitative approach in data analysis (Robson, 2011). At that point, 
further exploration to find causal inferences between organisational factors and the 
vulnerability of airports could be possible (Shadish et al., 2002). Diffusion of the 
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resulting explanatory framework as part of an improved risk assessment system 
could then be evaluated. 
Third, data collection methods employed in this thesis included interviews, 
document examination, and field observation. Gathered information was interpreted 
by means of content analysis, habitually used in intermediate position research 
(Edmondson & Mcmanus, 2007). The present sub-section has established the overall 
qualitative methodology of this study and its intermediate methodological fit. The 
next section aims to define a component of research methodology, namely the 
research strategy, which, as the name itself explains, provides directions on the 
research process (Remenyi, Williams, Money, & Swartz, 2003). 
3.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY: CASE STUDY 
 A research strategy can be defined as ‘…the general plan of how the 
researcher will go about answering the research questions’ (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2012, p. 600). Several strategies to conduct research in business and 
management include, among others, experiments, surveys, case studies, action 
research, grounded theory, ethnography, archival research, cross sectional and 
longitudinal studies, and participative enquiries (Saunders et al., 2012). In spite of 
their apparent variety, these strategies have large overlaps, which makes the selection 
of the most appropriate one fundamental to the research (Yin, 2009). In order to 
select the most adequate strategy, Yin (2009) recommends to assess the three 
following criteria: a) the type of research question posed, b) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events, and c) the degree of focus on 
contemporary, as opposed to historical events (p.8). 
First, the research questions of this thesis predominantly have the form of 
‘how’ and ‘what’ type questions (see Sub-section 3.2.2). In particular, they are 
exploratory questions (Yin, 2009) and the findings they generated in the present 
research took the form of hypotheses and propositions about the complex phenomena 
investigated. Yin (2009) suggested that exploratory questions are suitable for 
different research strategies (experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, case 
study). Thus, an exploratory case study was deemed an appropriate research strategy 
for the present investigation. Second, the researcher had no control whatsoever over 
the explored events. For example, this last point made the experiment research 
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strategy unsuitable for the present thesis and further supported the choice of a case 
study approach (Yin, 2009). Third, the chronological focus of this study was on 
events that were contemporary or located in the immediate past experience of the 
participants. Case studies utilise methods such as interviews and observation to 
construct meaning about complex phenomena currently occurring. From the previous 
assessment of Yin’s criteria, this research adopted a case study approach to 
investigate OV in airports by exploring the ways in which it manifests (SSD), its key 
determinants (individual and organisational factors), and the potential for reducing it 
(existing and potential countermeasures).  
In addition to Yin’s three criteria, the case study approach was the most 
appropriate strategy for the present research for several reasons. First, case study 
research typically focuses on society and culture in a group or organisation (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2011). It provides an intensive analysis of ‘bounded systems’ (Stake, 
2008, p. 120) and stresses developmental factors in relation to the context (Flyvbjerg, 
2011). The present research analysed airports as bounded systems, focusing in 
particular on OV as a developmental factor (through the concept of pathways of 
vulnerability) in relation to the organisational context. Second, the case study 
approach provided deep (that is to say detailed, rich, and complete) analysis of 
complex phenomena (SSD, OV, individual and organisational factors of 
vulnerability, etc.). Third, this approach explored the possible determinants of such 
complex phenomena by linking consequences (service disruptions) to potential 
factors (individual and organisational factors, etc.). Fourth, the case study approach 
enabled the understanding of contextual factors and processes (Flyvbjerg, 2011), 
assumed to play a crucial role in the possible development of OV in airports. 
Further support for the selection of a case study approach derived from 
previous studies adopting the same interpretive framework as the present 
dissertation, the macroergonomic approach. Macroergonomic literature abounds in 
studies conducted by embracing the case study approach in multiple contexts: health 
care management (Carayon et al., 2013), safety management (Haro & Kleiner, 2008; 
Nagamachi & Imada, 1992), IT security (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Clem, 2009), and crisis management (Meshkati, 2002b; M. J. Smith, 
2002). Furthermore, Hendrick (2004a) indicated the case study approach (although 
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defining it as field study approach) as one of the most appropriate research strategies 
for studies adopting the MeA. 
3.5 SINGLE CASE STUDY DESIGN WITH EMBEDDED APPROACH 
This thesis made use of qualitative methods in order to provide a better 
understanding of how vulnerability to SSD manifests in airports as complex 
sociotechnical systems. Organisations investigated in the present study belong to a 
single industry, Australian civil aviation. In particular, core to the present research 
was the role of the central management function in the explored airports. As a 
consequence, a single case study design was adopted. Yin (2009, p. 48) indicated 
five rationales for single case study design. Among others, single cases are 
particularly suitable when the explored phenomena are representative or typical. This 
thesis considered the three examined airports to be illustrative of many others in 
Australia. The findings that emerged from the present investigation are deemed to 
produce information about the organisational behaviours enacted in average 
Australian aerodromes. Furthermore, the adoption of three distinct case studies 
would have hampered the confidentiality of the explored airports, as a detailed 
description of their key characteristics (location, size, structure, regulations, etc.) 
would have been necessary to justify the adopted approach.  
The present research adopted a single embedded case design, collecting data 
from three different airports. The embraced approach is defined as embedded 
because OV to SSD was explored within three different units of analysis, as part of 
the airport management functions: leadership level, corporate management level, and 
operational management level. In addition, each unit of analysis was investigated 
through the related area of operations: Landside, Landside/Airside, and Airside.  
The three research questions constituting the present thesis were used to 
compare and contrast perspectives emerging from the three units of analysis and the 
three areas of operations, in order to highlight similarities and gaps in the perception 
of OV. In addition to the three units of analysis focusing on airport management 
functions, data concerning two other organisations (a security screening provider 
(SSP) operating at the three airports and the Australian Federal Police, (AFP) were 
integrated in the study in order to produce a more complete reflection on OV. In 
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particular, the SSP and AFP provided additional information about the security 
function carried out in airports. 
Overall, the research design of this thesis was structured in such a way as to 
enable a holistic understanding of how vulnerability could typically incubate and 
manifest in Australian airports. As such, differences and gaps among the three units 
of analysis and the three areas of operations were highlighted. Furthermore, 
commonalities and discrepancies were investigated across the three data collection 
sites in order to account for variance, where present. However, the three selected 
airports have significant similarities in terms of size, governance structure, nature of 
safety, and security operations, etc. This translated into recurring themes and results 
observed across the three data collection sites. In the rare instances of variance, 
results were discussed with the supervisory team and the key contacts in the explored 
airports in order to cast light on potential explanations for variance. Where present, 
elements of variance are illustrated throughout the chapters that describe the results 
yielded by this study (Chapters Four and Five), together with suggested explanations 
deriving from the researcher’s interpretation. The nature and characteristics of the 
adopted sample of airports are further reviewed in the following section. 
3.6 SELECTION OF THE AIRPORTS 
In the framework of the Airports of the Future research project, the present 
study’s sampling, data collection, and analysis techniques complemented the ARC 
Linkage Project’s research plan (LP0990135). As a consequence, data collection 
sites were selected from a list of airports participating in the project. Access to these 
airports was previously negotiated and pre-approved under the conditions established 
by the Airports of the Future research project. 
Site selection utilised a purposeful sampling strategy with the aim of 
illustrating typical cases (Patton, 2002) in Australian airports. Purposeful sampling 
enables selection of information-rich cases, which in turn produce a better 
understanding of the explored phenomena. The description and comprehension of 
OV proposed in the present study can be tested for robustness through theoretical 
replication in different data collection sites within the Australian aviation network 
(Yin, 2009). 
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The chosen airports have been kept confidential in order to preserve the 
identity of their airport management organisations (airport operators). They are 
referred to in the present study as Airport A, Airport B and Airport C (or Airport X, 
Airport Y and Airport Z, not in the order, to further enhance anonymity). The three 
airports are located in sub-urban areas. An additional Airport W was originally 
selected at the beginning of the study, as the first data collection site. However, after 
only one semi-structured interview conducted with the identified key contact and 
some hours of observation, the airport management organisation decided to withdraw 
from the study. Airport W was then replaced by another site, similar in terms of size, 
passengers, and organisation. 
In order to illustrate how OV can incubate and manifest in Australian airports, 
selected sites had to be representative of the Australian aviation industry. They were 
therefore selected from the 11 largest airports in the country, which produce around 
87% of Australia’s overall passenger traffic (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012). All 
the selected airports have domestic as well as international terminals. Size was a 
crucial aspect in sampling, as the selected airports had to be big enough to provide 
sufficient data for the purposes of the present thesis. Bigger airports were in fact 
deemed to feature higher levels of complexity and variety, and consequentially, to 
yield a broader spectrum of SSD (RQ1), a vaster scale of individual and 
organisational factors impacting on OV (RQ2a), and a more complete range of 
potential for improvement in tackling the aforementioned factors and disruptions 
(RQ2b).  
In order to provide consistency to the selected sample, the three nominated 
airports were all chosen from privatised airports, according to the Airports Act 1996 
(Australian Airports Association, 2012). These airports share similar governance 
arrangements and are characterised by related actors (airlines, SSP, retailers, etc.). 
Furthermore, all of the selected airports service both domestic and international 
passengers in an environment marked by similar institutional and regulatory 
requirements (Office for Transport Security, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 
Customs, Biosecurity, Australian Federal Police, etc.). Finally, airport management 
organisations operating in the three data collection sites present comparable 
functions for specific areas central to the present thesis (e.g., terminal operations, 
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security and emergency management, Workplace Health and Safety, Airside 
operations, risk, and compliance, etc.).  
3.7 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
 In order to nurture the case study presented in this thesis, field research was 
conducted in the selected airports. The research methods utilised in the field were 
semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and field observation. This section is 
intended to provide theoretical justification and details on these methods. 
 The complexity of airports as sociotechnical systems was emphasised in 
Chapter Two. As critical infrastructures for the provision of services that not only 
include air transportation, but also shopping, entertainment, catering, and sometimes 
accommodation, airports are characterised by an articulated network of stakeholders 
with different and often conflicting interests. The airport management organisation 
sits at the heart of this network, due to its operations directly or indirectly serving all 
other actors in the system. Airports are ‘…socially based economic organizations 
composed of complex and interdependent groups of decision makers’ (Kirschenbaum 
et al., 2012, p. 68), where OV could derive from practices and behaviours enrooted in 
the system. As mentioned in Chapter Two, these practices may go unnoticed, but still 
create the potential for disruptions. Furthermore, the stratification of functional 
layers (leadership, corporate management, operational management), within airport 
management and within the organisations interacting with airport management, 
makes the investigation of social phenomena a challenging task. 
In such a dense environment, the primary goal for any data collection 
conducted in a managerial study is to cast light on the practices, behaviours, beliefs, 
and assumptions enrooted in the system. A shallow exploration of the most evident 
descriptors of airports as complex sociotechnical systems would not enable an 
understanding of the very origins of OV. As a consequence, semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, and field observation were selected due to their 
capacity to grasp information about the context and the experience of participants, 
the primary sources of understanding about OV. Additionally, these three methods 
complemented each other in forming an illustration of OV in the investigated 
airports. 
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The investigation into OV conducted by this research focused first on the 
manifestations of OV. Potential SSD to airport operations were first explored (RQ1 – 
Study One). Their individual and organisational determinants as contributors to OV 
through specific pathways were then identified (RQ2a – Study Two). Finally, 
existing countermeasures to the aforementioned OV factors were assessed and 
potential areas for improvement highlighted (RQ2b – Study Two). 
For practical reasons related to cost reduction and efficient travelling, data 
collection was conducted in Study One and Study Two at each airport. In this way, 
knowledge and understanding of the ways in which OV potentially incubates, 
manifests, and develops in Australian airports were progressively accumulated by the 
researcher. The scope for the single case study approach was then defined. In each of 
the three selected airports, the research team identified a key contact with whom a 
preliminary meeting was organised to share the objectives of the research, illustrate 
the research methods, nominate participants in the semi-structured interviews, and 
organise the field observation sessions.  
SSD, their potential individual and organisational determinants, and the 
countermeasures to tackle these precursors were all found combined in the 
experiences and perceptions of every interviewee/participant. As a consequence, 
semi-structured interviews and field observation took place concurrently, with a 
focus on the two research questions simultaneously. In contrast, document analysis 
was carried out at a later stage. Explored documents were in fact found to be more 
useful for specific research questions, given their peculiarity. For this reason, 
document analysis proved beneficial only after the researcher gained a first, general 
understanding of the explored phenomena in their context. Document analysis was 
carried out in order to provide a further depth of analysis and triangulation, by 
combining related findings with those of the two previous methods. After data 
collection was completed at the three sites,27 analysis was conducted on each study 
across the three airports. The overall data collection and analysis process adopted for 
the three studies is illustrated in Table 3.3. 
                                                 
 
27 The data collection process took around one year, including the withdrawn Airport W field 
research. 
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Table 3.3: Data Collection and Analysis Process 
 
AIRPORT A (total days: 12) 
 RQ1/Study 1 RQ2a-RQ2b/Study 2 
Data 
Collection 
Methods 
Interviews 
/Field 
Observation 
Document 
analysis 
Interviews / Field 
Observation 
Document analysis 
     
AIRPORT B (total days: 10) 
 RQ1/Study 1 RQ2a-RQ2b/Study 2 
Data 
Collection 
Methods 
Interviews / 
Field  
Observation 
Document 
analysis 
Interviews / Field 
Observation 
Document analysis 
     
AIRPORT C (total days: 13) 
 RQ1/Study 1 RQ2a-RQ2b/Study 2 
Data 
Collection 
Methods 
Interviews / 
Field 
Observation 
Document 
analysis 
Interviews / Field 
Observation 
Document analysis 
     
 
 
  
Analysis Safety and Security 
Disruptions 
Macroergonomic Factors of Vulnerability 
Existing Countermeasures to OV  
Discussion OV-Generated 
Disruptions in Airports 
Revised Macroergonomic Model for OV 
Assessment 
Practical Suggestions for Improvement
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3.8 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Due to their emphasis on the experience and the knowledge and perception of 
participants, semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most important research 
method for this thesis. The intrinsic value of interviews derives from their capacity to 
immerse the researcher into the social world of the participant (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011). In fact, interviews provide a representation of the ways in which interviewees 
perceive their context, their role, and other actors’ roles in the same context. In 
addition, interviews yield evidence about the social phenomena under exploration 
and insights into the cultural framework utilised by participants to identify 
phenomena. From this, interviews lead the researcher to theoretical understanding 
(Miller & Glassner, 2011). 
Semi-structured interviews typically nurture studies based on individually lived 
experiences, as they allow a close and personal interaction between the researcher 
and the participant (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). However, they are commonly 
utilised as a method to gain a first layer of information towards the elaboration of 
organisational case studies (Marshall & Rossman, 2011), according to the 
perspective that organisations are first of all made up of people (Tichy & Cohen, 
1997). Moreover, interviews are deemed to be particularly effective when knowledge 
about a topic is not complete in the literature (as in the case of vulnerability in 
complex sociotechnical systems) and an enhanced understanding of key concepts 
(such as OV) is necessary (Yin, 2009). Within the macroergonomic approach, 
interviews are indicated as an elective research method to gather complex qualitative 
information about organisations (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002; Newman, 2002). 
Traditionally, interviews are classified in unstructured, semi-structured, and 
structured (Newman, 2002) according to the degree of formalisation and rigidity of 
the interview process. Semi-structured interviews were adopted in this study as they 
feature an appropriate balance between a guided, topical approach (Patton, 2002) and 
the flexibility needed to investigate complex social phenomena. In particular, the two 
RQs were utilised as pre-determined topics around which the respondents had the 
chance to explore new areas of reputed interest. In this way, structured answers to the 
RQs, as well as participants’ perceptions and understanding of reality, could be 
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captured. Consistent to similar research on the crisis prevention stage of crisis 
management (D. Smith, 2005), the present study conducted a retrospective analysis 
of the explored phenomena (disruptions to normal business operations, OV, etc.) 
predominantly based on the participants’ experience in their roles. 
A total of 30 interviews were conducted in the three airports (12 in Airport A, 8 
in Airport B and 10 in Airport C) using the two RQs as the principal themes around 
which respondents questioned.28 Answers were therefore based on the interviewees’ 
actual experience in the explored airport. Within their responses, interviewees had 
the chance to highlight their perceptions and interpretations of:  
 The most common and relevant SSD manifested in their working 
environment (RQ1);  
 The main individual and organisational factors reputed to have a potential 
impact on the aforementioned disruptions, in the context of the proposed 
macroergonomic approach (RQ2a); 
 The countermeasures in place to deal with those disruptions and the areas for 
improvement related to these countermeasures (RQ2b). 
In spite of the scheduled interviews and the pre-listed questions, the 
interviewer was free to probe beyond the answers. Additionally, the respondents 
were provided with opportunities to elaborate further on their replies. This was 
encouraged by the sub-questions posed by the interviewer, which were modulated 
around topics that the respondents were more prone to discuss. Furthermore, sub-
questions were informed by the researcher’s gradual understanding of the key topics 
as the data collection stages were conducted. Despite the withdrawal from the study 
by Airport W, the interview, the observation session, and the document analysis 
conducted prior nonetheless played the important role of a pilot test for the 
investigator in the familiarisation process with the explored context. 
An example of this progressive assimilation by the researcher of the airport 
management organisations’ perspective was produced by RQ2a. After becoming 
familiar with the respondents’ viewpoints on the individual and organisational 
factors for vulnerability, the interviewer started directly asking participants for 
                                                 
 
28 The script utilised to conduct the semi-structured interviews is illustrated in Appendix 01. 
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specific examples referring to the macroergonomic categories.29 This clearly helped 
the interviewees to organise their responses and contributed to aligning the interview 
on a common language/tone. This method fostered further richness to the interview 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Consequentially, the vast majority of participants’ 
responses took the form of an articulated illustration of the OV potentially found in 
their working environment. 
Further elements justified the choice of semi-structured interviews as the 
principal data collection method for this thesis. First, semi-structured interviews 
enable a quick yield on a large amount of data (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Second, 
this research technique largely benefits from a climate of reciprocal trust created with 
the participants. The interviews’ quality largely relies on mutual confidence between 
the interviewer and the interviewee (Seidman, 1998). Such interacting trust was a 
pre-existing condition in a large-scale research project like Airports of the Future. 
During the interviews, when the researcher introduced the study as part of an 
ongoing university research project, a climate of trust was immediately created with 
the participants. This was due to different factors: the recognised value of Airports of 
the Future as a research project with potential to directly benefit the involved airport 
organisations, the acknowledged role of the Queensland University of Technology as 
a relevant actor in the research field, etc. After the interview, this confidence was 
also strengthened due to the planned follow up activities (debriefing, circulation of 
draft analysis on what had emerged from the preliminary stages of data collection, 
etc.). Follow up is indeed reputed to improve the quality of data produced (Lee, 
1993). Another element that contributed to increasing the reciprocal trust was the 
interviewer’s background familiarity with safety and security management practices. 
As previously mentioned, a preliminary meeting was organised with a key 
contact in each airport in order to identify interviewees who could provide insightful 
information and would be available to interview. This partially informed the adopted 
sampling technique. Based on the key contact’s indications, the selection of 
respondents followed a purposeful sampling technique (Patton, 2002), similar to that 
adopted to choose the data collection sites. All potential candidates for the interviews 
were given the choice to participate or refuse to do so, and all interviewees signed a 
                                                 
 
29 See Sub-section 2.4.2 for additional reference. 
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specific consent form. Elements of convenience sampling (Babbie, 2013) were also 
introduced to benefit from some interviewees’ availability on shift at a specific time. 
In the framework of the holistic approach adopted by the present study, respondents 
were selected to enable the broadest illustration of how Australian airports typically 
work, from an airport management perspective. In order to do so, the three units of 
analysis and the three areas of operations had to be represented in the sample. 
Details about the criteria utilised to classify each unit of analysis and areas of 
operations are illustrated in Chapter Four. In general, the units of analysis were 
constituted by the three managerial levels present in the airport management 
organisations at the three airports. Their main criterion for classification referred to 
every respondent’s functional level within the organisational chart. The leadership 
level (LL) included general managers, directly reporting to the Board of 
Directors/CEO of the airport. The corporate management level (CML) included the 
corporate managers directly reporting to the general managers. The operational 
management level (OML) included the operational managers directly reporting to the 
corporate managers. Due to their interconnectedness with airport management 
organisations, security screening providers and the Australian Federal Police 
(SSP/AFP) constituted an additional unit of analysis that integrated the airport 
management organisations’ perspective on OV, with particular reference to security 
management functions. 
 The areas of operations were classified according to the area of competence of 
the managers. Areas of competence were categorised based on interviewees’ 
responses, in order to directly draw information from participants’ experience and 
perceptions. Landside (LS) managers had the terminals and their annexes (front-of-
house) as their main area of intervention. Airside (AS) managers were those 
predominantly dealing with tarmac and runways/taxiways operations (back-of-
house). Landside/Airside managers (LS/AS) had mixed functions between the front-
of-house and back-of-house.  
As previously mentioned in Chapter Two, airports as complex sociotechnical 
systems are characterised by the presence of numerous, interconnected sub-systems. 
In order to account for this crucial feature, units of analysis and areas of operations 
were crossed in the present study and the resulting components were considered 
fundamental constituents of the overall complex system. This was reflected in the 
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sampling strategy adopted for the semi-structured interviews. Table 3.4 illustrates the 
aforementioned sample, with the total number of respondents per unit of analysis and 
area of operations. 
 
Table 3.4: Respondents per Units of Analysis and Areas of Operation 
Area of Operations
Unit of Analysis 
Landside Landside/Airside Airside
Leadership Level - 3 - 
    
Corporate Management Level 3 4 3 
    
Operational Management Level 2 7 3 
    
Security Screening Provider/Australian Federal 
Police 
5 - - 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
10 
 
14 
 
6 
 
 
Due to their strategic role, respondents at the leadership level did not have a 
specific area of operations, but equally shared functions and responsibilities in both 
LS and AS. Conversely, due to their topic-specific focus on security, SSPs and AFP 
interviewees operated almost exclusively LS, as a contracted organisation the former, 
and as a governmental agency the latter. Table 3.5 illustrates the job titles and 
functions of respondents.30 In order to further protect respondents’ identities, job 
titles in Table 3.5 are indicated with a generic descriptor, which does not correspond 
to the formal job title. 
                                                 
 
30 In Airport W the job title of the only interviewee was Security & Planning Manager. 
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Table 3.5: Job Titles (generic descriptor) and Functions of Respondents in the Semi-
structured Interviews 
 
Unit of Analysis/Area of 
Operations 
Job Titles Length of Interviews 
Leadership Level LS/AS General Manager 
General Manager (2) 
31’52” 
30’13” and 38’06” 
   
Corporate Management 
Level LS 
Security & Planning Manager (2) 
Terminal  Manager 
29’06” and 37’41” 
35’19” 
 
 
  
Corporate Management 
Level LS/AS 
Compliance Manager 
Risk Manager 
Risk & Compliance Manager 
Terminal Operations Manager 
35’41” 
45’23” 
31’32” 
1.01’03” 
   
Corporate Management 
Level AS 
Operations Manager 
Airside Manager (2) 
59’48” 
37’38” and 35’10” 
   
Operational Management 
Level LS 
Security Operations Manager (2) 45’45” and 1.19’33” 
   
Operational Management 
Level LS/AS 
Workplace Health & Safety Manager 
Workplace Health & Safety Officer 
Duty Manager (3) 
Facilitation Manager 
Facilitation Manager  
59’58” 
45’23” 
29’35”, 36’53” and 
21’02” 
41’28” 
38’26” 
   
Operational Management 
Level AS 
Compliance Coordinator 
Airside Coordinator 
Airside Operations Manager 
22’15” 
38’14” 
32’38” 
   
Security Screening 
Provider/Australian 
Federal Police LS 
AFP (2) 
Screening Point Manager (2) 
Security Manager 
- 
33’37” and 32’15” 
51’32” 
 
 
All semi-structured interviews conducted in the present study were preceded by 
relevant statements about ethical issues, informed consent, and 
privacy/confidentiality of collected data. All respondents agreed to have their 
interviews audio-recorded, with the exception of two cases, in which the researcher 
was allowed to take notes about the answers. The length of the interviews ranged 
from a minimum of around 20 minutes to a maximum of more than one hour. 
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Relevant information deriving from tone, body language, etc. was noted by the 
interviewer during and after the interview, as suggested in the literature (Burgess, 
1982). In particular, these elements were balanced with the actual responses, in order 
to provide further information about respondents’ experience and perceptions of their 
working environment. This was particularly true in the case of emphasis or nuances 
added to specific concepts by means of humour, sarcasm, disappointment, or covert 
criticism.  
An example of this was that of a respondent who illustrated the privacy 
concerns related to some old body scanner equipment, by making use of gestures and 
para-verbal communication: 
‘…the person standing next to the equipment isn’t the person that sees the 
image, but they just couldn’t get over that bit. I don’t see you come through 
and I can see your *whistle* […] so ours just goes *whoop* and takes the 
picture…’ (Security screening provider/Australian Federal Police-LS) 
In a couple of cases, the interviews were interrupted by phone calls to which 
the respondents had to attend. In these cases, in order to preserve the privacy of these 
conversations, the audio-recorder was paused and then re-started once the phone call 
finished. The audio-recorder always functioned properly, and in no instance did an 
interview have to be conducted again. Furthermore, the quality of all audio 
recordings was high enough to allow transcription, which was verified by the 
researcher at the end of every interview. The 30 interviews were all transcribed by 
means of a professional service, with the exception of the very first interview, which 
was transcribed by the researcher in order to become familiarised with the 
respondents’ perspectives and verify the appropriateness of the questions. In order to 
check the quality of the transcription service and ultimately strengthen this thesis’s 
accuracy and validity, the researcher then replayed all of the records with their 
transcription, as suggested in the literature (Patton, 2002). This process produced a 
two-fold benefit: 1) it corroborated the researcher’s knowledge about the discussed 
topics, and 2) it allowed him to rectify inconsistencies and gaps in the transcription, 
due to transcribers’ unfamiliarity with technical language. In order to preserve the 
confidentiality of the collected data, transcription was performed by qualified 
professionals, upon signature of a specific confidentiality agreement. 
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3.9 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
 Document analysis was used in the present research to corroborate data 
collected through the semi-structured interviews. Yin (2009) identified four strengths 
characterising this research method. First, it is stable, in that selected documents can 
be accessed and utilised repeatedly. Second, it is unobtrusive, which refers to the fact 
that it does not require the researcher to intrude in the research context (contrary to 
field observation and semi-structured interviews conducted in the field). Third, it is 
exact, as it supposedly contains accurate information. Fourth, it is broad, as it 
potentially covers a vast range of events, contexts, and times. 
In spite of its effectiveness in integrating other research methods to achieve 
triangulation and nurture the case study strategy, document analysis has some 
limitations (Yin, 2009). First, retrievability of documents could be an issue. Second, 
there is a risk of biased selectivity if the series of documents is incomplete. Third, 
documents may be affected by reporting bias referring to their author’s opinion 
about a specific topic. Fourth, access to the documents may be restrained at a later 
stage, making them unavailable. 
In the present investigation, once the appropriateness of document analysis was 
established, selection of the documents was the most relevant task to accomplish. As 
for the semi-structured interviews, a purposeful sampling strategy was applied 
(Patton, 2002). In each airport, the preliminary meetings with the key contacts 
allowed the researcher to discuss this thesis’ objectives, in order to agree upon a list 
of documents that could be relevant for the research, as well as accessible to the 
investigator. The purposeful sampling criterion resulting from these discussions was 
therefore a mix between relevance (intended as ability by the document to provide 
information around the RQs) and confidentiality requirements.  
In Airport A, the key contact sorted the request of the documents to their 
owners within the airport management, collected all of the pieces of writing and then 
made them available to the researcher. In Airports B and C, the investigator was 
asked to directly negotiate the release of the documents with the respective owners. 
Some documents were granted in printed form during the field data collection, 
whereas some others in electronic format at a later stage. The owners of most of the 
documents were corporate managers, consistent with their functions of organisational 
strategic managers and supervisors for compliance to existing regulations.   
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Document analysis provided the present investigation with robust, written 
information about the explored organisations, with a transversal focus on the two 
RQs. In particular, the analysed pieces of writing enhanced information about SSD 
(RQ1) and individual and organisational factors for systemic vulnerability (RQ2a). 
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the aforementioned documents, they 
are indicated in the present thesis with a generic, descriptive title, different from their 
official one. Table 3.6 lists the documents analysed for the three airports. Documents 
obtained from Airport W before withdrawal from the research project are also 
indicated for completeness.31 
 
Table 3.6: Analysed Documents 
Source Code Format Description 
Air. A A01 Paper Management of safety systems in compliance with CASA 
regulations 
Air. A A02 Paper Review of Airside safety risks 
Air. A A03 Paper Risk assessment document 
Air. A A04 Paper Risk treatment 
Air. A A05 Paper Hazard notification form 
Air. A A06 Paper Incident notification and investigation form (generic) 
Air. A A07 Paper Incident notification and investigation form (AS) 
Air. A A08 Elect. Regulations for Airside drivers 
Air. A A09 Elect. Annual review of safety and security events (1) 
Air. A A10 Elect. Annual review of safety and security events (2) 
Air. A A11 Elect. Annual review of safety and security events (3) 
Air. A A12 Elect. Organisational structure and chart 
Air. A A13 Elect. Framework for the elaboration of corporate risk assessment 
documents 
Air. A A14 Elect. Review of aerodrome security risks 
Air. B B01 Paper Management of safety systems in compliance with CASA 
regulations 
Air. B B02 Paper Process for risk management 
Air. B B03 Paper Risk assessment document 
Air. B B04 Paper Risk treatment (framework) 
                                                 
 
31 Although documents obtained from Airport W were not considered for the purposes of this thesis, 
their analysis nonetheless contributed to gaining a better understanding of the potential, typical safety 
and security disruptions in Australian airports. 
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Air. B B05 Paper Risk treatment (evaluation) 
Air. B B06 Paper Safety performance indicators in compliance with ICAO 
regulations 
Air. B B07 Paper Review of safety and security events (limited timeframe) 
Air. B B08 Paper Safety and security bulletins (2) 
Air. B B09 Paper Terminals layout map 
Air. B B10 Elect. Organisational structure and chart 
Air. B B11 Elect. Review of Airside operations risks 
Air. B B12 Elect. Regulations for Airside drivers 
Air. B B13 Elect. Review of landside operations risks 
Air. B B14 Elect. Annual review, notification and investigation security events (29 
files) 
Air. B B15 Elect. Corporate risk assessment matrix 
Air. B B16 Elect. Report on security screening performance 
Air. C C01 Paper Aerodrome manual 
Air. C C02 Paper Operational plan 
Air. C C03 Paper Organisational structure and chart 
Air. C C04 Paper Internal safety staff HR management document 
Air. C C05 Paper Terminals layout map 
Air. C C06 Elect. Regulations for Airside drivers 
Air. C C07 Elect. Review of Airside risks 
Air. W - Elect. Internal security and emergency guide 
Air. W - Elect. Annual review of safety and security events 
 
 
In addition to the documents indicated in Table 3.6, other pieces of writing 
were investigated during the present study. In particular, these involved international 
standards (such as the ones produced by the ICAO, for instance) or federal and 
national regulations (from governmental agencies, such as Office for Transport 
Security and CASA). The nature of these documents is general, in that they refer to 
the international or national civil aviation regime and are not case specific. As a 
consequence, they were used in the present research to gain an enhanced 
comprehension of the legal and managerial requirements to which the explored 
airports are subject. Analysis of these documents was therefore conducted when the 
airport-specific pieces of writing listed above referred to them. These general 
documents are referenced according to this thesis’ referencing style. 
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3.10 FIELD OBSERVATION 
One of the most important needs that the researcher felt at the earliest stages of 
data collection was to gain sufficient situation(al) awareness32, so to master the 
airport context, just as aviation operators and managers are required to do. The 
illustration of the airport environment conducted in Chapter Two depicted a complex 
context, in which business-as-usual operations required a high level of specific 
competence and skills. As a result, the external observer immersed in such a scenario 
may feel lost and not fully understand what is happening around them. The 
complexity that characterises the human-machine interaction in modern airports 
(ICAO, 2011) and the number and nature of stakeholders involved in aviation 
operations require a specific approach for the external observer to make sense of 
airport processes, practices, and structures (Knox et al., 2008). Marshall and 
Rossman (2011) argued that observation can take different forms, according to its 
degree of formalisation. Observation can range from simple ‘hanging around’ to 
strict action-recording by means of formal checklists. In all cases, field notes are the 
product of observation and enable the investigator to fix their impressions, in the 
form of ‘detailed, non-judgemental, concrete descriptions of what has been 
observed’ (p. 139). 
Field observation was conducted by the researcher in the form of hanging 
around the three data collection sites,33 for a total of around 21 hours. During the 
preliminary meetings held at each airport with the key contacts, sessions of field 
observation were planned in order for the principal investigator to become 
familiarised with the airport environment. These familiarisation sessions were 
organised following the indications of the key contacts in each airport. Field 
observation was therefore a compromise between the need of the researcher to 
investigate and the obligation by airport management to protect the confidentiality 
and anonymity of their operations. The focus of observation was predominantly on 
                                                 
 
32 The concept of situation (or situational) awareness is a crucial element in the complex systems 
theory and is described as ‘…the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near 
future…’ (Endsley & Jones, 2011, p. 13). 
33 Field observation was also conducted in Airport W prior to withdrawal from the study. Although 
data drawn from this site were not considered for the purposes of this thesis, observation in Airport W 
nonetheless increased the investigator’s knowledge of the airport industry. See Table 3.7 for further 
reference. 
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impersonal elements such as airport layout, design, equipment, and organisational 
processes and procedures.  
Field notes (typed and hand-written) were taken extensively during and after 
observation, in order to provide an effective reminder of information that could be 
forgotten or distorted over time, before analysis of gathered data (Punch, 2012). 
Some notes were taken in the form of audio-records and then transcribed by the 
investigator. After each day spent in the field, the researcher reviewed and refined 
the data by expanding their scope, where necessary; highlighting recurring themes; 
and emphasising logical connections among themes. The first sessions of field 
observation were the ones in which the researcher collected the most field notes, still 
being unfamiliar with many of the observed contexts. In the following sessions, with 
the progressive accumulation of knowledge and situational awareness, field 
observation became more a confirmation of what was previously observed. When the 
observed contexts started becoming recurrent, and no new insight could be gained, 
saturation was reached and observation suspended, until the next airport. 
Together with document analysis, field observation was utilised to complement 
the data collected through the primary research procedure, semi-structured 
interviews, and achieve triangulation (Jick, 1979). Of the three adopted methods, 
field observation was the one that yielded the least amount of data directly reported 
in the present thesis. Nonetheless, this method provided precious insight into the 
functioning mechanisms of the investigated airports and their sub-systems and on 
some elements that are crucial to aviation in general: size of the airports, physical 
location, logistics, operations, etc. 
Through the key contacts, the involved airport management organisations 
selected specific modes (or loci) of field observation and granted access to those to 
the investigator. Some contexts were explicitly excluded from the observation, 
mainly due to the commercial in confidence nature of the associated data. In other 
areas of the explored airports, observation was permitted, but with limited scope. 
Table 3.7 provides an overview of the modes in which field observation took place in 
the three selected airports. 
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Table 3.7: Field Observation Modes 
Airport Mode of observation Main sub-systems Area of 
Operations 
A, B, C, 
W 
Terminals walk-through 
(domestic and international) 
Front-of-house parking, check-in 
area,  checkpoints, concourse, 
boarding gates, baggage belts 
LS 
    
A, B, C Security screening 
checkpoints  
X-ray gates, walk-through metal 
detector, Customs 
LS 
    
A, B, C, 
W 
Aerodrome serviceability full 
inspection 
Ramp, taxiways, runways, 
perimeter fences, general 
aviation 
AS 
    
A, B Airport management control 
room  
Airport management control 
room 
LS/AS 
   
A Vehicle access point 
inspection 
Vehicle access point AS 
    
B Airport operations 
coordination meeting 
Airport operations LS 
    
C Airside operations control 
room  
Airside control room AS 
    
 
In this research, the field observation stage took the form of unstructured 
familiarisation sessions, where no preliminary prompt was followed and the decision 
regarding which areas to examine was predominantly a call by the key contact. 
Sometimes, the researcher was able to ask to focus on specific contexts. When this 
did not directly involve security operations, observation was generally granted. In 
contrast, when issues related to commercial in confidence information could arise, 
access was generally denied.  
The following paragraphs provide an explanation of the field observation 
modes examined in the present thesis. This illustration is expected to provide enough 
detail for other researchers to perform a similar analysis. This last point is deemed to 
increase the dependability of this investigation (Shenton, 2004). 
Terminals walk-through (domestic and international). In all airports a first 
session of field observation was constituted by a tour of the airport facilities, which 
the researcher performed, accompanied by the key contact. During this walk-through, 
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the investigator could observe the most basic airport operations (e.g., exploration of 
the terminal facilities and parking areas, access to the sterile areas, test of the checks 
performed by Customs, exploration of the baggage handling system, etc.). This direct 
observation of airport operations increased the researcher’s awareness and 
knowledge about the airport environment. The key contact’s role was crucial in 
explaining the observed practices and procedures and in yielding rich information. 
Serviceability and Airside (AS) inspections. In all airports, the researcher had 
the chance to participate in serviceability and Airside inspections.34 The key contacts 
explained that in Australian airports, these investigations are predominantly aimed to 
ensure the effectiveness of the AS equipment (e.g., runway lights, parking bays, 
conditions of the tarmac, etc.) and are therefore conducted by AS officers. The 
investigator was driven around the AS areas of the three selected airports, where 
different situations were observed: the design and layout of the airport, the length 
and conditions of the runway, the conditions of the external perimeter fences, the 
allocation of the parking bays on the apron, the presence and position of the general 
aviation facilities, etc. Field observation conducted in this mode yielded a large 
amount of data on the structural characteristics of the explored airports and allowed 
the researcher to gain a better understanding of the physical limits of the aerodromes 
(e.g., potential for expansion, geographic features of the airport, interaction with 
surrounding businesses and commercial actors, etc.). 
 Security screening checkpoints. Information associated with the security 
screening process has the potential to be highly confidential. An example of this is 
the possibility for the external observer to see the content of the passengers’ bags on 
the screening monitors. In order to avoid this instance, the principal investigator of 
the present study was allowed to observe the screening procedure from a certain 
distance. Furthermore, observation never involved screening monitors. The 
confidentiality of the passengers was therefore fully guaranteed. This precaution 
exceeded the common standards in modern airports, where passengers involved in 
the screening process normally have the chance to see the screening monitors in 
operation. In the present research, field observation of the security screening 
checkpoints revolved around the understanding of the procedures that characterise 
                                                 
 
34 One such inspection was also conducted in Airport W. 
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this practice. Prior to observation, the key contact escorting the principal investigator 
illustrated the nature of the research to the security screening supervisors. On some 
occasions, the latter informally provided additional information on the screening 
process by recounting past experiences and common instances associated with their 
duties. As in the case of other modes of observation, no particular disruption could 
be witnessed by the researcher during field observation of the security screening 
points. However, these sessions of observation complemented information on the 
screening procedures drawn from the semi-structured interviews. 
Other field observation modes. In the different data collection sites, other 
modes of field observation were made available to the investigator. In particular, the 
researcher was invited to explore an airport management control room (Airports A 
and B), to observe a vehicle access point inspection (Airport A), to participate in a 
coordination meeting of the operations function (Airport B) and to inspect an Airside 
operations control room (Airport C). 
    Different reasons justify the adoption of field observation as a research 
method for the present research. First, this research method directly immersed the 
researcher into the investigated context, by casting light on the complexity of the 
explored organisations (Robson, 2011). Airports feature a degree of complexity that 
requires the social explorers to firstly make sense of what is happening around them 
(Knox et al., 2008). The presence of numerous sub-systems in modern airports makes 
comprehension of the overall functioning mechanisms harder. In particular, decision-
making is a complicated task in an environment characterised by a wealth of 
stakeholders. Interpersonal behaviours therefore have to be carefully considered in 
order to clear up complexity and observation is an effective method in reaching this 
objective (Yin, 2009). 
Second, another reason for the adoption of field observation in the present 
exploratory study lay in its complementarity with semi-structured interviews. While 
the latter provides a representation of reality as perceived by actors in the airports, 
the former enables direct observation of that reality by the investigator, who can 
therefore directly witness how events uncover. In the present study, observation was 
typically carried out after the interviews, by spending time on site with the 
interviewees during the accomplishment of their duties. As a result, in many 
instances, the researcher was able to better understand references made by 
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respondents in the course of previous interviews. Examples include operation of 
security screening points, Airside and tarmac activities, terminal procedures, etc.    
Third, as in the case of the semi-structured interviews, field observation is 
indicated as a preferred method for research that adheres to the macroergonomic 
approach (Hendrick, 2004b). One recent example is the study conducted by a team of 
researchers on the performance of complex health care services through direct 
observation of safety-related clinical events (Carayon et al., 2013). 
One limitation in the field observation methodology lies in the fact that it must 
take place in a bounded time, for efficiency reasons. Thus, occurrence of events 
significant to the research is not guaranteed, because, to use Law’s words, ‘…the 
ethnographer is never where the action is…’ (1994, p. 45). However, this was a 
negligible limitation in this study. In fact, field observation was used primarily to 
corroborate data and information derived from semi-structured interviews. In 
addition, observation was utilised with a focus on RQ2a and RQ2b, in order to 
explore commonplace factors impacting on organisational vulnerability and the 
countermeasures in place to face such factors. SSD (RQ1) were not expected to take 
place during observation (at least not large-scale ones, which were not in the scope of 
the present investigation). More common events were nonetheless directly examined 
including unattended items, Airside security breaches, ramp safety issues, and 
congestion in the terminals. In one instance, the investigator was particularly lucky to 
witness the impact on airport operations of a bird strike that had occurred to an 
airplane a few hours prior. 
3.11 DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of qualitative analysis is to transform data into findings and then 
into knowledge (Patton, 2002). The underlying idea of this process is that the 
researcher progressively makes sense of the collected material and draws an overall 
picture of the investigated phenomena. Explanation is not typical of qualitative 
inquiry, which, on the contrary, aims to explore social reality in order to gain better 
comprehension of its nature and characteristics. Sense-making requires rationality, 
and logic, but also intuition. Therefore, data analysis is not sharply separated from 
data collection (Patton, 2002). Recurring themes, common patterns, and 
interpretative effort transversally occur during the research process, throughout 
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which knowledge is progressively built up. Chronological sequences are not the rule, 
but the exception. Data are collected and unconsciously examined by the researcher 
at the moment of collection itself. Continuous re-adjustment derives from this 
process and very often preliminary data analysis informs the way in which further 
data are gathered at a later stage. 
This research was no exception, as data collected in each airport were 
informally analysed and interpreted on the spot. This enabled a progressive 
construction of knowledge built up from airport to airport. This modus operandi was 
particularly suitable for the single case approach adopted in this thesis, whose main 
objective was to represent how OV potentially incubates and manifests in Australian 
airports. A multiple case design aimed to represent OV in three different airports, 
according to their size, location, operational arrangements, etc., would have required 
the researcher to have a common starting basis for the three venues, in order not to 
bias the findings drawn from them. 
In spite of this necessary clarification, to make the data collection and analysis 
process more efficient and easier to monitor, this investigation adopted a staged data 
management approach: 
1. Stage One – Data Collection. As illustrated in the previous sections of 
Chapter Three, semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and field 
observation were conducted in each airport, revolving around the two RQs, 
before moving to the next data collection site. 
2. Stage Two – Data Preparation. This phase was preliminary to the analysis 
stage. During this phase, the researcher reviewed the transcriptions of the 
semi-structured interviews to check for inconsistencies, surveyed the 
documents to be included in the document analysis, and re-examined the 
observation field diaries to verify their completeness. A first interpretative 
framework was drafted revolving around recurring themes of OV. 
3. Stage Three – Framework for Data Analysis and First Level of Coding. In 
order to organise the recurrent themes emerging from the collected data, 
different coding criteria were established for the two studies of the present 
thesis. 
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A. Study One, RQ1 (SSD): A review of the semi-structured interviews 
and document analysis contributed to the definition of the categories, 
nature, characteristics, and evolution of the SSD (actual and potential) 
in the explored airports. Identification of the recurring themes was 
possible through several sessions of examination of the data, across 
the three data collection sites. The number of identified macro-
categories progressively increased throughout the different sessions 
until 15 macro-categories of SSD were identified within the data 
collected across the three aerodromes. Table 3.8 lists the macro-
categories of SSD identified as recurring themes within RQ1, across 
the three airports. These macro-categories indicate both actual and 
potential events. 
Table 3.8: Recurring Themes in RQ1 
 Macro-categories of Safety and Security Disruptions 
1 Aircraft emergencies 
2 Airside breaches 
3 Bird and wildlife management 
4 Congestion and queuing in airports 
5 Disruptive behaviours by passengers or general public 
6 Fire alarms 
7 Maintenance, works, and repairs 
8 Natural hazards 
9 Prohibited items violations 
10 Ramp safety issues 
11 Landside safety events 
12 Landside security breaches 
13 Technical failures 
14 Traffic management front-of-house 
15 Unattended items 
 
B. Study Two, RQ2a (factors of organisational vulnerability) and RQ2b 
(suggestions for improvement): Recurring themes within RQ2a and 
RQ2b were identified based on the review of the literature conducted 
in Chapter Two. In particular, the macroergonomic approach 
constituted the blueprint for identification of individual and 
organisational factors of vulnerability (RQ2a) and associated 
suggestions for improvement (RQ2b) as recurring themes across the 
 Chapter 3: Research Methodology                                       
 145 
three data collection sites. Data were then organised and classified 
around these recurring themes. Table 3.9 provides an overview of 
these themes, with an illustration of the respective descriptors, across 
the three airports. 
Table 3.9: Recurring Themes in RQ2a and RQ2b 
Theme Descriptor 
Individual Factors Human factors referring to an individual’s choices, actions, 
practices. 
Task Factors The ways in which tasks are designed and allocated within the 
explored organisations. 
Tools and Technology 
Factors 
Hardware and software tools and technologies utilised in the 
explored organisations. 
Environment Factors Physical layout, design and structure of the explored airports. 
Organisational Factors: 
Communication Factors 
Communication practices diffused in the explored organisations. 
Organisational Factors: 
Culture Factors 
Organisational safety and security cultures diffused in the 
explored organisations. 
Organisational Factors: 
Policy Factors 
Policies, guidelines, and regulations implemented in the explored 
organisations with an organisational and/or a governmental 
origin. 
Organisational Factors: 
Structure Factors 
Governance mechanisms and organisational structure enacted 
throughout the explored organisations. 
Organisational Factors: 
Implementation Factors 
Practical implementation of organisational and governmental 
policies. 
Organisational Factors: 
Strategy Factors 
Organisational strategic objectives (economic constraints, 
business models, long-term goals, etc.) 
External Environment Influence of the external environment, not derived from the 
explored organisations. 
 
In the first level of data analysis, the collected data were coded around 
recurring themes in the frameworks for data analysis previously 
illustrated (Study One and Study Two), across the three airports. QSR 
International’s NVivo 10, a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software was used. Interviews’ transcriptions, observation 
field notes, and relevant documents were imported into the software.  
4. Stage Four – Second Level Data Analysis (Study One and Two). After the 
first level of coding, which organised the data around the recurring themes 
illustrated in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, a second session of coding was conducted 
across the three airports. In this case, sub-themes and sub-nodes were 
identified within the collected data (Study One and Study Two), in order to 
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provide a richer description of the explored phenomena (SSD, RQ1, for Study 
One and individual and organisational factors of vulnerability, RQ2a, and 
potential for improvement, RQ2b, for Study Two). In so doing, data analysis 
yielded more complete information and sub-categories of meaning could be 
singled-out across the three data collection sites. 
5. Stage Five – Third Level Data Analysis (Study One and Two). After 
completion of the first and second levels of analysis, the same data were 
examined from the perspectives of the three units of analysis (leadership 
level, corporate management level and operational management level, plus 
the security screening provider/Australian Federal Police level) and the three 
areas of operations (Landside, Landside/Airside and Airside), across the three 
aerodromes. In this way, findings highlighted in Stage Four were referred to 
the units of analysis and the areas of operation in order to identify the 
respective key topics for the two studies. This stage of data analysis primarily 
involved data produced by means of semi-structured interviews and 
observation field notes. In some instances, the perspective of the different 
units of analysis and/or areas of operation emerged as not relevant for the 
analysis. In these cases, only the two first levels of data analysis were 
considered relevant and no further coding was conducted. 
6. Stage Six – Discussion: The last stage of data analysis focused on 
determining connections among findings of the two studies. Data coded and 
analysed across the three airports were gathered and organised around the 
single case study approach adopted in the investigation. In particular, SSD 
(actual and potential) in airports (Study One) were associated with potential 
individual and organisational factors for OV (Study Two, RQ2a), in order to 
enhance comprehension of the mechanisms that preside over OV in airports. 
According to the conceptual framework underlying the present thesis, this led 
to the identification of specific pathways of vulnerability (Kraemer, Carayon, 
& Clem, 2009; D. Smith, 2004, 2005). At the same time, this last stage cast 
light on the relationship between individual and organisational factors for OV 
and existing countermeasures (RQ2b), in order to provide practical 
suggestions for the improvement of the latter. 
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Coding and data analysis were performed across the three data collection sites 
in order to identify differences and emphasise, where possible, variance in the 
collected data. However, the explored airports were characterised by significant 
similarities in terms of size, governance system, underlying regulations, nature of 
safety and security operations, etc., as illustrated in Section 3.6. This translated into a 
homogenous sample, typical of qualitative research adopting a single case study 
approach (Yin, 2009). Collected data yielded similar results across the three data 
collection sites. Variance was highlighted in a minority of cases and only for some of 
the explored phenomena. These rare cases are highlighted in the present thesis and 
discussed in the chapters illustrating the results drawn from the investigation 
(Chapters Four and Five). 
In order to ensure reliability in the coding process, the adopted frameworks for 
data analysis were discussed with the two research supervisors for testing. 
Furthermore, a test of reliability of the coding criteria was conducted on different 
excerpts of the semi-structured interviews in the three airports. An external observer, 
who was unaware of the research objectives, was asked to code excerpts from the 
interviews by classifying them in the different SSD (Study One) and 
macroergonomic categories (Study Two) contained in the research framework. In 
case of initial dissimilarities between the observers, differences were discussed in 
order to provide an agreed coding. When no agreement could be achieved, the related 
passages in the interviews were excluded from analysis. The resulting kappa 
coefficient (Cohen, 1960) was 0.88 for Study One and 0.82 for Study Two, which 
indicates almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). The compared excerpts 
were a total of 84, equally extracted from interviews conducted in the three airports. 
These tests confirmed the reliability of the adopted frameworks for coding and 
subsequent data analysis. 
Traditionally, one of the limitations that scientific research has to face is that 
findings may be dependent on the adopted data collection method or source of 
evidence. Each method or source is indeed expected to highlight only a portion of 
empirical reality (Denzin, 1978). In case study design, this last point translates into a 
limited representation of the explored phenomena. In order to avoid this, it is highly 
recommended that different methods or sources of evidence are employed to inform 
the case study (Yin, 2009). This process is called data triangulation (Patton, 2002) 
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and can take the form of within method triangulation or across method triangulation 
(Jick, 1979). In the first case, the researcher uses different sources of evidence within 
the same method; while in the second case, the researcher utilises various data 
collection methods. In both instances, data triangulation is meant to strengthen the 
findings.  
In the present research, within method triangulation was achieved by 
interviewing different people within the same unit of analysis and area of operations, 
by analysing different documents on the same topic, and by observing different 
employees at work within the same unit of analysis and area of operations. Across 
method triangulation was instead reached by comparing and contrasting themes 
emerging from analysis of the semi-structured interviews with those emerging from 
the other two methods (document analysis and field observation). In this way, the 
investigator cast light on the similarities and gaps in the themes identified. 
Converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2009, p. 115) were therefore highlighted in each 
study/RQ. A typical example of across method triangulation was when an 
interviewee described the progressive stages characterising an SSD (semi-structured 
interview) and this description was later compared to the investigation process 
conducted on the very same disruption (document analysis). In the case of more 
common events witnessed by the researcher during his presence at the airport 
(unattended items, Airside security breaches, etc.), the investigator could also add his 
observation notes (field observation) as a source of evidence, to achieve further data 
triangulation and draw more robust information. 
3.12 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to assess the quality of a scientific investigation, different criteria or 
tests exist, which largely depend on the nature of the adopted methodology. 
Qualitative research therefore has different evaluation measures than quantitative 
research, even though the former have traditionally been borrowed from the latter 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). In the literature, qualitative research is tested against 
criteria that have slightly different names (Healy & Perry, 2000; Lincoln et al., 2011; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002; Robson, 2011; Shenton, 2004; Yin, 2009), 
but can basically be summarised as follows: credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln et al., 2011; Shenton, 2004). 
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Credibility, which corresponds to internal validity in quantitative research, is 
one of the most important criteria to consider (Shenton, 2004). It is a measurement of 
the extent to which the findings highlighted by the study are congruent with the 
examined reality. It provides an assessment of the association between the actual 
investigation and its planned objectives. In order to achieve credibility, Patton (2002) 
recommended a combination of three inquiry elements: rigorous methods, the 
credibility of the researcher, and philosophical belief in the value of qualitative 
inquiry.  
Several practical steps were undertaken in the present research to achieve 
credibility (Shenton, 2004). First, the research method adopted in the present thesis 
was well established, as it was based on previous comparable projects. Data analysis 
followed the macroergonomic approach on complex systems theory (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007), which has proved to be effective, in 
particular in assessing organisational vulnerability in complex sociotechnical systems 
by adopting research methods similar to the present thesis (Carayon, 2006; Carayon 
et al., 2013; Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Kraemer, Carayon, 
& Clem, 2009). 
Second, credibility was ensured by the development of familiarity with the 
culture of the participating organisations. The researcher spent extensive time in the 
selected airports during all stages of the data collection, from semi-structured 
interviews, to field observation, for a total of around 25 days in the field. This 
allowed the investigator to develop an increased understanding of the organisational 
cultures enacted within the explored airports. 
Third, triangulation of qualitative research tools was achieved, as previously 
mentioned. Not only semi-structured interviews, but also document analysis and field 
observation were performed to ensure the richness, variety, and completeness of 
information (across method triangulation). Furthermore, many sources of evidence 
were sought in order to compare and contrast data obtained adopting the same 
method (within method triangulation). Finally, in spite of embracing a single case 
study design, this investigation replicated the same research methods in three 
different data collection sites (Airport A, Airport B, and Airport C) in order to gain 
an enhanced comprehension of the phenomena that regulate OV in Australian 
airports. 
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Fourth, informants’ honesty was not only ensured by giving potential 
respondents the opportunity to refuse to undertake interviews, but also by double-
checking their responses against official documents provided by airport management 
organisations for the document analysis stage.  
Finally, frequent debriefing sessions, as well as peer scrutiny, were held with 
this thesis’ supervisors and other members in the Airports of the Future project in 
order to test the findings for robustness and credibility. 
Transferability (external validity for the quantitative researcher) is another 
key parameter to assess trustworthiness in qualitative research. In general terms, any 
piece of qualitative research features limitations in terms of generalisability and 
transferability of findings to a broader population (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). In 
particular, in case study research the considered context is of crucial importance 
(Yin, 2009), limiting the scope for transferability to other settings.  
Despite this, the present investigation adopted an embedded approach, where 
multiple units of analysis and areas of operations were explored. As a consequence, 
analytical generalisability was produced by opposing findings derived from different 
managerial levels and working settings, in order to stress differences and similarities. 
Furthermore, extending the investigation to three data collection sites provided 
further transferability to the overall research on OV in airports. Additionally, this 
study carefully itemised the adopted research methodology by providing the readers 
with specific information about the research design, the data collection methods, the 
sampling strategy, etc. This was expected to help the readers in assessing 
transferability of the present investigation, giving relevant information about how the 
same could be replicated in other settings (Shenton, 2004). In particular, airports 
were considered to be complex sociotechnical systems (De Bruijne et al., 2006; 
ICAO, 2011; Wheeler, 2005) and the conclusions drawn by this study could 
potentially be applicable to other related systems (hospitals, power plants, ports, 
etc.), once tested for robustness.        
Dependability is the homologue of reliability in quantitative research; 
obtaining the same results when the investigation is repeated under the same 
conditions by other researchers. However, in the case of qualitative research, the 
nature of the explored phenomena makes the achievement of the same results harder 
to predict. Consequentially, the minimum goal for the qualitative investigator 
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wishing to achieve dependability is ensuring that the research process is 
appropriately detailed, in order to allow fellow investigators to reproduce it, 
regardless of the results (Shenton, 2004). Testing the logical approach adopted in a 
piece of research to provide an analytic framework for repetition of the study by 
others, is therefore crucial to achieving dependability in qualitative inquiry. 
According to Yin (2009), two tactics enhance the dependability of case study 
research: the development of a case study protocol and the elaboration of a case 
study database. A specific case study protocol was created for the present thesis in 
order to meticulously document the utilised procedures. This protocol is described as 
clearly and accurately as possible in this chapter. Additionally, a definitive case 
study database was produced, composed of the different research methods and 
sources of evidence previously mentioned. Data contained in this database have 
different forms, including transcriptions, notes, and documents. All are fully 
accessible following QUT’s protocols for data retrieval. Only in the case of 
confidential information related to ethical, privacy-, safety- and security-related 
issues is full disclosure not possible. For the aforementioned reasons, the present 
study can be seen as a prototype model (Shenton, 2004, p. 71) for similar 
investigations sharing the same scientific objectives. 
To conclude the evaluation of the present thesis’ trustworthiness, 
confirmability refers to the objectivity of a qualitative piece of research, namely its 
independence from biases that may affect the researcher (Shenton, 2004). Similar to 
construct validity in quantitative research, confirmability assesses the degree to 
which an investigation’s findings are based on the experiences of the informants, 
rather than on the choices of the researcher. The case of a data coding criterion 
influenced by the investigator’s viewpoint on a specific topic is an example of a 
piece of research with low confirmability. One key strategy to enhance 
confirmability is the establishment of chains of evidence (Yin, 2009), whereby there 
is a logical connection throughout the different research stages, from data collection 
to elaboration of the conclusions. In addition, having key informants verify draft 
results generated by data analysis and provide preliminary feedback is an additional 
strategy to increase confirmability (Yin, 2009). Finally, triangulation is another 
possible solution to limit confirmability biases (Jick, 1979).  
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In order to ensure the confirmability of this thesis, the investigator made use of 
both within method and across method triangulation, as previously mentioned. In 
addition, the combination of the different research methods enabled the researcher to 
regularly adjust and review the collected data in order for the findings to logically 
flow from the data analysis. Another element increased confirmability of the present 
research. After data collection was conducted in each airport, the researcher 
elaborated a first, draft report in the form of a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation, 
uniquely referring to the findings highlighted in that specific aerodrome. This report 
was then submitted to the key contact in that airport in order to receive feedback. The 
benefit from this was twofold. First, the report strengthened the trust by airport 
management organisations in the research, which in turn proved very useful when the 
investigator had to further address his key contacts after data collection (e.g., to ask 
for additional interviews or documents). Second, feedback by the key contact on the 
report and on the draft findings demonstrated that the researcher was on the right 
track with his data analysis. 
3.13 ETHICS 
Prior to data collection, this research obtained ethical clearance from the QUT 
Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC). As a consequence, this investigation 
was declared compliant to QUT's human research ethics framework, which is in turn 
based on the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research35. QUT’s 
human research ethics framework is aimed at ensuring that scientific research 
follows ethically sound methodologies, at the same time reducing potential bias, 
which may characterise the research process itself. 
Ethical clearance was granted to the present investigation in a relatively short 
time (around two weeks from application). This was possible due to the inclusion in 
the application package of an Authorised Data Collection Agreement signed by all 
participants in the Airports of the Future ARC Linkage Project, prior to 
commencement of the research project itself. This document provided further proof 
of the ethical soundness of the present investigation.36 
                                                 
 
35 For further reference, http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines-publications/e72. Retrieved on 8th June 
2015. 
36 A copy of the aforementioned agreement is contained in Appendix 02. 
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Due to the characteristics of the organisations that operate in airports and the 
delicate nature of information associated with functions such as safety, security and 
corporate risk, the confidentiality of the collected data was of utmost importance in 
the present thesis. Anonymity was therefore guaranteed to the three airports (referred 
to as Airport A, Airport B, and Airport C). Furthermore, very little background 
information is provided in the present document around these three data collection 
sites so that they cannot be identified. Interview transcriptions, field observation 
notes, and analysed documents were treated so as to eliminate all references to the 
airports’ actual identity. Anonymity was also ensured to interviewees, who are 
identified only by means of a generic code and whose job title is modified in this 
dissertation to preserve their personal identity. The collected data were revised and 
adjusted in order to omit all references to the personal identity of the respondents. As 
stated in Section 3.9, in the present thesis investigated documents and reports are 
referred to with generic descriptions by omitting their official names in order to 
preserve the identity of mentioned people and organisations. In one case, an airport 
management organisation requested that the investigator sign an additional 
confidentiality deed, which was done upon authorisation by QUT UHREC. 
3.14 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
One methodological limitation that the present research had to face was related 
to its qualitative approach. Qualitative research methods suffer from limited 
generalisability, deriving from their lack of statistical value, which is a basic 
characteristic of quantitative studies (Yin, 2009). Despite the fact that qualitative 
studies are not generalisable in the probabilistic sense, transferability of their 
findings is nonetheless possible (Marshall & Rossman, 2011), as previously 
discussed. Stemming from the qualitative research methodology, the present 
research’s main objective was the detailed exploration of a complex, sociotechnical 
phenomenon: organisational vulnerability. The achievement of rich and detailed 
information by analysing saturated data (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) characterised 
the present investigation, which was aimed to:  
 Identify the most common and relevant SSD (actual and potential) 
experienced in the explored airports (RQ1); 
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 Cast light on their individual and organisational determinants through specific 
pathways leading to the development of organisational vulnerability (RQ2a); 
 Assess existing countermeasures to tackle such determinants and provide 
practical suggestions for the betterment of these countermeasures (RQ2b). 
These findings can be analytically generalised to Australian airports, keeping 
in mind the need for further research and tests for robustness. The present research 
considered airports to be stereotypical examples of complex sociotechnical systems 
and produced a single case study design with embedded units of analysis, to prove 
so. One methodological objection that may arise at this point is that findings from a 
single industry cannot be transferred to other fields of application, without concerns 
for validity issues. In order to face this additional, potential limitation, the present 
study referred to the existing literature, which, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
considers airports to be complex sociotechnical systems (De Bruijne et al., 2006; 
ICAO, 2011; Wheeler, 2005). The comprehension of OV deriving from the findings 
and conclusions of this thesis, together with the adopted research methodology, can 
therefore be extended to other complex sociotechnical systems. Consequentially, 
future research could further test this thesis’ underlying theoretical framework in 
order to expand knowledge of OV in complex sociotechnical systems. This could be 
a preliminary step towards the application of quantitative methods in the study of 
OV, for the purpose of achieving statistical validity of results. 
Another limitation intrinsic to the present study refers to a potential bias in the 
collected data and associated information. As illustrated in particular in Section 3.8, 
the viewpoint adopted in this thesis is that of airport management, with particular 
reference to the managerial roles. This entails a twofold bias, in particular in the data 
collected by means of semi-structured interviews. First, the perspective of other 
organisations operating in the explored airports (airlines, ground handling 
companies, retailers, etc.) is not included in the study. Second, as most respondents 
belonged to the managerial level, collected data reflected the perspective of 
managers who expressed their views on all organisational levels of airport operations 
(leadership, management, operators, etc.). This twofold bias may be interpreted as a 
limited viewpoint on the mechanisms that regulate safety and security performance 
in the explored organisations. However, given the limited resources available for the 
present research, focusing on airport management functions was considered a 
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necessary compromise to yield significant results. First, as illustrated in Sub-section 
2.5.3, airport management organisations are at the core of airport operations and, 
more than any other company, are representative of all the organisational functions in 
airports (regulatory/compliance, economic, strategic, safety/security, etc.). Second, 
within the airport operators, the managers’ perspective is considered the broadest, 
reflecting an overarching viewpoint on the safety and security issues emerging from 
the three data collection sites. 
3.15 SUMMARY 
The present chapter synthesised the methodology adopted in the present 
research. Stemming from a constructivist paradigm, this qualitative investigation 
adopted a single case study design, with embedded units of analysis. Data were 
collected by means of semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and field 
observation in three different sites, Airport A, Airport B, and Airport C. Data 
analysis revolved around the identification of recurring themes across RQ1, RQ2a, 
and RQ2b. Limitations to the present research resided, for example, in its qualitative 
approach, which entailed reduced generalisability, and in its specific focus on airport 
management (and security screening providers), which excluded other airport 
organisations as direct sources of information. A number of actions were nonetheless 
taken to reduce the impact of these limitations. Chapter Four discusses the findings 
that emerged from Study One of the present investigation. This study addressed 
RQ1:  
RQ1: What are the most common and relevant safety and security 
disruptions to normal business operations in Australian airports? 
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Chapter 4: Results: Safety and Security Disruptions 
(RQ1) 
‘There can't be a crisis next week, my schedule is already full.’ 
 
HENRY KISSINGER, The New York Times Magazine (1 June 1969) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in the previous chapters of this document, addressing, understanding, and 
answering the two research questions of this thesis is deemed to enable comprehension and 
assessment of organisational vulnerability (OV) in airports. In particular, a better understanding of 
the ways in which vulnerability can manifest (safety and security disruptions, RQ1) and of the 
factors37 that can contribute to it (individual and organisational factors, RQ2a) is considered 
essential to identify actions that can limit or nullify its consequences and improve vulnerability 
management in airports (suggestions for improvement, RQ2b).   
Chapter Two laid the conceptual foundations for the study of vulnerability. By examining 
prior academic work in the fields of risk and crisis management, this research has cast light on the 
process that due to holes existing in the system (D. Smith, 2005) potentially leads to SSD, which 
may in turn escalate into systemic crises. Furthermore, Chapter Two highlighted two main needs in 
the literature: an enhanced comprehension of the crisis incubation process, focusing on operational 
safety and security issues, as well as a holistic knowledge of the factors that increase OV. Chapter 
Two also introduced the macroergonomic approach (MeA) as an interpretive framework for the 
exploration of organisational factors impacting on vulnerability in complex sociotechnical systems. 
The understanding of the aforementioned process is reputed to be essential to elaborate practical 
interventions aimed to complement the existing countermeasures to OV in airports (RQ2b). Chapter 
Two also illustrated the research design adopted in this thesis, with regards to its paradigm, strategy, 
methods, data management, and analysis, evaluation, ethical considerations, and limitations. 
The present chapter provides an overview of the findings that emerged from the first research 
study (Study One) composing this thesis. This chapter focuses in particular on the SSD (actual and 
potential) discussed by the respondents in the explored airports. Throughout the present chapter, the 
emerging disruptions are described primarily based on the respondents’ accounts and perceptions, 
                                                 
 
37 In this Chapter 4, the factors presented as potentially contributing to the identified Safety and Security Disruptions 
stem from the perceptions and opinions of the respondents in the semi-structured interviews. 
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but also by making reference to document analysis and notes about field observation conducted by 
the investigator. The structure of the present chapter is illustrated in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Structure and Topics of Chapter Four 
Section Sub-section Purpose and Topics 
4.1 Introduction  Introduction 
4.2 SSD in Airports 4.2.1 Aircraft Emergencies Events affecting airplanes 
 4.2.2 Airside Breaches Airside security violations 
 4.2.3 Bird and Wildlife 
Management 
Bird and wildlife issues 
 4.2.4 Congestion and 
Queuing in Airports 
Terminal congestion 
 4.2.5 Disruptive 
Behaviours 
Security threats by individuals 
 4.2.6 Fire Alarms Fire events (also false) 
 4.2.7 Maintenance, Works 
and Repairs 
Interventions in airports 
 4.2.8 Natural Hazards Storms, cyclones, floods, etc. 
 4.2.9 Prohibited Items 
Violations 
Landside security events 
 4.2.10 Ramp Safety Issues Safety of ramp operations 
 4.2.11 Landside Safety 
Events 
Slips, trips and falls in terminals 
 4.2.12 Landside Security 
Breaches 
Landside security issues 
 4.2.13 Technical Failures Technical problems 
 4.2.14 Traffic Management Car park management 
 4.2.15 Unattended Items Potential security violation 
4.3 Interactions among SSD  Connections among SSD 
4.4 Risk Assessment Documents and 
Incident Reporting Systems 
4.4.1 Risk Assessment 
Documents 
How airport organisations define and 
treat their risks 
 4.4.2 Incident Reporting 
Systems 
How airport organisation classify 
and manage their incidents 
4.5 Summary  Synthesis 
 
 
Figure 4.1 locates the position of this Study One in the overall conceptual framework 
underlying this thesis.38 It is worth remembering that the approach adopted in this academic work 
began with an understanding of SSD and then moved backwards to identify potential individual and 
organisational determinants of OV. The aim was to cast light on the way vulnerability incubates, 
develops, and manifests through specific pathways of vulnerability. 
                                                 
 
38 See Sub-section 2.6.2 for further reference. 
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Figure 4.1: Focus on Safety and Security Disruptions (SSD), RQ1 
 
Gaps highlighted in the literature are acknowledged in the present chapter by addressing the 
first research question: 
RQ1: What are the most common and relevant safety and security disruptions (SSD) to 
normal business operations in Australian airports? 
The present chapter illustrates the SSD that were reported as being the most common and 
relevant in the explored data collection sites. These included both actual and potential events. 
Section 4.2 contains a general overview of the concepts of SSD and an inventory of the SSD 
discussed by the interviewees in the explored airports. Sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.15 discuss the 
aforementioned disruptions in depth, by depicting the ways in which they manifest. Every sub-
section is concluded by a short, summarising paragraph. Particular attention is paid to examining 
both the actual and the potential impact of SSD on the airport system. A bottom-up approach is 
adopted in every sub-section. Disruptions are initially investigated in their sub-system of origin and 
then examined in the overall sociotechnical system, the airport. Analysis of the factors considered to 
potentially contribute to the SSD is not conducted at this stage. This last element constitutes the 
core of Study Two, as described in Chapter Five. SSD are presented in alphabetic order, as Study 
One is not intended to provide a ranking of their frequency or relevance. 
Pathways of Vulnerability 
AIRPORT SYSTEM 
SSD 
SSD SSD 
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Due to the specificity of the aviation sector, the present chapter addresses each SSD by 
progressively providing background information in order to clarify definitions, regulatory issues, or 
consolidated practices, which may be unknown to the reader. It is worth recalling that information 
about the SSD was predominantly drawn from the semi-structured interviews, stemming therefore 
from the respondents’ perceptions. Document analysis and field diaries about observation were 
utilised only where relevant and complementary to the former. Section 4.3 contains an overview of 
the interactions among SSD emerged from the study. Section 4.4 illustrates one of the by-products 
of Study One, namely a review of the risk assessment and incident reporting documents utilised in 
the explored airports. Section 4.5 provides a summary of the SSD and leads into Chapter Five. 
4.2 SAFETY AND SECURITY DISRUPTIONS IN AIRPORTS (SSD) 
Types and nature of SSD. In order to investigate how organisational vulnerability may have 
the potential to incubate in Australian airports, RQ1 was aimed to explore how SSD can manifest in 
the selected data collection sites. The first task the present investigation had to accomplish was to 
provide a description of these disruptions. This was reputed essential to identifying the potential 
precursors of these disruptions and lead therefore, to discussion on RQ2a and RQ2b.  
Before introducing the classification of SSD elaborated by this research, several reflections 
are necessary to better define the scope and depth of the present investigation. Since the initial 
interviews, it appeared evident to the researcher that the SSD highlighted by the respondents 
constituted the exception (rather than the rule) in the explored airports. Interviewees 
emphasised that, in general, normal business operations are carried out most of the time in the 
examined aerodromes. SSD (actual and potential) were therefore described as occasional changes in 
direction to transition into business-not-as-usual states. Normality of airport operations emerged as 
the rule and this can be attributed to a series of factors: the effectiveness of the Australian safety and 
security systems, the quality of the airport operators’ performance, the guiding role of airport 
management, etc. 
This last point is directly confirmed by the absence of significant entries in the Australian 
track record on safety and security aviation incidents, as illustrated in Chapter One of the present 
thesis (Australian Government, 2014; Wheeler, 2005). Australia, it is worth restating, has been 
called the ‘lucky country’ by researchers in the field of aviation safety (Braithwaite et al., 1998). 
Moreover, responses during the semi-structured interviews further indicated that SSD are usually 
limited to minor events in the explored airports. This was witnessed by an issue of definition that 
emerged in the early stages of several interviews. In numerous instances, interviewees replied to 
RQ1 by asking the researcher what type of disruption he expected to discuss with them. 
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‘Just to clarify, though, when you’re talking about disruptions, are you talking business as 
usual for us as an airport, or are you talking about disruptions to airplanes being able to 
come to the airport?’ (CML-LS/AS) 
The aforementioned examples drawn from respondents’ words reflect the difference between 
potential risk and an actual event. The criterion utilised by the respondents to provide their 
definition of disruption was based on a mix of their background experience and the range of tasks 
they were required to accomplish on a daily basis. Some interviewees focused on more potential 
instances, which stemmed from the traditional definition of risk, while others referred to actual 
(minor) safety and security events happening with a given frequency, in a defined amount of time. 
All respondents agreed in indicating that these events were deviations from the normal business 
operations carried out in the explored airports. Hence, several respondents focused on potential 
events that could affect their organisations rather than narrowing the scope of their answers to 
actual instances. As a result, the classification of SSD proposed in this chapter is the 
combination of (minor) actual occurrences happening in the explored airports and (major) 
potential risks deriving from aviation operations. Details about the nature of the illustrated SSD 
are provided throughout the following sections of this chapter.  
Chapter One highlighted that the literature lacks studies providing an integrated overview of 
the most common and relevant SSD that affect (or can potentially affect) Australian airports. 
Furthermore, during the preliminary meetings organised with the key contacts in the different 
airports, the fact that an exhaustive classification of the most relevant SSD did not exist clearly 
emerged. Information on SSD was scattered throughout a wealth of organisational documents, 
guidelines, incident reports, risk assessment dossiers, etc. This information included safety, 
security, and Workplace Health and Safety incidences. Additionally, while providing generic, 
standardised knowledge about the SSD, the aforementioned documents lacked depth of analysis and 
did not provide exhaustive details on them. As a consequence, these documents were found to be 
insufficient to gain better understanding of SSD. The first main objective of this thesis was 
therefore to produce a classification of these (actual and potential) disruptions, by describing them 
in detail and by proving an illustration of their nature and characteristics, based on the respondents’ 
perceptions. 
As in the case of the semi-structured interviews, the documents examined in the document 
analysis stage made reference to either potential risks (which was the case of risk assessment and 
risk treatment documents), or to actual events (incidents, accidents and near misses, as in the case 
of security and safety incident reports, etc.). Generally speaking, the organisational documents 
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found in the explored airports fell into two categories. On the one hand, they derived from 
international and national regulations on risk management and safety, Workplace Health and Safety 
and security policies (e.g., risk assessment and risk treatment documents). On the other hand, they 
constituted a classification of actual safety and security events into a series of predetermined 
categories (e.g., security incident reports). In neither case were such documents considered 
sufficient to account for the variety of phenomena occurring in the airports, which were indeed 
grasped through the semi-structured interviews. 
SSD described by respondents should not be considered as consolidated categories, 
encompassing the whole spectrum of possible risks and actual events taking place in the selected 
airports. SSD to which respondents referred could not be conceived as the ultimate result of a well-
established process, from causes to consequences. As the following sections of the present chapter 
show, the investigated SSD coexisted and were often interrelated. A single SSD could be the cause, 
as well the consequence of some others. A clear causal process lies outside the scope of the present 
research, as specified in Chapter Three. As a consequence, the guiding criterion for inclusion of the 
following SSD in Study One was based on respondents’ perceptions and experiences. 
SSD in semi-structured interviews. Depending on several factors (e.g., areas of operations, 
background experience, individual mindset, etc.), participants in the semi-structured interviews 
located the same SSD on different positions along a hypothetical chain of events. Bird strikes, for 
example, were mentioned by some respondents as a SSD per se, while other interviewees referred 
to them as contributing factors to other SSD (e.g., aircraft emergencies) and so on. As a result, one 
of the goals of Study One was to account for these differences in perceptions and experiences, 
considered to be the most accurate representation of reality in the explored airports.   
As Chapter Three illustrated, interviewees differed substantially in terms of job position, 
experience, focus, background, and duties. Thus, interviewees’ views on SSD were characterised by 
dissimilarities and diverging nuances. These differences were synthesised in the present research 
around the examined units of analysis and areas of operation.39 In order to ascribe various quotes to 
their corresponding sources, abbreviations for units of analysis and areas of operations are used in 
the present chapter after each quote.40  
SSD in document analysis. The document analysis conducted in Study One primarily utilised 
incident reports and risk assessment documents to draw information about the SSD. Incident report 
                                                 
 
39 See Section 3.8 for further reference on this. 
40 Units of analysis are classified as follows: leadership level (LL), corporate management level (CML), operational 
management level (OML), and security screening providers/Australian Federal Police (SSP/AFP). As for the areas of 
operations: Landside, Landside/Airside, and Airside. 
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documents were explored, analysed, and utilised in particular to gain enhanced comprehension of 
the ways in which the different SSD develop in the airports under investigation. These reports 
proved especially useful in embracing the widest spectrum of occurrences, accounting for sub-
categories of SSD with which the investigator was not always familiar. An example of this refers to 
different types of Airside breaches that may occur in an aerodrome. Conversely, analysis of risk 
assessment documents proved fruitful in gaining understanding of the criteria utilised by airport 
management to assess SSD and aviation-related risks. In general, risk management documents 
drafted in the three data collection sites provided an assessment of the likelihood and consequences 
of every risk event. Combined in a risk matrix, these two criteria produced a risk rating. After risk 
treatment was applied (controls, organisational defences, countermeasures, etc.), residual likelihood 
and consequences were assessed, leading to a final risk rating, which contributed to an enhanced 
comprehension of the perceptions that airport management organisations have on the SSD. Details 
about these criteria are reported in Appendices 03, 04, and 05. 
Both the incident reports and the risk assessment documents were utilised in the present thesis 
as a secondary source, to complement information drawn from the semi-structured interviews. The 
three data collection sites differed substantially in the ways incident reports and risk assessment 
documents were drafted. Furthermore, dissimilar types of documents were made available by the 
three airport management organisations. Occasionally, documents with similar characteristics were 
different in terms of covered timeframe (e.g., the security incident reports). In addition, risks and 
events classified in the aforementioned documents were found to have different names and 
characteristics in the three airports. As an example, in one of airports the classification of aircraft 
emergencies in the analysed risk assessment document stressed in particular the potential instances 
having a security-related origin (hijacking, bomb attack, etc.). On the contrary, another one placed 
more emphasis on the event per se (disabled aircraft), rather than its origins. As a result, the 
comparability of these sources was limited. In spite of this, document analysis was still presumed a 
valid integration of information deriving from the interviews. The single case study approach 
adopted in the present thesis made issues of comparability less relevant. In the present research, the 
ultimate purpose of the data collection was not to compare three data collection sites, but to gather 
general information about Australian airports from the investigated sources. 
For the purpose of clarity, Table 4.2 lists all of the SSD (actual and potential) emerging from 
the semi-structured interviews, integrated with information drawn from the document analysis and, 
in minor part, from the field observation. Table 4.2 also provides details about the key themes 
emerging from each SSD, indicated as paragraphs in the different sub-sections. Every sub-section is 
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concluded by a summarising paragraph, which is not reported in Table 4.2 for the purpose of 
brevity.
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Table 4.2: Summary of the Examined Safety and Security Disruptions (SSD) 
Sub-
section 
SSD Code Paragraphs 
4.2.1 Aircraft emergencies AirEm Units of analysis/areas of operations 
4.2.2 Airside breaches ASSec Airside security restricted area violations, access control breaches by staff, external perimeter violations  
4.2.3 Bird and wildlife 
management 
BWM Relevance, costs and liability, managing birds and wildlife 
4.2.4 Congestion and queuing 
in airports 
CQ Involved circumstances, units of analysis/areas of operations 
4.2.5 Disruptive behaviours by 
passengers or general 
public 
DB Runners, hostile attitudes, hoaxes, crime, units of analysis/areas of operations 
4.2.6 Fire alarms FA Fire events, false alarms 
4.2.7 Maintenance, works, and 
repairs 
MWR Management of maintenance, works and repairs, units of analysis/areas of operations 
4.2.8 Natural hazards NH Magnitude and consequences, management of natural hazards 
4.2.9 Prohibited items 
violations 
PIV Security screening process, impact of prohibited items violations, contributing factors, prohibited items violations by staff 
members 
4.2.10 Ramp safety issues RSaf Mismanagement of ground service equipment, speeding on the ramp, driving behind pushbacks, misuse of equipment on 
Airside vehicles, other ramp safety issues, ramp safety issues involving passengers, existing countermeasures to ramp safety 
issues, units of analysis/areas of operations 
4.2.11 Landside safety events SafLS Escalator falls, slips, trips, and falls in the terminal, equipment-related  Landside safety events, staff members  Landside safety 
events, units of analysis/areas of operations  
4.2.12 Landside security 
breaches 
SecLS Unscreened passengers (security screening points), unscreened passengers (in transit from unscreened airports), passback 
doors violations, break glass doors violations, contributing factors,  Landside security breaches by staff  members, Landside 
security breaches as a result of Office for Transport security inspections, units of analysis/areas of operations 
4.2.13 Technical failures TF IT system, equipment, infrastructure, aircrafts, document analysis 
4.2.14 Traffic management 
front-of-house 
TMFoH Safety, security, document analysis 
4.2.15 Unattended items UI Frequency, location, consequences 
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A quantitative analysis of the frequency and relevance of the SSD (as reported in the 
respondents’ words) lies outside the scope of the present thesis. However, general numerical 
information was produced in order to provide a sense of the extent to which the different findings 
were apparent in the data. From the analysis of the semi-structured interviews, based on the 
interviewees’ perceptions, Landside security breaches were discussed by the majority of 
respondents, with more than 63% of the interviewees mentioning this type of disruption. On the 
contrary, traffic management front-of-house was mentioned in less than 14% of cases. Figure 4.2 
depicts the frequency of SSD as indicated in the 30 semi-structured interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: SSD discussed in the interviews (calculated as number of occurrences on total interviews) 
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4.2.1 Aircraft Emergencies 
Frequency: 20% of respondents 
Aircraft emergencies were reported by respondents as potential events that cause an airplane 
to have some sorts of problems when landing, parking, taxing, or taking off. The range of potential 
events is broad and examples of these occurrences include technical failures while approaching the 
airport, collisions between aircrafts, or between aircrafts and other vehicles on the tarmac, 
hijackings, etc. The extent of these events is variable and respondents described them as ranging 
from local standbys to full emergencies. In the case of local standbys, an aircraft has developed 
safety or security issues while approaching an airport, taxing or taking off, but can still perform its 
operations in a safe way. Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting Services are requested to stand by at 
their position until further notice (ICAO, 1991). In the case of full emergencies an aircraft has 
developed conditions that make an accident possible. Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting Services are 
alerted to full emergency (ICAO, 1991). In both cases, the impact for the airport system is a concern 
and requires action from several sub-systems, involving both the Landside (LS) and Airside (AS) 
areas of operations: air traffic control, airport management, Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting 
Services, airlines, Airside safety teams, etc. 
‘These events affect the whole system because at best they strand aircrafts on the tarmac so 
everything has to wait then. Delay in the whole system.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
As previously mentioned, aircraft emergencies are extremely rare events in the explored 
airports, but their consequences are potentially devastating. Hence, respondents indicated them at 
the top of a hypothetical ranking of the most relevant SSD.  
‘We have a top ten [of SSD]. One of them obviously is in-aircraft emergency, depending on 
how large a scale that is.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
‘For us, in terms of operation, aircraft accidents and incidents are probably important as 
well.’ (CML-AS) 
‘Yeah, that’s a significant issue, runway accidents and incidents on airport.’ (CML-AS) 
The collected data revealed that local standbys as a result of aircraft emergencies are more 
frequent than full emergencies. Potential root causes generating these aircraft emergencies may 
equally be safety-related or security-related (or a combination of both). The former may include 
factors such as hydraulic issues in aircraft, broken or cracked screens (often caused by bird strikes), 
smoke in the cockpit, malfunctioning landing gears, flat tyres, or the presence of foreign object 
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debris on the runways/taxiways, etc. Among the latter, disruptive behaviours by passengers, 
runways intrusions, terrorist attacks, etc.  
Units of analysis/areas of operations. As the quotes reported in this sub-section have 
revealed, respondents that stressed the relevance of aircraft emergencies also underlined their rarity. 
These respondents belonged to the majority of the higher airport management organisational levels 
(leadership level and corporate management level). No mention of aircraft emergencies was made 
by interviewees in the other units of analysis. Additionally, aircraft emergencies were singled out 
due to their relevance mainly by respondents operating in the mixed LS/AS or AS area of 
operations. This last point emphasises a systemic perspective consistent with the nature of the jobs 
at the leadership level and the corporate management level, where attention was particularly drawn 
to potential, high-level threats, rather than actual, ordinary events. Furthermore, although aircraft 
emergencies originated AS, they were regarded as a global threat for the airport system, as they also 
impacted other areas of the aerodrome, for example the terminal and the LS area in general. 
Summary. Aircraft emergencies can range from local standbys to full emergencies and 
involve safety and security issues affecting an airplane executing various operations (take-off, 
landing, refuelling, etc.). Most respondents mentioning the relevance of aircraft emergencies 
belonged to the higher organisational levels in airport management (leadership level and corporate 
management Level). 
4.2.2 Airside Breaches 
Frequency: 36.7% of respondents 
Events falling into this category have a security-related nature and involve all the cases where 
the Airside zone (the restricted area comprised between the physical boundary of Landside/Airside 
and the external, back-of-house perimeter of the AS area) is violated by unauthorised access, a 
person or vehicle potentially posing a threat to the airport’s operations. Respondents in the semi-
structured interviews reported that Airside breaches may occur in the explored airports but their 
consequences are usually very limited, especially when the perpetrator has no intention to harm (the 
overwhelming majority of cases). On the contrary, when there is an intention to harm behind the 
Airside breach, the potential consequences are catastrophic if the crisis escalation process is not 
interrupted. As the history of Australian civil aviation witnesses (Australian Government, 2009b), 
this last case is obviously very rare, thanks to the proactive and reactive security systems in place in 
airports. 
‘Have we had them? Yeah, we've had breaches in the past. We've had Airside breaches and 
we’ve had sterile area breaches. I think everyone that I've had – in the seven years I've been 
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here, none of them have been with intent. They've all been by accident or through lack of 
knowledge, or they call them under regulations, disaffected persons, or mental health.’ 
(OML-LS) 
‘So, we have got cases of that, but all of them have been – yeah – no intent.’ (OML-LS) 
Airside breaches feature a further risk for airport management organisations. In the case of 
Airside breaches involving passengers or members of the public that managed to access AS from 
the LS sterile area, these individuals need to be re-screened before being allowed back to the sterile 
area. This is based on the principle that a security-screened individual who has accessed a non-
sterile zone may have undergone contamination (for example, accessing a prohibited item while 
AS). As a consequence, this individual cannot be allowed back into the sterile area without being 
re-screened. If this person manages to get back to the sterile area unscreened, there is a chance that 
the entire sterile area will need to be emptied and all individuals re-screened, in order to avoid 
cross-contamination. However, the presence of CCTV coverage of the event would enable 
investigators to verify that cross-contamination did not occur. In this last case, terminal re-screening 
would not be necessary. 
‘Breaches of Airside can occur here and has been previously where people leave gates open, 
the boarding gates open, and members of the public go out, out onto the ramp and then 
realise that they've come too far. It's not their aircraft that's boarding. It's somebody else's, so 
then they try and get back into the sterile area.’ (OML-LS) 
Data revealed that examples of Airside breaches include: Airside security restricted area 
violations (as mentioned above; a typical example of this is a confused passenger who manages to 
access the tarmac from the terminal, by passing through an external security door left open), access 
control breaches by staff members (when a staff member accesses the Airside security restricted 
area without an adequate identification card), or external perimeter violations (for example, the 
unlikely case in which an individual penetrates through the perimeter fences by cutting the wire or 
by breaking through with a vehicle). 
Airside security restricted area violations. Airside breaches are particularly critical to the safe 
and secure operations of the airport when they occur in the AS security restricted area, which is the 
AS homologue of the LS sterile area. One of the most relevant preconditions for this type of Airside 
breach is the presence of unsecured, unmanned, or open doors leading from the terminal to the 
external AS area. This last occurrence was reported in the explored airports, as witnessed by the 
following respondent, who referred to the doors that enable access to the tarmac: 
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‘Really, security doors for me. That’s the biggest [disruption] that I see maybe every second 
day. […] It’s every couple of days.’ (OML-AS) 
The security doors may be forgotten in an open or unsecured position by airline members, 
ground handlers, or other staff members after the involved aircraft has taken off. Similarly, external 
security doors may be intentionally left open by workers onsite to ease their continuous transfers 
between LS and AS. As a result, a passenger or a member of the general public wandering around 
the terminal may have the chance to access the Airside security restricted area and pose a potential 
threat to the safety and security of the airport. In order to prevent this from happening, standard 
operating procedures in the explored airports clearly urge staff members to always close these 
doors behind them. Different systems are in place to prevent these events from occurring, including 
safety and security patrols, CCTV coverage of the affected areas by the airport management 
coordination centre, alarmed external security doors, etc. When an external security door is noticed 
to be open, CCTV recordings may be inspected in order to ascertain that no one took advantage of 
the breach. 
Airside security restricted area violations do not always involve access to the tarmac via 
security doors. Document analysis revealed that in rare instances passengers may manage to sneak 
through the openings of the baggage carousels and access the Airside security restricted area.  
‘From a security point of view, we've had access to Airside through the baggage carousels ... 
that's probably the most common one from a public point of view. By a passenger. They 
couldn't find their bags and had to crawl through the carousel to get their bag.’ (SSP/AFP-
LS) 
In general terms, when Airside breaches involve general public or passengers, they require 
intervention by the police in order to clarify the doers’ intentions and where necessary, take further 
action. In the aforementioned case, upon intervention by police, CCTV coverage of the whole 
occurrence was made available by airport management and additional, large-scale risks deriving 
from the breach were forestalled. 
Access control breaches by staff members. Another category of Airside breaches refers to 
those cases where staff members or workers involved in airport operations (ground handlers, 
contractors, etc.) access AS against the established security procedures (for example, when a staff 
member tailgates a colleague deliberately omitting to swipe their access card). One notable case 
was highlighted by the document analysis conducted in one of the explored airports. This 
occurrence involved a contractor who accessed the terminal’s apron through a boom gate at a 
vehicle access point without having their vehicle security screened by the security screening 
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provider operator. The subsequent investigation stated that the contractor was compelled by time 
constraints because of their deliveries and openly decided to drive through the open gate without 
stopping for the necessary security checks (Aviation Security Identification Card, etc.). Airport 
management organisations define the individuals who behave in this way as ‘runners’.  
‘They’ve got to come Airside. Yeah. And we get runners doing that. They can’t bother waiting 
for the security guard and they’ll drive through. So, we get that sort of thing. Especially when 
I was new, when it started off, was a big issue, but now people... they’re used to it.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
Another relevant event involved an employee who used their identification card to drive AS 
and try to take a family member to the apron in order to board a scheduled flight without the need to 
queue in the terminal. The family member did not have any valid authorisation to access AS.  
Airside breaches committed by employees in the airport organisations entail a series of 
consequences for the perpetrator, involving, among others: attribution of one or more demerit 
points, withdrawal of the Australian Security Identification Card, re-induction of security 
procedures, etc.  
External perimeter violations. Airside breaches can also involve the external perimeter of the 
AS area, which is usually constituted by a fence topped with razor wire. External perimeter 
violations may affect this fence and occur in different ways. As for other Airside breaches, their 
relevance largely depends on the perpetrators’ intentions and the ability of the airport system to 
prevent the occurrence from further escalating. Most cases of external perimeter violations prove 
minor, as the doers’ purpose is harmless, as witnessed by the following excerpts:  
‘Very rarely, we get Airside breaches by people climbing over. We've probably had ... Since 
I've been over here, we've probably had about two or three. I think I mentioned to you this 
morning, they have fishing down at the river and the bridge, so one day some people actually 
climbed up on the bridge over the fences to go there fishing.’ (OML-LS) 
‘Yeah. They have every... look, I can remember one in the last two years where somebody cut 
through one of the fences at night. I don’t think we even ever found out why or what. I 
remember there was a... there were some... there was a guy vagrant living sort of... living in a 
disused building at one stage.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘We had a gentleman a couple of years ago that jumped the fence. He jumped the fence and 
hid in the stairwell and then his idea was he wanted to go back home, but he had no money 
because he was robbed.’ (OML-LS) 
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The previous excerpts witness the importance of the presence of intent as the trigger for 
potential large-scale security-related disruptions. Accidental violations of the AS area represent less 
of a threat for airport operations, although their potential for safety-related disruption may still be 
significant. 
Summary. Airside breaches described in the present sub-section include security-related 
events such as Airside security restricted area violations, access control breaches by staff members, 
and external perimeter violations. These events involve unauthorised access to the AS area and may 
entail the need for passengers’ re-screening before being re-admitted to the sterile area.  
4.2.3 Bird and Wildlife Management Related Disruptions 
Frequency: 26.7% of respondents 
In Australian airports, a crucial component of aviation safety is represented by an effective 
management of birds and wildlife living within and in the vicinity of the aerodromes. In the 
interviewees’ words, bird strikes represented a crucial, potentially serious disruption with 
consequences ranging from a major aircraft emergency to a minor local standby with economic 
damage to the aircraft. Other examples of bird and wildlife management related disruptions were 
reported involving insects (a typical example being some species of wasps found nesting in crucial 
aircraft components, potentially causing serious malfunctioning) or terrestrial animals, such as 
reptiles and mammals (representing a danger not only for the aircrafts, but also for the individuals 
onsite, especially in the case of reptiles).  
‘We try to put in place a robust management system around managing bird wildlife. Bird 
strike risk is also ranked as one of our highest strategic risk for the airport as well.’ (CML-
AS) 
‘Wildlife hazards can be disruptive. Obviously, if we do have a bird strike and the aircraft 
does an air return or even an aircraft landing and having a bird strike can prevent it from 
going on to the next port, if there’s damage to the aircraft. So, we spend a lot of time 
controlling the wildlife and making sure the runways and taxiways are clear of any wildlife 
hazards. The aircraft can come and go safely, so we have dedicated people to that task.’ 
(CML-AS) 
The previous excerpts from two interviews demonstrate the relevance of this SSD, which 
primarily affects AS operations but may also escalate to the point where it involves the whole 
airport. An example of this is a bird strike occurring to an aircraft while taking off, resulting in a 
local standby. Bird strikes are considered a systemic disruption in that they entail a series of 
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consequences not only for the AS area of operations, but also for the whole terminal, involving 
airport management organisations, airlines, ground handlers, etc.  
The frequency of bird strikes is monitored at the explored airports by analysing bird strike 
reports filled in by pilots of the aircraft. Participants in the semi-structured interviews recounted two 
elements impacting on the reliability of the subsequent information. On the one hand, not every bird 
strike is reported by pilots. On the other hand, some events reported as bird strikes originate from 
other causes. One of the respondents established an annual average of between 80 and 90 bird 
strikes in their airport, with only 2-3 events causing extensive economic damage. Respondents 
accounted for different factors impacting on the frequency of bird and wildlife management related 
disruptions in the explored airports. The geographical location of the airfield was reported as one of 
the most relevant, with the presence of natural features in the surroundings areas (rivers, woods, 
mangroves, etc.) being a contributory factor to wildlife-related issues. On the contrary, urban or 
suburban airports were assessed as naturally less-prone to bird and wildlife management related 
disruptions. 
Relevance. The relevance of bird and wildlife management related disruptions was 
emphasised by AS managers in particular during the interviews and by AS operations documents 
during the document analysis. Table 4.3 illustrates this last point by indicating how risk documents 
elaborated in the three airports41 assessed bird and wildlife management associated risks.42 
 
Table 4.3: Risk Assessment of Bird and Wildlife Management in the Three Data Collection Sites 
Bird and 
Wildlife 
Management 
Likelihood Consequences Risk Rating Residual 
Likelihood 
Residual 
Consequences 
Residual 
Risk Rating 
Airport X Possible Negligible Low Rare Negligible Low 
Airport Y Likely Catastrophic Extreme Rare Catastrophic High 
Airport Z Possible Major High Possible Major High 
 
 
Table 4.3 above highlights the differences existing in the ways the three airport management 
organisations involved in the present study assessed risks associated with bird and wildlife 
management related disruptions.  
                                                 
 
41 Airport A, Airport B and Airport C are here referred to as X, Y, Z (not in the same order) to further preserve their 
identity. 
42 As previously mentioned in Section 4.2, in the analysed documents an initial assessment of the likelihood and 
consequences of a risk determines a risk rating. After treatment and controls are applied, assessment of the residual 
likelihood and consequences is performed, leading to a final risk rating. For further reference on the risk assessment 
framework utilised in the three airports, see Appendix 03, 04 and 05. 
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 According to the risk assessment documents in Airport X, bird and wildlife management 
related disruptions might occur at some time in the following 12 months (possible); their 
expected consequences involve negligible impact on aerodrome operations, low financial 
loss, negligible damage to assets, and no injuries (negligible). Associated risks are therefore 
acceptable and manageable by routine procedures. 
 Risk assessment documents analysed in Airport Y reported that expected frequency of bird 
and wildlife management related disruptions range between one in five years and one per 
year (likely); their expected consequences involve substantial financial loss (more than 18 
million AUD), substantial damage to assets and/or infrastructures, potentially large number 
of injuries and fatalities, extensive impact on ability to deliver client services, and severe 
embarrassment to the organisation (catastrophic). Associated risks are therefore extreme and 
immediate action is required. 
 In Airport Z, risk assessment documents suggested that bird and wildlife management 
related disruptions might occur once every 10 years (possible); their expected consequences 
involve delays to aircrafts and damage ranging between 10 and 30 million AUD (major). 
Associated risks are therefore high and required executive management attention. 
Furthermore, improvement of management controls and minimisation of adverse 
consequences has to be executed. 
Costs and liability. Interviewees reported that costs associated with repairing aircraft 
components damaged by bird strikes can be very extensive for airlines. At the same time, if 
involved airlines can prove that airport management organisations did not operate in a way to 
prevent the bird strike, they can sue the airport operator and claim the money associated with the 
disruption. The following example refers to a Boeing 767, which experienced engine ingestion of a 
bird while taking off from one of the data collection airports and subsequently had to be cancelled. 
‘And then all the passengers had to be on carriage on something else. I think the [engine] 
blade set was about 750,000 dollars. But because of the out of service and all the on flow 
disruption around the network, was about two million dollars’ worth of damage. So, we 
wanna make sure they don’t come after us for that two million.’ (OML-AS) 
As the previous example illustrates, bird and wildlife management related disruptions are also 
relevant from a liability perspective. Airport management organisations constantly strive to ensure 
that effective bird and wildlife management is in place in order to avoid repercussions from the 
airlines in case of an accident. Daily effort is carried out by airport operators to ensure birds and 
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wildlife living within and around the aerodrome do not represent a safety threat to aviation, as the 
following interviewees witnessed: 
‘So, most common probably is wildlife. And that's probably indicative of the resources we put 
to it. So, with having two people dedicated every day to wildlife, seven days a week. So, you 
see the amount of resource that we actually put to that.’ (OML-AS) 
‘We do a lot of monitoring. We have an ornithologist that works as a consultant for us, and he 
comes in and does monitoring, and on the airfield three times a month. Does monitoring out 
there, and from that we can get data and look at what species and see the problems and look 
at ways and means of modifying habitat to try and get to the certain species.’ (OML-AS) 
The next paragraph provides an overview of some of the activities that airport operators carry 
out in order to monitor birds and wildlife. 
Managing birds and wildlife. From the interviews, it emerged that bird and wildlife 
management requires a proactive approach by airport management organisations. Bird habits, 
including feeding, migration, and reproduction are monitored by airport operators in order to have 
information on their potential transfers in and over the airfield. Bird species are mapped in order to 
identify when the most dangerous for aviation safety are likely to be present in the airspace. Airport 
management elaborates reports to be distributed across the airlines, so that pilots are aware of the 
bird-related risks existing at particular seasons and times. Real-time information is also ensured by 
radio communication between the pilots and the airport management coordination centre. Based on 
this information, the pilot may also decide to delay or abort take off if the presence of birds is 
significant. Similarly, the airport operator may decide to temporarily close one of the runways and 
use alternative ones. Data revealed that the presence of terrestrial animals on the airfield can be 
more easily controlled, due to the external perimeter fences. 
In spite of the efforts by airport management to foresee birds’ behaviours, risks associated 
with bird and wildlife management related disruptions are increased by the unpredictability of the 
involved animals, as one of the interviewees clearly pointed out: 
‘It’s unpredictable. It’s wildlife and that’s what wildlife is. […] You know, we do have 
trending that we track and we know at certain times a year, we’ve got different species 
coming. So, we are proactive in deterring those and when we see them on site and moving 
them on, we’re herding them to a safe place on the airport where they’re not gonna cause any 
damage to aircraft. […] You know, if you go for a week without having a strike, and you 
could have a reported strike every day. But they’re not necessarilybecause they’re 
reported, they’re not necessarily actual strikes. There’s no evidence found. There’s no 
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carcass found, nothing on the aircraft. It’s just that the pilot thought there was maybe a bird 
strike.’ (CML-AS) 
Investigations following a bird strike can be complex and require sophisticated instruments to 
ascertain origin and species of the involved birds. The following interviewee emphasised this last 
point, while showing the investigator a DNA sample recently taken from an aircraft affected by a 
bird strike: 
‘And these are some of the DNA samples that we get back here. One of the good things about 
the DNA is we can determine whether it was actually at this port or maybe overseas. So, quite 
often an aircraft will come in, they reported bird strike, we take a sample and that’s a bird 
that doesn’t belong to here. So, that’s good. It doesn’t get marked against us then.’ (CML-
AS) 
In many instances, it was reported in the semi-structured interviews that airport management 
implemented numerous strategies to prevent bird strikes and manage wildlife in general, following 
the guidelines established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO, 2012). Apart 
from collecting, reporting, and recording data on this phenomenon, wildlife management practices 
can be divided in two categories: active and passive.  
Active practices to reduce animals’ presence on the airfield include harassment techniques 
(chemical, audio, and visual repellents) or wildlife removal (capture and relocation or, where 
necessary and permitted, lethal control). In contrast, passive practices involve habitat modification 
and exclusion, flight schedule modification or other strategies to limit the attractiveness of the 
airfield or its surroundings for wildlife by preventing animals’ resting, roosting, or feeding. 
Respondents reported examples of practical actions falling into this category: for terrestrial animals, 
strengthened fence lines; for birds, nets over airfields canals, nocturnal mowing to avoid attracting 
birds, etc.  
In general, wildlife management was described as a continuous effort requiring constant 
adjustment and sophisticated techniques, as the following excerpt demonstrates: 
‘It's a lot of intensity, because you've got to take on people day after day after day to provide 
the information out there at the time. I think it's been very well worth it, and I'm sure we've 
prevented a lot of bird strikes.’ (OML-AS) 
An example of the endless effort airport operators have to undertake in order to provide 
effective wildlife management was reported at one airport. After relocation of a particularly 
territorial species of birds from the airfield, one respondent started observing an increased number 
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of bird strikes by that same species. A subsequent investigation proved that the relocated, mature 
birds had been replaced on site by young ones, which were not as knowledgeable as the previous 
ones in terms of familiarity with aircraft movements. The direct consequence was an increase in the 
number of strikes by young birds, which caused airport management to stop removal practices for 
that specific species. In another instance, the principal investigator of the present study had the 
chance to directly experience how persistent issues related to wildlife management can be. During 
an Airside inspection conducted with an Airside officer, a bird’s nest was found on top of some 
pipes running AS from the terminal. The safety officer reported that he had already removed the 
nest a couple of times, but the bird continued to re-make it. 
One final remark concludes this sub-section and summarises the issues represented by birds 
and wildlife in the explored airports. An actual understanding of participants’ perceptions on bird 
and wildlife management related disruptions can in fact be drawn from the following excerpt. The 
interviewee was a general manager operating at the leadership level and gave this answer to the 
investigators’ question: 
I – ‘What would you do in your airport if you had the magic wand?’ (LL-LS/AS) 
R – ‘On the safety side, I would love to get rid of all the birds and wildlife. We’ve improved 
this a lot, but it takes an enormous effort and people out there constantly working on that. It 
takes a lot of resources.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
The excerpt is a proof of the significance of the issue of bird and wildlife management in the 
explored airports. Airport management devote significant resources to tackling this problem. 
Summary. Effectively managing birds and wildlife in and around Australian aerodromes is 
one of the priorities of airport management organisations. The relevance and costs associated with 
this activity largely depend on factors such as the geographic positions of the airport or the extent of 
the threat represented by wild animals. 
4.2.4 Congestion and Queuing in Airports 
Frequency: 46.7% of respondents 
By nature, airports are locations where passengers expect to queue, due to the presence of 
several barriers and processes that hamper the smooth flow of people and goods (check-in 
procedures, security screening points, immigration and border protection, etc.). Although 
congestion and queuing in airports could be perceived as not being a disturbance directly involving 
safety and security issues, numerous respondents (second highest frequency in the interviews) 
indicated these events as disruptions, for several reasons. From the semi-structured interviews, it 
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emerged that congestion and queuing in airports are disturbances primarily affecting customer 
service, one of the key priorities for modern airport management organisations. These disruptions 
refer to those cases in which the terminal and its sub-systems (check-in areas, security screening 
points, baggage collection areas, arrivals, etc.) become overcrowded causing a negative operational 
impact on normal business. Data revealed that congestion can cause delays and even cancellations, 
and impose significant costs on all of the stakeholders involved in the aviation sector, from the 
passengers, to the airlines, through the airport management organisation. Congestion and queuing in 
airports have relevant consequences not only on the Landside of airports, but also on their Airside. 
Congestion in the terminal and slow operations may indeed translate to disruptions in flight 
schedules, causing excessive traffic on the tarmac and generating further delays. Pressure is put on 
ground handlers and security operators to meet their slot times. Furthermore, several interviewees 
highlighted that the interdependence existing among airports causes the adverse effects of 
congestion and queuing in airports to cascade throughout the whole air transportation network, 
multiplying involved costs. An example of this cascading effect was reported by the following 
respondents, who described the impact of congestion and queuing in airports on normal business 
operations: 
‘Operational delay, weather, aircraft maintenance issues, late passengers, lost bags all that 
sort of stuff, can cause a massive disruption to the rest of the business. So, for example, a 
disruption at 8:30 in the morning by half an hour can then have a flow down impact for the 
rest of the day.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘So, it is possible for example [Airport 1] to have adverse weather events and for aircraft 
from [Airport 2] and [Airport 3] to be diverted to [our airport]. So, that can impact on us and 
because we don’t have an alternative runway, it’s very restrictive. Although we’re lucky we 
don’t have a curfew, it can still disrupt flow rates and cause disruptions.’ (CML-LS) 
Congestion and queuing in airports were reported during the semi-structured interviews as 
manifesting specific trends, according to time of the day and time of the year. Similarly, data 
revealed that congestion and queuing in airports follow a seasonal trend that depends on certain 
circumstances such as school holidays, sport events, tourism, etc. During peak-hours, terminals 
experience significant congestion due to the high number of travellers. Security screening points 
tend to get saturated and long queues stretch in front of them. During a session of field observation 
at Airport A, the investigator was able to witness overcrowding of a security screening point during 
peak-time, which required the security screening provider to open an additional lane. The whole 
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event happened in a relatively short time, with a relevant wave of travellers hitting the screening 
point almost at the same moment.  
Involved circumstances. During the semi-structured interviews, respondents highlighted that 
numerous contributory factors impact on congestion and queuing in airports. As the core service of 
modern airports remains air transportation, any element affecting the normal operations in the 
aerodrome may potentially impact the timely performance of flights and therefore result in 
congestion and queuing in airports. Factors such as technical faults, local standbys, maintenance 
issues, adverse weather conditions, disruptive behaviours by passengers, incidents on the ramp, etc. 
can all create congestion and queuing in airports.  
From an organisational perspective, one factor was reported to be particularly relevant to 
congestion and queuing in airports: the physical design of the terminals and of their sub-systems. 
Respondents illustrated that when the security screening points are characterised by limited space, 
congestion is more likely to occur, especially when additional queuing lanes are not available. In all 
three data collection sites, interviewees mentioned future plans for expansion in order to cope with 
the increasing number of passengers. Data highlighted that the screening points are not the only 
airport sub-system that may get overcrowded. In the case of simultaneous arrivals, the baggage 
carousels and belts can also experience crowdedness and operate near capacity.  
From an individual perspective, another factor emerged as impacting on congestion and 
queuing in airports: passengers and the general publics’ behaviour. The following respondent stated 
this last point, while mentioning the habit of some travellers to start queuing at their boarding gates 
well before the scheduled departing time. This was referred as creating unnecessary congestion. 
‘Yeah. What people tend to do is ... They'll stand at boarding gate. They don't want to lose it. 
They know that's the one they got. So, they just stand there and then their flight ... They panic. 
When you travel in a group of 30, they all like to stand together and they just expand. We 
haven't got that much room.’ (OML-LS) 
The data analysis demonstrated how structural factors may interact with passengers’ 
behaviours and in turn unchain psychological adverse states in the customers during queuing. In one 
case this was exemplified by a respondent, who stated that the check-in area of their airport was too 
small. Thus, travellers had to queue in a wavy line, which prevented them from seeing the actual 
end of the queue. The following excerpt was taken from the aforementioned interview and explains 
this last point: 
‘I mean, once people are in a tense security, no matter how long it is, they think, “At least I'm 
in the right spot. We’re organised. We’re okay.” But when they actually curve around down 
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[to the check-in area] and then they can't even see the screening point, they think, "S***, how 
long am I gonna be here? I've got my boarding pass. I'll miss the plane,” blah, blah. So, that 
causes a bit of anxiety and stress.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Data emphasised that congestion and queuing in airports not only causes delays and upsets 
passengers, it can also make the terminal look cramped and disorderly, which was reported as 
extremely detrimental by airport management organisations. In the words of one interviewee, at 
peak-times the terminal may get ‘…messy, untidy, busy, which is not ideal for our business.’ (OML-
LS/AS) 
Units of analysis/areas of operations. Analysis of the semi-structured interviews highlighted 
that congestion and queuing in airports are a concern, especially for members of the operational 
management level. In particular, employees in charge of LS/AS operations indicated the relevance 
of congestion and queuing in airports as SSD in the explored airports.  
‘Operational delays generally come from passengers and baggage not getting to the aircraft 
on time for whatever reason […] lack of knowledge, coming to the airport first time 
travellers, they're not familiar with the travel processes in regards to check-in, baggage 
screening, passenger screening, immigration, border immigration processes, and then 
obviously, they're not familiar with the distance to the gates, which means that they could, you 
know, they may turn up to the gate last or late.  These are very common.  It’s probably very 
common delays around the globe in regards to that.’ (OML-LS) 
It is worth noting that respondents at the operational management level included job positions 
such as duty managers and terminal managers, responsible, among other things, for ensuring an 
adequate level of customer service and a regular flow of passengers throughout the airport. 
Summary. Although not directly resulting in safety and security-related disruptions, 
congestion and queuing in airports were indicated by respondents as relevant, potential disruptions 
to airports’ business operations. In particular, these events were considered to impact the normal 
flow of activities carried out in the explored airports and associated with other types of disruptions. 
4.2.5 Disruptive Behaviours by Passengers or the General Public 
Frequency: 40% of respondents 
Under the category of disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general public fall all 
instances where passengers or members of the general public display behaviours that are disruptive 
to normal business operations. From a risk management perspective, disruptive behaviours were 
found in the investigated documents as potentially covering the whole spectrum of attacks 
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perpetrated in the involved airports, including incidences such as front-of-house attacks, vandalism, 
public order events, hostage situations, etc. In practice, based on respondents’ experience and 
narration, disruptive behaviours emerged as associated with more common security-related issues, 
which usually entail intervention by the police. 
Disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general public may take different forms and 
interviewees in the present investigation highlighted the most common examples. It is worth noting 
that disruptive behaviours in airports may also be put in place by staff members (e.g., ground 
handlers, delivery men, cleaners, retailers, etc.). These last cases were not classified in the present 
research as disruptive behaviours, but fall under other categories (Airside breaches, etc.) 
Runners. A first case of disruptive behaviour involves those reported as runners by the 
participants in the interviews. Runners are people that refuse to complete the security screening 
process performed at the access points of the sterile area.43 The typical situation that involves 
runners is when a passenger selected for a random explosive trace detection test is concerned about 
being late for their flight and decides not to stop, running to the sterile area. Respondents illustrated 
that from a regulatory perspective, once a passenger is selected, the explosive trace detection test 
becomes part of the screening process, which must be completed before allowing access to the 
sterile area. In the instance of runners, security screeners have to ascertain that visual contact is not 
lost with the runner. If visual contact is lost, there may be a need to re-screen the whole sterile area 
if cross-contamination is suspected. Runners constitute a security disruption because they alter the 
normal business operations and in extreme cases may require investigations to verify potential 
terrorist intentions. Runners were also reported as possibly aggressive towards the screeners, 
especially when they felt it unfair to be randomly picked for the explosive trace detection test. 
‘With the screening, from a behavioural perspective of a passenger, it’s the explosive trace 
detection test, that’s the biggest one […] and it’s always the same thing: “Why did you pick 
me, do I look like a terrorist?” You know bla, bla, bla.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
Refusal to undergo security screening does not always involve runners, but also other types of 
behaviours. One of the security incident register examined during the document analysis contained 
an example of a passenger who was randomly selected for a full-body scanner,44 but refused to 
proceed. Boarding was therefore denied because security screening could not be completed. The 
                                                 
 
43 In the explored airports, runners are also considered those workers and operators who refuse to stop for the security 
identification process, for example at Airside vehicle access points. These instances are considered in this thesis as 
belonging to the category of Airside breaches, as illustrated in Sub-section 4.2.2. 
44 This procedure is aimed at detecting objects on a person’s body for security reasons. Body scanners also enable 
detection of non-metal items, unlike walk through metal detectors.  
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involved flight was delayed, as the passenger’s checked-in baggage had to be found and removed 
from the hold, entailing a significant disturbance for the airport operator. 
Hostile attitudes. A second example of disruptive behaviours provided by respondents was 
the case of hostile attitudes by passengers or members of the general public, either in the terminal or 
on board the aircraft. Aggressive behaviours may also occur resulting from interaction by 
passengers or general public with airport staff.   
Intoxicated people were reported as a common instance of disruptive behaviours involving 
hostile attitudes. This may involve passengers refused permission to board a departing aircraft by 
the pilots because ‘…they purely have been drinking too much’ (OML-LS/AS) as witnessed by one 
of the respondents. Similarly, members of the general public may be under the influence of alcohol 
or other substances and constitute a nuisance to the airport’s environment. During field observation 
at Airport A, the investigator witnessed one such case where the police had to intervene upon 
request from a bartender and escort an intoxicated individual outside the terminal.  
Staff members’ behaviours may also instigate passengers’ hostile reaction, as the following 
excerpt from an interviewee demonstrated: 
‘Sometimes it’s about the screener as well, that can have an impact on outcomes as well and 
people’s behaviours. You know, public perception is “He spoke pretty rudely to me while 
starting the screening process, so I’m gonna speak to him rudely back”’. (SSP/AFP-LS) 
This last point provides an explanation regarding why communication skills are essential to 
support an effective screening process. One of the coordinators at the screening area of Airport A 
pointed out the importance for screeners to welcome the passengers with a smile because ‘…a smile 
can make a world of a difference.’ (SSP/AFP-LS). 
The security screening process was described as an activity that may be perceived as 
intrinsically very invasive by some passengers, who may behave aggressively towards the 
operators. Manual inspection of carry-on bags was mentioned as one of these instances. When the 
operator at the x-ray screen identifies suspected items in a bag, they request that a colleague 
manually inspect it. Respondents in the interviews specified that under the current regulations, 
travellers are not allowed to handle their bag at this stage of the screening, which passengers may 
perceive in a negative way. 
‘Sometimes people can be a bit disruptive if they don’t like you looking through their bag. 
[…] The process is that it has to be the security guard that puts his hands in the bags and 
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checks the item. The passenger can’t put their hands in, so they get a bit upset.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
The previous excerpt witnesses the sense of frustration instilled in some passengers by having 
their personal items handled by strangers. This may translate to higher chances for the same 
passengers to display disruptive behaviours. 
Hoaxes. Hoaxes were also reported as disruptive behaviours by the respondents. According to 
current regulations, airport staff members must treat every threat as potentially involving actual 
risks (Australian Government, 2005).  
‘The apparent joking about bombs in bags and all that sort of stuff, which is not viewed in the 
same way by the general public as it is by the police and the airline staff […] there used to be 
signage on the check-in counters, at both ends, and also here to say, “There’s no such thing 
as a joke about safety and security” […] the check-in agents are actually obliged to call AFP 
if somebody makes a remark.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Data revealed that an apparent innocent remark by a passenger while boarding may escalate to 
the point where intervention by the police is requested and delays or disruptions to operations result. 
Crime. Respondents belonging to the police reported that disruptive behaviours in airports 
may involve a broad spectrum of different types of crimes that require traditional policing duties. 
Interviews conducted with police commanders emphasised the possible presence in the explored 
airports of potential criminal activities related to drugs, alcohol, illegal immigration, etc. An 
interviewee from one of the explored airports highlighted how intervention by the police is mostly 
decisive, when compared to the actions that airport operators’ employees may put in place: 
‘I guess we've always got the police to contact if something goes wrong, federal police they 
can speak to people in regards to airline regulations. Just having a nuisance person and you 
have a security guard, who they ignore and just create more hassle, they respect the police 
more.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 The same respondent emphasised that, compared to the police, the security operators are 
usually considered less authoritative figures by disruptive passengers. This last element 
demonstrates the importance for airports to have a police presence on site. 
Units of analysis/areas of operations. From the examination of the units of analysis and areas 
of operations of respondents who discussed the relevance of disruptive behaviours by passengers or 
the general public during the interviews, it emerged that this type of disruption is perceived as 
particularly relevant at the corporate management level and at the operational management level. 
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Interviewees from security screening providers/AFP also considered disruptive behaviours to be 
one focus of attention of their activities, revolving around the guarantee of a secure airport 
environment. Predominantly, interviewees working LS alluded to this type of disruption, which 
proves to be specific to the terminals’ environment. Indeed, no mention was made by AS operators. 
Summary. Under the category of disruptive behaviours by passengers and the general public, 
interviewees classified security-related events as involving a disruptive behaviour by an individual 
in the airport. These included runners violating the security checkpoints procedures, hostile attitude 
(e.g., intoxicated people), hoaxes perpetrated by passengers or general public, and generic crimes 
happening in the airport precinct. On some occasions, these security disruptions may require the 
intervention of the police.  
4.2.6 Fire Alarms 
Frequency: 23.3% of respondents 
The fire alarms category was considered in the present investigation as a standalone type of 
disruption, which can be classified into two main groups: fire events and false alarms. In extreme 
cases, both fire events and false alarms may lead to the activation of the airport emergency plan 
which entails, for instance, the total evacuation of the terminals. In this last case, disruption 
originating from fire alarms is even more significant, as all passengers in the terminal have to be 
rescreened before being admitted back into the sterile area. This was reported by a few respondents 
during the interviews. Furthermore, the emergency plan resulting from a fire alarm involves a series 
of operations that may slow down or hamper the restoration of normal business operations and 
consume significant resources. Interviewees explained how, in the case of fire alarms, the security 
screening procedures and baggage handling systems are stopped, the emergency exit doors disarm 
and the security screeners take on the role of emergency facilitators by supervising the exit doors. In 
addition, in all cases of evacuation, the airport operator has to conduct an official investigation on 
the events. Side-effects deriving from this emergency procedure include the possibility of security 
breaches in the presence of disarmed doors (or congestion in the terminal when operations get back 
to normal). 
Fire events. Actual incidences of fire that may happen in the whole aerodrome, especially in 
the terminals, fall under fire events. Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting Services managed by 
Airservices Australia are on duty at the explored airports to ensure first response in case of major 
fire events. Analysed data highlighted that fire events represent a potential, major disruption for 
airports with catastrophic consequences. However, their likelihood is classified as unlikely, as 
indicated by a risk management document analysed in Airport B. 
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Airport lounges were described by one respondent as particularly prone to fire or smoke 
related events due to the involved equipment (plugs, small appliances, etc.). Document analysis 
conducted in one of the airports revealed a past situation where a small fire resulted from a 
malfunctioning mobile phone charger plugged in at one of the lounges. Smoke and fire started 
developing from the appliance but were easily managed by the operators. In the meantime, the 
owners of the phone charger had embarked on a departing aircraft. Upon intervention by the police, 
the passengers were disembarked for investigation and held in custody for criminal damage.  
Fire events may also develop on board an aircraft. One such instance was documented in a 
safety report and involved fumes coming from the cabin of a landing aircraft. The airbridges for 
passengers’ disembarking were only deployed when expansion of the fumes into the terminal was 
prevented. 
False alarms. Data revealed that false alarms have more minor consequences than fire events, 
but are more frequent. They usually involve activation of fire detection and alarm systems by a 
source other than fire (e.g., dust, particles, smoke, etc.). In extreme cases, false alarms may cause 
significant disruptions, especially when involving evacuation of the terminals following activation 
of the emergency plan. Respondents in the interviews indicated false alarms were a common 
disruption in their airports, placing them in the top position in a hypothetical ranking of the most 
frequent SSD, as the following excerpts highlighted: 
‘From a daily perspective, the most common and relevant disruptions would be any alarms 
that may be activated, and predominantly we do get fire alarms. And not a lot, but they are 
actually one of our issues within the terminal.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
‘Probably the most number one would be fire alarms, false fire alarms. That would be 
number one I think.’ (CML-LS) 
‘Fire alarms are probably another one for us. Very common.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘Another safety issue is fire evacuations. We have too many.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
‘You know, I mean we get the everyday occurrences like fire alarms.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
The frequency of false alarms is increased by numerous causes. The most common were 
identified when dust, particles, or smoke were captured by the sensors in the alarms, as the 
following quotes illustrated: 
‘All of them are caused by over-sensitive fire alarms that go off in case of dust or in case of 
maintenance work that produce dust, etc.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
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‘It’s basically dust being blown through the air conditioning vents and that’s around our 
asset and our maintenance of that asset and the cost of duct cleaning and those sorts of 
issues. It happens regularly. […] Yeah, just dust on the detectors, faults detectors, yes, 
faulties…’ (OML-LS/AS) 
In spite of the frequency of false alarms, respondents from the three airports reported that 
measures are in place to reduce the likelihood of these events, such as the ‘double-knock’ fire 
detection and alarm system. In order to be escalated and considered an actual fire event¸ a first 
alarm has to be confirmed by a second proof, such as another alarm going off in the same area, a 
break glass door being manually activated adjacent to the first alarm, or the first alarm not being 
turned off within a specific time slot. 
In the case of works being conducted by contractors and the potential release of a large 
amount of particles or dust, another procedure is in place in order to reduce the risk of false alarms, 
as stated in the following excerpt: 
‘But we have processes to minimise this: when contractors work in specific areas, they have 
to communicate where they work, so that if a fire alarm goes off where they are, we call them 
to confirm that it is a false alarm.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Summary. The large majority of fire alarms described by respondents in the semi-structured 
interviews referred to cases of false alarms generated by works, dust, small particles, etc. 
Respondents also referred to a minority of fire events in the explored airports. 
4.2.7 Maintenance, Works, and Repairs 
Frequency: 20% of respondents 
Several respondents highlighted the relevance of extraordinary interventions like 
maintenance, works, and repairs as a potential safety disruption to normal business operations in the 
selected airports. These activities are in fact deemed to alter the normal flow of operations at the 
three data collection sites and often require adjustments in the way business is conducted. 
Furthermore, they may impact on the safety of the aerodrome’s users. In addition, in the case of 
mismanagement of maintenance, works, and repairs, disruptions may be caused by involuntary 
damage to the aerodrome equipment, services, infrastructures, etc. A perception of the relevance of 
maintenance, works, and repairs for airport operations was provided during an interview, as stated 
in the following excerpt: 
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‘If I was gonna put a behind wildlife in terms of disruptions, would be works and 
maintenance. Now, out of 27 staff or AS Operations Officers, I've got five that are dedicated 
to capital works.’ (OML-AS) 
Maintenance, works, and repairs encompass a large variety of events. These range from 
maintenance to the tarmac, to extraordinary repairs to be conducted in the main terminal buildings. 
Although not directly initiating safety or security issues, maintenance, works, and repairs were 
considered disruptions by the respondents due to their potential impact on normal business 
operations. One typical, significant example depicted during the interviews was the partial closure 
of taxiways or runways resulting from rejuvenation or paving works. In extreme cases, 
maintenance, works, and repairs may create conditions for incidents to happen, as witnessed by the 
following interview: 
‘Yes. So, that can interfere with passenger movement, with walkways, change of walkways, 
change of the road system, all that sort of stuff. And if there’s major incident at one of those 
sites, that can really impact operations as well.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Risks associated with maintenance, works, and repairs may potentially be increased if the 
usage of particular tools or machinery is required during works. Document analysis conducted on a 
risk management report at Airport B provided examples of the aforementioned instances. 
Equipment used during maintenance, works, and repairs was in fact reported as having the potential 
to interfere with aircraft operations. The case of high cranes penetrating the obstacle limitation 
surface 45 was indicated as an example of this instance. Similarly, portable lights used by workers 
were reported as a potential distraction for pilots or air traffic control.  
Management of maintenance, works, and repairs. Major maintenance, works, and repairs 
are managed in the selected airports through the method of working plan, a document that details 
the characteristics of the planned work (timeframe, disruptions involved, responsibility, etc.) and is 
placed under the responsibility of the project manager identified by airport management. Moreover, 
a Notice to Airmen is usually released by the airport management organisations to the airlines in 
order to inform pilots of the works being conducted and specify temporary changes to the AS area.  
Maintenance, works, and repairs were reported by the interviewees as often involving the 
presence of contractors or sub-contractors on site, which entails specific Workplace Health and 
Safety requirements for airport management organisations. The following excerpt was drawn from 
                                                 
 
45 Obstacle limitation surfaces are imaginary surfaces drawn above the aerodrome’s airspace to identify the lower limits 
above which objects become obstacles to aircraft operations (Australian Government, 2009a). 
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an interview conducted with a Workplace Health and Safety specialist in one of the selected 
airports. 
‘As contractors, I mean, are required to fulfil safety measures while working onsite. So, we 
screen all contractors that come onsite. They get pre-qualified. Accreditation, insurances, licenses, 
all that sort of stuff. Make sure they have a safety plan for the work they’re doing. And we review 
all that before they commence work.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
The same interviewee also illustrated the risks linked with maintenance, works, and repairs, 
focusing in particular on injuries deriving from mismanagement of maintenance, works, and repairs, 
potentially occurring to workers/employees or passengers. Thus, in order to prevent maintenance, 
works, and repairs from becoming a major safety concern, contractors and sub-contractors were 
reported as being regularly audited by airport management organisations. The project manager 
identified by the airport operator plays a key role in ensuring the sufficient liaison with the involved 
external companies, as it was referred during the interviews. 
Apart from the Workplace Health and Safety-related inconvenience caused by such injuries, 
legal (compliance) and operational (investigations) impacts were also reported. Respondents 
emphasised that in the case of safety incidents during maintenance, works, and repairs, the regulator 
intervenes and conducts an investigation to ascertain liability. This event was reported as potentially 
highly disruptive in terms of normal business operations. Such an investigation may in fact involve 
the need to suspend the works and partially close the AS area, with a possible impact on the 
schedule of aircraft movements. 
‘Could result in injury to themselves or to others. So, if there is an injury that might be 
reportable through the regulator, we would then have to cease operations around that, 
whether it’s a contract work site or if it’s in the terminal, like one of the airline workers, that 
sort of thing, we’d have to cease operations within that particular area until the regulator 
comes in, does an inspection, goes through the whole investigation process.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Units of analysis/areas of operations. The review of maintenance, works, and repairs carried 
out in the present section has highlighted particular cases of works conducted in the AS area of the 
selected data collection sites. No mention of LS maintenance, works, and repairs was made by the 
respondents in the semi-structured interviews. In addition, maintenance, works, and repairs were 
deemed to be strictly related to safety or Workplace Health and Safety issues. Respondents who 
stressed the importance of maintenance, works and repairs were all employed in the LS/AS or AS 
areas of operations, with a specific focus on safety management. 
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Summary. Similar to congestion and queuing in airports, maintenance, works, and repairs are 
also not directly related to SSD. However, their nature and characteristics have the potential to 
entail Workplace Health and Safety issues, due to presence of contractors, use of machinery, etc. 
4.2.8 Natural Hazards 
Frequency: 26.7% of respondents 
In spite of not directly resulting from operations at the selected airports (and in general not 
being generated by individual and/or organisational factors), natural hazards were nonetheless 
indicated by several respondents as SSD in the explored data collection sites. These events did not 
constitute a core focus in the present thesis, which was aimed to investigate the individual and 
organisational determinants of OV in Australian airports. However, although natural hazards are not 
causally linked to OV in airports, the risks and impacts can nonetheless be influenced by how 
vulnerable the airport is (as a complex sociotechnical system and critical infrastructure). 
Magnitude and consequences of natural hazards. Document analysis conducted in Airport B 
included an examination of risk assessment documents, which highlighted two main entries 
referring to natural hazards. The first one involved Airside (AS) risk assessment. Adverse weather 
conditions (lighting, hail, severe winds, and extreme heat) were reported as potentially impacting on 
aviation equipment and resulting in damage to the aircrafts, vehicles, infrastructure, or on 
passengers, general public, or personnel and, in extreme cases, causing injuries or death. This type 
of event was classified as possible (likelihood) and moderate (consequences) before risk treatment 
and unlikely (likelihood) and moderate (consequences) after risk treatment. The second entry 
involving natural hazards referred to Landside (LS) risk assessment. Adverse weather conditions 
(fire, storm event, flooding) were considered as potentially causing loss of life or injury or damage 
to property. This type of event was classified as unlikely (likelihood) and catastrophic 
(consequences) before risk treatment and rare (likelihood) and catastrophic (consequences) after 
risk treatment. The same type of analysis was conducted in Airport A where natural hazards were 
classified as a specific entry only in the LS risk assessment document. They were assessed as 
unlikely (likelihood) and catastrophic (consequences) before risk treatment, and rare (likelihood) 
and catastrophic (consequences) after risk treatment.46 
Data revealed that severe natural hazards have the capacity to cause major disruptions in 
airport operations. The probability and intensity of natural hazards were reported by respondents in 
the interviews as strictly depending on the geographical location of the aerodrome, for climatic 
                                                 
 
46 For further information on the classification utilised in the risk assessment documents, see Appendices 03, 04 and 05. 
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(cyclones, thunderstorms, hail storms, heavy rain, floods, etc.), as well as environmental 
(earthquakes, etc.) reasons. The three data collection sites featured a certain variety in terms of 
geographical position, which enabled discussion around different types of climatic events. During 
the semi-structured interviews, respondents mentioned past experiences where natural hazards 
extensively disrupted airport operations: 
‘[At the occasion of that event] certainly the terminal was shut, the airport's shut, for about 
12 hours I think.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
The night before the researcher conducted his field observation at Airport B, an extensive 
thunderstorm hit the aerodrome. The memory of this event was still fresh in the respondents’ words 
during the following semi-structured interviews: 
‘Weather, like last night, we had delays last night. Two storms, electrical storms. Basically, 
airline staff will not work out on the aprons when there’s electrical storm. It’s a safety risk.’ 
(OML-LS/AS) 
Thunderstorms emerged as particularly common in the three data collection sites, especially 
in specific seasons. Thunderstorms were reported as extremely relevant, as they predominantly 
affected AS operations, with stranded aircrafts, ceased ground operations, and evacuation of the 
whole tarmac. 
‘A thunderstorm might shut the airport down for 10 minutes or 2 hours, which causes a lot of 
chaos. It doesn't shut down what happens inside the terminal, but anything on the tarmac 
stops. If there's lightning, you don't work. It is a safety aspect, and it lists simply for safety. It's 
not safe really for planes to fly in storms…’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Apart from the impact they have on the affected aerodrome, natural hazards emerged as a 
significant example of coevolution (Buuren et al., 2012) or tight coupling (Perrow, 1999) that can 
be found in the civil aviation system. Disruptions deriving from natural hazards in one airport may 
impact operations at other aerodromes, with aircrafts potentially diverted to other destinations in 
case of adverse weather conditions. One of the respondents explained that in case of adverse 
weather conditions, their airport may attract diverted flights from three other international 
aerodromes in Australia. This was reported as potentially causing other disruptions and subsequent 
delays in operations. 
Management of natural hazards. Respondents explained that airport management 
organisations have the potential to limit the consequences of natural hazards, despite not being able 
to influence their likelihood. Contrarily to other SSD, natural hazards cannot be prevented through 
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the activities of the airport operator or airport management organisations. Thus, preparedness and 
response are the only stages of the crisis escalation cycle on which airport management 
organisations can focus. Mitigation of safety and security risks associated with adverse weather was 
mentioned by respondents in the interviews as the core activity of airport management organisations 
with regard to natural hazards, as the following passage witnessed: 
‘Okay, let’s go with the adverse weather event. So, there are a number of factors there which 
may contribute to us not properly managing that sort of a risk.’ (CML-LS) 
One interesting aspect of natural hazards that emerged during the fieldwork conducted by the 
investigator referred to the decision-making mechanisms associated with adverse weather events. 
Airlines were reported as having different storm warning systems in place. As a consequence, 
information about the potential hazard represented by a thunderstorm, for example, may differ from 
airline to airline, which may lead to contrasting decisions as to whether to continue or stop 
operations.  
‘Each of the airlines has a separate storm warning system and can make its own decision, 
safety decision, as to whether to continue to operate or not in the event of an adverse weather 
warning. So as an airport operator we could make a decision that the impending weather or 
storm surge was going to be too high risk to continue operations, but we can’t stop the 
airlines from doing it.’ (CML-LS) 
The previous passage demonstrates the limited decision-making power that the airport 
operator has over the airlines when it comes to adverse weather conditions. 
Summary. Although not directly related to individual or organisational factors depending on 
airport operations, natural hazards have the potential to cause major disruptions to aviation, which 
may in turn have safety or security-related consequences. The likelihood and consequences of 
natural hazards are classified in different ways in the three explored data collection sites, depending 
on elements such as characteristics, geographical location, severity of the threat, etc. 
4.2.9 Prohibited Items Violations 
Frequency: 36.7% of respondents 
Introduction of prohibited items in the sterile area (Landside) and the Airside security 
restricted area has the potential to present security-related consequences. Prohibited items violations 
were classified in the present research as those instances where disruption is associated with the 
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presence of a forbidden object in the sterile areas. Prohibited items violations refer to the security 
screening rules, regulations, and procedures illustrated in Chapter Two47. 
Two main goals are associated with the security screening activities carried out in modern 
airports. Security screening has to provide an effective filter to ensure 100% of items entering the 
sterile area are cleared. At the same time, security screening has to be fluent enough to ensure no 
unnecessary delays are caused in airport operations. Data revealed that a trade-off exists between 
these two objectives. However, security is generally reputed the absolute priority. Hence, in some 
instances, delays or minor interruptions to the passengers’ flow are considered a tolerable by-
product of an effective security screening process. One of the respondents in Airport A specifically 
highlighted this last point as follows: 
‘There’s no pressure, or there should be no pressure, so, while we wanna have a fairly good 
facilitation rate, like a throughput rate of passengers per hour on the number of screening 
machines that we use that’s definitely – but the most important thing is the sterile area.’ 
(OML-LS/AS) 
The next paragraph provides an overview of prohibited items violations associated with the 
security screening process in place in the explored airports. In particular, causes and consequences 
of this type of disruption are explored. 
Security screening process. In the respondents’ words, prohibited items violations have the 
potential to be a relevant SSD due to the likely consequences they may entail. However, data 
highlighted that in reality, in almost all cases, prohibited items violations did not involve malicious 
or disruptive intentions by the perpetrators. Semi-structured interviews revealed that prohibited 
items were usually found on passengers or in passengers’ belongings due to negligence, ignorance 
of regulations, or distraction. 
‘The problem is that the public really, even to this day, still don’t know what they can and 
can’t bring through, because nobody checks on websites, nobody checks the government 
websites.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
‘And that's where we have to stop the screening point. The police would attend and interview 
the person. And nine times out of ten, it has been – seen to be a genuine mistake.’ (OML-
LS/AS) 
                                                 
 
47 See Sub-section 2.4.2 for further details. 
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An extensive analysis of the security incident reports from one of the data collection sites cast 
light on the process entailed by the identification of a prohibited item at the screening point. In one 
specific case, a credit card flick knife was found in a passenger’s carry-on bag during x-raying. In 
these instances, the operators working for the security screening provider activate the duress alarm 
and request intervention by the Australian Federal Police. The police identify and question the 
passenger to ascertain potential malicious purposes. If the violation is established as being genuine 
and not related to disruptive intentions, the item is simply confiscated and the passenger is free to 
go. Although not representing a security threat, such an instance may nonetheless result in delays or 
minor disruptions to the screening flow, as happened in the aforementioned case of the credit card 
flick knife. Not only prohibited items, but also suspected objects may be identified by security 
screening operators, who then may decide to request intervention by the police, especially when the 
items may be the result of a crime. Objects falling into this category include money, drugs, etc. 
Impact of prohibited items violations. Data revealed that a disruptive impact is generated by 
prohibited items that eventually access the sterile area. The typical example of this is when an 
operator detects a prohibited item in a carry-on bag on their screen, but is then unable to pinpoint 
which bag on the roller contains the aforementioned item. As the operator tries to reconcile the 
image on the screen to the bag, the screening process continues; the passenger recollects their bag 
from the roller and walks past the screening point. As a result, a prohibited item is in the sterile 
area. This occurrence was described by the interviewees as potentially disruptive, even in absence 
of malicious intentions by the perpetrators. If the operator manages to identify the involved 
passenger, keeping visual contact on them, the traveller may simply be stopped and asked to go 
back to the screening point for a manual check. In contrast, if the passenger is not immediately 
stopped and visual contact of them is lost, potential cross-contamination has to be considered. 
CCTV recordings may be used to verify this incidence. Consequentially, airport management may 
be required to empty the sterile area and re-screen all passengers, which can cause major disruption 
to airport operations. 
‘Reconciling the image on the screen to the bag that you’ve actually got in front of you. So, 
99.99% times, it’s done. It’s just that one time where you might have two bags similar 
together. The screener is a little bit distracted and he goes: “This is the bag that we want to 
be searched” and it gets picked up, they start searching it, but the one with the knife has 
actually been picked up and taken.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
‘Well, predominantly there are instances where a security screener has identified a threat 
item or an object in an item carry-on or baggage and they’ve been unable to identify the 
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image on their screen with the bag that’s on the belt. So, the passenger, quite innocently, 
retrieves their bag and the screener can’t find the item. So, the passenger will go into the 
sterile area then we have to find or relocate the passenger.’ (CML-LS) 
Respondents in the interviews also reported instances where prohibited items were not picked 
up at all by the screeners at the airport of origin, but were identified at a later stage at the arrival 
airport.  
‘A couple of times, we've had people who have gone down to say [arrival airport] and it's part 
of the process, on the aircraft, they'll say, sorry, I've got a pair of scissors they didn't pick up 
in [departure airport] […] We would normally follow that up with the screening captain and 
say: “Look on this particular day, somebody got through with this particular item.”’ (OML-
LS)    
This last case was considered as not causing an immediate disruption to the operations, but 
potentially entailing a later investigation with airport management organisations questioning the 
security screening provider. 
Contributing factors. Several factors were indicated by the respondents as potentially 
contributing to the generation of prohibited items violations. First, interviewees pointed out that in 
most instances prohibited items violations occur due to human error by the screening operators. 
Distraction and complacency were identified in particular by interviewees as two major factors for 
human error. The following passage from a conversation between the interviewer and a respondent 
illustrated this last point: 
I: ‘So, why do screeners sometimes miss prohibited items?’ 
R: ‘Because they’re human.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Second, data revealed that at times, images of the screened bags projected in front of the 
operator may be misleading. Several respondents reported as typical the case of items having a 
shape similar to weapons (such as belt buckles, cap guns, etc.).  
Third, items considered forbidden by regulations may include a large variety of objects that 
would not be perceived as intrinsically dangerous for security reasons. This is particularly true in 
the case of international terminals, where regulations are generally more restrictive than domestic 
ones. Such an occurrence may cause misunderstanding and confusion in operators.  
Fourth, rules and policies are not always completely clear and leave the operators some room 
for interpretation. In some instances, the definition of a prohibited item may be problematic and 
lead to delays or disruption in the screening process, as the following excerpts emphasised: 
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‘So, we’re trying to clarify what's a knife and what isn't a knife and apparently, if it has a 
rounded edge, then that's regarded as being a butter knife. But as soon as it has a pointed end 
and like sharp serrations, that sort of thing, that's no good. So, I guess a steak knife, for 
example, wouldn't be allowed. But if it's just a very curved-edge butter knife, then that is 
allowed.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘So, by that, the bag goes through the x-ray. The operator looks at it and goes yay or nay. But 
if it’s in doubt, he’d probably say to a supervisor, “Can you come and look at this one?” And 
that would happen a lot with things like even probably some toys that might have sharp edges 
or – they’re having to make judgement calls a lot on what they think might be allowed and 
what mightn't.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 As the previous excerpts witness, instances of required interpretation of regulations were 
described by the respondents. These mainly involved the definition of the characteristics of a 
prohibited item.  
Prohibited items violations by staff members. The overwhelming majority of prohibited 
items violations reported by the interviewees involved passengers travelling with prohibited items. 
However, prohibited items violations may also be committed by airport staff members or 
contractors. From the document analysis conducted in Airport B one case emerged where a 30-cm 
wood chisel was found AS, near one of the gates that lead to the tarmac for passengers’ boarding. 
Subsequent investigation highlighted that the chisel had been forgotten by a contractor while 
working AS. This event was classified as a major potential security risk, as the chisel could have 
been used to damage people or assets. 
Summary. Prohibited items violations were reported as those instances in which unauthorised 
objects are introduced in the sterile areas (LS) or in the security restricted areas (AS) of airports. 
These cases constitute a violation of the security screening requirements enforced in Australian 
aerodromes and may equally entail human intent or accidental violation (mainly due to distraction 
by security screeners and/or passengers). 
4.2.10 Ramp Safety Issues 
Frequency: 40% of respondents 
Events falling into the category of ramp safety issues predominantly referred to occurrences 
(incidents and risks) related to safety and Workplace Health and Safety involving AS operations 
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held on the ramp (or apron).48 Respondents clearly highlighted in the semi-structured interviews 
that the ramp could be considered a sub-system of the airport complex sociotechnical system, with 
its key actors, facilities, equipment, and rules/regulations. Thus, the spectrum of occurrences 
involving events classified in the present thesis as ramp safety issues was quite broad. 
Ramp safety issues were considered in this investigation as predominantly involving staff 
members or contractors and only in minor part, passengers or members of the general public. 
Similar to other SSD, ramp safety issues involve both actual incidents and occurrences having the 
potential to escalate to incidents. The following passages were drawn from interviews conducted 
with two Airside managers in two of the explored airports. 
‘I suppose the most common safety-related issues that I deal with are ramp staff, driving on 
the ramp. The ramp is Airside, and they're the baggage handlers that load and unload the 
aircraft, and tug drivers that drive the tugs Airside. They're probably the greatest risk Airside 
that I deal with.’ (OML-AS) 
‘The single biggest contributor to occupying my time will probably be Airside driving, ramp 
safety incidents.’ (CML-AS) 
Data emphasised that the most common trait of ramp safety issues involves ground operators’ 
practices, behaviours, and attitudes. The interface between the operators and ground service 
equipment (tugs, trucks, airbridges, lifts, and all vehicles involved in ground operations) emerged as 
particularly crucial in the case of ramp safety issues. Errors or violations by operators while driving 
or manoeuvring AS vehicles or ground service equipment may result in major accidents, such as 
collisions with assets (aircrafts included) or people.  
Mismanagement of ground service equipment. Mismanagement of ground service equipment 
was indicated by the interviewees as a potential instance for ramp safety issues. One common 
example referred to the storage of equipment and vehicles utilised AS. Dollies, airbridges, tugs, 
tractors, ground power units, loaders, etc. can be parked and stored in specific areas of the apron. 
However, data revealed that ground handlers often park or store the aforementioned 
equipment/vehicles outside the prescribed zones, resulting in potential safety and Workplace Health 
and Safety events. When this circumstance is coupled with incorrect procedures, operational errors, 
or intentional faults by operators, the consequences may be very relevant and involve damage to 
equipment and aircraft, or injury to operators and more rarely passengers. Respondents’ discussions 
                                                 
 
48 See Sub-section 2.4.1 for further details. 
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on ramp safety issues mentioned examples of buildings hit and damaged by vehicles, collisions 
between tugs, aircrafts chipped by airbridges, etc. 
‘It was the high lift vehicle for the regionals. So, they... the wheelchair… anyway, he gets the 
wheelchair, passed it off the regional aircraft about... while he’s trying to bring it under the 
building and it’s too tall around the building, so it hit the building.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘We have had actually an Airside driving incident […] where an aircraft has actually been hit 
by a vehicle driving. Ground service equipment in the process of servicing an aircraft have 
damaged the aircraft here at […]. That’s the airline contract ground service organisations 
and they’ve driven too close or have driven too fast or driven inappropriately. Haven’t had 
the right controls in place and have actually dented an aircraft.’ (CML-AS) 
‘So the two tugs hit each other and one guy was thrown out of the tug, but he was very lucky 
he wasn’t injured, so just minor injuries.’ (CML-AS) 
‘We had a toilet truck, it was just come back from servicing. It was left on the apron and the 
guy from the servicing company forgot to put the hand break on and it rolled right across the 
apron. So, that guy actually…lost his licence for a month because that was very, very 
dangerous. That could have rolled into an aircraft.’ (CML-AS) 
 The previous passages are not supposed to fully cover the spectrum of ramp safety issues 
involving mismanagement of ground service equipment. However, they provide an overview of 
these issues and cast light on the way in which they manifest. 
Speeding on the ramp. The most common infringement perpetrated by AS drivers and 
reported by respondents was speeding on the tarmac.  
‘[under ramp safety issues] I would put speeding…speeding would be the number one thing.’ 
(CML-AS) 
In the ramps of the observed airports speed limits exist for ground operations, established by 
airport regulations. Under speeding on the ramp category fall those incidences where tug drivers, 
baggage handlers, and in general AS vehicles drivers exceed the speed limits. Data highlighted that 
this type of behaviour may result in major accidents, representing a potential threat to the safety of 
people and the integrity of the ground service equipment or aircraft. 
Driving behind pushbacks. Another ramp safety issue that emerged as relevant in the 
interviewees’ words was driving behind pushbacks. An aircraft is usually pushed back on the ramp 
from its gate by a tug (or tow vehicle) and then put in the conditions of taxing/manoeuvring by 
itself. According to reports by the respondents (and contained in the airports’ Airside Drivers 
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Handbooks) an aircraft pushing back has priority and other vehicles have to cease their operations 
during the pushback or at least stay at a certain distance from the plane. Respondents reported that 
in some instances ground handlers and other ground service equipment operators disregard this 
regulation and drive behind an aircraft pushing back, posing a potential safety and Workplace 
Health and Safety risk. Pilots and drivers involved in pushbacks usually have limited sight of what 
is behind the aircraft, which increases the safety risks when an AS vehicle is operated in the 
vicinity. 
‘People who continued to go near the aircraft with pushback but they can't, so it's guys 
looking so much at the pushback didn't realise there was a plane coming up alongside, and 
that was a little bit close, to say the least.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
  In one of the explored airports, the presence of a rear of aircraft road, stretching across the 
apron behind the parked aircrafts and utilised for operations with ground service equipment, was 
reported as increasing the cases of operators driving behind pushbacks. The following passage 
supported this last point: 
‘That road came about because of the airbridges, the new air bridges out there. With the 
other terminal, we used to drive under the air bridges like we do it in the international. With 
the way those airbridges are designed, we ended up having to go and put the road behind 
aircrafts. That is an issue for us. We do have a lot of breaches on there, a lot of safety issues. 
People don't see the tugs. People don't see the aircraft lights when it goes.’ (OML-LS) 
 The same interviewee added that, in spite of its intrinsic potential for safety-related 
disruptions, the rear of aircraft road belongs to those structural characteristics of the explored 
airports that may require time and resources to be modified. 
Misuse of equipment on Airside vehicles. Another type of ramp safety issue emerged from 
the semi-structured interviews involved the misuse of equipment associated with driving AS. This 
category included: misuse of beacons and unfastened seat belts.  
Respondents indicated that AS drivers sometimes do not activate the beacons on their vehicle 
while driving. Beacons are signal beams located on top of ground service equipment vehicles that 
are intended to emphasise vehicle movements. In spite of not being an immediate safety disruption, 
vehicles operating without the prescribed beacons may represent a safety risk, as they are less 
visible to other operators. In addition, such an infringement requires safety officers to intervene and 
consume time, as was explained by the following interviewee: 
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‘We do have issues with vehicles driving without beacons. It doesn't really disrupt things, but 
it's something that has a potential for someone not to see ... It's there for a reason in the 
manual standards. It's something that probably disrupts people, because it disrupts your 
thinking. You’ve actually got to go in and fix it. It takes a safety officer away from the job that 
they're supposed to be doing.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Instances of unfastened seat belts were also described by interviewees in the three data 
collection sites. One of the respondents reported the case of a ground handler who was driving with 
an unfastened seat belt and ejected out of his vehicle as a result of a collision with another AS 
vehicle. Following this accident, regulations on seat belts became more stringent and currently 
require AS drivers to have their belts fastened or reduce the maximum allowed speed. 
Other ramp safety issues. The potential for disruption associated with ramp safety issues also 
lies in the particular type of substances utilised for ground operations; the clearest example of this is 
aircraft fuel. Due to the risks associated with the presence of fuel, smoking is prohibited AS, as is 
the use of mobile phones within a certain radius from refuelling equipment. However, during an AS 
patrol conducted in one of the airports with an Airside officer, some cigarette butts were identified 
in one AS area. The officer reported that this occurrence had been previously identified, but 
perpetrators could not be caught on the spot. One of the respondents in the interviews stated that 
while passengers have become more and more aware of the prohibition of smoking AS, and in 
general do not do it anymore, some operators in certain cases infringe this prohibition. However, it 
is worth noting that this violation occurs at a safe distance from the refuelling facilities of the 
airport. 
‘Probably we do have less and less issues of smoking in our Airside environment. Ground 
operators know they're not allowed to smoke, but they'll hide around little corners and smoke. 
Passengers are told not to smoke when they get off, and this sort of thing. Generally speaking, 
most people are great, but you will get one or two that are difficult, and it's that little bit of a 
disruption thing.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 Ramp safety issues involving passengers. The list of examples mentioned previously 
demonstrates that most ramp safety issues classified in the present thesis involved staff members. 
However, some instances of ramp safety issues may involve passengers when they access the apron 
in the case of tarmac boarding. Interaction between passengers and ground service equipment or AS 
vehicles may lead to potentially relevant safety accidents. Apart from the aforementioned instances 
of AS smoking, respondents mentioned other examples of safety issues associated with travellers. 
One such instance involved passengers utilising their mobile phones while on the tarmac. This case 
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was reported by one respondent as ‘…not such a big issue…’ (CML-AS) unless done near refuelling 
equipment. Another example of ramp safety issues involving passengers described the case of an 
individual on the ramp running after documents (typically a boarding pass) blown away by the 
wind. Potential risks related to this incidence include collisions with AS vehicles or ground service 
equipment. In relation to this last element, respondents pointed out that the current decrease in the 
number of airline operators involved in passenger marshalling may increase the chances of ramp 
safety issues involving travellers. A strong opinion on this last point was clearly expressed by one 
of the respondents who stated: 
‘There is very limited control over passengers’ movement, because the ground-handling staff 
that the airlines allocate to control their passengers is woeful.’ and then added ‘…this may in 
turn lead to having passengers get lost on the ramp and wandering off.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Furthermore, the following passage was drawn from the same interview and highlighted how 
difficult the monitoring of passengers on the tarmac may be: 
‘When you got one person who's trying to control the front of the queue, the back of the 
queue, people in the middle, English as a second language, wandering around….then decide 
that they want to use their mobile phones, and go and stand over here and take a photo of the 
plane.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Existing Countermeasures to ramp safety issues. Different countermeasures are 
implemented by airport management organisations in order to prevent ramp safety issues from 
occurring. Data revealed that most of these countermeasures are aimed at modifying AS drivers and 
operators’ behaviours. An example of this involved speeding on the ramp; a practice contrasted by 
the airport operator by means of ramp inspections, speed cameras, speed bumps, etc. Furthermore, 
penalties may be applied to the perpetrators of these ramp safety issues, as it was reported during 
the semi-structured interviews and witnessed by the two following excerpts: 
‘Yeah, there's people out there who speed. We - our safety officers out there do have speed 
guns and make sure it's all under control…yeah, Airside driving, so the safety officers police 
all that. Speed guns, basically policing the Airside…’ (OML-AS) 
‘We’re pretty harsh with consequences, so if people do the wrong thing, they lose their 
licence.  There's even access rights and stuff we take away as well.’ (OML-AS) 
In the Airside Driver Handbooks examined at the three data collection sites, the lists of the 
typical AS infringements included the penalty points attributed for each case and provided an 
overview of the events regulated by the AS safety regime. As was witnessed by several 
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respondents, the purpose of the penalty point system is not exclusively to punish perpetrators, but to 
prevent future ramp safety issues from occurring. 
‘As for ramp safety, we deploy those [penalty points] as a deterrent just to try and stop 
people. We prefer it to be a deterrent rather than go and book people. But we do book people 
if we have to and we send out safety alerts.’ (CML-AS) 
Data highlighted that in the case of ramp safety issues, airport management organisations 
conduct investigations in order to ascertain responsibilities and attribute penalties, where necessary. 
CCTV recordings may be used to gain better understanding of the events. Together with 
investigations, airport management organisations elaborate on statistics for the most common 
incidences of ramp safety issues and develop subsequent strategies to improve the AS safety 
regime, with the collaboration of key stakeholders (airlines, governmental agencies, private 
businesses, etc.). One of the respondents reported that key performance indicators are under study 
in the airport in order to establish a measurement standard for ramp safety issues. Despite efforts 
made by airport operators, enforcement of an effective safety regime on the ramp was reported to be 
a challenging task, as the following respondent declared: 
‘The ramps are an interesting one. It’s a very difficult to police in terms of safety.’ (OML-LS) 
Units of analysis/areas of operation. During the semi-structured interviews, ramp safety 
issues emerged as relevant, potential disruptions and were especially reported by operational level 
managers operating AS or LS/AS. Respondents emphasising this type of disruption had a specific 
focus on safety (Airside managers). 
Summary. In the explored airports, ramp safety issues constitute a significant category of 
safety disruptions. These involve events such as mismanagement of ground service equipment, 
speeding on the ramp, driving behind pushbacks, misuse of equipment on Airside vehicles, other 
ramp safety issues and ramp safety issues involving passengers. The variety of occurrences is 
generated by the specificity of ramp operations, which can be considered a sub-system in the 
complex sociotechnical system of airports. 
4.2.11 Landside Safety Events 
Frequency: 36.7% of respondents 
Under Landside safety events, the present thesis classified all instances where safety or 
Workplace Health and Safety events occur to passengers, members of the general public, or staff 
members operating in the explored airports. Landside safety events mainly involve passengers or 
the general public, as they exclusively occur Landside (LS, within the terminals). The most 
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common instances of Landside safety events reported by the interviewees were escalator falls; slips, 
trips, and falls; equipment-related Landside safety events; and staff members Landside safety 
events.  
Escalator falls. In those airports where escalators were present in a significant number, 
escalator falls were indicated by respondents as particularly common and relevant. Escalators are 
utilised to enable access to the different floors of the terminal. However, escalators may present 
some risks in terms of safety, particularly when passengers carry bags or suitcases. Their movement 
may catch individuals unprepared and cause them to fall. 
‘So, the safety issues we have are... we have escalator falls, quite a few escalator falls. Sort of 
to... well, generally there’re people dragging their suitcases on the up. So, they’ve come in 
and instead of using the lifts, they choose to use the escalators.’ (OML-LS) 
‘So, our main safety issue within the terminal is escalator falls. We have some slips and trips, 
just people falling over.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘Fall down the escalators – that’s probably the one that surprises us, how many people fall on 
the escalators.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
In the respondents’ words, escalator falls are more common when numerous, bulky pieces of 
baggage are held by passengers, when elderly people are involved, or when many people utilise the 
escalator as a group. The resulting safety incident was reported as unleashing a domino effect where 
people and bags follow each other down the moving stairs. 
‘And they [the escalators] got the power saving mode too. So, when you step on them, they 
take off in a little bit of a jag. So, if you’re elderly... especially if you have a suitcase in one 
hand or two and you have to hold the suitcase. The classic example is a suitcase in one hand, 
briefcase in the other, so you’re not holding on. Your briefcase gets... your suitcase gets 
caught on something or tips and then, you follow it down. And we have had some elderly who 
broke their... broke a hip about six months ago…’ (CML-LS/AS) 
One of the respondents specified that escalator falls follow a seasonal trend, as indicated in 
the following passage: 
‘So, we would have one to two a month escalator falls and during the holiday season, we have 
more. During the business travelling season, we have less, for obvious reasons.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
As the previous respondent illustrated, during the tourist seasons, escalator falls increase in 
number due to increased use and the presence of passengers with more baggage. It is worth noting 
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that airport operators put in place strategies to reduce these occurrences. For example, bollards are 
located at the beginning of the escalator in order to prevent passengers from taking suitcases on the 
stairs. In addition to the bollards, signage urges passengers to use the lifts rather than the escalators 
when carrying bags or suitcases. In spite of these countermeasures, many passengers still decide to 
carry their bags on the escalators.  
One of the consequences resulting from escalator falls was reported as particularly critical to 
airport operators. This referred to the risk of passengers suing airport management organisations 
and claiming money due to the reported injuries. However, one interviewee explained that these 
falls predominantly result from passengers holding their bags on the escalator, which is explicitly 
prohibited by signage and bollards. Thus, in most cases, airport operators are not required to pay 
people involved in escalator falls. 
‘We’ve been able to avoid most claims in the escalator space, especially when people take 
their luggage up there and they lose their balance. Often they’ll say that. “Oh, I had my 
baggage and I lost my balance.” The minute they say that, it’s very hard for them to put in a 
claim, because the signage is there.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
On the other hand, respondents also reported cases in which airport management 
organisations had to pay the passengers. Examples of this included medical expenses or costs 
related to delays or missed flights. When discussing these instances, one interviewee stressed the 
importance of effective customer relationships in keeping passengers satisfied. 
‘Look, a perfect example was…there was a 91-year old visitor to the terminal who fell, and I 
think he was only claiming $300 or something for his medical. You’d hate for that to be 
knocked back and then it goes to the press and, you know, the reputation issues associated or 
something like that would far outweigh the $300.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
As for the frequency of escalator falls, respondents provided a rough idea based on their 
perceptions, given the lack of official statistics. In Airport B in particular, the frequency of escalator 
falls was indicated around one/two a month or three/four a month, according to the interviewees. 
On the contrary, in Airport C this event was perceived as more frequent and occurring ‘a couple of 
times a week’ (OML-LS/AS) with the involvement of an ambulance in the major cases. Analysis of 
risk management documents conducted in Airport B highlighted that escalator falls were listed as a 
specific entry. These events were classified as ‘almost certain’ (likelihood) and ‘minor’ 
(consequences). 
Slips, trips, and falls in the terminal. Another category of Landside safety events reported by 
the interviewees were slips, trips, and falls in the terminal. In Airport A the investigator was 
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informed by one respondent of a Landside safety event that took place the week before. During a 
particularly busy time at the airport, long queues were stretching across the concourse. While 
cutting through one such queue in order to reach another area of the terminal, a passenger tripped on 
a bag on the floor and injured their knee. Slips, trips, and falls may also be determined by slippery 
surfaces (e.g., during cleaning or in adverse weather) or because of objects and debris on the floor 
(e.g., pieces of sandwiches or fruits, liquids), especially in some areas (e.g., the toilets). These 
instances have the potential to disrupt normal business operations as involved individuals might 
need first aid and an investigation may be required by the airport operator.  
Slips, trips, and falls were also classified in the risk management documents analysed in 
Airport B. Their likelihood was categorised as ‘almost certain’, while their consequences ‘minor’. 
Among the identified root causes, spills, adverse weather, patrons failing to follow instructions, and 
hazardous equipment were listed. 
Equipment-related Landside safety events. Data revealed that conditions for Landside safety 
events may be created by the presence of specific equipment in the terminals. Respondents reported 
that wheelchairs or trolleys are sometimes involved in ramp safety issues, especially when 
opportunities are given to children to have contact with these pieces of equipment. One example 
was illustrated in Airport B and involved a little girl who managed to activate an electric wheelchair 
and cut her leg. In some instances, Landside safety events were described as associated with the 
ergonomics of items, tools, and equipment utilised at the explored airports. An example of this was 
reported at Airport A, where the security screening tables utilised to facilitate the screening process 
used to have protruding legs, which caused a number of trips or injured toes in passengers. 
Similarly, in Airport B some of the baggage belts used to have sharp edges, which caused cuts to 
passengers’ hands. 
Staff members Landside safety events. As the aforementioned examples illustrated, most 
Landside safety events classified in the present thesis involved passengers or visitors to the airport. 
However, some incidences involved staff members. One such case occurred at Airport B one week 
before the researcher’s arrival. In this instance, a baggage handler inadvertently crushed a number 
of trolleys into a glass sliding door, smashing it. Investigation by airport management followed and 
the employee was re-inducted regarding manoeuvring blocks of trolleys. 
Units of analysis/areas of operation. Respondents emphasising the relevance of Landside 
safety events were predominantly involved in the LS and the LS/AS areas of operations, with a 
specific focus on safety and Workplace Health and Safety. In addition, the operational management 
level was primarily involved in the definition and discussion of Landside safety events. 
 Chapter 4: Results: Safety and Security Disruptions (RQ1)                                        205 
Summary. Under the category of Landside safety events fall all those instances where safety 
or Workplace Health and Safety issues are raised within the terminals of the explored airports. 
These events include escalator falls, slips, trips, and falls, equipment-related events and Landside 
safety events involving staff members.   
4.2.12 Landside Security Breaches 
Frequency: 63.3% of respondents  
During the semi-structured interviews, the integrity of the sterile area was described by the 
respondents as a crucial element in airport security management. As indicated in Chapter Two of 
the present thesis, in modern airports the sterile area is intended as a buffer zone to ultimately 
prevent prohibited items or unauthorised individuals on board or in the vicinity of the aircrafts.  
In the present investigation, Landside security breaches were identified as those events where 
the integrity of the sterile area is compromised by access of unscreened individuals who may 
potentially carry items representing a threat to other people, or to assets and facilities. The relevance 
of this security risk was witnessed by the large number of respondents who mentioned it (more than 
63%, most frequently reported SSD). As the present section describes, not only sterile area 
breaches, but also other types of breaches relevant to the security of the LS area were classified in 
this research under the category of Landside security breaches. Furthermore, Landside security 
breaches only included LS events, whereas security breaches to the Airside security restricted area 
fell in the category of the Airside breaches, as described in Sub-section 4.2.2. 
Despite the importance of the integrity of the sterile area, airport management organisations 
operating at the three data collection sites admitted that sometimes breaches did occur. Disruption 
to normal business operations is predominantly caused by the investigation process that these 
instances generate. In contrast, their consequences for airport security were reported as usually 
being very limited. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases, Landside security breaches are 
perpetrated with no malicious intentions. The relevance of Landside security breaches is therefore 
related to the potential for exploitation associated with them.  
‘From a security terminal point of view, breaches of the sterile area are our main concern 
because of the implication on the operation and what that would mean.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘So, the breach itself doesn't actually cost the time. It's the investigation side of it which takes 
the time and the assessment of what actually has occurred and then confirming the details.’ 
(OML-LS) 
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Individual and organisational factors may create the conditions for outsiders to penetrate the 
security systems and cause major disruption, but only when harmful intentions are present, as the 
following excerpts from the interviews demonstrated: 
‘We've had sterile area breaches. I think everyone that I've had – in the seven years I've been 
here, none of them have been with intent. They've all been by accident or through lack of 
knowledge or they call them under regulations, disaffected persons, or mental health.’ (OML-
LS) 
‘The sterile area breaches – again, that's lack of knowledge of the passenger or persons.  It’s 
been human error from either the screeners or the passenger and 99% of the time, when you 
go back and review it, it's been a failure in the process of the screener or the actual 
passenger.’ (OML-LS) 
 As the aforementioned passages reported, Landside security breaches mainly involve 
passengers or members of the general public. However, in some instances these events may also 
concern employees. In the case of passengers or members of the general public, Landside security 
breaches may take different forms and develop through different mechanisms.  
Unscreened passengers (security screening). One first instance reported by the respondents 
referred to those cases where unscreened passengers manage to access the sterile area. As a result, a 
Landside security breaches is generated. Access to the restricted buffer zone may happen through 
the security screening points. In these incidences, security screeners fail to ensure that 100% of 
passengers are declared clear to access the sterile area. An interesting case was illustrated by one of 
the respondents. In one occasion, around 20 passengers managed to get through the security 
screening point before one of the screeners realised that the walk-through metal detector was 
actually off. A colleague had tripped on the electric plug cord and unplugged the scanner. The 
terminal had to be locked down and people in the sterile area re-screened. Similarly, in another 
airport, one of the screeners forgot to switch the walk-through metal detector on at the start of the 
shift and several travellers transited without being properly screened before being taken back and 
re-screened. The aforementioned incidences represent a major disruption, in that they potentially 
require a total or partial lock-down of the terminal and the re-screening of all patrons.  
‘If we lose observation with them [unscreened passengers accessing the sterile area], which is 
quite possible in a terminal where you have hundreds of thousands of people, you don’t have 
an option but to empty everybody out and rescreen them all. So, they are your, sort of, top 
four which cause heartache for you.’ (CML-LS) 
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Cases of terminal lockdown and total re-screening of individuals were reported as somehow 
rare by the respondents.  
‘The rule is, as long as somebody in responsibility keeps line of sight on them [unscreened 
passengers accessing the sterile area], we don’t have to evacuate the area. So, as long as we 
keep line of sight on them, the supervisor would call the police, get a response down there. 
They follow them all the way. The police will finally catch up with them, drag them aside and 
do whatever. In that case, we don’t have a breach of the sterile area. Having said that, if we 
do lose sight of them that becomes a major issue.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
As it was reported in the previous excerpt, in most cases screeners manage to maintain eye 
contact with the involved passengers and full re-screening is avoided. The next paragraph reviews 
the issue of passengers transiting through a specific airport and the security-related issues that this 
may entail. 
Unscreened passengers (in transit from unscreened airports). Landside security breaches 
perpetrated by passengers or members of the general public may also be the result of procedural or 
operational errors by staff members. One such instance was illustrated in particular in one of the 
explored airports and directly concerns the overall aviation security system. As illustrated in 
Chapter Two, as a consequence of the current national regulations, unscreened passengers arrive at 
screened airports.49 This may represent a particular problem when incoming unscreened passengers 
are transiting through the airport and need to board another airplane. In this last case, they may 
potentially mix with screened individuals and contaminate the sterile area. In order to prevent this 
issue, data revealed that the explored airports have measures in place to separate unscreened from 
screened travellers and avoid contamination. These measures include specific arrival areas 
dedicated to passengers coming from unscreened ports, marshalling of unscreened passengers by 
airline members, dedicated fast-track lanes to conduct the passengers to the screening points, etc. 
In spite of the latter measures, the potential for Landside security breaches does exist and 
respondents highlighted cases in which Landside security breaches actually occurred. On one 
occasion, an airline staff member escorted transiting passengers coming from a regional, unscreened 
aerodrome directly into the departure lounge (sterile area). According to the interviewee’s words, 
this instance was only detected at a later stage, when another similar occurrence happened and the 
involved passengers were already in the sterile area. As the following excerpt witnessed, a major 
disruption originated from this event: 
                                                 
 
49 See Sub-section 2.4.2 for further details. 
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‘We realised that we had an airline staff member who probably brought the same group of 
people straight into the lounge from unscreened ports. The first aircraft has probably around 
70 people. The second was probably at 12-13 […] Part of the problem there is that we had 
sort of about 120 people within an hour and ten minutes go through our sterile area. We 
couldn't account for all of them, so as a precaution, we had to empty the lounge, re-screen 
everybody back in. That's a very rare scenario, that type of thing. The issues there are we got 
delays. We had probably about four aircraft delays out because it takes at best probably 50 
minutes to re-screen everybody back in. […] Then to compound it even more, we had about 
eight screened aircrafts up in the air that departed [the airport] in that hour that were now 
going to places like…’ (OML-LS) 
In the case of international flights, due to the different security screening standards, 
requirements, and procedures implemented from country to country, international passengers 
transiting in an Australian airport are still required to undergo screening. As a result, just as in the 
aforementioned case of domestic flights, the potential for disruption exists, and one respondent 
discussed a case in which this potential became reality. As in the previous case, an airline staff 
member escorted passengers coming from an international flight straight to the departure lounge 
instead of via the screening point. Landside security breaches involving differences in screening 
requirements were effectively summarised by the following respondent: 
‘Yeah, it doesn’t happen so much internationally. All the international ports, the majority of, 
they’re all screened. But still, Australia may not accept the level of screening that arriving 
flights come from. Domestically, there’s more of a risk ‘cause some domestic flights still come 
from unscreened ports, mining and stuff like that or chartered flights, so there’s still a risk.’ 
(OML-LS/AS) 
 This last excerpt demonstrates that harmonisation of global aviation security requirements is 
still an open issue in the international aviation scenario.  
Passback doors violations. In some cases, sterile area breaches may occur in areas other than 
the security screening points. One incidence reported by some respondents refers to attempted 
passbacks through sliding doors.50 Respondents discussed instances where violations were 
committed by individuals trying to transit in the wrong direction by getting back to the sterile area 
                                                 
 
50 These sliding doors can sometimes be found in the terminals and constitute the boundary between the sterile and the 
non-sterile areas. During the field observation performed at the three data collection sites, sliding doors were typically 
found between the check-in area and the sterile area (to allow non-travelling individuals’ egress from the sterile area) or 
between the baggage collection area and the sterile area (for the landed passengers to recollect their baggage). In both 
cases, these sliding doors are designed to enable transit in only one direction, in order to avoid contamination of the 
sterile area. 
 Chapter 4: Results: Safety and Security Disruptions (RQ1)                                        209 
through such sliding doors (passback). This constitutes a potential Landside security breach due to 
contamination of the sterile area. Reasons for this type of infringement were reported to include 
confusion, misinterpretation of signage, or intentional behaviour. In order to prevent these 
occurrences, airport management organisations may decide to have security officers overseeing 
sliding doors where passback could occur. 
Document analysis performed in one airport highlighted a case of passback door violation 
where a passenger tried to return to the sterile area through a sliding door in order to collect the 
suitcase that they had forgotten inside. In this instance, the security officer could not stop the 
passenger, who ran through the doors very quickly and committed a passback violation. 
Break glass doors violations. Landside security breaches classified in the present research did 
not involve only breaches to the sterile area, but also events where a security disruption was 
generated by unauthorised access to a restricted area. One typical reoccurring example during the 
semi-structured interviews was the activation of break glass doors by passengers or members of the 
public. When activated, the break glass emergency system opens doors that would normally be 
closed, in order to facilitate egress on the tarmac. This activation may only occur in case of 
emergency and is strictly prohibited in all other cases. A Landside security breach may occur when 
individuals break the glass and as a consequence activate the emergency exit. This Landside 
security breach was reported as usually involving late passengers that found the boarding gate 
closed but could still see their aircraft ready to push back on the ramp. Data highlighted that in 
several cases, travellers thought this was an emergency and decided to activate the break glass door. 
Such an instance does not constitute a sterile area breach, as the involved individuals have 
supposedly been screened beforehand. However, following activation of the duress alarm that 
monitors the break glass doors, the police and airport management intervene in order to ascertain 
the passengers’ intentions and exclude further consequences. Interviewees explained that in these 
instances passengers may incur in fines for violating the emergency procedure. 
Factors contributing to Landside security breaches. From the document analysis performed 
in one of the selected airports, it emerged that staff members’ behaviours may increase the chances 
for Landside security breaches to occur, as is the case in other SSD. Examples of these instances 
included unmanned passback doors, or swipe card doors left open or unsecured by employees after 
transit. These occurrences create conditions for a potential breach in the integrity of the sterile areas 
or the restricted areas and were considered in the present thesis as Landside security breaches per 
se. Security incident reports examined in one of the data collection sites abounded with examples of 
emergency gates and secured doors left open. In one such instance, a security officer in charge of 
 210                                        Chapter 4: Results: Safety and Security Disruptions (RQ1) 
supervising a passback door temporarily left their position. A passenger thought the door was a 
normal exit door and managed to transit through and access the sterile area, before being blocked 
and taken back by another security officer. CCTV recording excluded cross-contamination. 
Landside security breaches by staff members. In spite of predominantly involving breaches 
perpetrated by passengers or general public, Landside security breaches may also involve 
infringements by staff members. Respondents discussed tailgating in particular as a recurrent 
security disruption. When transiting through secured doors (alarm doors, swipe access doors, etc.), 
employees of airport management organisations have to make sure they secure those doors behind 
them, either by locking them or by swiping their access cards. A twofold rationale was reported by 
interviewees. First, security on site must be preserved and unauthorised access avoided. Second, 
employees’ presence and movements must be constantly monitored, which was described as a 
crucial requirement in case of emergencies. For different reasons, some employees are sometimes 
found tailgating, that is to say, following their colleagues through alarmed doors or swipe access 
doors without following the prescribed security procedures. Complacency was reported as being the 
most common cause of Landside security breaches perpetrated by operators of airport organisations. 
Some staff members may feel less constrained by the existing regulations, as if they could be above 
the rules. One respondent provided a significant example of this type of occurrences: 
‘We put so much effort into maintaining the sterile area, but then you get Customs who can 
enter here through their lunch room unscreened, you can have airline staff members moving 
between the sterile and the non-sterile areas, dealing with aircrafts.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
In another case reported in a security incident document, a flight crew member coming from 
an unscreened port entered the sterile area directly from the aircraft without being screened. The 
presence of around one hundred passengers in the lounge and the lack of CCTV recording caused 
the airport operator to opt for sterile area lockdown and re-screening of all passengers. 
Landside security breaches as a result of Office for Transport Security inspections. One last 
example of Landside security breaches is worth illustrating before concluding the present sub-
section. This case was brought to light during document analysis conducted in one of the airports 
and involved a particular type of Landside security breach perpetrated by a staff member. In order 
to verify the quality of the screening process in Australian airports, the Office for Transport 
Security (OTS) performs random inspections and site visits and conducts tests on security screeners. 
During one of these tests, a disguised OTS inspector transited through a security screening point 
with the Aviation Security Identification Card of a colleague. During the screening procedure, the 
screener failed to realise that the picture on the card did not match the identity of the person that 
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was carrying it and let the inspector pass. After some minutes, the inspector revealed themselves 
and questioned the screener and their supervisor about the test failure. An investigation was started 
involving the security screening provider, airport management, and OTS. This investigation led the 
security screening provider to review all screening procedures in order to improve them and avoid 
future failures during the screening process. The aforementioned example witnessed the potential 
for disruption intrinsic to Landside security breaches and stressed the importance of correct 
individual and organisational practices to decrease organisational vulnerability in the explored 
airports. 
Units of analysis/areas of operation. To conclude Landside security breaches, an 
examination of the units of analysis and areas of operation was performed. As the name itself 
indicates, Landside security breaches were predominantly reported in the semi-structured interviews 
by respondents operating LS or LS/AS, with a particular focus on security management. In addition, 
the units of analysis of interviewees that discussed Landside security breaches were equally 
represented across the whole sample, from the leadership level through to the security screening 
provider/Australian Federal Police level. 
Summary. Violations of the security requirements occurring in the LS areas of the explored 
data collection sites are classified in the present thesis under the category of Landside security 
breaches. The most common instances include unscreened passengers (either through the security 
screening points or in transit from unscreened airports), passback doors violations, break glass door 
violations, security violations by staff members, and security violations as a result of Office for 
Transport security inspections. In spite of their rarity, Landside security breaches were reported as 
particularly crucial by more than 60% of interviewees, making this disruption the most relevant in 
the interviewees’ responses. This indicates the catastrophic potential of Landside security breaches. 
4.2.13 Technical Failures 
Frequency: 33.3% of respondents 
Technical failures were indicated as a minor disruption in the three selected data collection 
sites. Respondents reported a few cases where technical issues to equipment, tools, or machinery 
created the conditions for SSD. Technical failures were classified in the present investigation as 
SSD due to their potential to escalate into major emergencies. The spectrum of events illustrated by 
respondents and falling under the category of technical failures was broad and included incidences 
from all the subsystems in the airport: curbside, terminals, sterile areas, ramp, external perimeter, 
etc. The present section is therefore intended to report instances actually described by the 
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participants during the semi-structured interviews and not to cover the full range of failures 
potentially occurring in the explored aerodromes. 
In the respondents’ words, the relevance of technical failures was considered limited, and this 
was for essentially four reasons. First, technical failures were considered low-probability events. 
Second, routine and extraordinary inspections (serviceability inspections) were mentioned as an 
effective way to detect technical failures before they escalate into greater consequences. Third, 
availability of technicians and repairers was described as crucial in addressing technical failures in a 
timely and effective way. Fourth, the presence of back-up systems (redundancy) was reported as 
also ensuring normal business operations in case of technical failures. As a result, interviewees 
demonstrated perceiving technical failures as potential risks rather than actual incidences. This was 
witnessed in their words by the use of the conditional tense and of a hypothetical tone: 
‘The next one would be failures in wheels…’ (LL-LS/AS); ‘…this could cause significant 
disruption…’ (CML-LS/AS); ‘…I’ve been here since February and I haven’t experienced any 
major interruption…’ (OML-LS/AS); ‘…it wouldn’t be hard for something there to go 
wrong…’ (CML-LS/AS), etc. 
Information about technical failures drawn from the semi-structured interviews can be 
organised around four main categories: IT systems, equipment, infrastructure, and aircraft. All of 
these instances can be considered as having the potential to affect the airport’s normal business 
operations, including safety and security.  
IT systems. IT systems were the most recurrent category of technical failures in respondents’ 
words. It was reported as potentially having a destructive impact on airport operations, which 
largely rely on IT functionality. IT systems failures can impact the safety of the airport, as well as 
its security. In this latter case, however, malicious intentions by individuals have to be present for 
the vulnerability to be exploited. 
‘But there’s times when things just go off-line. And there’s an amount of time where you gotta 
sort that out and get things back online again. IT systems can go down, generally have an 
impact.  And that can affect the airlines.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘But if that was to occur [IT failure], that could cause significant disruption, especially I know 
there’s been some minor disruptions to the check-in system that they use here in the terminal.’ 
(OML-LS/AS) 
 An exhaustive review of IT-related issues in the explored airports lies outside the scope of 
the present investigation. The relevance and extent of this issue, however, suggests that further 
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research could be fruitfully conducted in this field, for instance emphasising the role of cyber-
security in Australian airports. 
Equipment. A second category of technical failures was reported to include failures to 
aviation equipment. These instances may have a detrimental effect on the normal business 
operations, but also on safety and security of the airport system. Safe operations may be hampered 
by failures in the ground service equipment (refuelling trucks, airbridges, lifts, etc.) which may lead 
to other SSD. Similarly, faults in screening machinery (x-ray machines, baggage handling system, 
etc.) may result in decreased security and contribute to create conditions for further emergencies. 
‘Things like, as I mentioned before, the baggage handling system going down which has a 
major impact on the airport, on the operations.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘Just a motor blowing somewhere, or it’s all computerised as well. So, the x-ray machines 
and that sort of thing. So, we have had instances where that breaks down.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
The next paragraph provides an overview of the major technical failures associated with 
faulty equipment in the data collection site. As for the case of IT, an extensive illustration of this 
type of disruptions lies outside the scope of the present study. 
Infrastructure. Airport infrastructure may in some cases be affected by technical failures that 
hamper its functionality, as well as safe and secure operations. These instances cover the whole 
spectrum of sub-systems present in modern airports: Landside, Landside/Airside and Airside. Data 
analysed included examples of such faults, for instance cracks and crevices in the building’s roofs 
(LS), pavement failures (AS), etc.  
Aircraft. The last category of technical failures depicted by respondents encompassed all 
those instances where technical issues affect aircraft. The potential for disruption is major and such 
instances may, in extreme cases, lead to loss of human lives. One of the respondents highlighted the 
nature of some of these failures. 
‘Hydraulic issues in aircrafts, broken and cracked screens, maybe because of bird strikes, 
smoke in the cockpit. The next one would be failures in wheels, wheels failing to come down. 
But hydraulic the most common one. Few times a year. Flat tyres as well.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
The immediate consequence stemming from the type of events described in the previous 
passage is an aircraft emergency. Normal business operations and general safety have the potential 
to be largely impacted by technical failures affecting aircraft. 
Document analysis. Document analysis performed on incident reports and risk management 
documents elaborated at the explored airports corroborated the description of technical failures 
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conducted in the present section and enabled a better understanding of the technical faults in the 
selected data collection sites. Examples of such events found in the aforementioned reports included 
x-ray machines shutting down, frozen PCs, alarmed doors not closing properly, electromagnetic 
locks (mag locks) not working, etc. 
Summary. Due to the large amount of equipment (hardware and software) utilised in 
Australian airports, technical failures are a disruption with the potential to affect normal business 
operations. However, their relevance was considered limited due to the following reasons: low 
probability, possibility of early detection, availability of technicians, and presence of back-up 
systems. 
4.2.14 Traffic Management Front-of-House (TMFoH) 
Frequency: 13.3% 
Disruptions related to the management of vehicles and pedestrians accessing the airport 
precincts and their vicinity were classified in the present research as traffic management front-of-
house (TMFoH). Among the SSD described in this study, the issue of TMFoH was the least 
relevant, as it was deducted from the scarcity of references in the semi-structured interviews (13.3% 
of respondents). Despite not directly involving aviation operations, neither facility intended to host 
aviation operations, access roads, parking areas, and curbside are in general considered a sub-
system of the airport, as they host services that are ancillary to aviation. Airport organisations 
(airport operator, Australian Federal Police, emergency services, etc.) intervene when disruptions 
take place in the front-of-house. Furthermore, the front-of-house premises are part of the airport 
precinct in all the three data collection sites explored in the present thesis, as understood from the 
document analysis. Few respondents mentioned issues of TMFoH as significant disruptions. 
However, some of the reported examples indicated that potential for safety and (in minor part) 
security disruptions does exist with regards to TMFoH.  
Safety. Safety concerns related to traffic management can be summarised by comparing the 
front-of-house to a road section where private vehicles, public transport (buses, trains, etc.) and 
pedestrians interact with each other in parking zones, roads, and sidewalks. Road events and 
accidents have the potential to occur in the front-of-house sub-system and indirectly impact airport 
operations, as the following passages demonstrated: 
‘We haven’t had that many pedestrian incidents, but you don’t want to get one of those 
because it’s likely to be quite serious or fatal. You’re probably gonna have a vehicle involved. 
A few incidents in the port whatever, the drop-off area out there. A couple of people getting 
nicked by a car as it goes past, we’ve had a couple of those.’ (OML-LS) 
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One of the respondents reported that passengers’ pick up and drop off was one major issue 
involving TMFoH, especially during peak hours. The three explored airports have different 
arrangements in terms of parking, however, in principle, limited time is granted for passengers’ pick 
up and drop off. Alternatively, short term or long term pay parking areas are available to drivers. 
The pick up process was described as being particularly problematic at times, with drivers parking 
their vehicles for longer than allowed, while waiting for landed passengers to exit the terminal. 
 ‘The drop off is generally fairly quick. It's the pick up that is the issue.’ (OML-LS) 
‘I would say probably, biggest issue out there is people, drivers parking their vehicles and 
believing that they can stay there for however long they like until such time that their 
passenger comes out of the terminal, so they're doing the pick up/drop off process.’ (OML-
LS) 
In some instances, the limited amount of time granted for passenger pick up and drop off was 
reported as too strict and inadequate by the respondents themselves. One such case was depicted in 
the following passage: 
‘For example, you've got husband and wife, three kids under five and you've got granny and 
grandad, grandad's in a wheelchair, granny's got a walking frame, it's not going to take two 
minutes. It's going to take best probably ten minutes to get them to move out.’ (OML-LS) 
 Traffic management front-of-house predominantly represents a problem of safety in the 
explored airports, with reference to the issue of road safety. In some cases, security elements may 
be associated with this type of disruption, as described in the following paragraph. 
Security. As the previous example illustrated, congestion may result from TMFoH, which 
may hamper the normal business operations at the airports. In extreme cases, interviewees reported 
instances of security issues related to TMFoH similar to road rage events, where drivers were 
described as becoming abusive or disruptive, with potential intervention by the police. As was 
referred to in other SSD, disruption deriving from TMFoH is essentially associated with the 
involved process. Curbside officers are usually employed in airports in order to manage parking 
areas and front-of-house vehicles. In the case of disruptions, these staff members and other 
resources may get tied up. Investigations by the airport operator may result from major events 
related to TMFoH. 
Document analysis. In order to gain an enhanced completeness of analysis, further examples 
of TMFoH were drawn from the security incident reports examined in one of the selected data 
collection sites. These instances can essentially be divided into safety-related and security-related. 
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Among the former, car accidents were indicated as the most common occurrence. Among the latter, 
numerous incidences involved disruptive behaviours by individuals: vehicles unattended for long 
time, fights between drivers, suspicious individuals wandering around the car parking areas, etc. 
Summary. Traffic management front-of-house may involve vehicles and/or pedestrians at the 
airport facilities (terminals or access roads, parking, etc.). Furthermore, this disruption may have a 
safety-related (in case of accidental events) or a security-related nature (in presence of human 
intent, such as road rage, intoxicated people, etc.). 
4.2.15 Unattended Items 
Frequency: 26.7% of respondents 
The last category of SSD classified in the present thesis was unattended items. This SSD was 
categorised in this study based on the principle that in Australia, airports regulations forbid leaving 
items unattended.51 Interviewees specified that the threat posed by unattended items may manifest 
directly (e.g., presence of explosives in a suitcase) or indirectly (e.g., presence of prohibited items 
usable with disruptive intentions). In the latter case, malicious intentions have to be present for the 
threat to be exploited. All employees operating at the airport are urged to be vigilant towards the 
threat posed by unattended items and to communicate all cases where items onsite are left 
unattended. Upon police intervention, individuals leaving items unattended may be fined and 
prosecuted. The most typical examples of unattended items are pieces of baggage left unattended by 
passengers or members of the general public. Staff members or contractors may also perpetrate 
unattended items violations, especially when these involve prohibited items left unattended on site 
(e.g., working tools such as chisels, hammers, knives, etc.). 
‘Another exposure is with contractors. Contractors are a big exposure because they are 
working and they’ll put the screwdriver down and they’ll walk away and forget about it. Now 
again, it doesn’t happen very often, but it’s an exposure.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Frequency. In spite of the existing regulations, unattended items were reported by 
respondents during the semi-structured interviews as common cases of security disruptions 
occurring in the explored airports.  
 ‘Yeah, well, pretty much on a daily basis we do have a lot of unattended items.’ (CML-LS) 
 ‘Unattended items. Yeah. We have them regularly.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
                                                 
 
51 Instances of unattended items are in fact regarded as threats ‘…to commit an act of unlawful interference with 
aviation.’ (Australian Government, 2005, p. 303). 
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‘The most common ones would be – on a day-to-day basis – would be unattended items.’ 
(OML-LS/AS) 
Although not particularly crucial in terms of potential impact (in the interviews, less than 27% 
of respondents indicated them as relevant), the analysis of the security incidents reports drafted in 
one of the selected data collection sites indicated unattended items as encompassing the 
overwhelming majority of entries. This trend was nonetheless described as decreasing, as one of the 
respondents declared: 
‘I think it’s fair to say that the level of unattended baggage has dropped considerably in the 
last three years.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 The previous excerpt indicates a decrease in the number of unattended items experienced in 
the data collection sites. 
Location. From a security perspective, the location of the unattended item is crucial to assess 
its dangerousness. Interviewees specified that unattended items mainly occur in the terminal 
buildings, especially in the check-in area or in the sterile area. 
‘Within the check-in area, that's probably where we get the majority of unattended items.’ 
(OML-LS) 
Respondents explained that unattended items identified in the sterile area pose less of a 
danger for the airport, as they are supposed to have been through a security screening point and 
cleared. In contrast, items found unattended in the check-in area and in general in the front-of-house 
areas may represent a greater threat.  
Consequences. Interviewees emphasised that in the case where an item is found unattended 
and is evidently not a threat to the safety and security of the airport, the first task for staff members 
is to try and reconcile the item with its owner. This can also be done by means of a public address 
message, if the item has a tag name on it. If the owner cannot be identified and dangerousness of the 
item cannot be excluded, staff members are requested to conduct an assessment of the situation and 
verify the potential threat. In order to do so, the principle called ‘hot-up’ is utilised in Australian 
airports.52 According to the answers provided to the questions incorporated in this principle, the 
assessor is able to conduct an evaluation of the relevance of the threat posed by the unattended item. 
If the item is clearly harmless, it can be disposed by the staff member. In case of doubt or confirmed 
                                                 
 
52 The ‘hot-up’ principle consists of a series of questions that the assessor answers in order to evaluate the threat posed 
by the item (Australian Federal Police, 2009). 
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potential threat, the Australian Federal Police are called to make their assessment. In extreme cases, 
the bomb appraisal team may intervene, as the following example illustrated: 
‘We had an unattended item, it was actually found over in the car park. And it actually turned 
out to be a contractor who had been working there and left a box with wires hanging out of it. 
So, it looked quite suspicious. It was suspicious. We had the bomb appraisal team down there 
and they actually sealed off an area as a general rule. They’ll come down. Have a look. They 
might bring the x-ray machine down, have a squeeze…’ (CML-LS/AS) 
In the explored airports, unattended items were reported as predominantly representing a 
security issue, in that their presence may be associated with malicious intentions by perpetrators. 
However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, such intentions are not present and the resulting 
dangerousness of unattended items is limited. In spite of this, unattended items were considered a 
SSD in the present thesis, as they require intervention by airport management and consume 
resources. The greater the potential threat, the more extensive the resources utilised to face it. A 
summary of the ways in which unattended items manifested in the explored airports is illustrated in 
the following excerpt: 
‘The implications of that [unattended items] is that if they [the police], for example, find the 
item in the queuing area – like people are queuing for check-in, they will then have to clear 
that area; so do the x-ray of the bag, issue being radiation, as well as obviously if there is a 
device in the bag that could explode or something […] So, it has quite an implication on our 
queuing and just general traffic flows in the airport. Now, the time that it can take – by the 
time that we identify this unattended bag, it can probably take up to probably an hour […] So, 
the level of the disruption normally depends on where the bag is being dumped. Now, if it's 
dumped, for example, out in the plaza, not such a big deal. It's not gonna disrupt traffic flows. 
But if it’s right by the security screening area or in the check-in area, then yeah it’s gonna 
restrict people flows. So then, that becomes a bit of an issue.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 The following paragraph summarises the most relevant features of unattended items. This 
concludes the overview of the most common and relevant SSD (actual and potential) emerging from 
Study One of the present thesis. Section 4.3 is intended to depict the interactions existing among the 
disruptions described in Sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.15. 
Summary. Despite unattended items emerging as very common events in the explored 
airports, their impact on aviation operations is predominantly very low, and the large majority of 
cases results in minor disturbance. In rare exceptions, the presence of unattended items within the 
terminals may entail intervention by the police and a terminal lockdown. 
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4.3 INTERACTIONS AMONG SAFETY AND SECURITY DISRUPTIONS 
One of the elements that emerged from the analysis conducted in the present Study Two is 
that the identified SSD can interact in the chain of events that characterise the crisis escalation 
process in the explored airports. In particular, data revealed that SSD can potentially influence each 
other. A specific disruption may contribute in generating another one, which may in turn be the 
precursor for additional disturbance. Potentially, every SSD is related to the other 14, with differing 
degrees of intensity. A review of the most relevant connections existing among SSD is conducted in 
the present section. 
Aircraft Emergencies. Aircraft emergencies emerged from the interviews and the document 
analysis as almost always intertwined with other types of SSD. Data emphasised that a number of 
SSD in particular have the potential to constitute an antecedent for an aircraft emergency, involving 
both safety and security issues. Examples included, but were not limited to, Airside breaches, bird 
and wildlife management, disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general public, etc. 
Conversely, especially in the case of minor, local standbys, congestion and queuing in the airport 
may result from an aircraft emergency. During observation held in Airport A, for example, the 
investigator had the chance to witness a minor aircraft emergency caused by a bird strike (bird and 
wildlife management). One of the engines of a nationally-bound aircraft was impacted by a bird 
during take-off and forced to fly back and land to perform safety checks on the impacted engine. 
This event caused the stranded aircraft to stand on the tarmac for the time necessary for inspection, 
resulting in other flights being delayed and, subsequently, in congestion of the domestic terminal 
(congestion and queuing in airports). 
Airside breaches. Airside breaches involving passengers or members of the general public 
accessing the Airside area were reported as strongly linked to another SSD, Landside security 
breaches. This occurrence may involve an individual who forces a break glass boarding gate in the 
sterile area and manages to reach the security restricted area on the tarmac. 
‘Other disruptions...the only other thing from moving it further out is breaches of Airside. 
Breaches of Airside can occur here and has been previously where people leave gates open, 
the boarding gates open, and members of the public go out, out onto the ramp and then 
realise that they've come too far. It's not their aircraft that's boarding. It's somebody else's, so 
then they try and get back into the sterile area.’ (OML-LS) 
In contrast, Airside breaches may in turn create conditions for a Landside security breaches. 
Examples of this were reported in the semi-structured interviews and involved members of the 
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public accessing AS from LS (Airside breaches) and then trying to return to the sterile area, causing 
potential contamination (Landside security breaches). Furthermore, depending on the perpetrator’s 
intentions, Airside breaches may be related to prohibited items violations, disruptive behaviours or 
be a determinant for ramp safety issues, aircraft emergencies or congestion and queuing in airports. 
The case of Airside breaches generating ramp safety issues may occur in particular when tarmac (or 
rear-stair) boarding is conducted by the airlines, entailing the presence of passengers on the tarmac 
and representing a security or more commonly a safety risk. 
‘Yeah. And you can have passengers get lost in that wandering off and stuff like that.’ (CML-
AS) 
 The previous excerpt witnesses the importance for airlines to adequately roster staff 
members during ramp operations. 
Congestion and queuing in airports and Landside safety events. Congestion and queuing in 
airports emerged from the present investigation as one disruption that does not intrinsically involve 
safety or security issues, but mainly operational disturbance. However, the relevance of congestion 
and queuing in airports for this thesis resided in the fact that this disruption can lead to other SSD 
directly involving safety and security issues, as witnessed by respondents. Examples included 
disruptive behaviours (for instance by passengers upset due to congestion in the terminal), ramp 
safety issues (such as incidents on the tarmac caused by the increased pressure put on ground 
handlers), or Landside safety events.  
The interaction between congestion and queuing in airports and Landside safety events was 
exemplified by an airport management employee. As the employee recounted, a man had fallen 
over a bag and injured his knee in the terminal. The bag belonged to a passenger who was queuing 
in a long line to board his flight. The man had to cut through the queue to reach another area of the 
terminal and could not see the bag on the ground hidden by the crowd. The airport management 
employee added that the injured man sued the airport operator for not having put in place measures 
to limit congestion in the terminal, highlighting once more the relevance of SSD for liability issues. 
Another interviewee also recalled this case during the interview and noted: 
‘He's not the first person to have fallen over someone else's bag because of that interaction or 
that chaos that you sometimes have here.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Virtually all events listed in the present research as SSD can in turn be contributing factors to 
congestion and queuing in airports. Any incidence representing a disturbance in the normal business 
operations may in fact produce congestion and queuing in the airport, resulting in delays and 
disruptions in the air transport service. Examples of this include unattended items (with the extreme 
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case of terminal lock-down for bomb appraisal), fire alarms (even in the case of false alarms the 
evacuation alarm may trigger and cause disruptions and delays), aircraft emergencies (potentially 
involving also minor events such as local standbys), etc. 
Disruptive behaviour by passengers or the general public. Document analysis conducted in 
the three explored airports emphasised how disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general 
public can be associated with other types of disruptions. Examples included Landside security 
breaches, when a passenger forces a break glass door to access AS, for instance; or congestion and 
queuing in the airport, when disruptive behaviour results in delays and subsequent congestion in the 
terminal, for example. 
Fire alarms. Data revealed that the SSD mostly related to fire alarms were congestion and 
queuing in the airport resulting from the activation of the emergency plan. Two other examples of 
potentially interconnected SSD were Landside security breaches (when an individual violates the 
sterile area by taking advantage of the disarmed doors in case of emergency) and aircraft 
emergencies (in the case of smoke or fire on board an aircraft). 
‘Then, the impact we may have is fire alarms resulting in evacuation of the terminal and 
having to rescreen all the passengers. That can cause impact on the on-time performance of 
the airport. This is because after a fire alarm, doors disarm and screening points stop, 
because staff has to attend to the disarmed doors and the baggage handling system stops. All 
of these utilises a lot of resources and causes a lot of congestion.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
 In spite of predominantly being false alarms, fire alarms have the potential to escalate into 
major crises in the affected airports. 
Maintenance, works, and repairs. In the respondents’ words, maintenance, works, and 
repairs were reported as potentially related to other types of SSD. In particular, ramp safety issues, 
aircraft emergencies, and congestion and queuing in the airport were found to potentially result 
from maintenance, works, and repairs.  
‘Construction works often. They have the potential to significantly impact an airport. If 
they’re not managed appropriately, that means that if for whatever reason they’re allowed to 
go too high, then the only safe thing you can do basically to reduce your runway length or if 
you…through the airport which could mean in poor visibility … Aircraft would miss out.  
They’re not visual and therefore they have to go around and then … or refer to other airports. 
Managing cranes so that they don’t impact airport is a significant risk that we need to 
undertake.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
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As the previous passage demonstrates, maintenance, works, and repairs have the potential to 
be associated with a number of other disruptions. First, extraordinary works on the tarmac may 
increase the number of vehicles, equipment, and machinery present on the ramp. This may therefore 
lead to an increased likelihood of safety incidents (ramp safety issues), with potential involvement 
of employees (e.g., ground handlers). Second, maintenance, works, and repairs may impact normal 
aircraft operations, and in extreme cases lead to aircraft emergencies. Third, partial or total closure 
of taxiways and runways may reduce the capacity of the aerodrome and congestion and queuing in 
the airport may eventually result, both AS and LS. 
Natural hazards. Collected data emphasised that the impact of natural hazards is systemic, in 
that this type of SSD has the potential to seriously affect the whole aerodrome. Even in the case of 
minor natural hazards, other SSD may originate that hamper normal airport operations. For 
example, congestion and queuing in the airport were reported as a side-effect of ceased AS 
operations resulting from a storm alert, as one of the respondents clearly highlighted: 
‘The airport isn’t closed, but the terminal and the ground handling activity cease, so all of the 
ramp staff and anyone on apron, gets off. So, all the aircraft that’s still on the gates and you 
can still have aircraft arriving, and there’s nowhere for them to go, so they bank up on taxi 
ways waiting for departures once the storm’s passed and everyone’s allowed to resume 
activity. What happens then is you get passengers that are waiting to go outbound just 
banking up inside the terminals. You get visitors that are awaiting arrivals that are sitting out 
there and they can’t get in and in some instances, they’ll pull on to a gate, they can see the 
aerobridge there, but nobody can drive the aerobridge in the three metres, so they’re waiting. 
So, you end up with a lot more people in the terminal and a lot more chances - well your risk 
is higher the more people that you’ve got here.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
The same respondent illustrated other SSD associated with natural hazards, such as Landside 
safety events. As an example, passengers and the general public were reported more likely incur 
slips, trips, and falls when exposed to inclement weather. 
Landside security breaches and prohibited items violations. Data revealed that interaction 
between Landside security breaches and other types of SSD (prohibited items violations, Airside 
breaches, disruptive behaviours, etc.) may occur in the explored airports. In particular, Landside 
security breaches entailing unscreened people accessing the sterile area may be associated with 
prohibited items violations. As previously mentioned,53 during the screening process, operators may 
                                                 
 
53 See Sub-section 4.2.9 for further details. 
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not be able to reconcile the prohibited item detected on their screen with the actual carry-on bag 
containing it (prohibited items violations). The involved passengers may therefore manage to access 
the sterile area (Landside security breach), which has the potential to lead to cross-contamination 
and need for general re-screening. Landside security breaches may also be associated with 
disruptive behaviour, such as the case of the aforementioned runners who do not stop for the 
explosive trace detection tests at the security screening points and directly try to access the sterile 
area.54 
Technical failures. Respondents reported that technical failures may interact with virtually all 
other SSD. An immediate consequence of technical failures is the need to undertake maintenance 
and repairs on the affected sub-systems, which may entail interruptions typically generated by 
maintenance, works, and repairs. Technical failures occurring on the equipment utilised in the 
airports have a wide spectrum of possible safety and security consequences: aircraft emergencies, 
prohibited items violations, ramp safety issues, Landside safety events, Landside security breaches, 
etc. The following passage illustrates some of the aforementioned instances: 
‘From an infrastructure perspective, I guess, disruption there’s a few things there. What I 
mentioned, I guess, serviceability of the infrastructure. So, serviceability of infrastructure, 
everything from checking equipment, security screening points, departure gates, aero bridges, 
part of the water serviceability and that sort of stuff.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
The potential interaction of SSD occurring in airports may lead to more extensive 
consequences and, ultimately, to actual organisational crises. These would inevitably attract a larger 
amount of resources, and potentially attract media attention, denting the airports’ legitimation. 
Further research is suggested in this area with the aim of providing an exhaustive investigation on 
the ways in which SSD have the potential  
Study One did not only focus on SSD. One of its by-products was a review of the risk 
assessment documents and incident reporting systems conducted in the three data collection sites. 
This will be the final topic in the present chapter, and will lead to the illustration of the 
macroergonomic factors of organisational vulnerability depicted in Chapter Five. 
                                                 
 
54 See Sub-section 4.2.5 for further reference. 
 224                                        Chapter 4: Results: Safety and Security Disruptions (RQ1) 
 
4.4 REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTS AND INCIDENT REPORTING 
SYSTEMS 
One of the by-products originating from Study One of this thesis was represented by the 
systematic review of risk assessment documents and incident reporting systems in the three 
explored data collection sites. Document analysis enabled the researcher to investigate the nature 
and characteristics of the frameworks underlying the ways in which the three airports describe and 
classify their operational risks and their most common safety and security accidents. Sub-sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2 highlight the results emerging from this review. In particular, the results underline 
potential gaps in the ways in which risks and safety and security incidents are defined, classified, 
and treated in the three data collection sites. 
4.4.1 Risk Assessment Documents 
In the examined airports, an absence of a shared, common framework to conduct risk 
assessment with regards to both Landside and Airside operations emerged as a by-product of Study 
One. Document analysis utilised as a data collection method has emphasised that the three airports 
identify, classify, and treat their operational risks in different ways based on their likelihood and 
consequences, as indicated in Appendices 03 and 04. 
In Airport X, a rare event is considered to occur once in 10 years; in Airport Y, less than once 
in 100 years; and in Airport Z, once in 20 or more years. Similarly, in Airport X, a major event is 
classified as causing major impact on operations; in Airport Y, economic loss between $4.5M and 
$18M; and in Airport Z, economic loss between $10M and $30M (see Appendix 03 for further 
details). Furthermore, Airport X has three categories of risk rating (and, consequentially, of 
strategies for intervention), while Airport Y and Airport Z have four (with different definitions, see 
Appendix 04). In addition, the examined risk entries have different names and definitions in the 
three airports and several risks are classified in certain airports, whereas in others they are not.  
The risk assessment matrices originating from these diverse taxonomies of operational risks 
are in turn different and entail a non-homogeneous classification of risk ratings (Figure 4.3, 
elaborated by the author based on information drawn from the risk assessment frameworks utilised 
in the three aerodromes). 
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Figure 4.3: Risk Assessment Matrices in the Three Airports 
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Dissimilarities in the assessment of risk likelihood and risk consequences (and therefore also 
in the resulting risk rating) are expected and understandable. One could question that the different 
categories of likelihood and consequences have different definitions due to the diverse size of the 
airports, in terms of passengers, aircraft movements, revenues, etc. Based on this, in larger airports, 
risks could be more likely to be due to the increased number of movements and passengers.55 At the 
same time, their consequences could be more relevant due to the higher economic value. Thus, a 
major event in Airport X may correspond to a minor event in Airport Z, and so on. For example, an 
airport surrounded by forests or other natural features is expected to have a different assessment of 
bird strike risk than an urban airport. Similarly, estimated consequences of a runway incursion in a 
busy international airport are supposed to be naturally different from those in a small regional 
aerodrome.  
However, differences in risk assessment should be limited to estimates of likelihood and 
consequences and not also include the criteria against which this assessment is conducted (see 
Appendix 03). The introduction in the likelihood and consequences definitions of a weighting 
coefficient based on the airport category would maintain the individual characteristics of airports 
(size, revenues, movements, etc.) by nonetheless preserving comparability of risk assessment 
frameworks among the different airports. 
4.4.2 Incident Reporting Systems 
In order to describe the ways in which SSD manifest and develop in airports, the present 
investigation conducted an overview of the incident report documents made available by the 
respective airport operators. Differences emerged in the way these reports are drafted. 
Different documents were made available by the airport operators in the present research. In 
all cases, incidents were reported without an effective classification (by type, occurrence, impact, 
etc.) and distinction between Landside and Airside operations, or safety-related and security-related 
events was missing. In one case, the incident reports were constituted by a synthetic list of statistics 
on the most common incidents and near-misses experienced in the aerodrome. Additionally, these 
reports lacked details (characteristics, causes, consequences, etc.) and did not provide information 
about the follow-up resulting from the incidents. On the contrary, in another case, the researcher 
was provided with a series of documents detailing investigations being carried out on specific 
events with abundance of details. However, a statistical overview of the aforementioned documents 
                                                 
 
55 Yet, this argument is true only in theory, as in the three explored airports the classification of likelihood does not 
follow this pattern and the very same event is not considered more likely in the biggest airport than in the smallest one. 
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was not available. Lastly, access to incident reports in the third airport was denied due to security 
concerns. 
In general, document analysis revealed that dissimilarities exist in the way information about 
incidents and near-misses is collected, reported, and classified in the three explored airports. Further 
research on this last point is deemed to provide additional insight on the effectiveness of the 
incident reporting systems in the explored aerodromes. However, the present research has 
highlighted a certain gap existing between data and information. The involved airport operators 
seemed to struggle to translate the numeric, quantitative dimension of incidents and near-misses 
into practical information for future decision-making. As in the aforementioned case of the risk 
assessment documents, the examined incident reporting systems were found suitable for compliance 
purposes more than for strategic and decision-making objectives. Further proof of this was provided 
by the fact that, when asked about suggestions for improvement in the incident reporting systems, 
respondents in the semi-structured interviews emphasised the need for quicker, on the spot data 
entry.56 This implicitly stressed the prominent statistic value of the reporting systems that may be 
perceived as a compliance fulfilment, more than an actual tool for decision-making. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
In the present chapter, SSD (actual and potential) manifesting in the explored airports were 
described, based on the respondents’ experience and analysed documents. Field notes elaborated 
during the field observation constituted a further source of data in order to integrate information 
deriving from the interviews and the document analysis. 
As Section 4.3 has emphasised, the 15 SSD have coexisting elements of safety and security. 
As an example, a potential aircraft emergency may be a threat to the safety of passengers. At the 
same time, if the emergency hypothetically results from an unlawful act perpetrated by one or more 
individuals, such a disruption also has security-related features. A classification of the 15 SSD 
based on the safety vs. security criterion was therefore reputed unfruitful. On the contrary, a 
distinction based on the predominant areas of operation (where the aforementioned SSD take place) 
provided a more effective overview of the phenomenon under study. As mentioned throughout the 
present chapter, the boundary between Landside and Airside is only a physical one. Events 
occurring in the explored airports have a systemic nature and their impact crosses the physical 
boundary LS/AS, developing in both of them. Several SSD have the potential to develop both LS 
and AS. Thus, the criterion utilised to classify the described SSD revolved around respondents’ 
                                                 
 
56 See Sub-section 5.2.3 for further details on this. 
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perceptions and analysed documents. Table 4.4 summarises the SSD according to the predominant 
area of operations in which they were reported. 
 
Table 4.4: Classification of SSD Based on Areas of Operation 
Landside SSD Airside SSD 
Congestion and queuing in airports Aircraft emergencies 
Disruptive behaviours by passengers and the general public Airside breaches 
Fire alarms Bird and wildlife management 
Prohibited items violations Maintenance, works, and repairs 
Landside safety events Natural hazards 
Landside security breaches Ramp safety issues 
Technical failures  
Traffic management front-of-house  
Unattended items  
 
 
Figure 4.4 provides an overview of the SSD embedded in a typical airport system, located 
wherever they have the potential to develop and manifest. 
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AIRSIDE 
Back Of House 
LANDSIDE 
Front Of House 
Terminal Building
Sterile Area
Security Restricted Area
SSD Code 
Aircraft Emergencies AirEm 
Airside Breaches ASSec 
Bird and Wildlife Management BWM 
Congestion and Queuing in Airports CQ 
Disruptive Behaviours by 
Passengers or General Public 
DB 
Fire Alarms FA 
Maintenance, Works and Repairs MWR 
Natural Hazards NH 
Prohibited Items Violations PIV 
Ramp Safety Issues RSaf 
Safety Events LS SafLS 
Security Breaches LS SecLS 
Technical Failures TF 
Traffic Management Front-of-House TMFoH 
Unattended Items UI 
Figure 4.4: Safety and Security Disruptions in the Three Data Collection Sites 
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The present chapter provided an answer to RQ1 and illustrated the ways in 
which SSD potentially manifest in the explored airports. Categories of safety and 
security disturbances to normal business operations were examined and practical 
examples described. Recurring themes were highlighted and connections among the 
different SSD established in order to gain a better understanding of the overall 
impact on the airport system. This has laid the foundations towards Study Two, 
which aimed to identify the potential contributory factors to SSD. As a result, an 
assessment of the organisational vulnerability to SSD in the explored airports was 
conducted and is illustrated in Chapter Five. 
The 15 categories of SSD depicted in the present chapter are not intended to be 
an exhaustive taxonomy of the safety and security related events that can take place 
in Australian airports. As has emerged from this chapter, numerous sub-categories of 
SSD exist, ranging from actual events to potential risks. Document analysis 
conducted in the three data collection sites proved insufficient to achieve an all-
encompassing classification of safety and security occurrences, as was revealed in 
Chapter Three. The illustration of SSD provided throughout the present chapter has 
demonstrated that the variety of explored phenomena (disturbances) was more 
suitable for a qualitative type of investigation, based on the accounts provided by 
primary sources. Direct experiences and perceptions of the respondents built up an 
overview of themes that constituted the basis for exploration of organisational 
vulnerability in Australian airports. 
At this stage, the starting point for this exploration has been achieved. The 
ways in which OV manifests have been clarified. Study Two is illustrated in Chapter 
Five. This study was aimed at gaining a better understanding of the individual and 
organisational factors potentially contributing to the SSD depicted in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Results: Macroergonomic Factors of 
Organisational Vulnerability and Areas 
for Improvement (RQ2a and RQ2b) 
‘You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks  
If you only attack places which are undefended. 
You can ensure the safety of your defence  
If you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.’ 
 
SUN TZU, The Art of War 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four addressed RQ1 and provided an extensive description of the most common and 
relevant safety and security disruptions (SSD) potentially experienced in the explored airports. Data 
was drawn from the respondents’ words in the semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and 
field observation.  
This thesis assumed that organisational vulnerability (OV) has the potential to manifest and 
contribute to generating SSD. An enhanced comprehension of the possible ways in which SSD 
incubate, develop, and manifest was therefore considered essential in order to cast light on 
individual and organisational determinants of OV.  
As the previous chapter highlighted, SSD are potentially very complex phenomena that 
intrinsically escape strict classification. Data have revealed that SSD: 
 Take on different characteristics, according to the circumstances in which they manifest 
(e.g., the various types of aircraft emergencies);  
 Incubate and manifest in specific areas of operations (Landside, Landside/Airside, and 
Airside) 
 In extreme (and rare) cases, have the potential to impact the overall airport system and in 
some cases the global aviation network; 
 Involve multiple actors from different organisations (private and public); 
 When significant, affect various functional levels (leadership level, corporate management 
level, and operational management level) within the same organisation. 
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Study Two is illustrated in the present chapter. This study utilised findings from Chapter Four 
(Study One) and investigated potential individual and organisational determinants57 of SSD. An 
exploratory framework for enhanced comprehension of OV in airports as sociotechnical systems 
was then proposed and practical suggestions for improvement provided. As the name itself 
indicates, this framework is exploratory is that it proposes possible explanations on the origins of 
the identified SSD. The structure of the present chapter is illustrated in the following Table 5.1: 
 
Table 5.1: Structure and Topics of Chapter Five 
Section Sub-section Purpose and Topics 
5.1 Introduction  Introduction 
5.2 Individual and Organisational 
Factors for Vulnerability 
5.2.1 Individual Factors Human factors 
 5.2.2 Task Factors Tasks allocation and design 
 5.2.3 Tools and Technology 
Factors 
Equipment 
 5.2.4 Environment Factors Airports’ layout and design 
 5.2.5 Communication Factors Organisational communication 
 5.2.6 Culture Factors Organisational cultures 
 5.2.7 Policy Factors Organisational and governmental 
policies 
 5.2.8 Structure Factors Organisational structure 
 5.2.9 Implementation Factors Execution of policies 
 5.2.10 Strategy Factors Business strategies 
 5.2.11 External Environment Factors outside the airports 
5.3 Macroergonomic Factors and 
Pathways of Vulnerability 
5.3.1 Pathway (Group 1) Ramp safety issues 
 5.3.2 Pathway (Group 2) Airside breaches 
 5.3.3 Pathway (Group 3) Various security breaches
5.4 Summary  Synthesis of the chapter 
 
As the previous chapters highlighted, the present research adopted the macroergonomic 
approach (MeA) as the interpretive framework of choice. Chapter Three demonstrated that the MeA 
was particularly fitting with this investigation’s theoretical and practical goals.58 Despite the 
suitability of the MeA, the macroergonomic categories (individual, task, tools and technology, 
environment, and organisation) have been slightly revised and adjusted to the organisational 
environment that characterises Australian airports. This was done to provide a more adequate 
description of the reality as described by the respondents and illustrated in the material utilised for 
the document analysis. 
                                                 
 
57 In this Chapter 5, the factors presented as potentially contributing to the identified Safety and Security Disruptions 
stem from the perceptions and opinions of the respondents in the semi-structured interviews. 
58 See in particular Sub-section 2.4.2. 
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Study Two constituted the core of this research in that it provided an improved 
comprehension of the concept of OV in complex sociotechnical systems. Furthermore, potential 
intervention strategies intended to limit the impact of the highlighted factors of OV are provided 
and illustrated in this chapter. The following research questions are addressed and discussed: 
 
RQ2a: How do individual and organisational factors contribute in generating the safety 
and security disruptions highlighted in Study One and increase the level of vulnerability in the 
explored airports? 
RQ2b: How can the impact of the highlighted individual and organisational factors for 
organisational vulnerability be limited and safety and security disruptions prevented in airports? 
Figure 5.1 depicts the part of the overall theoretical framework on which the present chapter 
focuses. In particular, RQ2a investigated the ways in which the macroergonomic factors interact to 
shape pathways of vulnerability that potentially lead to SSD. RQ2b then explored the potential 
countermeasures to break such an interaction or obstruct the pathways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Focus on Macroergonomic Factors of Organisational Vulnerability (RQ2a) and Areas for 
Improvement (RQ2b) 
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5.2 INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS FOR VULNERABILITY 
Findings emerging from Study Two (RQ2a and RQ2b) are organised in this chapter around 
the MeA.59 A brief overview of the MeA is presented as follows: 
Individual factors – The personal characteristics of operators working in complex 
sociotechnical systems (such as airports) are encompassed within individual factors. Individual 
factors also include the ways in which these characteristics influence operators’ performance 
(Carayon, 2006). Individual factors are impacted by the other determinants (task, tools and 
technology, environment, and organisation) and are ultimately responsible for human performance 
in complex work systems. In the MeA, the individual factors category is the one that most closely 
represents the impact of the human factor on systemic performance (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Task factors - Task factors potentially contribute to shaping the safety and security 
performance of complex sociotechnical systems. In particular, elements such as job demands, job 
content, machine-pacing, and job control have been identified by the macroergonomic theory as 
work system factors capable of influencing employees’ performance, health, and safety (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Tools and technology factors - Tools and technology factors emerge as a relevant category of 
work systems components, which researchers have to take into account when assessing the 
performance of a work system. In particular, tools and technology factors constitute the basis for 
investigations aimed at improving ergonomics in complex work systems (Carayon & Smith, 2000; 
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Environment factors - Environment factors may have an impact on the performance of 
operators in work systems, including safety and security levels. The physical environment may 
generate job stressors deriving from noise, lighting, temperature, air quality, and workplace layout 
(Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Organisational factors - A fifth dimension is considered crucial within the MeA, in that it 
reflects how organisations as uniform entities shape a work system’s performance: the 
organisational factors (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). In order to fully 
embrace the organisational dimension of work systems, the MeA classifies it into six sub-
components (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007): communication, culture, policy, structure, 
implementation, and strategy.  
                                                 
 
59 Further reference to this interpretive framework can be found in Sub-section 2.4.2. 
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Communication factors - Factors associated with organisational communication influence 
safety and security performance in complex work systems. Communication factors include 
elements relating to communication and information sharing put in place in the considered 
organisations. Communication factors also encompass the ways in which organisational 
components interact (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Culture factors - The MeA considers culture factors to be composed of the founding 
elements of the organisational philosophy (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Elements such as 
organisational practices, values, and beliefs, and the ways in which these shape the culture 
diffused in the examined work systems are included in the culture factors category. 
Policy factors - Policies, regulations, and guidelines that drive an organisation’s activities 
are included under the category of policy factors. Policy factors also embrace the ways in 
which organisational policies impact workers’ performance (Carayon & Smith, 2000; 
Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Structure factors – The MeA defines structure factors as the arrangement of the 
organisational functions (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Governance mechanisms and 
organisational settings are included in this category. 
Implementation factors - Implementation factors refer to the ways in which work systems 
carry into effect organisational policies, procedures, and practices (Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007). 
Strategy factors - This macroergonomic category encompasses the strategic posture of the 
examined organisations, including the broader organisational issues affecting the performance 
of the explored work systems (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). 
Figure 5.2 is a graphical representation of the MeA as depicted in the complex sociotechnical 
systems theory. 
Figure 5.2: Representation of the Macroergonomic Approach 
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As stated in Chapter Four, the SSD that are investigated in the present research constitute an 
exception to normal business operations, which are conducted with no disruption in the 
overwhelming majority of cases in the explored airports. As a consequence, also the individual 
and organisational factors for vulnerability investigated in this thesis in the vast majority of 
cases do not lead to visible disruptions in airport operations. However, under specific 
circumstances specified in the remainder of this chapter, these factors may contribute in creating 
organisational conditions in which SSD may develop. 
In the present section, every sub-section corresponds to a category of macroergonomic 
factors. RQ2a is addressed in the first part of every sub-section, with discussion organised around 
different recurring themes. During data analysis, in some instances, areas of operation were utilised 
as the magnifying lens for exploration of macroergonomic factors. Operations held Landside (LS), 
Landside and Airside (LS/AS), or Airside (AS) were therefore utilised as recurring nodes for 
investigation. In other cases, where areas of operations did not constitute a meaningful perspective 
for investigation, other case-specific themes were analysed, according to the macroergonomic 
category in which they belonged. As in the case of Chapter Four, in order to ascribe various quotes 
to their corresponding sources, abbreviations for units of analysis and areas of operation are used in 
the present chapter after each quote.60  
A quantitative investigation of the occurrence of each macroergonomic category lies outside 
the scope of the present research. However, in order to provide a general overview on the relevance 
of the individual and organisational factors of vulnerability identified in this thesis, some numerical 
information is presented in Figure 5.3. This illustration depicts the frequency of the 
macroergonomic factors as emerged from the 30 semi-structured interviews. A total of 883 excerpts 
were coded around the 10 macroergonomic categories. The most recurring category is 
Organisational Factors: Organisational Culture (21.5% of the coded occurrences), while the 
category that gathered the least occurrences is Task Factors (2.9%). 
                                                 
 
60 Units of analysis are classified as follows: leadership level (LL), corporate management level (CML), operational 
management level (OML), and security screening providers/Australian Federal Police (SSP/AFP). As for the areas of 
operation: Landside, Landside/Airside, and Airside. 
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Figure 5.3: Frequency of Macroergonomic factors (as factor occurrence on total occurrences) 
In this chapter, each sub-section contains a summarising paragraph. Where appropriate, 
reference is made to illustrative tables and figures reported as Appendices. RQ2b is addressed in the 
last paragraph of every sub-section, under the heading Suggestions for Improvement, which reviews 
the practical suggestions for intervention emphasised by the respondents. The structure of each sub-
section is illustrated in Table 5.2. Recurring themes are indicated as paragraphs and sub-
paragraphs.61 
                                                 
 
61 The paragraphs: Summary and Suggestions for improvement are not indicated in the summarising Table 5.2 for the 
purpose of brevity, as they are recurrent for every sub-section. 
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Table 5.2: Macroergonomic Factors for Vulnerability to Safety and Security Disruptions 
Subsec. Macroergonomic Category Code Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
5.2.1 Individual Factors IndF Complacency, stress, lack of skills, 
limited experience 
 
5.2.2 Task Factors TasF Task repetitiveness Landside, Airside 
   Stressful tasks  Landside, Airside 
5.2.3 Tools and Technology Factors T&TF Landside Decision-making, technological change, ergonomics 
  Airside Bird and wildlife, ground operations, Airside surveillance
5.2.4 Environment Factors EnvF Landside Storage areas, terminal design
   Landside/Airside Sterile area design, transit point design, terminal buildings design 
   Airside Ramp, taxiways and runways, general aviation 
5.2.5 Organisational Factors: 
Communication Factors 
OComm Internal, systemic, external  
5.2.6 Organisational Factors: Culture 
Factors 
OCul Culture Complacency culture, safety and security cultures, bureaucracy, 
cultural change 
   Training Induction, on-going training 
5.2.7 Organisational Factors: Policy 
Factors 
OPol Safety Nature of safety regime, interpretation, inadequate regulations 
   Security Nature of security regime, interpretation, regulatory inconsistencies, 
regulatory change, general aviation 
5.2.8 Organisational Factors: Structure 
Factors 
OStr Rostering  
   Contractual arrangements Ground handlers, other contractors, structure and decision making 
5.2.9 Organisational Factors: 
Implementation Factors 
OImp Security screening, training, cost 
reduction practices 
 
5.2.10 Organisational Factors: Strategy 
Factors 
OStra Low cost business model, competition, 
stakeholder networks 
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5.2.1 Individual Factors 
Frequency: 7.8% of total occurrences.  
During the semi-structured interviews, respondents discussed the importance of the human 
factor as a potential determinant of the levels of safety and security in the airport system. Data 
revealed that human factors impacting on airport operations can potentially include errors induced 
by complacency, stress, lack of skills, and limited experience. 
Complacency. Complacency was reported a reason in cases of sub-optimal safety and security 
performance by operators during their working activities. Respondents highlighted that 
complacency could potentially affect all operators working at the airports, regardless of the 
organisations they belong to. 
‘So, well, that’s... whether it’s our staff or whether it’s airline ground handlers, retail staff, 
you just get complacent really.’ (CML-LS/AS)  
As for the airport operator, the most common example mentioned by the interviewees referred 
to security screeners who sometimes may reduce their level of attention and commit errors during 
the screening process. Missed prohibited items, unscreened passengers, or sub-optimal screening of 
staff members were described as the potential instances originating from complacency of the 
security screeners. These occurrences were found to potentially lead to SSD such as prohibited 
items violations or Landside security breaches.  
‘You have human factor stuff going on around the airport. So, for instance, when we do our 
systems checks on the [security screening providers] operations, they’ve been pretty good in 
the last couple of months. But it’s that complacency from individuals, and so that’s a human 
factor element to it.’ (CML-LS) 
‘The sterile area breaches, it can be human error from either the screeners or the passenger, 
and 99% of the time, when you go back and review it, it's been a failure in the process of the 
screener or the actual passenger and it's just…it’s one of the Swiss cheese model that's lined 
up and they’ve got through.’ (OML-LS) 
The security screening provider indicated complacency as an area in which constant attention 
was needed. Two managers described their daily effort to keep operators motivated to lower their 
levels of complacency. 
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‘Are they [the security screeners] feeling involved in what they're doing? Not always. A bit 
more at the screening points. Not so much out on the inspection points, where it's a bit 
monotonous.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
Stress. Interviewees singled out another potential determinant for errors committed at the 
screening points: the psychological adverse state caused in the operators by high levels of stress. 
Stress may derive from tasks involved in an individual’s job or from situations outside work. In 
spite of the ‘…basic rule of thumb that everyone has issues outside work and we keep them away…’ 
(SSP/AFP-LS), operators may be affected by adverse mental states generated by personal issues. 
Data revealed that the challenge for the airport operator (or the security screening provider) is to 
limit the impact of these issues and prevent the resulting chain of events from developing, as the 
following excerpt witnessed: 
‘“Look, I'm splitting up with my wife. My head isn’t in the space.” So, I go, “Okay, we’re not 
gonna put you on operation screening. We’re gonna put you somewhere else.” So, in this way 
you’re mitigating the risk by removing it.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
Adverse mental states may be a possible determinant for inadequate behaviours by the 
operators. A typical example of this was reported by some respondents who described the situation 
in which a hostile attitude by screeners may generate disruptive behaviours by passengers or the 
general public. 
‘A smile goes an awful long way with people […] It can disarm the ones who are doing bad 
stuff as well, because you can still be doing your assessment in your head of that person with 
a smile.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
This last point emphasises the importance for operators to have good communication skills 
and focus on customer service, in order to have a positive relationship with passengers. 
Lack of skills. Apart from instances of complacency and stress, data underlined that operators 
may incur errors while performing their duties due to lack of skills from both a physical and a 
psychological perspective. Respondents noted that this issue involved the selection process in place 
to recruit screening operators, which does not depend on the airport operator, but on other 
contracted organisations (e.g., the security screening provider). An interesting example was 
mentioned by one interviewee, who revealed that the contracted security screening provider used to 
not test candidates to security screening for visual acuity. This was reported as possibly leading to 
controversial results in the screening process: 
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‘And, surprisingly enough, when these people [security screeners] are hired, they’re not tested 
for visual acuity by [security screening provider]. We’ve introduced it here, but for a screener, 
visual acuity is not part of their performance indicators. […] Yeah, but we’ve also found 
colour blind people!’ (LL-LS/AS) 
It is worth noting that the excerpt above refers to instances occurred well before the data 
collection. This issue had in fact already been fixed by the involved airport management 
organisation at the time of the data collection. Inadequate skills by the operators may also involve 
lack of knowledge and competence around specific matters. One such instance was the case in 
which regulations about prohibited items had to be interpreted by the screeners, regardless of their 
legislative competence. In other cases, data highlighted that screening operators may be affected by 
lack of the psychological skills necessary to ensure adequate levels of customer service. 
Communication and empathy towards passengers undergoing screening were reported as examples 
of psychological skills, as the following passage demonstrated: 
‘Sometimes some of the screening staff perhaps are not as skilled as they need to be in 
understanding the diversity of the people. […]’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 Soft skills are therefore important for screeners to understand the variety of situations in 
which they may be involved during their shifts. 
Limited Experience. Background experience of safety and security operators emerged as an 
important individual factor. Several respondents emphasised the relevance of having knowledge 
and experience in the aviation sector as a determinant of improved performance, especially with 
regards to operational roles. One knowledgeable respondent stated that when they or their peers are 
absent from work, replacement is very problematic due to the lost expertise and knowledge. 
‘An aviation background at an operational role is hugely important, because then they 
[operators] can understand why an airline’s doing what an airline’s doing. […] So, the 
things that prevent our operation going to kind of s*** when we have problems are really 
our... the knowledge of the ADMs [aeronautical decision-making] and the operations group as 
a whole.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Similarly, for Landside operations, a military (or police) background was reported as highly 
recommended in security screening positions, due to the involved self-discipline and team work. 
Additionally, this type of background was described as highly valuable in situations of conflict, for 
example in instances in which passengers put in place disruptive behaviours. 
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‘[Screening] It’s a lot of people, depending on the background just dealing with people. If 
they [the screeners] worked in office where all they’ve done is data entry and journals, and 
then they’ve got some person there flaring up at them “Why can’t I take my bottle of water?”’ 
(SSP/AF-LS) 
Conversely, lack of experience was described as potentially detrimental in some specific 
airport operations, such Airside ground handling. A respondent highlighted the risks associated with 
the fact that some ground handling companies may sometimes employ operators without extensive 
experience in thorny ramp activities: 
‘They [ground handlers] are not quite getting the experience out there that they should before 
they go Airside or drive out there, I suppose. Some companies used to wait six months before 
they let some drive out there, whereas now, almost two weeks, a week or so later, they’re 
trying to get them out there driving.’ (CML-AS) 
 Experience in airport operations therefore emerged as an important skill for workers 
operating AS. 
Summary of individual factors. The present sub-section discussed how the human factor can 
potentially play an important role in contributing to the generation of the SSD described in the 
present investigation. In particular, interviewees reported that the human factor may include 
instances of complacency, stress, lack of skills, and limited experience that may lead operators to 
incur errors, potentially resulting in SSD. 
Suggestions for improvement. In order to limit the impact of the human factor on airport 
operations, and in particular on the safety and security performance, respondents suggested 
intervening on the single determinants: complacency, stress, lack of skills, and limited experience. 
In the collected data, training was described as the most effective countermeasure to reduce the 
repercussions of human factors, as the following excerpt demonstrated: 
‘I think training is a huge…like given the human factor part, massive human factor part that 
airports have, training is obviously critical.’ (OML-LS/AS)  
Training was reported as a highly fruitful strategy to limit operators’ errors, not only by 
improving skills and knowledge, but also by breaking consolidated habits and repeated practices, 
and therefore by reducing complacency issues (refresher training). Improved recruiting processes 
and enhanced supervision on operators were also included among the effective strategies to limit 
errors by operators.  
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In terms of limited experience, participants involved in the interviews remarked on the 
relevance of information sharing and benchmarking among airport management employees within 
the same airport and among different airports in the Australian network. Direct contact with other 
airport employees was described as a fundamental means to corroborate aviation expertise. 
Conversely, excessive reliance on technology was seen as a potential hurdle to developing 
interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, data indicated that sharing best practices can be a 
particularly effective tool to achieve enhanced safety and security management, especially in the 
case of smaller airports, which do not always have the capacity and resources to establish best 
practices by themselves. Airports of the Future, the project of which this thesis was originally part, 
was mentioned as an example of effective sharing of best practices: 
‘Airport of the Future, I think is cutting edge type of research, so our opportunity to input to 
that and also what we put from what you guys put forward is important to us.’ (CML-LS/AS). 
 The previous passage witnessed the positive perception that the interviewee had about the 
Airports of the Future research project. Sub-section 5.2.2 illustrates the influence that task-related 
factors may have on the safety and security performance in the explored airports. 
5.2.2 Task Factors 
Frequency: 2.9% of total occurrences. 
In spite of the lowest occurrence among the macroergonomic categories (2.9% of the coded 
excerpts of the interviews), data revealed that task factors may have an impact on the safety and 
security performance of the explored airports. In particular, two emerging themes were emphasised 
by respondents during the semi-structured interviews: task repetitiveness and stressful tasks. Both 
task factors were referred to Landside and Airside areas of operation. The present sub-section 
illustrates them by providing practical examples. 
Task repetitiveness. Task repetitiveness was reported as a factor for organisational 
vulnerability due to its ability to potentially generate complacency (individual factors). Repeating 
the same operations over and over and following a constant pattern where no relevant issues occur 
for extended periods of time may lead employees to lose their focus and lower their attention 
threshold. Thus, when confronted with a sudden occurrence, operators may not be in the ideal 
psychological conditions for early response.  
Landside. Security screening was taken as a typical example to depict the potential for task 
repetitiveness. Data emphasised that operators working for the security screening provider may 
become complacent due to boredom deriving from their tasks. This was reported as having the 
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potential to create conditions for Landside security breaches or prohibited items violations. 
Complacency deriving from task repetitiveness was found to potentially occur especially in the case 
of reduced operations, when the security screening points have to process a limited amount of 
passengers in an extended timeframe. Interviewees emphasised that operators may lower their 
attention threshold and switch to activities such as talking to their colleagues, reading magazines, 
utilising their mobile phones, etc. In addition, in the case of sudden waves of passengers that may 
occur at particular times of the day, screeners may need some time to switch back on and regain 
complete focus on the screening process. These observations were reiterated by the following 
respondent: 
‘On a day-to-day basis, the biggest battle we have is complacency, because they [security 
screeners] are doing a repetitive task […] So, it’s raising people from whether this is the 
third, fourth week and they sat there in the screening and all of a sudden, there's a knife there 
and they’ve got to switch on and react to it.’ (SSP/AFP-LS)  
As the previous excerpt highlighted, task repetitiveness can be strictly associated with 
individual factors (complacency). This provides evidence that the macroergonomic factors explored 
in the present investigation are closely related and a sharp classification might be difficult to 
conduct. Task repetitiveness was observed as not only having the potential to affect operators 
working at the security screening points, but also other employees (e.g., baggage screeners). 
‘Usually the reason why the guys miss them [prohibited items during baggage screening], is 
because they're just tired, or they're looking at hundreds of bags every day. Not expecting it.’ 
(CML-LS/AS)  
During the fieldwork conducted in one of the airports, the researcher observed a specific job 
position that required supervision of a sliding door connecting the check-in area with the sterile area 
of the terminal, in order to avoid passback doors violations.62 The researcher envisioned that tasks 
associated with this surveillance role may be particularly monotonous, as the operator would be 
sitting on a chair surrounded by a plasterboard structure that would only enable frontal sight. The 
operator would face the sliding doors in order to make sure that individuals leaving the sterile area 
would not try to return in through the same door. 
Airside. Similar to Landside, screening was utilised by respondents as the typical example to 
illustrate possible instances of task repetitiveness in Airside operations. Data revealed that security 
                                                 
 
62 A passback door violation involves a passenger or a member of the general public who manages to access the sterile 
area transiting through an exit door against the normal flow. For further information on this occurrence, see Sub-section 
4.2.12. 
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screeners may potentially be affected by boredom and frustration when employed at the external 
inspection points, such as the vehicle access points that regulate entry to the AS. Vehicle access 
points were described as being particularly quiet in certain parts of the day, which may contribute to 
lowering screeners’ attention. Complacency deriving from task repetitiveness therefore has the 
potential to create favourable conditions for Airside breaches. The following respondent provided 
an explanation of this phenomenon by discussing the job motivation of some screeners rostered at 
the inspection points. In the following excerpt, elements of individual factors and task factors are 
combined. This point further witnesses the interaction existing among the macroergonomic factors 
examined in the present thesis: 
‘Job motivation may be an issue sometimes. Not so much on the screening point. So, much 
more out on the inspection points, where it's a bit monotonous.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
Ramp operations were also reported as potentially being affected by the complacency of 
operators, which may in turn create fertile ground for safety issues, especially when critical ground 
service equipment is employed. Ramp safety issues emerged as the potential, ultimate consequence. 
The following passage exemplified this last point: 
‘Driving the air bridge is a classic example. The air bridge is a... big piece of heavy 
equipment. And everybody, the first time they start driving them, is really careful and really 
quite precise and really very nervous about it. But after you’ve done 500 dockings and out, 
you can’t help but get... yeah, get complacent.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Stressful tasks. A second instance of task factors was indicated by respondents as involving 
stress induced by demanding tasks. Work overload and work stress were described as possible 
antecedents for impaired performance, involving the airport operator, as well as other organisations 
(e.g., security screening providers). 
‘If we have security guards, that maybe they're not vigilant, complacency. Maybe they've 
worked seven days straight. Fatigue, they're tired […] I myself used to work 10 days straight. 
That can have an impact.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Landside. Specific work shifts (e.g., night and weekend) were reported as potentially affecting 
employees’ stress levels, especially when they involved operators not used to working off hours. 
These factors were found depending on elements like job position (whether the job requires 
working at night or not), airport operating hours (whether the airport has a curfew or not), age and 
background experience of workers (whether they are used to working at night or not), etc. 
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Data highlighted that different, effective countermeasures are in place to prevent complacency 
deriving from monotonous tasks or stressful duties. Airport management organisations implement 
shift changeovers that enable a more varied pattern of assigned duties across working hours. 
‘We have a 12-hour shift personally, but we break the duties up in that 12-hour shift […] So 
that it’s not monotonous and we keep it changing all the time.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
As for the security screening activities, national and international screening practices suggest 
shifts of 20 minutes maximum on the same position, in order to reduce the repetitiveness of the 
involved tasks (Bolfing & Schwaninger, 2009). Security screeners therefore rotate through the 
different existing positions at the screening points, access controls, inspection areas, etc. 
‘On the x-ray, the legislation is you can only have twenty minutes on, twenty minutes off. It 
used to be twenty on, forty off, but they changed it a few years ago. Because of the size of the 
airport, because there are so many other positions you do, you do get a break from it [x-ray 
screening], so in two hours you might get on it twice maybe.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
 Rotation of duties and job positions was positively associated by respondents with lower 
levels of complacency and boredom deriving from monotonous tasks. 
Airside. Managers operating at the corporate management level focused their attention on 
ground handling operations and illustrated the impact that inappropriate job demands may have on 
the safety of ground operations in general. Ground handling activities are usually managed by 
airlines, either by employing their own workers or by outsourcing the service to other companies. 
Interviewees reported that in both cases, time constraints may be present, especially if one considers 
that the typical business model employed by airlines involves quick turnaround times. Thus, job 
demands may be particularly stringent and result in significant workload. Airlines were reported as 
pushing at times ground handlers to perform their duties in a limited time. Respondents in the semi-
structured interviews illustrated that this could be potentially detrimental to the performance of 
ground handling activities, especially in terms of safety: 
‘The problem is that that’s gonna have an impact on their time constraints. They need to rush, 
rush, rush […] They’ll rush. They’ll speed. They’ll run all over the place. […] On time 
performance sort of affects people’s behaviour out there, speeding and stuff like that.’ (CML-
AS) 
The previous example was illustrated by a respondent who associated the possibility of 
creating conditions for ramp safety issues (e.g., ground vehicles speeding on the tarmac) with task 
factors. Ramp safety issues may also generate from task factors due to the reported lack of control 
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by the airport operator on airlines’ task allocation. Respondents stated that airport management has 
no possibility to influence the way in which airlines attribute duties to their employees or to the 
contracted ground handlers. The following passages clarified this last point and provided evidence 
regarding the fact that the airport operator is not always aware of airlines’ operating procedures: 
‘We don’t have a lot to do with that [task allocation for ground handlers]. That’s sort of... we 
don’t have much of an influence on that, because that’s really down to the airline. Yeah. If 
they decide to put in 45-minute turns or 30-minute turns and they’re sort of putting 
themselves under pressure, that’s their choice.’ (CML-AS) 
‘So, we actually don’t have a contractual arrangement with the ramp operators, so we 
actually don’t have direct control over them. So, what we are controlling is the environment 
within which they operate, not their actual tasks, and that their tasks are managed by their 
airlines…’ (CML-LS/AS) 
 As the previous passage has highlighted, airport management does not have complete 
control over ground handlers’ job allocation, but works to ensure that safe and secure working 
conditions are ensured. The ground handlers usually have contractual arrangements in place with 
the airlines to perform their duties. 
Passenger marshalling63 was also reported to be potentially characterised by stressful tasks.  
As mentioned in Sub-section 4.2.10, having passengers on the apron represents a potential risk for 
aviation operations, due to the presence of ground service equipment (e.g., airbridges, ramp 
vehicles, etc.). Interviewees explained that inadequate levels of passenger supervision may increase 
the chances for interaction between travellers and ground service equipment or even aircraft, posing 
a potential safety risk for the whole aerodrome. One respondent reported a particular example 
where task allocation by airlines for passenger marshalling proved inadequate due to the excessive 
cognitive and quantitative workload: 
‘We noticed that the [airline] aircraft landed, and there were only two people taking care of 
the passengers. One, the lady, was up there, just watching the people coming off the aircraft, 
and the other one was in charge of checking that passengers didn't use mobile phones, but 
then also to check the security door down there. It was a bit too much for one only person.’ 
(LL-LS/AS) 
                                                 
 
63 Passenger marshalling includes all of the activities performed by the airlines (or by their contractors) aimed at 
preserving the safety of passengers while on the ramp for boarding or disembarking aircrafts. 
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In one of the airports, the principal investigator of the present research was involved in a ramp 
inspection. He therefore witnessed a situation of stressful tasks associated with passenger 
marshalling. The Airside officer escorting the researcher commented that such an instance was also 
linked to an issue of sub-optimal levels of staffing by the involved airline. 
Summary of task factors. To summarise, different organisational factors related to task issues 
emerged from the semi-structured interviews as possibly impacting safety and security of airport 
operations. First, task repetitiveness was mentioned as having the potential to cause complacency 
and decreased attention levels in LS and AS operations. A typical example reported by the 
interviewees was the case of security screening operations. In specific screening positions (security 
screening checkpoints, vehicle access points, etc.), involved tasks may be monotonous to operators. 
Complacency may therefore result and the integrity of security controlled areas (sterile area, Airside 
security restricted area, etc.) may be compromised by instances of superficiality of unconcerned 
operators. Typically, these conditions were reported as potential contributing factors towards 
security-related disruptions: Airside breaches, ramp safety issues, Landside security breaches, and 
prohibited items violations.  
Second, stressful tasks were referred to by respondents as a possible precursor for SSD. In 
particular, at times operators were reported as potentially being overwhelmed by specific shift 
conditions (working at night) or duration (working for several days straight). Work stress was found 
in the semi-structured interviews as potentially affecting both LS and AS operations. Respondents 
revealed that airlines may at times impose stringent deadlines on ground handlers in order to 
optimise use of time. Unsafe practices (e.g., speeding on the tarmac, parking ground service 
equipment outside the dedicated areas, etc.) may create fertile conditions for ramp safety issues. 
The range of disruptions to which work stress can possibly contribute included: Airside breaches, 
prohibited items violations, ramp safety issues and Landside security breaches. A visual overview 
of task factors as potential antecedents for SSD is illustrated in Appendix 06. 
Suggestions for improvement. During their discussion of the task factors that mostly impact 
safety and security operations, interviewees provided some suggestions for improvement based on 
their practical experience. In particular, task allocation was highlighted as a crucial area for 
intervention. A manager emphasised the need for the airport operator to employ more staff 
members outside their office, in order to increase the situational awareness of the airport operator. 
In the explored aerodromes in fact, duty managers are responsible for aircraft bay allocation64. This 
                                                 
 
64 The attribution of specific parking bays on the ramp for landed aircrafts. 
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was reputed to reduce duty managers’ presence in the terminal and therefore limit their general 
supervisory role. 
‘I would rather see our duty managers out on the floor liaising directly with the airlines and 
the bay planning being done elsewhere. So, the aim would be to get the duty managers, 
instead of sitting in the office over there doing things, to be […] the eyes and ears out there 
and not being tied up behind the scene.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Complacency deriving from repetitive tasks has been highlighted in the present sub-section as 
a crucial task factor. Respondents stressed the importance of enhancing operators’ motivation by 
increasing the frequency of position rotation (security screeners). Active collaboration with the 
security screening providers in order to foster work engagement and motivation in staff members 
was highlighted during the interviews as an effective instrument. Furthermore, interviewees 
suggested strengthening audit and compliance practices towards the contents of the training 
administered by security screening providers to their operators. 
5.2.3 Tools & Technology Factors 
Frequency: 10.4% of total occurrences 
Airports as sociotechnical systems are largely dependent on human-machine interaction 
(ICAO, 2011). Thus, an investigation of the individual and organisational factors possibly creating 
the conditions for the development of SSD cannot disregard the impact that work tools and 
technology have on systemic performance. During the semi-structured interviews, interviewees 
stressed that inappropriate equipment may affect operators’ performance and contribute to 
generating SSD. In the present thesis, tools and technology involved all equipment utilised in 
airports to service the aviation transportation. These tools and technology included both hardware 
and software components. Data emphasised that respondents referred to their areas of operations 
and discussed the specific tools and technology factors used in either Landside or in Airside 
operations. 
Landside. The overwhelming majority of tools and technology factors potentially 
contributing to the development of SSD in the explored airports referred to LS operations. In 
particular, three recurring themes emerged from the analysed data: technology supporting decision-
making, technological change, and ergonomics. 
Technology supporting decision-making. Managers working for the security screening 
providers were particularly sensitive to tools and technology factors. All of them demonstrated high 
levels of knowledge of technological aspects of security management. They revealed that the role of 
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technology is particularly crucial when it supports security decision-making in airports. Security 
screening emerged as the most relevant instance of this last point, as humans make security 
decisions based upon information produced by machines. The operator observes the x-ray screen 
and decides which items are allowed into the sterile area and which are not. The potential for 
prohibited items violations resides in the interaction between human (screener) and machine (x-
ray). This interaction is less relevant in terms of security performance when the machine itself 
makes the security decisions, with little or no human intervention. The automated baggage 
screening system65 is an example of this last instance: 
‘Down in the automated baggage screening system, probably 70 to 80 % of bags never get 
looked at by a human […] Whereas with security screening, I mean the body scanner and the 
walk-through […] that's where the vulnerability lies, because you're relying on the humans to 
make an assessment based on what the machine shows.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
 The previous passage provides an example of the importance of the human factor in the 
screening process. The next paragraph is intended to further explore the issue of technological 
change. 
Technological change. Technological change and use of cutting-edge tools and technology in 
order to enhance operators’ performance were described as crucial elements in the security 
screening process. One respondent provided an example of this by reporting the improved 
performance deriving from the adoption of multi-view x-ray system, as compared to the traditional 
single-view x-ray systems.66 The interviewee stated that, existing terminals may employ different 
technologies within the same aerodrome. This may have the potential to affect operations at the 
screening points and increase the chances for prohibited items violations. 
‘Currently, I know at the domestic terminal they are looking at it [screening process] with the 
single view x-rays, but there’s much better technology out there which we currently use at the 
international points transit…’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
On this very last point, but from an opposite perspective, the same respondent highlighted 
another interesting aspect of technology adoption. From a security performance perspective, newer 
technologies are not always more effective than earlier ones. The provided example referred to 
                                                 
 
65 This system is organised in different levels of screening. Checked-in bags are scanned by means of explosive 
detectors. Those that do not raise any alarm are automatically cleared and ready for loading on the aircraft. Human 
intervention (manual search) is necessary only in extreme cases (e.g. traces of explosives detected by the machine). 
66 For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to note that the multi-view system provides the x-ray screen operator 
with different images of the same object, whereas the single-view system with only one image. For further reference on 
this, see Michel & Schwaninger (2009) or Bolfing & Schwaninger (2009). 
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body scanners. In their traditional design, the scanners enabled the operator to have internal vision 
of the scanned individual. However, due to privacy concerns, the new body scanners only provide 
an image of the body line and not of the internal parts of the individual. The respondent expressed a 
clear opinion about these two different technologies: 
‘I actually prefer the old technology, the old technology, we could actually see internally.  
The privacy advocates unfortunately got a hold of it. […] We talk about things that could be 
internally used, whereas the current technology is all about just the body line and if it’s out of 
the body line.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
The way in which technological change affects safety and security performance in the 
explored airports was emphasised as a crucial theme in respondents’ words. In spite of being 
compliant to existing regulations, in some cases tools and technology utilised in the airports were 
reported as approaching their end-of-life. 
‘CCTV cameras are now eight-year-old technology, which in the IT world is... probably 
means they’re a bit old, but they generally... they do the job pretty well. Our screening 
equipment is also getting old. We know the screening equipment is getting towards its end of 
life and it’s gonna have to be replaced in the next couple of years.’ (CML-LS/AS)  
Data revealed that technological innovation is constantly related to legislative issues. In 
particular, gaps exist between technological change and regulatory change: within Australia and 
between Australia and other countries. First, interviewees highlighted a gap potentially existing 
between technological change and regulatory change within Australia. While the former happens at 
a faster pace, the latter usually takes longer. The slowness with which regulations enforce 
technological change was reported to be a potentially detrimental factor to the effectiveness of 
security management in Australian airports. This phenomenon could be defined as a horizontal gap 
between technological and regulatory change. 
‘I’d say from a regulation point of view, we’re probably slow to react. The technology 
changes. We still make people play laptops at screening points. There’s other places in the 
world that don’t. Well, I don't know who’s right, who’s wrong, but whenever it comes to this 
sort of policy and regulation, we actually seem to not be particularly responsive.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
Second, respondents pointed out a further gap in technological change and regulatory 
change between Australia and other countries. While certain States (e.g., the US and Canada) or 
institutions (e.g., the European Union) mandate minimum standards of technology for security 
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screening, Australia (and in particular the Office for Transport Security) does not impose standard 
requirements, which generates a lack of harmonisation in the aviation security screening regime. 
This second gap could be defined as a vertical gap between technological and regulatory change. 
When asked about the reasons as to why Australia does not impose minimum security screening 
standards, respondents advanced economic motivations. Interviewees reported that airport operators 
can implement a new security measure (e.g., technological innovation in the screening process) and 
recoup related costs from airline passengers only if that measure in mandated by law. In the case of 
non-mandated measures, the only way for the airport operator to recover costs is by negotiating 
with the airlines, which does not guarantee a total cost recovery. The horizontal and vertical gaps 
were reported as particularly significant in the case of a heightened threat scenario, where an 
emerging threat (e.g., non-metallic improvised explosive devices) manifests that existing 
technology is unable to detect. In this last scenario, quick technological and regulatory change 
would be crucial to preserve aviation security. 
Ergonomics. Ergonomic factors also emerged as having a potential impact on the generation 
of SSD. In particular, respondents with Workplace Health and Safety roles emphasised this last 
point. In some cases, Landside safety events occurring to passengers were described as the 
consequence of sub-optimal human-machine interaction in specific LS areas: the security screening 
points, the baggage carousels, and the escalators. In Airport A, some passengers were reported as 
having injured their feet while transiting along the screening lanes. These injuries resulted due to 
the passengers hitting the legs of the screening tables, which were excessively protruding. In one 
instance, a traveller fractured a toe and successfully sued the airport operator for the accident. 
‘Then they [the passengers] shuffle along, and cognitively your mind tells you that there’s the 
table. You don't realize there's actually a leg there, and so what happens is that they'll catch 
their foot on there and fall forward, and a lot of times the guards said that they had to catch 
people falling forward.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Data revealed that the ergonomics of the security screening area has a relevant impact on 
passengers’ screening experience. This can in turn generate psychological repercussions. The 
following excerpt illustrated this last point:  
‘A screening area is confrontational to people at the best of times, and I don't think we factor 
in the emotional side, so people tend to be a little bit more difficult.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
The ergonomics of the security screening areas not only have an impact on passengers, but 
also on screening operators. The importance of adequate ergonomics at the screening areas was 
underlined during data collection and associated with specific task factors. Stressful tasks were in 
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fact described as potential antecedents of sub-optimal performance by screening operators.67 The 
following passage illustrates the mix of ergonomic factors and stress-related issues, under which 
security screeners may be: 
‘When you're sitting there and you're trying to watch that screen and you got all this activity 
coming past you there and out of the side and you're watching your other colleagues walking 
that way up, it's very difficult if you think about it…’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Airport A also experienced issues related to the baggage belt carousels located at the arrival 
areas. Landside safety events affecting passengers were reported by interviewees. These 
occurrences originated from the sharp edges of the baggage conveyors. In several instances, 
travellers had cut fingers when collecting their bags from the belts, which caused the airport 
operator to pay for the damage. In consequence of these events, sharp edges were rounded, but 
conveyors remained a point of attention for airport management organisations in the involved data 
collection site. 
The last tools and technology factor associated with ergonomics that emerged from the semi-
structured interviews affected Airport B in particular. Several respondents reported the cases of 
Landside safety events deriving from the power saving mode de-activating on the escalators present 
at the airport. Passengers with their suitcases and bags utilising the escalators (which, it is worth 
noting, is against airport regulations) were in some instances caught by the recoil deriving from the 
activation of the escalator and fell from it. This type of Landside safety event was reported as 
primarily generating from the passengers violating the prohibition of carrying trolleys and suitcases 
onto the escalators. 
Airside. Tools and technology utilised in Airside operations were reported by interviewees as 
having three main focus areas: bird and wildlife management, ground operations and Airside 
surveillance.  
Bird and wildlife management. In order to manage birds and wildlife on the aerodrome and 
prevent their presence from hampering aviation operations, the airport operator makes use of a 
broad range of specific equipment whose main goal is to disperse animals. Active practices to 
reduce animals’ presence on the airfield utilise harassment tools (e.g., chemicals, audio repellents, 
visual repellents, etc.). The importance of such tools was witnessed by several respondents who 
reported the case of some pyrotechnic-charged cartridges. These cartridges are used by AS officers 
in order to scare birds away from the aerodrome. When the Australian manufacturer of such 
                                                 
 
67 See Sub-section 5.2.2 for further reference. 
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cartridges decided to discontinue production, the airport operators had to find new products from 
overseas. This slowed down bird and wildlife management operations and required additional 
resources to guarantee the quality of the interventions. Interviewees reported that airport 
management is constantly searching for new tools to make bird and wildlife management more 
effective, given the great potential impact that bird and wildlife management issues may have on 
airport operations.68 
‘We're currently looking at new equipment for bird dispersal and that sort of stuff. So yes, 
there's an area there where we're lacking because of the other side. […] We're looking at 
some night vision type stuff for that issue. We're looking at gas canons, which are to disperse. 
We're always looking at that.’ (OML-AS) 
‘…and even with bird and wildlife, technology has improved safety. I’ve got no doubt about 
that. I think radar is probably the next one we’re going to go with, improvements in knowing 
where birds are...’ (CML-AS) 
Ground operations. Another area of attention for tools and technology factors mentioned by 
respondents was ground operations. Under this category fell all of the tools and technologies 
utilised to support aviation ground operations, such as aircraft servicing (cleaning, refuelling, 
baggage loading and unloading, etc.) and aircraft movement (airport operation database69, nose-in-
guidance-systems70, tugs, etc.). The usage of ground service equipment was reported by respondents 
as particularly thorny due to the potential for ramp safety issues. One such instance was illustrated 
by one of the interviewees, who described the potential for disruption deriving from gaps between 
regulations and technology adoption in ramp operations. Following an accident that happened at an 
Australian airport, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority mandated seat belts for all tug drivers during 
ground operations. This required airlines and ground handling companies to retrofit their 
equipment. During the transition, speed limits for tugs not fitted with seat belts were decreased in 
order to guarantee safe operations. Over time, given the difficulty of fitting old equipment with new 
technology and given the need to maintain quick ground operations, the practice changed, as the 
following excerpt illustrated: 
                                                 
 
68 See Sub-section 4.2.3 for further details. 
69 One of the respondent explained that this software handles ‘…everything to do with aircraft movements, registration, 
bays, arrivals, carousels that they use, check-in desks that they check-in on, everything.’ 
70 Nose-in-guidance-systems indicate those systems that are utilised in modern airports to provide information to pilots 
attempting to park their aircraft at a stand.  
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‘Now what happens is, if you’re not wearing it [the seat belt], it just limits the speed down to 
5k’s. So, you can still drive the tug without a seatbelt, but it just limits it down to 5k’s. So, 
you’re counting for that guy jumping on and off all the time.’ (CML-AS) 
Ground operations involve AS driving, which was described in Sub-section 4.2.10 as an 
activity presenting potential for safety disruptions. Respondents stressed the contributing role of 
technological issues to the development of ramp safety issues by illustrating one case where a mix 
of technology adoption and new practices may generate disruptions. The Bombardier Q400 is a 
series of twin-engine airliners produced by Bombardier Aerospace. These aircrafts have a single, 
red flashing anti-collision beacon on top of their fuselage. This beacon is aimed at indicating that 
the aircraft is about to move on the tarmac and no ground service vehicles should be around it. The 
Airside manager interviewed reported that the aforementioned beacon is more difficult to see from 
the tarmac. This, coupled with the current practice of not starting the aircraft’s engines during 
pushback in order to save fuel, presents the potential for ramp safety issues, as the following 
passage witnessed: 
‘[The Q400] it’s an aircraft that the beacon sits in front of it. So, if you’re driving behind it 
you can’t see it working. Also, what’s occurred is [the airline] used to start the engines on 
them, whereas now, they don’t start the engines when they do a pushback. So, there’s no 
visual cue that the aircraft’s moving.’ (CML-AS) 
Airside Surveillance. Airside surveillance is that component of AS operations in which the 
airport operator supervises AS activities in order to ensure their safety and security. The three data 
collection sites presented different levels of technology adoption in this area, but in all of them 
CCTV systems were reported as the most important tool, especially in terms of post-event 
investigations. 
‘We generally capture it [accident] on CCTV.  We’ve got about 1,500 cameras on airport, so 
it’s really good to be able to capture incidents.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
In one of the data collection sites, respondents emphasised that the innovative Advanced 
Surface Movement Guidance and Control System71 was implemented. This technology enables early 
detection of unexpected behaviours and incident review by the AS operations control room. The 
two other airports selected in the present study were not provided with the Advanced Surface 
                                                 
 
71 The Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System is an air traffic surveillance system aimed to track all 
aircrafts and vehicles (tugs, cars, trucks, etc.) present on the aerodrome. 
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Movement Guidance and Control System, which was reported as a potential limit to safety and 
security performance by some of the respondents.  
Another important component of the AS surveillance regime is the external perimeter fencing, 
which is included in the present sub-section as a defence tool against Airside breaches and bird and 
wildlife management issues. The investigator participated in extensive inspections of the external 
perimeter fencing systems of the three airports. In one such instance, the researcher attended an 
unplanned inspection. After review of the external fences, some weaknesses were found by the 
airport operator. These weaknesses were reported by the interviewees as having the potential to 
possibly increase the chances for Airside breaches or bird and wildlife management issues. 
Summary of the tools & technology factors. The present sub-section has highlighted the 
relevance of tools and technology factors as potential antecedents for SSD in the explored airports. 
A visual overview of tools and technology factors is depicted in Appendix 07. In particular, LS 
operations may be impacted by: decision-making performed in conditions of poor human-machine 
interface (security screening process), issues arising from horizontal and vertical technological 
gaps, and ergonomics problems. These three factors have the potential to increase the likelihood of 
disruptions such as Landside security breaches, prohibited items violations, or Landside safety 
events. Similarly, AS operations were reported as potentially being affected by: sub-optimal use of 
technology to support bird and wildlife management, issues arising from ground service equipment 
and other tools and technology utilised on the ramp, and weaknesses in the external perimeter 
fences. Disruptions originating from these factors may include: Airside breaches, bird and wildlife 
management, and ramp safety issues. 
Suggestions for improvement. To conclude the tools and technology factors emerging from 
the explored airports, suggestions for improvement of tools and technology were provided by the 
respondents, who mainly focused on two areas for improvement: prevention of, and response to, 
SSD. In order to make prevention and response more effective, interviewees discussed the need to 
strengthen the CCTV systems and to make technology more portable. These were described as 
powerful tools to gain a better situational awareness and, in general, to improve airport operations 
(e.g., security screening procedures, baggage handling, etc.). 
As discussed in Chapter Four, CCTV cameras are a powerful tool for early detection of 
potential safety and security threats (prevention). In addition, CCTV recordings constitute one 
fundamental source of information to conduct investigations on SSD (response), to the point that a 
duty manager declared during an interview that the best place to manage an incident on site is in 
front of the CCTV computer. In order to gain improved coverage of all critical areas in an airport, 
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some respondents wished for an increase in the number of cameras present in their aerodrome. This 
was deemed to lead to a better integration of the different CCTV systems. 
‘So, if I had money to spend and increase something, probably I would do more CCTVs 
around the airport.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘Our CCTV is not as good as it should be. There's a lot of issues of bandwidth, of imaging 
and all the rest of it. It’s gold, a good CCTV system can help a lot. It can help you see 
something before it becomes a problem if you want so you can monitor it.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Respondents highlighted that the use of cutting-edge technology translates into strengthening 
of the CCTV systems. An example of this was referred by one respondent, who suggested using 
CCTV systems to forecast the number of passengers hitting the security screening areas at a given 
time. This would enable better planning prior to peak periods (for instance, by setting up additional 
screening lanes before the travellers’ arrival), which would eventually decrease the likelihood of 
SSD (e.g., congestion and queuing in airports, prohibited items violations, etc.). 
‘What we would like is the IT to give us the ability to better monitor what’s going on with the 
operation. So we can be more proactive, we take the pressure off the screening point and 
there’s not the pressure on them to process passengers, they won’t feel under pressure to... if 
they’ve got the fourth lane running when it starts getting really busy and they’re not trying to 
set up the fourth lane while there’s queues out the door and people starting to get aggravated 
and the ... so there’s... trying to rush the job and make mistakes so... It probably does come 
back to a safety/security issue.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘Well, it’s anything in internal we would like to have better data knowledge in advance so we 
can sort of plan for events instead of... ‘cause at the moment, we’re very reactive.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
At the same time, portable technology was described as a potential improvement for the post-
SSD phase, by enabling more efficient response and recovery and more effective organisational 
post-crisis learning. The typical example illustrated by respondents referred to the post-SSD 
investigations carried out by the airport operator, both LS and AS. These investigations traditionally 
take place sometime after a critical event, when the involved operators reach their office to write 
their report on the occurrence. The availability of portable tools (tablet computers, smartphones, 
etc.) enabling access to live incident reporting systems was indicated as extremely beneficial to 
speed up investigations. Furthermore, several respondents expressed the desire to have portable 
versions of the software traditionally used on desktop computers to enter incident reports. 
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‘I mean, it’d be great to have something where you can just use your iPhone or your 
smartphone to just enter an incident and it just goes straight in. We’ve got to move with the 
times.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘We’re just waiting on that [portable technology] and implement it and we can go live with 
this and each of the officers will then have a tablet and they can report live and then we can 
actually trend on a dashboard live, so we can see incidents and things that are happening.’ 
(CML-AS) 
Progress deriving from the use of portable technology was also imagined by some 
respondents as applying to other SSD, such as maintenance, works, and repairs. Enhanced, real-
time performance was indicated as a potential improvement associated with this, as the following 
excerpt witnessed: 
‘The ability for the duty managers when they’re walking around the terminal to support the 
maintenance, which at the moment is quite a cumbersome procedure. If they walk around with 
a tablet or something rather than go directly, and tap, tap, tap on a tablet…’ (CML-LS/AS) 
5.2.4 Environment Factors 
Frequency: 7.8% of total occurrences 
In the present investigation of Australian airports as sociotechnical systems, the physical 
layout of the workplace was highlighted as particularly impacting the safety and security levels. The 
semi-structured interviews emphasised that aviation operations are extremely influenced by the way 
in which aerodromes and the adjacent areas are designed and by the resulting interaction between 
individuals and facilities or space. Data emphasised that environment factors affect the Landside, 
the Landside/Airside, and the Airside areas of operations. However, their relevance was reported as 
changing significantly from airport to airport, depending on a number of features (e.g., geographical 
position, design, available space, etc.). 
Landside. Data collected in the three sites demonstrated that LS operations may be affected 
by environment factors revolving around the following two emerging themes: storage areas and 
terminal design.  
Storage areas. Lack of sufficient storage areas was reported as an environment factor by 
several interviewees. In particular, respondents in two of the airports explained that the layout of the 
terminals may be designed so as to avoid an untidy look. As a consequence, storage areas are 
reduced to a minimum, which may have the potential to increase SSD as congestion and queuing in 
airports. 
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‘There’s nowhere to put it [LS equipment] ‘cause we haven’t put any storage area in the 
plans.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘It’s a nice looking terminal. The aesthetics are good. It’s clean. It’s neat. It’s tidy. If you start 
adding storage rooms in […] it would disrupt the look and the flow and the ambience of the 
terminal.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
 The design and layout of storage areas were indicated as factors potentially impacting the 
safety performance delivered in the airports in particular.  
Terminal design. Aviation operations may be impacted by the way in which space is allocated 
in the terminal. In one of the explored airports, the domestic terminal is leased to two important 
airlines, who manage the two ends of the terminal itself. The in-between area is a common-use area 
and hosts operations of other airlines. The physical separation between the two main carriers results 
in a neat distinction between the ways in which they operate. Commercial competition becomes 
concrete and tangible and operational pressures follow through. Respondents revealed that this has 
the potential to impact how services are managed, and, ultimately, how safety and security are 
ensured. The following passage highlighted the physical separation existing in the aforementioned 
domestic terminal: 
‘Well, everybody…if you have [airline 1] leaving from this end and [airline 2] leaving from 
that end and both aircrafts are going to the same destination, they both wanna be on time, 
they both wanna get away first. They wanna arrive first. And so, there’s those sorts of 
pressures to operations…’ (CML-AS) 
Another respondent affirmed the possibility of having an increased number of Landside safety 
events deriving from environment factors associated with the design of the terminals. The following 
example referred to an instance where a passenger had to cut one of the queues at a boarding gate in 
order to reach another area of the terminal and fell over a bag left behind by another passenger.72 
‘It's part of the whole design of where you've got departing and arriving mixing at those peak 
times. He's not the first person to have fallen over someone else's bag because of that 
interaction or that chaos that you sometimes…’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Availability of space was reported as an issue related not only to the terminal buildings, but 
also to the front-of-house areas. Land is usually rented to companies that install their facilities 
around the airport, increasing their visibility and benefitting from the location. At the same time, 
                                                 
 
72 More details of this occurrence are reported in Sub-section 4.2.11.  
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however, this practice was described as possibly posing additional safety risks to airport operations, 
due to the increased traffic front-of-house and the interaction with private vehicles. This was 
reported as presenting a potential for the generation of traffic management front-of-house issues. 
‘And the thing also from an environment point of view, we have a lot of tenants who are non-
aviation, sort of related business. […] We’ve got [company 1], there’ll be [company 2] soon. 
Further south is [company 3] so there’s a lot of big warehouse and big companies. […] So, 
there’s trucks, there’s refuelling tankers. There’s all sorts of activity going on that when 
someone comes to the airport to catch a plane, they just want to park their car or get dropped 
off and catch a plane.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Interviewees at Airport A reported that Landside safety events may also be generated by the 
habit of certain passengers to queue at the boarding gate well before the scheduled boarding time. 
This was described as in turn being generated by the specific design of the involved terminal, as the 
following excerpt demonstrated: 
‘Unfortunately the way our terminal is designed…you can’t see your aircraft, so because it’s 
quite a way to walk, passengers think they're going to miss their aircraft, because they can’t 
actually see it sitting there. [Early queuing] is quite a common response that we get from 
passengers.’ (OML-LS/AS)   
In general terms, the design of terminal buildings was reported to be one of the most relevant 
factors impacting the organisation of the queues within the explored airports.  
‘It's very easy to get a backlog from the screening point right through the terminal. Last week 
I was there, and the line was the full length past right down to the [airline dedicated area].’ 
(OML-LS/AS)  
As the previous excerpt witnessed, the issue of long queues stretching throughout the 
terminals is particularly compelling when the flight schedule features intense peak times, potentially 
resulting in congestion and queuing in airports. 
Landside/Airside. Safety and security issues deriving from environment factors associated 
with the physical layout of airports were reported as also involving the LS/AS transition areas. 
Three main recurring nodes were highlighted by data collected during the semi-structured 
interviews: sterile areas design, transit points design, and terminal buildings design.  
Sterile area design. Several respondents highlighted that the sterile area (LS) and the security 
restricted areas (AS) are characterised by issues associated with their design. As mentioned in Sub-
section 4.2.12, the different levels of screening required in Australian airports may cause 
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unscreened passengers from regional aerodromes to land in airports where security screening is 
indeed necessary. In these cases, separation between screened travellers and unscreened ones 
prevents cross-contamination from occurring and ensures secure operations. In two of the airports, 
this issue was described as particularly relevant in the case of transiting passengers. These airports 
were in fact reported as not having preferential lanes for transiting passengers coming from 
unscreened ports. As a consequence, airport operators have to ensure that the involved airlines 
escort their arriving passengers out of the terminal (sometimes through dedicated tunnels) and then 
to the sterile area through the security screening checkpoints. The inconvenience of this procedure 
was described by a respondent, who ironically defined the escort as a ‘walk of shame’ for the 
passengers. Additionally, in the case of lack of training by the involved airline staff, chances of 
Landside security breaches may possibly be higher. This was exemplified by the case of the airline 
marshal erroneously escorting unscreened passengers directly into the sterile area.73 
Transit point design. The isolation of some transit points was reported to be a second 
environment factor potentially impacting the performance of security operators. As highlighted in 
Sub-section 5.2.2, some inspection points are designed so that their position is peripheral. This 
decreases the operators’ involvement in the performed activities (complacency), potentially 
increasing the chances for Landside security breaches or Airside breaches. 
Terminal building design. A third, significant environmental factor relating to the LS/AS 
transition referred to the number of terminal buildings present in a specific airport. In two of the 
explored data collection sites, there are two separate terminals, one for the international flights and 
one for domestic ones. In contrast, in the other explored airport, one single building simultaneously 
hosts the domestic and the international terminals.  
During the interviews, respondents provided different opinions on the impact that this 
difference in the number of terminals could have on the safety and the security of the aerodromes. 
On the one hand, the physical separation between two terminals was reported as beneficial for the 
airport operator, in that it allows a better distinction between the procedures utilised for the 
international flights and the ones in place for the domestic flights. The specific security screening 
regulations and the prohibited items applying to the two types of terminals were referred as an 
example of this. On the other hand, the separation between the domestic and the international 
terminals was described as problematic for the passengers, who need to travel from one building to 
the other in the case of transfers. Transfers may occur entirely AS, by means of shuttle buses, or 
through the LS, by means of trains or buses.  
                                                 
 
73 See Sub-section 4.2.12 for further details on this occurrence. 
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‘[The separation between international and domestic terminals] makes it much more complex 
for the passenger in terms of transits and transfers and stuff like that, and also for levels of 
screening. So, we might have certain level of screening for one terminal that’s not the same 
for the others.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
The previous passage demonstrates that the different screening requirements in place in the 
two terminals may constitute a factor of complexity for the passengers, who may not necessarily be 
familiar with them. 
Airside. Environment factors reported by interviewees involved in AS operations can be 
divided in three categories of factors: ramp, taxiways and runways, and general aviation. These 
factors can contribute to the generation of safety disruptions such as ramp safety issues, aircraft 
emergencies, or Airside breaches.  
Ramp. In the respondents’ words, one of the biggest concerns involving environment factors 
in the AS operations was the lack of sufficient storage areas on the ramp. These areas are delimited 
by horizontal markings and predominantly harbour ground service equipment (e.g., trolleys, 
airbridges and other AS vehicles). Storage areas are utilised in AS operations in order to maintain 
separation between ground service equipment and aircraft, ramp operators, and passengers boarding 
or disembarking aircrafts. Storage areas on the tarmac constitute a safety zone, where equipment 
can be left and safe operations maintained. However, several respondents pointed out the scarcity of 
these safety zones. Together with storage areas, aircraft bays were sometimes reported as being 
insufficiently spacious, especially considering the current industry trend towards the use of bigger 
aircraft and the presence of peak times during the day. 
‘Aircraft parking restraints in terms of the amount of bays we’ve got and stuff like that. New 
aircraft types, so things like 787s take a bit more room. You’ve got to build that sort of 
capacity as you go and we’re probably not too bad. We’ll have some squeezy times […] Well, 
our role is hit in the morning […] So, our morning peak is the killer […] but I think it’s a 
common problem around a lot of the airports around Australia.’ (CML/AS) 
Another element reported by respondents as potentially problematic for the safety of ramp 
operations was the presence of the so-called rear of aircraft road. This road is normally utilised by 
ramp vehicles to travel through the apron, when the terminal structure does not allow travel 
underneath the airbridges in front of the aircrafts. The rear of aircraft road is present in two of the 
data collection sites and several respondents highlighted the potential risks associated with having 
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vehicles driving behind the aircrafts. This is especially true when the latter are pushing back74 and 
when aircraft movement is difficult to detect.75 
‘With the other terminal, we used to drive under the airbridges. With the way those airbridges 
are designed, we ended up having to go and put the road behind aircrafts. That is an issue for 
us. We do have a lot of breaches on there, a lot of safety issues. People don't see the tugs. 
People don't see the aircraft lights when it goes.’ (OML-LS) 
 Reduced awareness of the movements of aircraft was indicated as a potential risk, that, 
coupled with the presence of the rear of aircraft road, may potentially increase the chances for ramp 
safety issues in the explored airports. 
Taxiways and runways. A further, potential vulnerability influenced by environment factors 
was identified in the absence of additional, parallel taxiways and runways beyond the main ones. 
Having redundant pathways for aircraft operations would ensure backups in case of disruptions 
and/or accidents, with aircraft emergencies being the most critical one. 
General aviation. Another environment factor was reported as potentially impacting the 
safety and security of Airside operations in two of the explored airports. In these two aerodromes, 
the position of the general aviation facilities (terminal, parking bays, hangars, etc.) was described as 
potentially problematic. As illustrated in Chapter Two, general aviation encompasses a range of 
aviation services including corporate aviation, flight training, agricultural aviation, etc. General 
aviation is therefore subject to different safety and security requirements than the regular public 
transport. Examples of this are the absence of security screening for general aviation passengers 
and the possibility of access to general aviation facilities simply upon possession of a valid Aviation 
Security Identification Card or a swipe access card. Thus, environment factors generate the 
potential for security disruptions on the general aviation side of the airports. In one aerodrome in 
particular, general aviation is located away from the main terminal buildings, as an AS inspection 
conducted by the researcher during his field observation demonstrated.  
‘As you saw this morning, the general aviation side of the airport is closer to the runway than 
this side of the airport [main terminals]. That's very vulnerable over there. Yeah. The general 
aviation, you know, before I called it the “dark side”... we're very open. We're very exposed 
over there.’ (OML-LS) 
                                                 
 
74 Driving behind aircrafts that are pushing back is prohibited by airport regulations. This event can nevertheless occur 
in some instances, as emphasised in Sub-section 4.2.10. 
75 See Sub-section 5.2.3 for further details. 
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 The previous excerpt highlighted that location of the general aviation was reported by some 
respondents as a crucial element of attention, given the difficulty for the airport operator to 
supervise the general aviation side of the aerodrome. 
Summary of environment factors. To summarise, different factors related to the physical 
design of facilities in the explored airports were indicated by respondents to be potential 
determinants for an increased chance of SSD. First, the absence of sufficient storage areas for 
ground service equipment utilised in AS operations or other type of equipment used in LS 
operations was reported as a possible antecedent of the following safety-related disruptions: ramp 
safety issues, congestion and queuing in airports, Landside security events, etc. Second, security-
related disruptions (e.g., Airside breaches, Landside security events, etc.) were described as 
possibly generated by the difficulty in supervising airport areas located away from the main 
terminal buildings (e.g., the general aviation terminal) or by the absence of dedicated facilities for 
transiting unscreened passengers.  
In general, a common need for better usage of the available space emerged from the three data 
collection sites. The examined data collection sites are all characterised by expansion plans in the 
future, in order to accommodate the expected, increased number of travellers and businesses. The 
geographical location of the aerodromes was emphasised as the most important physical factor to 
consider with regards to enlargement projects. 
Suggestions for improvement. Respondents suggested that the physical dimension of modern 
airports is changing over time, especially in LS operations. Data pointed out that passengers do not 
perceive the aerodrome as a place where only aviation services are provided. On the contrary, they 
think of the airport as an environment that hosts opportunities for various experiences (e.g., shops, 
restaurants, entertainment, etc.). Passengers are therefore keen to speed up aviation-related 
processes (e.g., check-in, security screening, boarding, etc.) in order to have more options regarding 
how spend their spare time. Airport operators should therefore change the way in which they work 
accordingly. The following respondent illustrated this trend: 
‘Nowadays the passenger’s in control. They wanna check-in at home. They only wanna come 
to the airport to drop their bags off.  They wanna go through the screening point at the last 
minute maybe, or sometimes they wanna go through the screening point three hours before so 
they can have a look at all the duty free. So, it’s more about giving options to the passenger 
and meeting what they need. They’re the boss.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Safety and security-related services therefore have to accommodate passengers’ needs for 
spare time and in general take as short a time as possible. During the semi-structured interviews, 
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respondents emphasised the need for environment factors to contribute to this, referring in particular 
to the layout of the explored airports and the need to guarantee availability of space for safety and 
security services. Several respondents indicated the need for their airports to expand the terminals, 
in order to accommodate more passengers at the same time. 
‘Oh, look, if we could start again, we’d probably have a bigger check-in hall area.’ (OML-
LS/AS) 
‘If it had a bigger foot print, for example, it wouldn’t look as congested. Like if the check-in 
hall went further out, then the actual queuing area could probably always be confined just to 
the point between the lift and the security point are’. (OML-LS) 
Long-term projects for the expansion of the aerodrome exist in the three data collection sites, 
as it was drawn from analysis of strategic documents provided by the three airport operators. The 
geographical location of the airport site is a crucial factor potentially impacting the expansion 
projects. 
5.2.5 Organisational Factors: Communication Factors 
Frequency: 12.9% of total occurrences 
As the previous sub-sections demonstrated, individual factors, task factors, tools and 
technology factors, and environment factors are the elements of the macroergonomic approach that 
more directly impact the performance of the operator in the explored airports. Human factors 
deriving from individual experience and perceptions, elements associated with job design and 
duties, human-machine interface, and impact of the physical environment, all have the potential to 
contribute to influencing the safety and security levels in the three data collection sites. 
Sub-sections 5.2.5 to 5.2.10 revolve around the organisational sphere of the MeA, which 
shapes the others. The first category of organisational factors examined in this Study Two was 
communication factors. The semi-structured interviews underlined that the airport operator 
performs communication at three different levels: internal communication, systemic 
communication, and external communication. The present investigation defined as internal 
communication the exchange of information existing within the airport operator. Security screening 
providers were included in internal communication due to their commercial contracts with the 
airport operator and the duties they perform accordingly. Systemic communication was defined as 
occurring between the airport operator and other organisations that work at the explored airports, 
regardless of the nature of their business (airlines, Customs, Biohazard, the police, retail, etc.). 
External communication was identified as the exchange of information occurring between the 
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airport operator and the external stakeholders. The main representatives of these are the passengers 
and the general public.  
As for the involved areas of operations, internal communication and systemic communication 
were reported as involving both Landside and Airside operations. In contrast, the overwhelming 
majority of external communication referred to LS operations. This was due to the presence of 
passengers or general public in the explored airports being almost entirely confined to the LS area. 
The present sub-section is organised around the different types of communication and refers to the 
relevant areas of operations when needed. 
Internal communication. During the semi-structured interviews, respondents mentioned a 
wealth of initiatives intended to ease internal communication in airport management organisations. 
These initiatives included staff meetings, training, circulation of newsletters and bulletins, team 
building activities, etc. A relevant issue referring to internal communication emerged from an 
assessment of information-sharing practices implemented in one of the data collection sites in 
particular. A respondent reported that managers working on security matters (mainly LS) are 
sometimes less keen to share information than their colleagues operating in the safety area (mainly 
AS). The respondent explained this fact by stressing the different organisational cultures enacted by 
the two groups and affirming that security managers seem to be more prone to partially hold their 
operations in secrecy. 
‘I actually think that the Airside safety team is better linked into the business than the security 
team. The security team, sort of, sits over here and I’ve managed security for many years and 
they sit out on their own, they’re isolated. They’re not integrated into the business, they think 
it’s some secret stuff, but it’s not a secret.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
The role of the security screening providers in the internal communication emerged as 
particularly relevant for security operations in the explored airports. Due to their organisational 
structure, security screening provider representatives sit in numerous aviation security committees 
and may acquire aviation information even before airport operators. Furthermore, data emphasised 
that the same security screening provider is often employed in different airports and information-
sharing is therefore enhanced. This contrasts with the economic competition that exists among 
airports, which, in contrast, can hamper the circulation of information.  
Systemic communication. As for systemic communication, interviewees stressed that, in spite 
of a general level of effective communication occurring between airport management and other 
airport organisations, some issues associated with communication factors may exist with certain 
governmental agencies. Data revealed that on occasion, the latter seem reticent in sharing 
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information. A typical example referred to in two of the data collection sites involved 
communication with Customs, especially when compared to communication with other 
organisations. When asked to assess systemic communication within their airport, a respondent 
provided the following answer: 
‘No, I think on the whole, it [systemic communication] probably works pretty well. Especially 
between us and [the security screening provider], we work very closely with them. Probably 
with Customs a little bit less, but it’s probably less change to procedure with Customs.’ 
(OML-LS/AS) 
In general, business-oriented activities performed by the airport operator may sometimes 
clash with the regulation-oriented activities carried out by governmental agencies. This may entail 
miscommunication.  
‘The government agencies are a little bit different because of their clearances and because of 
our clearances […] so, they're not allowed to share certain information to private industry.  
So, there's a bit of disconnect there. It's just an old methodology again.’ (OML-LS) 
The focus of operations and attitude towards communication by governmental agencies was 
better understood by taking into account their reaction to the changes in the surrounding 
environment. For instance, data revealed that Customs became more willing to share information 
with the airport operator as soon as regulatory and procedural changes occurred, such as in the case 
of new threats (Ebola virus, SARS virus, etc.) or the implementation of new technology. 
Gaps in information sharing were not only noted by managers working for the airport 
operator, but also by governmental organisations. Diverging organisational attitudes were reported 
by a police employee as a factor for sub-optimal communication. The police officer reported that, at 
times, airlines may be uncommunicative or scarcely collaborative, especially in the case of police 
investigations involving passengers. Carriers may in fact prioritise the quality of their relationships 
with customers over effectiveness of governmental inquiries. 
Organisations having similar business-oriented attitudes to the airport operator may also be 
reluctant to share information. For instance, ground handling organisations were highlighted as not 
being as collaborative as needed when investigations were undertaken to identify responsibilities 
deriving from accidents in AS operations. 
‘You seem to always be chasing them [ground handlers] to get the information back or give it 
back, one or the other. That’s probably the only area we get a bit of problem with 
communications.’ (OML-AS) 
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Respondents reported that airport operators usually strive to prevent rigid attitudes by 
organisations involved in safety accidents during AS operations (e.g., ground handlers). In order to 
do so, the airport operators apply a no blame culture. This is reflected in their communication style. 
A corporate manager explained that a crucial area for attention when investigating safety accidents 
is relationship building. Open communication and collaborative decision-making inform safety 
investigations, whose main goal is not to ‘…beat responsible organisations with a big stick…’ but 
to ‘…help them to be compliant’.  
Other respondents mentioned the case of some low cost carriers, as another example of 
organisations hesitant in releasing information: 
‘Probably all the communication is really good with all of them [airlines], apart from the low 
cost carriers. […] The low cost carriers, we really struggle to get communication from them 
about schedules, about pretty much anything really.’ (CML-LS) 
The investigator questioned the respondent on the reasons for this reluctance in information-
sharing. The interviewee answered that the business model is the main cause, explaining that, on 
occasion, these carriers ‘…just don’t care…’ and, as an airport operator, ‘…you’re lucky if you do 
get a response [from the low cost carriers]…’ Data revealed that this behaviour can be associated 
with sub-optimal levels of staffing related to the low-cost operational model. Inadequate 
information-sharing by low cost carriers was re-affirmed at the same data collection site by another 
respondent working for a security screening provider, as highlighted in the following passage: 
‘They [low cost carriers] don't like to give out too much information. We can only roster for 
what they tell us. So, you roster for a full aircraft even if they’re carrying five people. They 
are the ones barring a bit.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
In order to overcome communication factors, respondents almost entirely agreed upon the 
importance of developing direct knowledge of the different stakeholders acting in the airport 
environment. Personally knowing the right people to address in case of need was reported as an 
exceptional way to improve information sharing and ease communication among organisations: 
‘And sort of just go doorknocking.  Every now and then, I get invites from all the airlines to 
go and have a coffee, and it’s just about being there, being visible. […] like I go and have a 
coffee at [airline] lounge with those guys. And a big part of my job is maintaining 
relationships […] And if you can be approachable, then you are more successful.’ (CML-LS) 
On the downside, data showed that direct knowledge of the relevant stakeholders may entail 
two issues. First, given the large number of individuals and organisations involved in aviation 
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activities, knowledge and relationship building are time-consuming activities. Second, such 
knowledge may get lost in case of turnover of crucial staff members. In particular, negative impact 
of staff turnover was referred to by the police, as the following LS manager described: 
‘So, federal police…they're always continually shuffling. I think in the last three years, they've 
done a complete 100% shuffle of staff, which breeds discontinuity. There's no continuity there 
and we struggle with that, because they have a commander that will do this and then all of a 
sudden, they go and have a fill-in commander.’ (OML-LS) 
Data highlighted that another factor potentially impacting the quality of communication is the 
size of the airport. According to several respondents, the smaller the airport, the easier and more 
effective the communication. This element was directly experienced by the investigator in the 
smallest data collection site, which was defined as a community airport by several interviewees. 
‘So, it’s actually quite easy for one person to maintain a relationship with all those 
organisations. And being a smaller port, you run into them. You’ve got time to have a cup of 
coffee with their customer manager once every fortnight, just to catch up and have a cup of 
coffee.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Data indicated that the size and physical structure of the terminals, as well as organisational 
complexity, come into play as determinants of the effectiveness of systemic communication. During 
observation conducted in the biggest airport, one respondent supported the relevance of these 
determinants by comparing the domestic terminal to the international one. Communication was in 
fact reported to be smoother in the former than the latter. This was due to the smaller size of the 
building, the limited number of vertical levels (floors), and the reduced number of involved 
organisations (e.g., fewer carriers, etc.). 
Data also revealed that communication between the airport operator and other organisations is 
eased when it involves actors who speak a common language based on shared experience, 
background, and perceptions (culture). Knowledge of aviation operations is the basis of this 
common language, as was declared by the following respondent: 
‘So, as I said, I’ve got good relationships with the airlines, but certainly aides and duty 
managers, they have good relationships with the guys on the ground. So, they know who to 
talk to. If there’s an issue, you don’t spend half an hour trying to find out how to sort the issue 
out. The guys know where to go to.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
 Knowing who to address in the different situations emerged as an important soft skill, as the 
previous passage emphasised. The following paragraph examines the impact that external 
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communication can have on the safety and security performance in the explored airports. In 
particular, the relationship between airport organisations and passengers or members of the general 
public is analysed. 
External communication. When referring to external communication performed by airport 
organisations, interviewees predominantly discussed the relationships with passengers or members 
of the general public. One first contact point between travellers and airport organisations was 
identified in the security screening checkpoints. Several respondents stressed the importance for 
screening operators to effectively communicate with the passengers in order to facilitate an 
experience that in many cases is perceived as confrontational by nature.76 During an inspection 
conducted at a security screening area, a screening coordinator described a smile as the most 
powerful instrument to ensure collaboration by passengers. Conversely, a hostile attitude by the 
screener may generate an equivalent response by the traveller and potentially escalate in security 
disruptions (e.g., disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general public). 
Furthermore, even in presence of adequate external communication by the airport operator, 
passengers or general public may decide to ignore the provided information, which can lead to 
disruptions. Analysis of security incident reports performed at the explored airports emphasised that 
one common reason for this was poor understanding of English by some travellers. Examples of 
Airside breaches or Landside security breaches were found by the investigator in the 
aforementioned reports. The root cause of many of them was related to the genuine difficulty that 
some passengers had in understanding public announcements, warnings, signs, etc. Examples were 
reported by respondents, who mentioned the case of passengers carrying bags and suitcases on the 
escalators, despite the prohibition publicised by banners and public addresses (risk of Landside 
safety events), or carrying prohibited items through the screening points, despite the existing 
regulations (risk of prohibited items violations). The following interviewee illustrated this point: 
‘The public really even to this day, still don’t know what they can and can’t bring through, 
because nobody checks on websites, nobody checks the government websites and you can put 
out as much information out at the front of the screen and point, nobody reads signs, nobody 
listens to videos, it’s just someone goes, “Oh, I didn’t know I can’t do that.”’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
Lastly, other organisations operating in the airport may send out incorrect or misleading 
information for the passengers or members of the general public. Although this instance did not 
directly fall into the category of external communication (information is not directly provided by 
                                                 
 
76 See also Sub-section 5.2.3. 
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the airport operator), consequences of this occurrence can affect airport management. A typical 
example reported in two of the data collection sites involved airlines posting incorrect departure 
times on the terminal screens, potentially leading to disruptive behaviours or congestion and 
queuing in airports. This was witnessed by the following excerpt: 
‘The airlines need to post the delay, otherwise they keep a current time, so therefore people 
think they’re due to board when they're not really, and they get cranky at us.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 This type of misleading information was reported as potentially creating adverse 
psychological states in the passengers and causing them to queue too early in front of the boarding 
gates. This emerged as potentially increasing the chances for Landside safety events.  
Summary of organisational factors: communication. The review of communication factors 
contained in the present sub-section has highlighted several warnings for the explored airports, in 
the field of communication and information-sharing. Compared to other organisational factors 
analysed in the previous sub-sections, communication factors were found to be less directly linked 
to specific types of SSD. Exceptions were represented by examples in which communication gaps 
were indicated to be potential antecedents of the following SSD: congestion and queuing in airports, 
disruptive behaviours, prohibited items violations, Landside security breaches, etc. These primarily 
involved external communication originating from the airport operator and other airport 
organisations (airlines) and aimed at passengers or members of the general public. 
Another consideration that emerged from the analysis of the communication factors was 
related to the nature of the shared information. Security matters emerged from the semi-structured 
interviews as potentially involving reticence, or at least caution, in information-sharing. Data 
revealed that this is due to a number of reasons, such as clearance and regulatory requirements (as 
in the case of Customs and Australian Federal Police). In other cases, not only security, but also 
safety-related matters appeared to potentially generate prudent communication. For example, this 
was associated with the underlying business model of some organisations (as in the case of the low 
cost carriers) or with undergoing investigations aimed to assess responsibilities (as in the case of 
ground handlers). 
One final consideration drawn from a semi-structured interview can effectively be used to 
summarise the systemic effects that communication factors may have on the aviation network in 
general. The involved respondent illustrated the cascading effect that slow information sharing 
potentially has on the security procedures enacted in Australian airports. The interviewee remarked 
that the evolution of the international security scenario is usually slowly captured by governmental 
agencies. These have to provide information to other governmental institutions, which are expected 
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to produce policies accordingly (the Office for Transport Security, for example). At a later stage, 
these policies have to be implemented by the executive organisations (airport management, under 
the supervision of the police). Procedural adjustment is therefore produced in accordance with 
security screening providers. Finally, practical procedures are executed by the operators, for 
example at the security screening points. In this cascading process, delays in comprehension and 
reaction to the changing international security environment translate into late adoption of security 
measures in airports. An overview of the most relevant gaps potentially existing in the 
communication and information sharing practices is illustrated in Appendix 08.  
Suggestions for improvement. In order to tackle the different communication factors depicted 
in the present sub-section, respondents in the semi-structured interviews highlighted several areas 
for improvement. First, external communication towards passengers and members of the general 
public should be made more effective, by providing precise, updated information and reassuring 
messages in the case of delays. Respondents underlined the importance of collaboration with other 
airport organisations (in particular airlines) to achieve this objective. A practical example 
mentioned during the interviews referred to the need to better utilise public addresses, whose 
current utility was questioned by one interviewee. 
‘Public address announcements. Often we don’t think a lot about how valuable it is to diffuse 
tensions in people by keeping them informed.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Second, systemic communication has to be followed up, in order to make sure that appropriate 
communication is actually received and understood by the recipients. When interviewed, one 
general manager remarked that, even in presence of instructions adequately communicated, some 
organisations seem to nonetheless ignore them. In this example, some ground handlers were 
reported as deliberately ignoring the obligation of always activating the beacons on their ramp 
vehicles.  
‘When you look out there and see that the beacons aren’t on, there’s something…I don’t know 
if there’s something going wrong or it’s they just don’t care. There’s certainly some 
improvement that could happen from that perspective.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Third, an improvement similar to the previous one should involve internal communication. In 
particular, quality communication is necessary for airport managers to effectively comprehend and 
assimilate information circulated within the organisation.  
‘It goes back to communication. We have developed SOPs [standard operating procedures], 
manuals, procedures, etc. Disseminating is OK, but we have to get people to read what we 
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disseminate. Protocols now are smarter and make people read them more. Smart, easy to 
read, small. Legible documents.’ (LL-LS/AS)  
Interestingly, just as in the previous case, this remark was raised by a general manager, 
indicating the sensitivity of top-level interviewees to communication issues. Sub-section 5.2.7 
introduces some of the cultural factors that emerged from the semi-structured interviews as 
potentially impacting the safety and security performance of the explored airports. 
5.2.6 Organisational Factors: Culture Factors 
Frequency: 21.5% of total occurrences 
The second organisational element explored in the present thesis emerged in the semi-
structured interviews as the most recurring within the macroergonomic approach (MeA). This was 
witnessed by the large number of comments made by respondents regarding the crucial theme of 
culture factors (21.5% of the 883 occurrences). The present thesis expanded the traditional 
definition of culture factors provided by the MeA by including all organisational elements that 
impact on operators’ perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs. In order to account for the different nuances 
presented by the interviewees, the present sub-section is organised around two main themes: culture 
and training. 
Culture. This category included the following emerging themes: complacency culture, safety 
and security cultures, bureaucracy, cultural change, and external culture.  
Complacency culture. Airport organisations were described as having different levels of 
understanding of the safety and security regimes in place. In particular, some organisations were 
reported as underestimating safety and security procedures, which potentially translates into sub-
optimal levels of attention by the respective operators. Inadequate cultural attitudes were 
predominantly reported as potentially resulting in increased complacency by airport workers, 
especially when compared to other organisations that, in contrast, constantly emphasised the need 
for maintaining safe and secure operations. Respondents illustrated different examples of this last 
point and organisational strategic goals emerged as a crucial factor in shaping the organisational 
culture. As for Landside operations, cases of complacency were referred by respondents to retailers, 
on occasion more focused on economic objectives than on safety and security goals. Landside 
security breaches or prohibited items violations were reported as potentially resulting from 
complacency in LS operations.  
For the same reasons, in Airside operations ground handlers were utilised as an example of 
operators potentially compelled by economic objectives. Data emphasised that this may in turn 
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potentially shift the focus from safety and security and lead to complacency, especially when other 
underlying factors are present (nature of the contracts, task overload77, internal tensions, etc.). Ramp 
safety issues have the potential to originate from AS complacency. The following two excerpts 
illustrated the aforementioned cases of retailers and ground handlers: 
‘The staffs that work in the coffee shop are just as likely to injure themselves or have a sterile 
area breach. But they haven’t got anywhere near the understanding of that the [airline 1] and 
the [airline 2] might instil in their staff.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘So, some of these ground handling organisations, they’ve got union issues, they’ve got staff 
issues. They’re not treated well by their employers, so with that in itself causes us issues down 
Airside. Not just a safety of others, but their own safety, so it’s an education thing and their 
safety and others’ safety as well.’ (CML-AS)   
 In the explored airports, airlines directly hire their own ground handlers or contract-out 
ground handling services to other companies (especially in the case of low cost carriers). 
Outsourced ground services were reported as potentially originating sub-contracting cultures, 
where responsibility and accountability could possibly be watered-down by the structure of the 
contracts in place.  
Investigations after a safety accident constituted a further example of the gap in organisational 
cultures existing between the airport operator and other organisations. In the case of AS safety 
events, ground handlers’ attitude was reported as sometimes being too solution-oriented and aiming 
for the fastest restoration of normal operations. This can lead the ground handlers to disregard the 
established procedures, which requires the airport operator to conduct thorough investigations. At 
this stage, it is worth quoting the following excerpt, which illustrated the relationship between the 
airport operator and the airlines (and their contractors). 
‘That's fine on a normal day to day business, but when it goes bad, the handling agent doesn't 
have the continuity with the carrier and the carrier then has problems and you've got the 
subcontracting culture.’ (OML-LS) 
Ramp safety issues were presented as being the most common safety disruption potentially 
originating from this type of complacent organisational attitude. In the following interview, the 
respondent expressed their frustration towards speeding on the tarmac, a type of behaviour which 
seems to be enrooted in the organisational culture of some ground handlers: 
                                                 
 
77 For further details, see Sub-section 5.2.2. 
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‘It goes down to education. […] Speeding is only gonna save you a couple of seconds, but it’s 
gonna put you in a much more dangerous situation. So, it’s trying to get that across that 
speeding doesn’t pay. It’s not gonna help you in any way, you know, we say, “Make haste 
slowly.” So, you can go quickly, but at the right pace.’ (CML-AS) 
Another interesting case of complacency related to the cultural attitude of certain 
organisations was witnessed by a respondent, who reported the example of AS access doors left 
open by staff members and the risk of having passengers accessing the tarmac (Airside breaches). 
According to the interviewee, some pilots can be responsible for this violation. This is due to a 
potential organisational culture, according to which ‘…they think they can take any path and take 
off into the air. They’re all over everything.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Safety and security cultures. In general, an important finding emerged from the investigation 
about how safety and security organisational cultures shape the performance in the explored 
airports. Indeed, data suggested the presence of relevant differences between a safety-oriented 
organisational culture and a security-oriented organisational culture within the explored airports. 
These differences are reinforced by external elements, such as underlying regulations and bounded 
scope of the areas of operations (LS for security matters and AS for safety ones).  
When questioned about the difference between a safety and security culture, one respondent 
emphasised the existence of intrinsic reasons. Safety was reported as being more naturally 
understood and assimilated than security. Thus, organisational cultures were described as more 
likely to embed the safety regime in place in airports rather than the security regime. The following 
passage illustrates this last point: 
 ‘Everyone’s focus is safety. Not everyone’s focus is security.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Data stressed that the difference between safety and security organisational cultures translates 
into two different operational mindsets for AS and LS operations. One respondent in particular 
pointed out a certain level of isolation of the security group, possibly related to the nature of their 
operations.  
In general, one of the culture factors that emerged as most relevant was associated with the 
degree of cultural integration within the airport system. In some instances, data highlighted the 
presence of dissimilarities in how organisations see themselves as part of a combined environment 
or as an individual component with its own identity. Team dynamics were reported as being shaped 
by the level of work engagement and motivation in safety and security operators, with significant 
nuances being highlighted by respondents. 
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‘But from the person on the floor, I would say they think very differently. The guys doing 
safety on the apron and everything […] they are very aware of the arena they are working on, 
which is very complex. Safety, safety, safety…excellent. Security guys, on the other hand, I 
sometimes wonder if they really know what their role is. My big thing is, “Do you know why 
you do what you do?” And I really think it is important for people to get reminded over this. 
[…] Really recognize what they do.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
The most natural consequence of this difference in work engagement and motivation is a 
different level of complacency experienced in safety and security operators. This may entail an 
intrinsic potential for sub-optimal performance, possibly due to a mix of boredom, contentment, and 
excessive sense of comfort. 
‘And I can see it, they [security screeners] get complacent sometimes, because they don’t 
know anymore the reasons behind what they are doing. I don’t know if this is cultural of what 
the reasons behind are, complacency, boredom, etc. People at the screening point have very 
different mindset to the guys working curbside or Airside.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
In the explored airports, a physical separation exists between the safety and security groups, 
with the former primarily localised within the terminal and the latter predominantly operating on the 
external, AS area. One interviewee admitted that this aspect may expand the gaps in organisational 
cultures and hamper systemic cohesion within the airport. In order to address this issue, the 
involved airport will be re-organised in the future, so that the safety and the security groups have 
closer facilities.  
In addition to physical separation, organisational structure and practices were also found to 
potentially contribute to a lack of cultural integration in the explored airports. While safety 
operators are mainly hired by airport management, security operators are hired by the security 
screening provider. Therefore, these two groups are subject to different HR management practices. 
For example, in one of the explored airports, an AS manager illustrated several team building 
initiatives (outdoor training, socialisation events, etc.) that were not found in the security 
management team. 
Bureaucracy. Some respondents emphasised that an excessive focus on bureaucracy may 
have the potential to lead to sub-optimal safety and security performance in the airports. In some 
instances, the existence of standard performance indicators was observed as causing operators to 
work towards the achievement of a minimum level of output. Two respondents effectively depicted 
this phenomenon as ‘ticking the box’. This indicates a general trend in some organisations to 
operate in order to ensure compliance and avoid regulatory consequences, rather than to effectively 
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perform. Not only cultural factors, but also individual elements were mentioned to provide a 
possible explanation of this occurrence: 
‘I see the look of relief in their eyes when they’ve had a tick from the regulator and I go, 
“Hey, that’s just the minimum, that should be just the minimum” but to them it’s like they’ve 
achieved the world best because they can tick this box and raise no issue.’ (CML-LS/AS)      
‘You'll also find that culture that they [security screeners] are on 21 dollars an hour and it's a 
culture like, "I'm finished now. I'm going home."’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
The phenomenon of bureaucratic compliance was also witnessed in organisations other than 
the airport operator, with repercussions on the overall system. An interviewee referred to the case of 
some airlines adopting specific ploys to fulfil regulatory requirements and demonstrate adequate 
performance track records. As the following passage illustrates, this may affect AS operations and 
lead to sub-optimal safety performance, potentially generating ramp safety issues: 
‘Some of the airlines […] want to get on-time departures, so they'll put the beacons on. Just 
the minute the beacon goes on and they can record their departure time. Then they still stand 
at the blocks for another two minutes. Two minutes is an awful long time for the guy in the 
tug, who wants to get past78, and he's just got to get over there, so it creates that frustration in 
him…’ (OML-LS/AS)   
Cultural change. Data revealed that some organisations operating in the explored airports may 
struggle to complete an ongoing cultural change. The most pertinent example of this was reported in 
all three airports and referred to the security screening providers. Traditionally, security functions in 
airports have been associated with the idea of bouncers that allow or forbid access of individuals or 
items to specific areas of the airport. An acknowledged cultural change has taken place in recent 
years and a prevalent culture of customer service, rather than security enforcement, has been 
spreading in operators. Communication skills, personal interaction, and facilitation have 
progressively taken over gatekeeping skills, physical presence, and decision. However, data 
revealed that, in some cases, operators may still show old attitudes and perform lower levels of 
customer service: 
‘It comes back to an appreciation of the behaviour of people and not putting everybody into 
one box, and understanding the diversity of the makeup of your traveling public. I think 
sometimes we as an industry don't really stop and think about it enough.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
                                                 
 
78 The example refers to the obligation for ground handlers to cease operations around and in the proximity of an 
aircraft that has its beacons on and is ready to taxi. 
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Training. The second and last element falling under culture factors was training. Interviewees 
organised their responses around two areas: induction and ongoing training.  
Induction. In Australian airports, airport operators fully train their own employees, but only 
partially train the operators working at the aerodrome for other companies. In particular, airport 
management focuses on safety and security awareness, leaving technical and operational training to 
the different organisations (airlines, ground handling, cleaners, retailers, security screening 
providers, etc.). Some respondents highlighted that, on occasion, some contractors may not be 
adequately trained. Interviewees underlined that the most critical function of training is preventing 
detrimental human-related factors from developing in operators and potentially leading to SSD. The 
following examples illustrated the crucial role of training in limiting the influence of human factors 
in aviation operations: 
‘A couple of examples of sterile area breaches…basically come down to the human factor, I 
suppose. So, you can have a number of engineering mitigation controls that eliminate the risk, 
but the human factor risk is always gonna be there. It might be a screening operator, it could 
be training of ground handling agents, or airline staff that don’t have a full understanding of 
what the sterile area means. So, there’s a lot of emphasis put on staff training to fully 
understand the importance of maintaining the sterile area.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
‘[On the reasons why some security screeners occasionally miss prohibited items through the 
x-rays] typically distraction, lack of concentration or they just really need more training.’ 
(OML-LS) 
Inductive training was described as particularly relevant and potentially problematic in the 
case of inexperienced employees, who need to develop their competence in aviation operations. 
‘So, I said that the biggest exposures are initial induction of staff and getting everybody on 
the same page from a security and a safety point of view.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Induction of airport workers was described as particularly thorny for the airport operator when 
directly performed by other companies. In one of the airports, the case of the airline staff member 
escorting arriving, unscreened passengers directly into the sterile area to board another flight was 
due to an acknowledged induction gap in the employee, who had just moved to a new job position. 
Training was expected to be administered by the airline itself, but training gaps were evident, as 
witnessed by the following respondent:  
‘[The employee] had been working with the airline, with the ground handling company here 
for two weeks. […] When I initially started talking to the ground handling manager here, it 
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came very evident that [the employee] hadn't been trained. [The employee] hadn't been 
shown this additional walkway for unscreened passengers. [The employee] hadn't been 
advised about processes for unscreened aircraft, so there was a bit of a training gap in [the 
employee’s] training, which they've now identified, now that we've had this incident.’ (OML-
LS) 
Data indicated that, due to the nature of some contracts, the airport operator has a limited 
supervisory role in the quality of induction training administered to airline operators, ground 
handlers, or other contractors. Furthermore, in the case of low cost carriers, the underlying business 
model may potentially imply cutting on extra costs, which may be detrimental to the quality of 
training. 
‘We rely on the airlines training their staff, for example on the correct use of some pieces of 
equipment. The fact is, we assume they do. We don’t see their training program. We don’t 
check their training records. We don’t insist on them being re-inducted every two years or 
whatever, just to raise their awareness.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
‘How do you ensure that they’ve got the right training, processes, and procedures in place? 
[…] You’re dealing with the low cost model and their contractors and that can be difficult.’ 
(CML-LS/AS) 
Respondents remarked that the presence of a large number of workers, especially when 
involved in extensive projects, may contribute to making supervision of safety and security 
induction more difficult. In order to overcome this issue, the airport operators have started 
organising online induction, which eases the process and reduces the costs. Yet, the effectiveness of 
online training, compared to face-to-face training, is questionable, as one respondent emphasised: 
‘I mean, a lot of our training’s done through portals and stuff like that now, so you can do it 
anytime, anyplace. But there’s nothing like having someone onsite doing something, showing 
someone face-to-face.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 As witnessed in the previous passage, some respondents were uncertain whether face-to-face 
or online training are the best solution in their organisations.   
Ongoing training. Respondents reported that the most crucial function of ongoing training (or 
refresher training), beyond maintaining high levels of skills and knowledge, is the reduction of 
complacency issues. Ongoing training re-engages employees and motivates them. Operators can re-
raise their level of attention and care through refresher training while performing their duties, as the 
following passage demonstrated: 
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‘I think it’s the official training required, because you get very complacent. It’s the same 
routine all the time. The aircraft comes in. You unload it. Then, you send it away. Refresher 
training is very important.’ (OML-AS) 
A structural element hampering the quality of ongoing training was underlined by one 
respondent, who singled out the massive presence of casual workers in Australian aerodromes. This 
was deemed to contribute to the loss of competence and expertise. Investment in training is in fact 
frustrated by the high turnover associated with casual work. A complete overview of the training 
issues emerging from the analysis of the safety function is illustrated in Appendix 09. 
Summary of organisational factors: culture. The present sub-section has contributed to 
reaching a better comprehension of the cultural factors impacting the safety and security 
performance in the explored airports. Cultural elements were organised around two main categories: 
culture and training. As some intrinsic characteristics of safety and security matters, cultural 
nuances have been identified in these two areas. Data demonstrated that safety and security 
operators may perform their duties based on slightly different mindsets. Occasionally, complacency 
of staff members was reported in the data collection sites, deriving from an organisational culture 
that may sometimes tolerate distraction and lack of engagement. Induction and refresher training 
were indicated as crucial aspects in shaping an adequate organisational culture in the airport system. 
These practices were reported as having the potential to successfully contrast complacency, in spite 
of the tendency of some organisations to underestimate the value of training. Appendix 10 provides 
an overview of the aforementioned cultural elements, with a particular emphasis on the intrinsic 
characteristics of safety and security organisational cultures. 
Suggestions for improvement. During the semi-structured interviews, respondents provided 
several suggestions for improvement based on their assessment of the impact of culture factors on 
organisational vulnerability. First, in the field of culture, respondents wished for the reinforcement 
of cultural change in airport organisations, the strengthening of security awareness in operators, and 
the increase of engagement by the local communities towards security. One respondent in particular 
highlighted the fact that knowledge of aviation security issues in the general public is generated by 
the media for the vast majority. The same interviewee pointed out that in contrast, airport operators 
should become primary source of information in the field of aeronautical security.  
Second, in the field of training, enhanced audit and compliance regimes enforced in the 
explored airports were reported to be possible instruments for the airport operators to better 
supervise the safety and security training. Continuous training was emphasised as a way to reduce 
complacency in operators and maintain adequate levels of expertise beyond initial induction, in both 
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safety and security operations. In particular, respondents highlighted the need to emphasise security 
awareness training in order for employees to internalise criticality of security issues, which are 
naturally difficult to be engrained in complex social systems. During the interviews, particular 
reference was made to the case of security screening providers, who need to put more effort into 
motivating their staff and reducing their complacency. In the case of ground handlers and ramp 
operators in general, strengthening of safety in AS operations training was reported as necessary. 
Problems associated with continuous training were identified in significant costs for the involved 
organisations. 
5.2.7 Organisational Factors: Policy Factors 
Frequency: 10.9% of total occurrences 
The present thesis adjusted and expanded the definition of organisational factors: policy 
factors (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007) provided by the macroergonomic 
approach. This was done in order to include in the policy factors the ways in which international 
and national regulations are adopted in Australian airports and impact aeronautical operations. 
International standards (ICAO, 2011) and national regulations (Australian Government, 2004; 
CASA, 2015) regulate the safety, as well as the security of passengers, operators, general public, 
facilities, and assets in airports.79  
The neat distinction between safety and security statutes was further supported during the 
semi-structured interviews conducted in the present research. Respondents clearly referred to either 
safety or security regulations according to the areas of expertise and activities they were involved 
in. Furthermore, the present sub-section shows that relevant information about interviewees’ 
perceptions on the policies underlying airport operations could be drawn from the comparison 
between the two regulatory frameworks.  
Safety. The regulatory elements of the aviation safety regimes in place in the explored airports 
were principally highlighted by respondents in charge of Airside operations. Safety policies were 
also discussed by some interviewees involved in Landside operations, though predominantly for 
Workplace Health and Safety matters. The emerging themes on safety policies were as follows: 
nature of the safety regime, interpretation, and inadequate regulations. 
                                                 
 
79 In Australian airports, safety and security regimes are established and regulated by the Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) and by the Office for Transport Security (OTS) respectively, which adopt international standards and 
laws and adjust them to the Australian context. At the airport level, the Safety Management System and the Transport 
Security Program are the respective reference documents for safety and security regimes. For more details on this, see 
Sub-section 2.5.2. 
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Nature of the safety regime. The most recurrent element emerging from the interviews 
referred to the acknowledged, objective difficulty for aeronautical activities to be regulated under a 
specific safety regime. Due to its nature and intrinsic characteristics, safety was reported as 
particularly complex to be regimented. The complexity of safety-related operations, which are 
usually conducted by more than one operator and belong to more than one organisation, was 
described as not particularly fitting within sharp regulatory boundaries. In addition, as Sub-section 
5.2.7 pointed out, consequences deriving from sub-optimal implementation of safety rules and 
practices may be particularly convoluted and lead to adverse or unplanned effects. One high-level 
manager provided the following example to illustrate the complexity that safety regulations have to 
face. The case referred to the obligation for AS vehicles to always have their rotating beacons on, 
during operations. 
‘It [the beacon] always has to be visible, but by doing so, it flashes people’s eyes, like pilots, 
handlers, operators, etc. And then that can become a further safety issue. So, the rule says 
you can’t block the beacons at all, but here we still put a bit of shield around them [beacons] 
so that they don’t flash too much people’s eyes.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Similar to the previous respondent, another employee concluded that safety regulations can be 
looser than security ones. However, the interviewee provided opposite explanations for this. Safety 
rules would be less binding than security ones because consequences deriving from unsafe acts are 
more intuitive than consequences deriving from unsecure practices. 
‘You know, if I was to say to you, “Be careful when you walk on the wet floor.” You go, 
“Yeah, I understand that ‘cause I'm gonna trip over."’ (OML-LS) 
Interpretation. Data revealed that the safety regime leaves more room for interpretation and 
personal opinion than the security one. Clear-cut safety rules do exist and are enforced in the case of 
aircraft operations. However, standards and guidelines (rather than strict rules and regulations), 
together with a large portion of common sense, logic, and intuition are more commonly used to 
enhance safe operations in modern airports, especially in the case of ground handling operations. 
Interviewees reported that in order to overcome the de-regulated nature of the safety regime, 
ground handlers are occasionally required to provide their own explanation of the regulations they 
have to abide by. One instance was illustrated by an interviewee, who mentioned the case of the 
rotating beacons that AS vehicles must activate while operating. 
‘Take for example the beacons on vehicles. It's not really clear as to what constitutes a 
beacon, although regulations do give some guidelines as to must be at the highest point in the 
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vehicle and must be 360 degrees and stuff like that. If you go out Airside, you will see many of 
them, and you would see they do not conform.’ (OML-AS) 
As the same respondent also pointed out, one of the crucial issues associated with this last 
element was that interpretation is given on the spot by the operators, when circumstances require 
them to do so. Thus, staff members that do not necessarily have the competence and expertise, 
sometimes have to interpret vague legislative provisions. The language utilised in regulatory 
documents was reported as a typical reason for uncertain interpretation. In extreme cases, 
inadequate language could lead to conflicting interpretation of similar regulatory provisions. One 
respondent described the examples of conflicting regulations and inappropriate language in the 
following excerpt, which referred to CASA’s Manual of Standards80. 
‘Because here, you know, in some areas it [the Manual of Standards] will say aerodrome 
operators “should” do this.  Well, that’s not a “must” or “shouldn’t” and then you’d find a 
paragraph here that says do this, but this other paragraph completely opposite.’ (CML-AS) 
The previous passage highlights a relevant element of discussion in the field of the legislative 
provisions established by CASA. An exploration of these provisions lies outside the scope of the 
present research, whose focus is not on the regulatory context in which Australian airports operate. 
However, it is worth noting that the Manual of Standards itself implies the existence of room for 
interpretation on specific regulations, where it indicates that ‘Where there is flexibility in 
compliance with a specification, words like “should” or “may” are used. This does not mean that 
the specification can be ignored, but it means that there is no need to seek CASA approval if an 
aerodrome operator chooses to adopt alternate means to achieve similar outcomes.’ (Australian 
Government, 2012b, p. 21). Despite most safety regulations in Australian airports originating from 
CASA’s activities, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) sets the guiding standards 
for ground operations and ramp safety in general, as the following passage showed: 
‘Well there’s air ground standards, but I don’t think they really pick up Airside driving or 
those standards very well. I think they’re a bit behind. I think CASA were... if they haven’t... I 
think they were looking at setting up a standards group for ground handlers and stuff like that 
[…] but a lot of the ground handling stuff comes from IATA.’ (CML-AS) 
                                                 
 
80 The Manual of Standards is the regulatory document of reference for Australian aviation safety. The Aerodrome 
Manual, the fundamental airport document which illustrates the critical legislative provisions that regulate airport 
activities, is elaborated according to the directions contained in the Manual of Standards. For further reference, see 
www.casa.gov.au  
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 Apart from the room for interpretation left by some safety regulations enforced in the 
explored airports, the impact that inadequate legislative provisions has on safety performance 
emerged from the interviews as an important issue.  
Inadequate Regulations. As the previous excerpt demonstrated, some issues with potentially 
inadequate regulations were highlighted by interviewees. One example mentioned by a high-level 
manager was the Civil Aviation Order 20.981, which still contains references to aircraft earthing 
practices, while the habit of earthing refuelling vehicles is now obsolete. 
‘So there’s... a lot of the standards are out of date when it comes to CASA. Yeah.’ (CML-AS) 
Associated with inadequate regulations, in some cases safety legislation was reported as 
slowly reacting to environmental factors (e.g., changes in technology, international regulations and 
consolidated practices). A further example of the impact that inappropriate regulations may have on 
operators’ performance derived from a component of the safety regime, the Workplace Health and 
Safety regulations. In particular, two interviewees involved in risk, compliance, and Workplace 
Health and Safety stated that due to its crucial role, airports tend to over-regulate the Workplace 
Health and Safety regime, by producing organisational policies and guidelines that may overlap and 
create confusion in staff members. 
Security. The first part of the present sub-section has provided evidence to support the 
importance of the safety regime among the policy factors that can impact operators’ performance. 
Despite this, the large majority of respondents mentioned the security policies and procedures as the 
most critical policy factors. The recurring nodes around security policies were the following: the 
nature of the security regime, interpretation, regulatory inconsistencies, regulatory change, and 
general aviation. 
Nature of the security regime. Respondents generally agreed in defining the security regime in 
place in airports as more prescriptive than the safety one. Two intrinsic characteristics of security 
were indicated as the reason for this: association with deliberate acts by perpetrators and non-
immediate perception of consequences of security violations. The following two excerpts 
respectively illustrated these two features of security management: 
‘[…] whereas with security screening you’ve got to screen 100% of people. Otherwise 
somebody could get on board with a knife.’ (LL/LS-AS) 
                                                 
 
81 It is worth noting that the Civil Aviation Orders are regulatory provisions that establish technical standards and 
specifications, as indicated by Australia’s overarching aeronautical safety law, the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 
1998. For further reference, see CASA (2015). 
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‘Security's not a natural process. […] If I said to you “Don't leave your bag unattended and 
remove all your wooden artefacts and don't have a plastic knife.” You'd go, “Really?” So, it's 
not ingrained process. It's not a process that everyone does through life.’ (OML-LS) 
As it can be drawn from the previous two passages, respondents expressed a general 
agreement in indicating that the security regime is more difficult to be naturally understood by 
passengers and members of the general public than the safety regime. This may potentially entail 
issues of interpretation of security regulations.  
This last point is further discussed in the following paragraph. 
Interpretation. The security regulations provide a neater boundary than the safety regime 
about what is allowed and what is not. However, issues associated with the interpretation of security 
regulations emerged from the interviews. Numerous respondents described the inconsistent 
interpretation of national and international regulations establishing what items can be carried in the 
airports’ sterile areas82 as a potential determinant for prohibited items violations. A certain degree 
of interpretation of the aviation security regulations is left to the security screening authorities,83 
who can adopt their own standard operating procedures implemented by the security screening 
providers. Room for interpretation was reported as being particularly significant for the prohibited 
items lists enforced in the explored airports.  
‘A while ago, they said butter knives can be allowed through the sterile area. […] So, we’re 
trying to clarify what's a knife and what isn't a knife and apparently, if it has a rounded edge, 
then that's regarded as being a butter knife. But as soon as it has a pointed end and like sharp 
serrations, that sort of thing, that's no good.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Interpretation issues can take place at different levels: vertical, when an overarching 
legislative provision is interpreted and adopted in different ways by different organisations; or 
horizontal, when the same regulation is read and understood in a different way by operators 
working for the same company. In the case of vertical interpretation, within the national context, 
different understanding (and implementation) of regulations is experienced not only from airport to 
airport, but also from airline to airline or from airport operator to airline (as security screening 
authorities). 
                                                 
 
82 An exhaustive overview of the security regulations enforced in Australian airports lies out of the scope of the present 
thesis. See Sub-section 2.5.2 for further reference on this. 
83 Usually the airport operator and the airlines. 
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‘We’ll get a complaint that says, “I just went through [Airport 1] screening and they took my 
scissors off me. And I... two weeks ago, I came through [Airport 2] with the same scissors in 
my bag and they didn’t.” (CML-LS/AS) 
‘You have slight inconsistencies between airlines. [Airline 1] will allow you to take sporting 
goods for example. [Airline 2] won't or vice versa. You've got some airlines that will not 
really care either way.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
In the case of horizontal interpretation, not only nature of regulations, but also individual 
factors come into play to determine diversity in understanding and implementation of rules. These 
factors include operators’ experience, skills, education, competence, etc. 
‘Some stuff’s ambiguous, but I guess you’ll always gonna have that, ‘cause write a sentence 
and everybody’s gonna read that sentence a different way. So, it’s quite hard, especially with 
the screening regulations, because […] the people that work at screening aren’t PhD 
students. And they’re not used to reading and understanding regulations and rules.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
Data emphasised that interpretation issues around prohibited items predominantly involve the 
security screening providers, due to the screeners’ role as street-level officers enforcing the 
regulations. High-level managers of security screening providers interviewed in the present research 
highlighted the frustration that may affect operators and their supervisors when required to make a 
judgement over prohibited items. Further frustration may also originate from unclear, technical 
language84 utilised in some regulations. Screeners’ discomfit was reported as potentially affecting 
their attitude towards travellers, potentially contributing to the generation of fertile ground for 
disruptive behaviours by the latter. 
Regulatory inconsistencies. A further concern for airport operators, cases of regulatory 
inconsistencies were also reported in the collected data, applying to both the national and the 
international levels. On the one hand, the existence on Australian soil of airports where security 
screening is mandatory and others where it is not, is a first example of internal inconsistency in 
security regulations. On the other hand, the presence of gaps in the required security screening 
levels across different countries is an example of external inconsistency. Australia may in fact 
require a level of granularity in the screening process that is not requested in other countries. Issues 
therefore arise when a flight coming from overseas is scheduled to Australia. In general terms, 
interviewees pointed out Australia’s marginal position in the global aviation environment as a 
                                                 
 
84 Or ‘gobbledygook’ as it was described by one respondent. 
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determinant for regulatory inconsistencies and slack legislative adaptation. The following excerpt 
witnessed this last point, conceding nonetheless that inconsistencies in security regulatory regimes 
do not exist only in Australia, but throughout the whole world.  
‘So, there's a lot of inconsistency on a global scale. […] They've got the legislative backing 
under the ICAO standards. What they need to do is to have the governments buy into that and 
say, "This is the global standard." So, it's already there […] but the governments don't agree 
on their own individual risk profile, so I understand that the higher countries with a higher 
threat level have certain security means and I also understand that other countries aren't at 
the same level. That's just life, but what they should do is harmonisation between the things 
that they can. A good example of harmonisation is prohibited items. There should be one list 
for prohibited items to travel around the world.’ (OML-LS) 
As the previous excerpt highlighted, inconsistencies in the aviation security regimes enforced 
in the different countries stem from a number of reasons: the nature of international law, limited 
regulatory role of ICAO, differences in security threat assessment levels, etc.  
Regulatory change. Aside from inconsistencies in regulations, numerous respondents also 
indicated that regulatory change is a slow-paced process, which may hamper the effectiveness of 
the aviation security regime. Australian regulations tend to be slow in adopting the international 
standards and, in general, in adjusting to the changing international security scenario. Technological 
change occurring on the threat side, as well as on the defence side is slowly assimilated by national 
legislation. As a result, new, acknowledged threats such as improvised explosive devices are only 
tentatively considered in regulations. Similarly, the use of innovative technologies (e.g., 
thermographic devices for security screening) is cautiously contemplated in Australian legislation. 
‘So, guns and improvised explosive devices are the way to go these days and I know the 
government’s slowly moving towards that now, but it’s just taking us a fair while to get there.’ 
(SSP/AFP-LS) 
‘I know that again it’s just the problem in this country is it takes so long to get there, they do 
all these forums, they call in white papers, but they send out all these questions for forums 
and you ask them and then four or five years later you get a green paper back saying, “This is 
what we’ve decided”, then maybe two or three years later they might actually implement it.’ 
(SSP/AFP-LS) 
Data revealed that one factor potentially contributing to the slowness with which regulations 
adopt and reflect technological change is the cost model imposed by the Australian regulatory 
system. As described in Sub-section 5.2.3, only the costs associated with security measures 
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mandated by law can be recouped by the airport operators, by applying a per passenger fee. In the 
case of non-mandated security measures, costs fall entirely on the airport operator. As a 
consequence of this cost structure, governmental agencies and airlines may have a common interest 
in limiting innovative security measures, in order to not heavily lie on passengers’ shoulders. 
General aviation. One last regulatory element was reported by several respondents as 
potentially contributing to security-related disruptions, in particular in one of the explored airports. 
As discussed in Sub-section 5.2.4, general aviation comprises all aviation-related activities that 
cannot be classified as regular public transport.85 Legislative provisions regulating security for 
general aviation activities are different from those for regular public transport. Generally speaking, 
general aviation is not subject to security screening in Australia. The underlying reasons for this are 
economic in nature. The government does not want to hamper quick operations performed by 
general aviation. This is clearly stated in official documents (Australian Government, 2009b) and 
was witnessed by some respondents during the data collection: 
‘On general aviation…there is no screening at all. […] They’re busy, they’re trying to 
generate money. They don’t want to spend too much. They’re certainly not going to spend 
money on access control systems and all that sort of thing.’ (OML-LS) 
‘At the general aviation, there’s a lot of fingers in the pie there…’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Access to general aviation, either by passengers or by vehicles, is usually regulated simply by 
means of swipe access cards, Aviation Security Identification Cards, and key box systems. Some 
respondents highlighted that the different regulatory requirements underlying general aviation 
activities may represent a potential systemic vulnerability. As mentioned in Sub-section 5.2.4, 
systemic weaknesses may be increased by the layout of the airport. When general aviation is located 
away from the airport operator control rooms, supervision and patrolling may become more 
complicated. Security disruptions such as Airside breaches or Landside security breaches were 
indicated as potential threats deriving from the aforementioned systemic weaknesses. 
Summary of organisational factors: policy. The present sub-section has illustrated the 
characteristics of several policy-related issues reported by respondents during the semi-structured 
interviews. These issues were described as potentially contributing to the generation of SSD in the 
explored data collection sites. 
                                                 
 
85 General aviation includes: recreational flights, private and corporate flights, aerial agriculture, mining aviation, fire-
fighting, flight training, charter, and some low-capacity operations (Australian Government, 2009b). See Sub-section 
2.5.2 for further reference. 
 290       Chapter 5: Results: Macroergonomic Factors of Organisational Vulnerability and Areas for Improvement (RQ2a and RQ2b) 
The safety regime in place in the three airports was reported as potentially affected by 
intrinsic regulatory hurdles (associated with the unpredictable nature of many safety issues), vague 
or out-of-date legislation (allowing safety operators excessive room for interpretation), and 
redundant regulation (in the case of Workplace Health and Safety). The safety disruptions with the 
potential to originate from the aforementioned factors were indicated in ramp safety issues and 
Landside safety events. 
The security regime presented additional issues. First, some of the underlying regulations 
were reported as enabling excessive room for interpretation, especially in the case of security 
screening activities and prohibited items lists. Second, lack of consistency was recognised as a 
potentially emerging issue, at both a horizontal level (within the same organisation) and a vertical 
level (among different organisations and countries). Excessive room for interpretation and lack of 
consistency in the existing regulations were reported as potentially generating security disruptions 
such as prohibited items violations or disruptive behaviours by passengers and the general public. 
Third, the disparity of security provisions existing between regular public transport and general 
aviation was reported as a potential security issue, leading to the creation of vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses in the security regime. Potential security disruptions associated with this last element 
included Airside breaches. 
Suggestions for improvement. As the present sub-section has emphasised, security 
disruptions were reported by respondents as potentially originating from inadequate policies and 
regulations applied by airports. In general, interviewees stated that further legislative consistency 
would strengthen the aviation security regime in the explored airports. Enhanced consistency was 
wished for by respondents, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, in order for countries in the 
global aviation network to produce and implement coherent regulations, especially for the 
prohibited items’ lists. Horizontally, so that Australian airports and operating airlines adopt the 
same standard operating procedures in security screening. In both cases, clear-cut regulations and 
‘black or white’ legislative provisions were reputed to be powerful instruments to improve 
consistency, in both safety and security. In addition, calls for a strengthened role by Australia in the 
international arena were underlined during the interviews. Isolation would be decreased if the 
country further enhanced its connections within global players such as ICAO or IATA. 
Numerous respondents reported that international and national aviation security regulations 
are becoming less stringent, such as the prohibited items lists. Screeners are asked more and more to 
gain sufficient situational awareness and apply common sense when required to make their own 
judgement about prohibited items. In particular, in order to overcome the interpretation dilemma, 
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the principle ‘Is this item going to bring a plane down?’ is progressively enforced in screening 
operations. Interviewees expressed their agreement with this principle and generally wished for 
enhanced flexibility in terms of forbidden objects on board aircraft. The opposite approaches to 
security screening applied to regular public transport and general aviation raised concerns among 
the respondents, who wished for a strengthened security regime, providing better supervision on 
general aviation operations. 
5.2.8 Organisational Factors: Structure Factors86 
Frequency: 6.5% of total occurrences 
During the semi-structured interviews, two organisational factors: structure factors were 
reported as particularly relevant to safety and security issues in explored airports. This sub-section 
investigates how rostering and contractual arrangements shape airports’ organisational structures 
and may in turn constitute potential determinants for SSD. 
Rostering. Data emphasised that one of the factors affecting the governance systems in place 
in airports is staffing levels. Under-staffed areas of operation limit the scope and the number of 
activities that can be carried out. Training in particular was reported as potentially affected by staff 
shortages. For instance, normal business operations have to be ensured in any case and when 
staffing is not adequate, ancillary activities (as training) are cancelled. Hence, airport operators have 
introduced online training and induction for their employees.87 Data showed that airport 
management could increase the number of performed tasks if further human resources were 
provided. Several respondents explained, for instance, that additional resources could be fruitfully 
employed in auditing contractors and sub-contractors operating on site. 
A common consideration made by the majority of the respondents was that some airport 
organisations suffer from inadequate rosters more than others. Some ground handling companies in 
particular emerged as experiencing issues with scarce number of staff members, potentially leading 
to the development of SSD, primarily ramp safety issues. The increasing competition in the ground 
handling services market lowered the prices and increased the bargaining power of airlines. Thus, 
ground handlers are obliged to keep their costs as low as possible, by reducing the number of staff 
members, nonetheless maintaining the quality of their services. 
‘Yeah...on time performances...certainly a bit of pressure. Staffing level is probably a lot less. 
[…] They [ground handling companies] probably don’t have as many staff as they could. I 
                                                 
 
86 An overview of the organisational structure of the safety, Workplace Health and Safety and security functions in the 
data collection sites is illustrated in Appendix 11. 
87 See also Sub-section 5.2.6 on training.  
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mean they got minimal staff. You often have issues when you wanna move aircrafts at night 
because they haven’t got staff around or available. So, they’re not rostered on.’ (CML-AS) 
In the respondents’ words, some of the airlines can also implement inadequate staffing levels, 
especially in the services that they perceive as ancillary. One example often mentioned during the 
semi-structured interviews referred to passenger marshalling, the service aimed to ensure 
supervision of passengers boarding and disembarking an aircraft through the tarmac. This service is 
intended to prevent safety and security accidents involving travellers on the ramp, but inadequate 
staffing levels may reduce its effectiveness. During observation conducted in one of the airports, the 
investigator witnessed one instance where a carrier only rostered two staff members to supervise 
passengers disembarking an aircraft. The safety officer present in that circumstance declared that 
two individuals are usually not sufficient to supervise the whole process. It is worth noting that not 
only low cost carriers, but also traditional carriers on occasion may under-staff passenger 
marshalling, as witnessed by the following excerpt: 
‘That’s the other thing with the airlines that haven’t got enough staff so passenger 
marshalling suffers. […] Low cost and even the major carriers. They’ll allocate a certain 
amount of staff and depending on what bay you get, you might have a fairly convoluted route 
for the passengers to walk to, to the aircraft. So, they don’t generally provide enough 
marshals for that.’ (OML-AS) 
Rostering issues may be contributing factors for sub-optimal decision-making in the explored 
airports, as was witnessed during the interviews. In particular, respondents reported that airlines 
may decide to limit the number of their staff members in the smallest airports and assign their 
decision-makers to the most important aerodromes. As a consequence, especially in case of 
emergency, decisions affecting the smallest airports are made elsewhere, in conditions of sub-
optimal situational awareness. 
Contractual arrangements. Respondents highlighted that contractual arrangements in place 
in the data collection sites can modify the governance frameworks of airport organisations and 
ultimately have the potential to affect their levels of safety and security. Multiplication of 
organisations and stakeholders operating in the aviation sector emerged as an overarching feature of 
the explored airports, especially in the case of Airside operations. As structure factors, contractual 
arrangements were in turn found to be associated with three emerging themes in the explored data 
collection sites: ground handlers, other contractors, and structure and decision-making.  
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Ground handlers. Ground handling companies have increased in number over the years and 
their market has become more competitive and complex, sometimes at the expense of the quality of 
the services. 
‘Over the last few years, there’s been an explosion of ground handling agencies and probably 
in terms of quality of training and experience on the apron, they’re probably not quite as up 
to speed as maybe some of the more established ground handlers.’ (CML-AS) 
Data revealed that low prices push airlines to contract more services out, in order to focus on 
the core business of aviation transport. Flexible contractual solutions are therefore encouraged and 
the number of casual workers increases. The emerging contractual arrangements bring discontinuity 
into the value chain and ownership and responsibility of the assigned duties are somewhat watered-
down. In addition, this governance model strongly limits the chances for airport operators to 
exercise their supervisory role on aviation activities. The presence of numerous stakeholders, sub-
contracting cultures, and complexification of contractual arrangements contribute to the weakening 
the supervisory role of airport management. Several respondents illustrated the impact of these new 
contractual arrangements, as witnessed by the following passage: 
‘Especially in the case of low cost carriers, they are under contractors. They [ground 
handling companies] are contractors. To me, that adds another barrier or ownership of the 
issue. […] My hands are tied. It doesn’t help facilitate that ownership of the customer service 
issue. I believe there is more of a discharge of responsibility. […] Yeah. Got a problem? Go 
and call the airline. We meet with the local management level, but I can’t impart management 
styles on him.’ (CML-LS) 
Respondents reported that these contractual arrangements may present the potential to 
increase the likelihood of events such as ramp safety issues. An illustration of this phenomenon is 
contained in Appendix 12. 
Other contractors. Ground handling activities were not the only activities found to be 
potentially affected by new types of contractual arrangements. Interviewees reported that major 
maintenance and repair activities in both Landside and Airside areas are usually contracted out by 
the airport operator to other companies. Airport management usually identifies a project manager, 
who is the first point of contact for both the contractors and the airport operator. Furthermore, 
contractors may decide to partially or totally sub-contract the assigned jobs, adding further 
organisational layers to the governance structure. Workplace Health and Safety issues were reported 
as potentially generating from these contractual arrangements in maintenance and repairs. The 
controversial issue for the airport operator is ensuring that the involved actors abide by Workplace 
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Health and Safety regulations, as it was revealed by the collected data. Adequate safety levels must 
also be guaranteed throughout the process. This can be particularly difficult, especially in presence 
of small companies. Safety disruptions (e.g., Landside safety events, maintenance, works, and 
repairs, etc.) may have the potential to emerge from the aforementioned structure factors. An 
illustration of these issues is contained in Appendix 13. 
‘We make sure that the principal contractor has a process in place for managing their 
subcontractors and that we’re satisfied with their process. But when you’ve got little bits and 
pieces companies, they could get in people that we don’t even know are here. They could just 
call up somebody and get them in to do the job.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Structure and decision-making. In one particular aerodrome, another element associated with 
contractual arrangements emerged as potentially problematic for the safety and security of airport 
operations, namely the relationship between structure and decision-making. Despite the specificity 
of this instance, the described features can be considered typical of the aviation sector and are 
therefore included in the present sub-section to gain a better understanding of the organisational 
context of Australian airports.  
In one of the data collection sites, one of the terminals happened to be leased to, and managed 
by, three different entities at the same time. Respondents stated that, when decisions have to be 
made, this organisational structure potentially results in three different approaches coexisting within 
the same building. Interviewees mentioned several cases in the past, where three separate decisions 
were made vis-à-vis the same issue. In the case of natural hazards, three different storm warning 
systems are in place in the terminal, which means that the three entities may autonomously decide if 
and when to cease operations for safety reasons. Furthermore, given that the three organisations are 
all security screening authorities, similar controversial issues arise when they have to make 
decisions about the screening process (e.g., what security screening equipment to adopt or which 
objects to include in the prohibited items lists). The emerging dissimilarities in decision-making 
may have the potential to increase the chances for safety (ramp safety issues, aircraft emergencies, 
congestion and queuing in airports, etc.) or security disruptions (disruptive behaviours by 
passengers or the general public, prohibited items violations, Landside security breaches, etc.). The 
following passage referred to the cases of decision-making about the security equipment: 
‘The challenge for us, in an airport like the domestic terminal here at [airport], is there are 
three lease holders. So, they can each make a decision to have or not to have certain 
equipment because of the lack of a mandated legislated standard.’ (OML-LS) 
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Summary of organisational factors: structure. The present sub-section investigated how the 
governance structure of the organisations involved in aviation operations may affect safety and 
security performance. In particular, two structure factors emerged: levels of rostering by airport 
organisations and contractual arrangements regulating the professional relationships among some 
of the involved organisations. In the case of rostering, several respondents emphasised the 
importance for ground handlers and airlines to provide adequate staff to cover specific positions 
(e.g., ground operators or passenger marshals), in order to improve the safety and security 
performance of the aerodrome.  
Conversely, emerging contractual arrangements were defined as potentially problematic due 
to a number of reasons: lack of engagement towards safety and security, watered-down 
responsibility, difficult supervision by the airport operator, etc. For the same reasons, Workplace 
Health and Safety issues were reported as particularly crucial when site works are performed by 
contractors or sub-contractors. Indeed, control and audit of the latter by the airport operator may be 
particularly thorny. Appendix 14 depicts an overview of the issues potentially deriving from 
problematic contractual arrangements and organisational structure. 
Suggestions for improvement. Respondents suggested several options to limit the impact of 
structure factors on the safety and security performance of the explored airports. First, Workplace 
Health and Safety managers suggested employing pre-qualified contractors, in order to ensure 
compliance to Workplace Health and Safety regulations by external operators involved in 
maintenance and repair works. By means of accreditation systems, the airport operator would be 
able to pre-assess the candidate third-parties and admit them on site only under specific conditions 
(e.g., based on their track-record on Workplace Health and Safety). Second, in order to contrast the 
multiplication of involved actors and limit the complexity of contractual arrangements, the airport 
operator may privilege solid, recognised companies over smaller ones. The latter may in fact offer 
economic advantages, but also lower levels of performance in terms of Workplace Health and 
Safety. Third, in order to promote internal cohesion within airport management organisations, 
respondents proposed to have the safety and security functions closer to each other, not only from 
an organisational perspective, but also from a physical point of view. In one of the airports, this 
consolidation process had already been planned, as one of the general managers witnessed in the 
following passage: 
‘Now here we will put them together, security and safety and Workplace Health and Safety in 
the same building in the future, which will ease communication. It’s going to be an 
Operations village.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
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5.2.9 Organisational Factors: Implementation Factors 
Frequency: 4.6% of total occurrences 
Organisational factors: implementation factors emerging from the collected data involved 
three main themes, which are explored in the present sub-section: security screening, training, and 
cost reduction practices. This category of factors emerged as the second least recurring in the semi-
structured interviews (4.9%). 
Security screening. Interviewees described situations where some security screeners 
operating at the Landside and Airside checkpoints were occasionally insensitive to the diversity of 
travellers. In these circumstances, implementation of regulations was reported to be too rigid and 
not completely taking passengers’ needs into account. 
‘It comes back to an appreciation of the behaviours of people and not putting everybody into 
one box and understanding the diversity of the makeup of your travelling public.’ (OML-
LS/AS) 
Furthermore, some practices implemented at the security screening checkpoints were reported 
as sub-optimal in terms of the generated performance. One reported example of this was when 
screening operators shift their position during the processing of items and passenger. This can result 
in an increased chance for prohibited items violations or Landside security breaches. It is worth 
noting that the involved airport operator has now changed the handover practices and the incidence 
of these disruptions has reduced: 
‘A lot of our incidences [prohibited items violations] happen during hand-over, when people 
lose track of what they were doing. So, we’ve introduced that hand-over can’t happen until a 
screener has finished the whole process. Hand-over has to happen consciously. Since we’ve 
stopped that, it really improved.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
 The previous example illustrates how airport organisations adapt to the changing 
environment and adjust their practices to reach optimal levels of safety and security performance.  
Training. Linked to the previous factor, a second implementation factor investigated in the 
present sub-section referred to the implemented training practices. These practices were criticised 
by some respondents for focusing only on the procedures and not on the reasons for security 
screening. This was described as potentially generating lack of commitment in the security 
screeners, who, on the contrary, could be made more engaged in the assigned duties by means of 
more comprehensive training. 
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Cost reduction practices. A third implementation factor was strictly linked to the business 
model implemented by some airport organisations (such as some airlines). Implementation of this 
model can be problematic, especially because it may lead airport organisations to reduce staff 
members in order to lower costs. It is interesting to note that given the interconnectedness of the 
airport sub-systems, this practice potentially cascades on numerous other components of the airport. 
A clear example of this was provided by the manager of a security screening provider who 
explained how reduced airline staff members may ultimately impact on the performance of security 
screeners: 
‘The passengers don’t really see the airline until they get to the boarding gate.  They check in 
online or at the kiosk. There's no check of their cabin baggage until they get to us [security 
screening providers]. So, the first point of contact they have is the screeners and if they’re 
cranky, the screeners will notice it at first...’ (SSP/AFP-LS)  
Data revealed that the potential for SSD due to sub-optimal performance by insufficient 
operators is increased when specific activities are under-staffed. Passenger marshalling and 
supervision of boarding gates were two reported examples of activities in which implementation 
may be hampered by an insufficient number of operators.88  
A second implementation issue involving some airlines was reported with regards to the 
enforcement of baggage regulations. One respondent in particular explained that some airlines used 
to have a more relaxed attitude towards the maximum weight and size of baggage allowed on board. 
With the stricter implementation of a true, low cost model, baggage regulations are nowadays 
enforced more rigidly, which sometimes catches passengers unprepared. Disruptive behaviours by 
passengers or the general public may therefore result and threaten the security of operations. 
‘Whereas, I guess five years ago, the low cost carriers weren’t really low cost, I guess that 
they weren’t really operating that true low cost model. They’d say: “We just waiver the 
excess baggage fee and that’s okay”, or whatever that be. It’s a change in their operating 
models of the airlines that’s kind of having a follow on to airports as such.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Furthermore, interviewees noted the potential for vulnerability to SSD originating from the 
practice of ‘fine-tuning the odds’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) that some airport organisations may 
conduct in their aeronautical operations.  
                                                 
 
88 For further examples of issues related to rostering, see Sub-section 5.2.8. 
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‘The airlines are at fault in the sense that they're so about this low-cost carrier thing, and it's 
cut, cut, cut, cut back on resources rather than having…and I think it's largely caught the 
aviation industry on the hop, to be honest.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
Examples of cost reduction practices included on the safety side, the reduced use of reverse 
thrust during landing (which enables fuel-saving, but also increases the potential for brake failures 
in aircrafts, as one respondent pointed out89), or the practice of not turning on the aircraft engines 
during pushbacks (which reduces the visual cue that the aircraft is in motion and presents potential 
risks for ramp operators90); on the security side, the failed adoption of innovative security screening 
equipment, when not prescribed by law, potentially resulting in sub-optimal security performance.91  
Summary of organisational factors: implementation. In the present research, implementation 
factors emerged as potential contributory factors for the generation of SSD. At times, security 
screeners were found to be insensitive to passengers’ needs and too strict in their implementation of 
screening regulations and practices. Another remark was made by some interviewees about the cost 
reduction practices that some airlines (both low cost carriers and traditional airlines) may 
implement, with particular reference to specific aviation operations. These were described as 
potentially sub-optimal in terms of safety performance. Lastly, data highlighted that implementation 
of security screeners’ training could be at times excessively focused on procedures and practices, 
rather than on motivation for screening. 
Suggestions for Improvement. Respondents’ suggestions for reducing the impact of 
implementation factors on the overall vulnerability of the airport systems primarily revolved around 
the security screening process. Intervention on the business model enacted by some airlines was in 
fact reported as being particularly hard to achieve, given the underlying, commercial issues. 
Changes in the training contents were urged by the interviewees, who stressed the importance of 
communication training and security awareness. Respondents explained that a better understanding 
of the underlying motivations for screening process and regulations would lead to enhanced 
engagement by operators and, ultimately, to better performance. 
                                                 
 
89 ‘Also brake failures... we’re getting a lot more 737 brake failures and that’s because they’re trying to reuse... reduce 
using reverse thrust when they land on the runways.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
90 See Sub-section 5.2.3 for further reference. 
91 See note above. 
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5.2.10 Organisational Factors: Strategy Factors 
Frequency: 14.6% of total occurrences 
The present thesis expanded the definition of organisational factors: strategy factors provided 
by the macroergonomic approach (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007), in order to capture the broader 
strategic objectives of the investigated organisations. The present sub-section analyses the high-
level goals pursued by the airport systems, including airport operators and airlines. Furthermore, it 
investigates how the achievement of these objectives may impact the systemic levels of safety and 
security. Data collected by means of semi-structured interviews cast light on three strategic 
elements in particular: low cost business model, competition, and stakeholder networks. Altogether, 
this category of factors resulted the second highest in terms of occurrence (14.6%).  
Low cost business model. One of the most frequently recurring elements in the respondents’ 
words (regardless of their job position or area of operations), was the coexistence of different, 
sometimes conflicting business models enacted by airport organisations. An excessive pressure on 
the achievement of economic goals was observed by the interviewees in some companies. Data 
emphasised an increasing general demand for cost reduction and growing revenues, especially by 
some players. Not only cost reduction, but also increased organisational pressure towards profit-
making was observed by the interviewees. A growing concern by airlines to minimise the time 
spent on the tarmac by their aircraft in order to increase revenue was highlighted, as the following 
excerpts demonstrated:  
‘You know, airlines are all about on time performance, so that puts pressure on their staff 
straightaway.’ (CML-AS) 
‘They […] just want passengers on the seats […] As long as they can get their seats, they're 
happy.’ (OML-LS) 
Quick turnaround, which is traditionally a peculiarity of low cost carriers, is becoming a 
current practice for traditional carriers, as the following except witnessed: 
‘Traditional carriers have been seeing that the low cost carriers can operate at a reduced 
cost with better turnaround, so some of the traditional have jumped onboard to do the same 
thing. So, I think it may be fair to say that it is across the board now.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
In general, time has become a crucial factor in the aviation industry and economic pressures 
coming from higher-level organisations (e.g., airlines) cascade on the lower-level companies (e.g., 
ground handling companies). Data underlined that the emerging scenario is characterised by a 
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multiplication of tasks and duties that have to be accomplished in a shorter amount of time. The 
following passage illustrated the complexity and the time constraints of the resulting scenario: 
‘Yeah, so I think they do a 45-minute turnaround. It [aircraft] comes in, has to be cleaned, 
passengers off, bags off, bags back on, passengers back on, and it goes again. That's quite 
tight, and it's obviously tight for the pilots. They're on time performance, so they're pushing 
the ground handlers. If the companies haven't got the right amount of people to do all of that 
stuff, then it flows onto the passengers in terminal, because obviously, they need to get the 
aircraft to depart, first and foremost, but the bags to the terminal are actually the ones that 
will be delayed.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
 The previous excerpt depicted the pressure to which ground handlers may be subject. This 
has the potential to lead to reduced levels of caution and to unsafe behaviours (e.g., speeding on the 
tarmac, misusing the ground service equipment, storage areas, etc.). These practices may ultimately 
result in ramp safety issues, aircraft emergencies, etc. An overview of the safety and security-
related consequences that the low cost business model may generate is provided in Appendix 15. 
Competition. Economic pressures existing in modern Australian airports were reported as 
building up a highly competitive environment, where organisations may enter into conflict in order 
to achieve their organisational goals. A typical example of this competition was referred by the 
interviewees mentioning the case of airlines, which strive to stand out and capture more passengers 
than the competitors. This was reported as evident when airlines are physically in contact with each 
other or share common spaces in the terminals, or when they have to make concerted decisions 
affecting their operations. The case of the airport where three different organisations lease parts of 
the same terminal is a clear example of this.92 Collected data highlighted that airlines may 
implement strategic behaviours by taking into account other carriers’ decisions and trying to excel 
vis-à-vis the passengers. 
‘So, at the moment, [the decision to cease operations in case of natural hazards] has to be 
through consultation, negotiation and that can sometimes be difficult, because airlines are 
competitive by nature.  Neither one of them wants to stop operating before the other one 
does and that will put…their risk cap type is a lot different. So, whilst there are some basic 
mandatory safety standards, the commercial imperative and a minimisation of disruption is 
often a big driver for them.’ (CML-LS) 
                                                 
 
92 See Sub-section 5.2.8 for further reference. 
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 Harsh competition among airlines was reported as reflecting on other organisational levels, 
especially in presence of contractual arrangements, such as those described in Sub-section 5.2.9. 
Data emphasised that ground handlers are at the heart of a strong competitive environment, where 
airlines have an important bargaining power towards their service providers. In addition, internal 
organisational issues may affect the performance of ground handling operators and increase their 
complacency towards unsafe behaviours on the ramp (ramp safety issues). The following passage 
illustrated this situation: 
‘The handling agents, because they're in the competitive tendering processes, they're always 
competitive in pricing, so they push down on the wages and the people…whereas traditionally 
you’d have a little bit higher paid people.’ (OML-LS) 
Data emphasised that competition does not only affect airlines and in turn ground handlers. 
Airport operators also perform their duties in a highly competitive environment, where airport 
corporations strive to attract the most passengers to their terminals and excel in growth rate. This 
last point emerged as a potential factor for increasing secrecy by the airport operators, who may be 
unwilling to share safety and security best practices with other aerodromes. Furthermore, airports 
may have an economic interest in contrasting the pressures that originate from the regulators and 
urge to implement enhanced security measures. Indeed, in order to keep passengers satisfied, 
airports may be against imposing cost recovery on them. Data highlighted that all these factors may  
have the potential to produce fertile ground for sub-optimal safety and security performance. 
‘Airports compete against each other and therefore they’re trying to keep their security 
charge down, but there are some fixed elements of that.’ (CML-AS)   
‘They [airports] become a bit jealous of all that sort of stuff, and especially in the areas of 
internal operations, anyways, in terms of passenger tracking, dwell times, processing rates, 
transaction times, there’s a massive amount of data.’ (OML-LS/AS) 
 The following paragraph provides further elements of discussion around the issue of 
stakeholder management in the explored aerodromes. In particular, organisational relationships with 
airlines are explored. 
Stakeholder networks. Stakeholder networks refers to the ways in which airport organisations 
build and maintain their reciprocal relationships and how the originated networks may impact safety 
and security performance. A first level of interaction refers to the internal structure of the airport 
operator. Several respondents emphasised that, on occasion, the safety and security functions may 
act in isolation and not interact effectively. This point was highlighted in Sub-section 5.2.6. An 
emerging trend is experienced in the explored airports; the different safety and security cultures 
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may in some cases prevail over a systemic perspective and cause the two areas to act in 
disconnection. 
‘I don’t think any of them look at it [the airport system] as a complete system. They all get it 
in their own little space.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Despite this separation between the safety and the security functional areas, a balance 
between a holistic perspective and an enforcement of function-specific practices (procedures, skills, 
culture, etc.) was considered the most appropriate approach by most airport operators. 
‘So, I personally like the separation between safety and security and I want it to be clear and 
neat. In fact, sometimes you have safety guys that have a passion for security issues and they 
would go and try to fix things where they’re not competent. We keep a holistic approach, but 
we still want everybody to stick to their competence.’ (LL-LS/AS) 
Collected data emphasised that the airport operators have a twofold need when they interact 
with the airlines. First, they have to keep good relationships with one of their most important 
commercial partners. Second, they have to negotiate with these partners in order to obtain their 
financial support in the case of safety and security innovations implemented in the airports. 
Respondents reported that this last point is particularly problematic for the airport operator: 
‘I know at our corporate level, trying to get money out of airlines now to improve things is 
very, very hard so…Yes, I know at that sort of level, it’s really very difficult.’ (CML-LS/AS) 
Generally speaking, airlines emerged as particularly reluctant to spare efforts and resources 
beyond what is prescribed by law. An example of this attitude was provided by one respondent, 
who illustrated the case of those individuals who manage to transit through the gate doors to access 
the airbridges or the Airside area directly (Airside breaches or Landside security breaches). These 
events mainly occur due to the absence of passenger marshals supervising the security doors, at 
least until the aircraft has taken off. A respondent reported that, when asked to provide staff 
members for the supervision of gate doors, airlines usually respond negatively, stating that these 
extra resources cannot be justified according to their business model. 
Data highlighted that governmental agencies are another key actor of the aviation network 
with which the airport operator constantly interacts. These agencies regulate the legislative 
frameworks that the aviation players have to abide by. Compliance to safety and security 
regulations emerged from the collected data as a fundamental achievement, not only for the airport 
operators, but also for the airlines, the ground handlers, the contractors, etc. However, a respondent 
raised a point about an excessive emphasis on compliance imposed on the airport operator. From 
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this, the underlying strategic objectives of the airport corporation could be potentially watered-
down. Thus, a perpetuation of consolidated, sub-optimal safety and security practices may occur 
and lead to resistance to innovate: 
‘This says to me that we’re being too much influenced by the regulator and not about having 
our own strategic direction and driving that and really what we should be doing is 
understanding and challenging the regulator as opposed to us being on the back foot.’ (CML-
LS/AS) 
The overall scenario involving the three main stakeholders (airport operator, airlines, and 
regulatory agencies) is characterised by a situation where airport management organisations are 
caught in the middle. First, they have to satisfy the airlines by supporting their business with 
excellent customer service. At the same time, they have to ensure that airlines abide by the safety 
and security regulations established by the governmental agencies. Second, they have to make sure 
that the legislative provisions imposed by the regulators are complied with. Simultaneously, they 
have to raise issues and ask for clarifications when regulations are not clear: 
‘The airports are the ones that I guess are in a really quite precarious situation, because they 
have to go back to the regulators […] Then you’ve got your airlines that, as we said, they all 
do things slightly differently, but then how as an airport can you manage that?’ (OML-LS) 
Summary of organisational factors: strategy factors. The present sub-section illustrated how 
the strategic goals of the explored airport organisations may impact the overall safety and security 
performance. Three elements emerged as particularly relevant: low cost business model, 
competition, and stakeholder networks. 
One of the most recurrent themes in the whole investigation was the role of the low cost 
business model that some carriers (low cost carriers, but also traditional) put in place to conduct 
their business. Decreased economic and human resources, reduced investments in activities 
considered ancillary, massive use of contractors and sub-contractors, pressure on time performance 
and economic goals, etc., were all reported as having the potential to create fertile ground for some 
SSD (e.g., aircraft emergencies, prohibited items violations, Landside security breaches, etc.). 
Exacerbated competition in the explored data collection sites was reported as a by-product of 
modern airlines’ business model, which increases the bargaining power of the carriers and brings on 
site a wealth of small organisations (e.g., ground handling companies), harder to manage and 
supervise by the airport operator. This was reputed to potentially contribute to such safety events as 
ramp safety issues. 
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Lastly, the airport operators’ position with regards to the key stakeholders in the airports was 
described as being ‘between a rock and a hard place’. On the one hand, airlines constitute the 
preferential commercial partner, which airport management organisations have to keep satisfied. On 
the other hand, airlines’ compliance to safety and security regulations has to be ensured by the 
airport operator itself. At the same time, governmental agencies, such as the Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority and Office for Transport Security, cascade their regulations into the airport system 
through the airport operator. The latter in turn refers back to the governmental agencies to clarify 
vague regulations and ensure the effectiveness of its supervisory role.  
Suggestions for improvement. Data revealed that, due to the nature of the strategy factors and 
their impact on the intrinsic characteristics of airport organisations, areas for intervention are mostly 
very limited. Furthermore, as was discussed in the present sub-section, airport operators have little 
or no power in terms of strategic directions over other actors (for example, airlines or ground 
handlers). Potential improvement is limited to specific, practical interventions, unless adjustment of 
strategic factors is carried out (e.g., low cost business model). Respondents listed an extensive 
series of suggestions for improvement including enhanced resourcing levels from both an economic 
and a staffing perspective (primarily involving airlines, ground handlers, etc.); change in 
organisational priorities in order to shift the focus from purely economic goals to superior safety 
and security objectives; and enhanced occasions for interaction among the airport organisations, to 
build trust and limit the scope of strategic interests, which may naturally be contrasting. 
5.2.11 Other Factors: External Environment 
In their formulation of the macroergonomic approach (MeA), Carayon and Smith (2000)93 did 
not include elements external to the investigated work systems. Their analysis is limited to 
individual and organisational factors directly originating within the explored organisations. In 
contrast, other authors in the sociotechnical systems field reach out to the outermost layers of 
society and include in their assessment of work systems performance factors deriving from political, 
economic, social, or cultural features.94  
The present investigation maintained Carayon and Smith’s point. Data collection has indeed 
proved the quality and appropriateness of the adopted MeA. The overwhelming majority of remarks 
made by the interviewees and data drawn from document analysis fit with the proposed MeA 
categories. However, in rare instances, respondents made reference to the external environment in 
their assessment of the factors that impact organisational vulnerability in airports. The present sub-
                                                 
 
93 See also Kraemer and Carayon (2007). 
94 See Sub-section 2.4.2 and in particular Table 2.12. 
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section reviews several environmental elements deemed to influence the safety and security 
performance of Australian airports.  
Respondents reported instances where passengers’ attitude towards aviation practices was 
considered a potential contributor to organisational vulnerability. One example involved a 
widespread complacent attitude with regards to security threats that, according to some respondents, 
would characterise Australia. Based on this viewpoint, Australians would naturally be more 
complacent than other citizens when exposed to security risks. Explanation of this resides in the 
country’s almost immaculate track record on terrorist acts: 
‘I think, from a general observation, in Australia we have a vulnerability in the area of 
complacency. Until the Lindt Café siege in Sydney, Australia lived in an entirely different 
threat environment from the rest of the world. We hadn’t had any notable or significant terror 
attacks. […] So, our biggest vulnerability will be complacency; that we are safe here Down 
Under, and we’ll be right and it won’t ever happen.’ (CML-LS) 
‘Sometimes, we have a different approach. We're very security and safety conscious, whereas 
sometimes the operators are like, "Nobody's stormed an airport in Australia. No one's ever 
done that.” They're probably right, that the risk is very low. True, but the reality is that it 
could happen, and it has happened in other countries…’ (CML-LS/AS) 
According to other interviewees, this intrinsic complacency would explain an acknowledged 
aversion manifested by Australians towards invasive security measures (e.g., frisk searches, body-
scanning, etc.).  
‘So, an example of that, if you go to Schiphol or Amsterdam, they're used to a certain style of 
screening.  Everything's a hundred per cent and they're very used to frisk search.  Over here, 
it's randomly continuous and they're not used to frisk search. The number of complaints we 
get is high, as it would be high compared to them because it's cultural.’ (CML-LS) 
Another respondent, who lived abroad for a long time before moving to Australia, stressed 
this last point by comparing the two cultural attitudes. The following passage was drawn from the 
related interview: 
‘What we've got here is you’ve got a culture in Australia…you know it’ll never happen here! 
And then we got, until we look at Sydney [Lindt Café siege], and even then it's like, "Oh, we 
weren’t really tested," so we got a real sort of lackadaisical.’ (SSP/AFP-LS) 
 The previous excerpt concludes the reflection on the influence that the external environment 
has on the safety and security performance of the explored airports. The following section provides 
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an illustration on how the different individual and organisational factors interact. According to the 
stance adopted in the present thesis, such an interaction is deemed to create conditions in which 
SSD to normal business operations may originate. 
5.3 MACROERGONOMIC FACTORS AND PATHWAYS OF VULNERABILITY  
The present chapter has highlighted the contribution that every macroergonomic factor 
(individual, task, tools and technology, environment, and organisational) potentially provides to the 
generation of SSD in the explored airports. Data analysis illustrated in the previous sections 
revealed that individual and organisational factors of OV rarely act in isolation. Most of time, they 
co-generate conditions for the development of OV and then possibly lead to SSD. The 
macroergonomic factors were found in constant interaction and reciprocal influence, just as 
multiple layers producing pathways of vulnerability (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; D. Smith, 
2004, 2005). These pathways have the potential to lead to the development of SSD in the explored 
airports. As mentioned in the present chapter, the number of interactions existing among 
macroergonomic factors is particularly relevant. The primary goal of the present research was to 
cast light on the ways in which individual and organisational factors for vulnerability interact and 
create conditions for SSD. 
The present section provides an illustration of the pathways emphasised from data drawn from 
the semi-structured interviews and the document analysis. This is deemed to enhance the 
comprehension of the systemic nature of macroergonomic factors and pave the way for future 
research in this field. The following procedure was adopted to highlight the ways in which 
macroergonomic factors for organisational vulnerability interplay and potentially create conditions 
for the emergence of SSD. First, the SSD are analysed as manifestations of organisational 
vulnerability. Second, based on the collected data, macroergonomic factors are identified and their 
reciprocal interactions highlighted. This emphasises the interplay existing among the different 
factors, based on elements predominantly emerging from the interviews. Third, based on the 
previous stage, connections are drawn from the interviews in order to identify potential associations 
among macroergonomic factors and, ultimately, potential for SSD. A detailed description of the 
different stages of the pathways is contained in the sub-sections that illustrate the macroergonomic 
factors (5.2.1 to 5.2.11).  
Three categories of SSD emerged as having a close connection with the macroergonomic 
factors for organisational vulnerability: ramp safety issues (Group 1), Airside breaches (Group 2), 
and disruptive behaviours by passengers and the general public, prohibited items violations and 
Landside security breaches (Group 3). These three groups of disruptions were isolated from the 
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others and emphasised in the present investigation because their generation was observed as strictly 
related to the macroergonomic factors investigated in the present thesis. In particular, attitudes, 
practices, and behaviours executed by airport organisations emerged as potential pre-determinants 
for these three groups of SSD. Conversely, the other disturbances (aircraft emergencies, bird and 
wildlife management, fire alarms, maintenance, works, and repairs, natural hazards, Landside safety 
events, technical failures, traffic management front-of-house, and unattended items) showed a less 
relvant connection with the interplay of macroergonomic factors. This does not mean that these 
other disturbances could not be generated by the individual and organisational factors emphasised 
in the present chapter. However, data collected from the semi-structured interviews and the 
document analysis revealed that the relationship between these SSD and the explored 
macroergonomic factors is more difficult to identify. An example of this is the aircraft emergency 
disruption. Respondents in the semi-structured interviews emphasised a number of factors 
potentially leading to these events, stemming from safety-related or security-related determinants.95 
A clear pathway of vulnerability linking the aircraft emergencies and the individual and 
organisational factors found in the explored airports is therefore more difficult to draw. 
The present section highlights the three groups of pathways of vulnerability more clearly 
emerging from data collected by means of semi-structured interviews and document analysis. These 
three groups refer to specific safety (Group 1) and security disruptions (Group 2 and 3). 
Furthermore, data revealed that these three groups include SSD whose potential determinants are 
most closely associated with managerial practices, attitudes, and behaviours implemented in the 
investigated aerodromes (by airport management as well as other organisations, such as airlines, 
ground handlers, etc.). Further research is needed to depict pathways of vulnerability leading to the 
other SSD explored in the present thesis. 
The three models of pathways of vulnerability resulting from the aforementioned analysis 
(Group 1, 2 and 3) should not be intended as an explanatory causal framework. As the present 
chapter has highlighted, the different factors (individual and organisational) influence each other 
and a neat cause-consequence relationship cannot be established at this stage. However, the models 
have an exploratory perspective, which opens to further research aimed at providing statistical 
evidence on the findings. 
                                                 
 
95 See Sub-section 4.2.1 for further reference on this. 
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5.3.1 Pathways of Vulnerability: Ramp Safety Issues (Group 1) 
As previously discussed in Chapter Four, ramp safety issues are a type of disturbance 
involving Airside (AS) operations with potential safety-related repercussions.96 Different pathways 
of vulnerability emerged as potentially contributing to this category of disruptions, involving 
elements from nearly all of the macroergonomic factors. Figure 5.4 draws information from the 
results illustrated in the present chapter in order to highlight the corridors of vulnerability that have 
the potential to generate ramp safety issues. The resulting overview emphasises how the six 
organisational factors shape the remaining four and ultimately generate individual factors, which 
create conditions for ramp safety issues.  
Contractual arrangements in place in airports may involve the presence of sub-contractors in 
charge of maintenance and repairs. The existing organisational structure implies that in airports 
where there are several contractual levels (sub-contractors, sub-sub-contractors, etc.) airport 
operators have reduced possibilities of control on elements such as safety and Workplace Health 
and Safety, etc. Furthermore, the multiplication of ground handling companies exacerbates the 
competition and potentially increases pressure on cost leadership, resulting in staff cutbacks and 
rostering issues. Training issues may emerge at this stage, with sub-optimal levels of induction 
training guaranteed by airlines and ground handlers. Lack of skills may in turn result from this and 
from the reduced number of staff members. Similarly, the remaining operators may experience 
increased workload, which can lead to higher stress levels and ultimately reduce safety 
performance. At the same time, the nature of the safety regime itself (which may imply loose 
regulations and enable room for interpretation) can have the potential to lead to enhanced 
complacency among the operators. In addition, the low cost business model implemented by some 
airport organisations may push companies to contain their costs and cut back on rostering (e.g., 
passengers marshalling). This may have the potential to lead to increased workload on the existing 
operators, whose safety performance may be negatively affected. From an environmental 
perspective, some characteristics of the ramp can increase the chances for safety-related incidents to 
occur, such as misuse of storage areas and of ground service equipment and the possible presence of 
a rear of aircraft road. The combination of all the aforementioned macroergonomic factors has the 
potential to create fertile ground for ramp safety issues in the explored airports. 
The pathways of vulnerability illustrated in Figure 5.4 refer to individual and organisational 
determinants of safety-related incidents, such as ramp safety issues. 
                                                 
 
96 See Sub-section 4.2.10 for a complete description of this SSD. 
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5.3.2 Pathways of Vulnerability: Airside Breaches (Group 2) 
The second group of macroergonomic factors potentially creating conditions for SSD in the 
explored airports refers to pathways of vulnerability leading to Airside breaches. In particular, these 
occurrences were highlighted during the semi-structured interviews in the Airside (AS) and 
Landside/Airside (LS/AS) transition areas. Figure 5.5 summarises the possible connections among 
the individual and organisational factors of vulnerability that potentially contribute in generating 
Airside breaches in the AS and LS/AS areas. In particular, the following analysis focuses on 
security restricted area violations and access control breaches by staff members.97 
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As in the previous Group 1 of pathways of vulnerability (ramp safety issues), factors 
potentially associated with the business model and the economic pressures present in airports 
                                                 
 
97 See Sub-section 4.2.2 for a complete description of these types of SSD. 
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(airline competition) have the potential to lead to sub-optimal rostering arrangements. This last 
point was emphasised during the semi-structured interviews, especially in the case of airlines, who 
may decide to reduce the number of operators in charge of administering security controls at the 
boarding gates. One such instance was referred to by respondents in the interviews, who reported 
that unmanned boarding gates may lead late passengers to try and reach the boarding facilities 
(airbridges, AS security doors, etc.) even after closure of the gate. Furthermore, some intrinsic 
characteristics of the organisational security culture diffused in the explored airports may cause 
staff members to execute sub-optimal security practices. Leaving security doors open after transit is 
one example of this last point, as emerged from the semi-structured interviews. Passengers and 
members of the general public may at this point take advantage from the situation and generate an 
Airside breach. Other macroergonomic factors may potentially increase the chances for security-
related breaches perpetrated AS or in the LS/AS transition area (Airside security restricted area, 
Sterile Area violations, etc.). In particular, analysis conducted in Chapter Five emphasised that 
monotonous tasks associated with isolated security checkpoints (e.g., vehicle access points in the 
AS or staff security screening points) may push security screeners to lower their attention threshold 
(complacency). Finally, a combination of legislative and environmental factors may increase the 
chances for Airside breaches. This may be associated with the presence of general aviation facilities 
in the examined airports. General aviation in fact emerged as a potential weakness in the security 
regime enacted in airports. Data revealed that this is due to the reduced security requirements for 
general aviation activities.  
The present sub-section has illustrated a second group of pathways of vulnerability 
emphasised in the explored airports. The investigated macroergonomic factors are deemed to 
potentially create conditions favourable for the development of Airside breaches, which are 
security-related types of disruption. The following sub-section depicts the third group of pathways 
of vulnerability emerging from this study, with particular reference to the following security 
disruptions: disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general public, prohibited items violations 
and LS security breaches. 
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5.3.3 Pathways of Vulnerability: Disruptive Behaviours by Passengers or General 
Public, Prohibited Items Violations and Landside Security Breaches (Group 3) 
This sub-section concludes Chapter Five by illustrating the ways in which three security-
related disruptions may incubate and evolve from specific macroergonomic factors. Disruptive 
behaviours by passengers or the general public, prohibited items violations, and Landside security 
breaches98 are examined as the potential manifestation of a third group of pathways of vulnerability. 
Figure 5.6 depicts how the interplay of individual and organisational determinants has the potential 
to create conditions for the development of the aforementioned security disruptions.  
In particular, data emerging from the semi-structured interviews and the document analysis 
emphasised that the security screening process may be impacted by security policies produced at the 
governmental level and implemented in the explored airports, with potential room for interpretation 
(horizontal and vertical) and regulatory inconsistencies (internally and externally). Adoption of new 
security technology could therefore hampered, which can contribute to sub-optimal security 
screening performance and ultimately, to prohibited items violations. At the same time, when 
screening operators are asked to provide their interpretation of security regulations (e.g., prohibited 
items), their workload increases. Higher levels of stress may potentially result and lead to disruptive 
behaviours by passengers or the general public or prohibited items violations. Similarly, 
complacency in security screeners may be enhanced by the security culture enacted in certain 
airport organisations (e.g., airlines and screening companies). Complacency also emerged as the 
potential by-product of the sub-optimal design of the screening points, with the impact of task 
repetitiveness and boredom deriving from monotonous duties (e.g., external, isolated security 
checkpoints). Furthermore, an environmental factor emerged from the data collection as potentially 
creating conditions for prohibited items violations or LS security breaches. In fact, in some of the 
explored terminals, the design of the sterile area has the potential to increase the chances for a mix 
between screened and unscreened passengers, with the latter, for example, coming from small 
regional airports. Additionally, as in the case of the pathways of vulnerability highlighted in Group 
1 (Sub-section 5.3.1), elements associated with the business models implemented in the explored 
airports may create conditions for security disruptions. This is the case of the low cost business 
models, which may push airport organisations to implement sub-optimal levels of rostering and 
economic cutbacks on training initiatives. Moreover, harsh economic competition may lead 
involved companies to put further pressure on cost reduction, with a potentially negative impact on 
their security performance. Finally, elements associated with an ongoing change in the security 
                                                 
 
98 See Sub-section 4.2.5, Sub-section 4.2.9 and Sub-section 4.2.12 for further reference on these SSD. 
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culture implemented in some airport organisations (e.g., security screening providers) may 
negatively affect the security performance in these organisations. An example of this refers to the 
switch to an organisational culture more prone to customer service that some airport organisations 
seem to struggle to implement. In these organisations, some operators may still emphasise their role 
as security safeguards (or bouncers, as reported by several respondents in the semi-structured 
interviews) rather than facilitators and communicators with the passengers. Inappropriate 
communication with the latter may derive from this incomplete cultural change and generate 
disruptive behaviours by passengers or the general public in response. Figure 5.6 provides an 
overview of the third group of pathways of vulnerability. 
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5.4 SUMMARY 
The present chapter addressed the key phenomenon explored in this 
investigation, namely the concept of organisational vulnerability to SSD in 
Australian airports. After having described and classified the SSD (Study One, 
Chapter Four), this research has examined the individual and organisational factors 
considered as potentially having an impact on the safety and security performance of 
the three data collection sites. These factors were analysed using the 
macroergonomic approach to complex sociotechnical systems.  
Findings emerging from Study Two highlighted that a combination of 
macroergonomic factors has the potential to increase the chances for SSD to occur in 
Australian airports: complacency by the operators and psychological and physical 
factors associated with the individual performance; monotonous tasks associated 
with isolated job positions; sub-optimal characteristics of hardware and software 
equipment; isolation of, and lack of surveillance on, airport infrastructures due to the 
physical layout and design; misleading and incomplete communication enacted by 
the airport organisations; sub-optimal safety and security cultures perpetuated by 
airport organisations; inadequate policies and regulations produced by governmental 
agencies and implemented by airport organisations; contractual arrangements among 
airport organisations leading to misunderstanding, lack of information sharing, etc.; 
inadequate implementation of safety- and security-related practices; and inadequate 
safety and security performance generated by contrasting strategic objectives by 
airport organisations. Furthermore, a reflection on factors external to the airport 
environment has emphasised a potential for complacency intrinsic to the Australian 
attitude towards airport safety and security. It is worth noting, as stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, that these entries constitute the exception, rather than the 
rule, in the explored aerodromes. 
This review of the macroergonomic factors led the principal investigator to 
elaborate several models that illustrate specific pathways of vulnerability in the 
explored airports. These pathways are constituted by the interplay of some 
macroergonomic factors that have the potential to increase the chances for specific 
SSD to occur. This enabled a better understanding of the mechanisms that regulate 
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crisis incubation in the explored airports and, in general, provided an integrated 
reflection on the concept of organisational vulnerability. 
This dissertation is concluded in Chapter Six, which critically discusses the 
results of this research and emphasises the theoretical and practical contribution 
produced by Study One and Study Two. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
‘Ma a me pare che quelle scienze sieno vane e piene di errori  
Le quali non sono nate dall'esperienza.’ 
‘But to me it seems that all sciences are vain and full of errors  
that are not born of experience.’ 
 
LEONARDO DA VINCI, A Treatise on Painting, I, 29 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Overall, this thesis sought to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms 
that characterise organisational vulnerability (OV) to safety and security disruptions (SSD) in 
Australian airports. This dissertation aimed to achieve the ultimate goals of filling the 
acknowledged gaps in crisis management literature and provide practical suggestions for the 
improvement of safety and security systems in Australian aerodromes.  
The present chapter contextualises the most relevant findings emerging from Study One 
(RQ1) and Study Two (RQ2a and RQ2b) and highlights the theoretical and practical implications of 
these findings. In so doing, this chapter emphasises the most relevant takeaways underlined by the 
present study in the field of airport management in Australia and provides practical suggestions for 
improvement. Furthermore, this chapter expands the theoretical knowledge of the crisis escalation 
process by enhancing the comprehension of organisational vulnerability in complex sociotechnical 
systems. A revised macroergonomic approach (R-MeA) is therefore provided as an improved 
framework for complex sociotechnical systems’ analysis. 
Discussion and conclusions reported in the present chapter are organised around the 
theoretical and practical contributions that Study One and Study Two of this thesis have offered. 
This chapter expands the results emerging from Study One and illustrates the novel classification of 
SSD proposed by this investigation. The evaluation of the risk assessment documents and incident 
reporting systems utilised in the three data collection sites highlights significant gaps and 
differences, which further research should explore. The theoretical and practical contributions of 
Study Two (RQ2b) are presented to provide a graphical representation to map pathways of 
vulnerability in sociotechnical systems. Furthermore, a revised version of the macroergonomic 
approach is introduced for a more complete assessment of OV in sociotechnical systems analysis. 
An original Safecurity approach is proposed by developing an enhanced understanding of the 
differences characterising safety and security management in Australian airports. A discussion of 
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training practices, general aviation regulations and low cost business models implemented in the 
explored airports provides practical solutions for the improvement of the associated managerial 
practices. Lastly, the methodological limitations of this dissertation are elaborated and the way is 
paved for future research in the field of organisational vulnerability of complex sociotechnical 
systems. The structure of this chapter is depicted in Table 6.1:  
 
Table 6.1: Structure and Topics of Chapter Six 
Section Sub-section Purpose and Topics 
6.1 Introduction  Introduction 
6.2 Theoretical and Practical 
Contribution of Study One 
6.2.1 Classification of SSD Summary of the classified SSD 
 6.2.2 Review of Risk Assessment 
Documents and Incident Reporting 
Systems 
Macro-categories of SSD 
6.3 Theoretical and Practical 
Contribution of Study Two 
(RQ2a) 
6.3.1 Organisational Vulnerability and 
Pathways of Vulnerability 
Graphic tool to map pathways 
of vulnerability 
 6.3.2 Revised Macroergonomic 
Approach 
Modified model for 
Macroergonomic analysis 
6.4 Theoretical and Practical 
Contribution of Study Two 
(RQ2b) 
6.4.1 Safety and Security Theoretical contribution to 
understand safety vs. security 
 6.4.2 Safecurity approach Safecurity: next model for 
safety and security management 
 6.4.3 Training Improvement of training 
practices 
 6.4.4 General Aviation Reflection on the role of general 
aviation 
 6.4.5 Low Cost Business Model Role of the low cost business 
model 
6.5 Research Limitations  What are the limits of this 
study?
6.6 Future Research  New directions for research 
6.7 Summary  Thesis’ overview 
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6.2 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY ONE (RQ1) 
The ultimate goal achieved by this thesis was the contribution of an enhanced understanding 
of organisational vulnerability as a potential determinant of SSD in Australian airports. The crisis 
management literature has constituted the background theoretical field to which this investigation 
belonged. As a piece of research on sociotechnical systems, the present study has adopted a crisis 
management approach. It has focused on potential and expected events (SSD, RQ1), considered OV 
from a hazard-independent perspective (SSD examined from an organisational viewpoint by means 
of the macroergonomic approach, RQ2a) and explored, therefore, the nature of the vulnerable 
object (airports, regardless of the nature of the hazards potentially contributing to the SSD). 
Ultimately, this study has provided practical suggestions for the improvement of safety and security 
systems in place in the explored airports (RQ2b). 
This dissertation first addressed RQ1 (Study One): 
RQ1: What are the most common and relevant safety and security disruptions to normal 
business operations in Australian airports? 
The following sub-sections provide an overview of the theoretical and practical significance 
of this investigation with regards to the research question addressed in Study One. 
6.2.1 Theoretical Contribution: Classification of Safety and Security Disruptions in 
Australian Airports 
Gaps in the literature. Researchers in the field of crisis management have highlighted gaps in 
the literature that this dissertation has addressed by expanding knowledge around its three research 
questions. First, crisis management literature has emphasised the need for further investigation of 
the dynamics that regulate crisis incubation (Turner & Pidgeon, 1978). According to the stance 
adopted in this investigation, in the crisis escalation model (D. Smith, 1990b, 2005), the initial 
crisis of management stage corresponds to the signal detection and preparation/prevention stages of 
the five phases of crisis management framework outlined by Pearson and Mitroff (1993). These 
preliminary phases of a crisis are underexplored in the literature and require further academic 
efforts (D. Smith, 1990b, 2005). In particular, additional research is advocated in the field of 
anticipation of crises by means of identification of their early signals or latent conditions (Reason, 
1990), in order to ‘…prevent the crisis from occurring.’ (D. Smith, 2005, p. 312). Second, linked to 
this first gap in the literature, a limit in the existing body of knowledge on crisis incubation is its 
excessive focus on extraordinary, rare events rather than on ordinary, commonplace ones (D. Smith 
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& Elliott, 2006). This limitation is meant to further reduce the scope and effectiveness of crisis 
prevention and mitigation efforts. 
This thesis has fruitfully addressed the first of these two gaps by expanding comprehension of 
the mechanisms that govern the crisis of management in airports. Detailed descriptions and 
classifications of the SSD that emerged (as exceptions to normal business operations) from the 
explored airports were provided. In this way, further information regarding how SSD may manifest 
and develop as potential determinants of major organisational crises was contributed. Results 
emphasised that signal detection and preparation/prevention are more effective when focused on 
commonplace events, such as the SSD classified in this thesis. This last point has addressed the 
second gap highlighted in the literature with regards to Study One. SSD analysed in this research 
were in fact, ordinary safety and security events, actually or potentially occurring in Australian 
aerodromes, indicated by collected data as particularly relevant due to their potential impact on 
aviation operations.  
Further theoretical contribution. Chapter Four, Study One of the present research cast light 
on SSD as safety and security disturbances having the potential to hamper aviation operations and 
eventually escalate into major crises. Section 4.5 provided an overview of the SSD by locating them 
in the areas of operation where they emerged as most likely and relevant according to the collected 
data. Table 6.2 provides a synthetic overview of these SSD. 
Table 6.2: Safety and Security Disruptions (Study One, RQ1) 
Landside Airside 
Congestion and queuing in Airports Aircraft Emergencies 
Disruptive Behaviours by Passengers or the General Public Airside Breaches 
Fire Alarms Bird and Wildlife Management 
Prohibited Items Violations Maintenance, Works and Repairs 
Landside Safety Events Natural Hazards 
Landside Security Breaches Ramp Safety Issues 
Technical Failures  
Traffic Management Front-of-House   
Unattended Items  
 
This research has revealed that the explored airports can potentially be affected by numerous 
occurrences, ranging from minor events to major disruptions. Likelihood is higher for the former 
than for the latter, while consequences are higher for the latter than for the former. The nature and 
characteristics of the SSD are different and vary from safety (and Workplace Health and Safety) to 
security issues. Moreover, numerous recurring themes were identified in every SSD and actual 
events and potential risks were equally represented in the collected data. In spite of accident 
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causation modelling not being the focus of this investigation, results from Study One could be 
fruitfully tested by utilising them as accident categories in a model aimed at identifying specific 
pathways of vulnerability.  
Interviewees were classified into four different units of analysis99: leadership level (general 
managers directly reporting to Board members or CEO), corporate management level (directly 
reporting to general managers), operational management level (directly reporting to corporate 
managers), and an additional security screening provider/Australian Federal Police level 
(contractors or police operating in close proximity with the airport operator). Respondents were also 
categorised according to their area of operation: LS, LS/AS combined or AS. This classification 
was expected to enable identification of recurring nodes and correlation with the hierarchical level 
of the respondents, in order to draw richer information. The only form of identification of 
respondents’ quotes was the initials of the corresponding unit of analysis. Results illustrated in 
Chapter Four emphasised that a minority of SSD could be associated with specific units of analysis. 
In the remaining majority of SSD, no significant trend could be singled out by analysing the units of 
analysis. 
This last point translates into an additional theoretical contribution produced by this 
investigation: airport managers have a systemic vision of their working environment when it comes 
to SSD. Regardless of their hierarchical level, they demonstrated knowledge of the airport system 
and avoided focusing exclusively on their area of competence. Their perception of the safety and 
security threats present on site was not conditioned by their role. A general manager could discuss 
very operational events and vice versa an operational manager could perceive very systemic 
disturbances to be relevant. Especially at the higher hierarchical levels, there was no typical SSD 
that airport managers had to deal with. This demonstrates that in the explored aerodromes airport 
managers and officers have a holistic view of their field of expertise. Further research is suggested 
in this area, but a preliminary consideration that can be drawn from this thesis’ findings is that in 
the explored airports, airport management enforces a culture of engagement to safety and security at 
all hierarchical levels. 
Another theoretical contribution of this thesis derives from the findings of Study One. A 
clearer interaction between the role of certain respondents and some specific SSD can be identified 
when examining the data according to the areas of operation where they originated. In particular, 
data referring to LS operations predominantly revolved around SSD potentially happening within 
the terminal buildings. At the same time, findings related to AS operations primarily involved SSD 
                                                 
 
99 See Sub-section 3.8. 
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occurring outdoor in the AS areas. A mixed perspective was provided by data drawn from the 
combined LS/AS areas of operation. 
Analysis conducted adopting a compounded perspective unit of analysis/areas of operation 
has nonetheless led to the identification of some trends in the discussion of SSD. First, aircraft 
emergencies were mainly discussed by respondents belonging to higher hierarchical levels 
(leadership level and corporate management level), consistently with a more systemic perspective, 
particularly sensitive to major events. Second, congestion and queuing in airports were 
predominantly emphasised by employees involved in more operational tasks (operational 
management level) in the combined LS/AS areas. This is reputed to be congruent with the customer 
service and passenger facilitation role played by some of the involved respondents (duty managers 
and terminal managers). Third, the relevance of maintenance, works, and repairs was particularly 
underlined by interviewees operating AS, with a focus on Workplace Health and Safety, a sub-
category of the safety regime of the airport. A similar focus emerged from a fourth SSD, ramp 
safety issues, which were primarily discussed by AS operators such as Airside managers. Their core 
activity in fact revolves around the safety of ramp operations. Fifth, discussion on LS safety events 
was mainly carried out by LS managers working in the Workplace Health and Safety field, which 
encompasses the majority of LS safety events. Sixth, LS security breaches predominantly emerged 
from semi-structured interviews with LS and LS/AS employees. This witnessed the relevance of 
security events on the LS/AS boundary (sterile area).       
Last, neater boundaries about the specificity of SSD could be established by referring to 
respondents’ activities as safety-related or security-related. Data unveiled that LS operations are 
mainly characterised by security management, while AS operations by safety management. Thus, 
data drawn from LS operations have predominantly underlined the relevance of security 
disruptions, whereas data emerging from AS operations have mainly highlighted the importance of 
safety disruptions. This last point demonstrated the specificity of perspectives adopted in the two 
areas (LS-security and AS-safety). On one hand, this translates into better skills and capabilities 
deriving from specialisation; on the other hand, data emphasised the potential for isolation and lack 
of communication between the two areas. 
6.2.2 Practical Contribution: Review of Risk Assessment Documents and Incident 
Reporting Systems in the Three Airports 
One of the by-products originating from Study One of this thesis is represented by the 
systematic review of risk assessment documents and incident reporting systems in the three 
explored data collection sites (Section 4.4). Document analysis enabled the researcher to investigate 
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the nature and characteristics of the frameworks underlying the ways in which the three airports 
describe and classify their operational risks and their most common safety and security accidents. 
Risk assessment documents. Data collected in the present thesis have highlighted that one of 
the strategic factors impacting on the safety and security performance of the explored airports is 
lack of harmonisation at the national level, especially with regards to the adopted security policies 
(prohibited items, etc.). The presence of different risk assessment frameworks in the three data 
collection sites was additional proof of this lack of consistency throughout the network of 
Australian airports (Sub-section 4.4.1 and Appendices 03, 04, and 05).  
Further research is necessary to study the effectiveness of risk assessment practices in 
Australian airports in depth, especially from an operational perspective. However, findings 
emerging from the present investigation (as illustrated in Section 4.4) are sufficient to conclude that 
shared risk assessment frameworks are the starting point to facilitate the sharing of best practices 
among airports. In order to do so, airports need to come to agreed definitions of risk likelihood and 
risk consequences¸ so that risk ratings and intervention strategies are consistent throughout the 
country. A second, more ambitious step would be the elaboration of common risk entries organised 
around similar macro-categories of risks. In this way, a specific risk would have the same name and 
characteristics in all airports, deemed to improve comparability and information sharing. 
Overall, this thesis has emphasised that an improved risk assessment system for Australian 
airports should be composed by: 
1) Common definitions of likelihood and consequences and common numerical 
standards for assessment (in terms of both time and economic impact). A weighting 
coefficient could be introduced in order to preserve the subjectivity of airport 
characteristics (size, revenue, movements, etc.) and, at the same time, ensure 
comparability.  
2) Standardised risk rating categories (e.g., extreme, high, moderate, and low risk) in 
order to have standardised strategies for risk treatment. 
3) Standardised risk entries with common definitions of risks (nature, characteristics, 
occurrence, etc.). 
This system is deemed to enhance the practical value of risk assessment in airports beyond 
compliance aspects. Furthermore, improved comparability of risk management activities among 
Australian airports is expected to ease best practices and information sharing.  
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In order to establish a common risk assessment framework, Australian airports need to focus 
on the trade-off between economic competition and safety and security performance. Even though 
further research is needed to illustrate Australia’s current positioning on the aforementioned trade-
off, de-emphasising economic competition among airports is deemed to reduce hesitation in 
information sharing, especially in the field of safety and security. As the present investigation has 
underlined, a list of risk entries based on common macro-categories is the starting point to 
achieving an agreed risk assessment framework among airports.  
Incident reporting systems. Apart from risk documents, this thesis also emphasised gaps and 
inconsistencies in the incident reports elaborated by the three airport operators (Sub-section 4.4.2). 
In particular, Study One highlighted how information about safety and security-related events in the 
three data collection sites is gathered in different ways. Descriptors and characteristics of airport 
incidents are diverse and so is the way in which the explored airports utilise information deriving 
from these reports.  
Therefore, the present investigation suggests Australian airports step back in order to 
reconsider the main objectives of their incident reporting systems and re-focus them on the 
production of information for safety and security decision-making. It is worth noting that such a 
new direction was urged by one of the respondents during the semi-structured interviews by 
stressing the need for a more strategic approach in information-sharing practices by Australian 
airports.100 In addition to reconsidering its purpose, incident reporting in Australian airports should 
be harmonised. Airport operators would in fact benefit from a commonplace reporting system with 
agreed definitions, event descriptions, and incident or near-misses entries. This would enhance 
comparability and information sharing, and ultimately lead to more informed decision-making in 
the fields of aviation safety and security. 
Safety and security disruptions as macro-categories of risks and incidents. In order to face 
the limits that this dissertation has underlined in the risk assessment documents (Sub-section 4.4.1) 
and incident reporting systems (Sub-section 4.4.2) of the explored airports, a re-organisation of the 
risk and incidents frameworks is suggested. In particular, these frameworks need to be systemic, 
and grasp risks and incident entries from the airport as a whole, and not as the sum of different 
standalone components (Salmon et al., 2016). The starting point of this operation is a common 
ground of definition of risks and incidents. The present thesis proposes to utilise the classified SSD 
as macro-categories of risks and incidents for Australian airports.  
                                                 
 
100 For further reference on this, see Sub-section 5.2.11. 
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SSD may be purposefully used in risk assessment documents and incident reporting systems 
such as parent entries that can be articulated in more specific events, upon further research. The 
classification between LS and AS should not be considered a strict distinction among different 
events. As discussed in Chapter Four, several of these occurrences may take place equally in the LS 
and in the AS areas. Thus, an improved categorisation would request managers in charge of risk 
assessment or operators in charge of data entry to classify the areas of operation where the case-
specific incidents occur (or would occur in case of risks).  
A further classification suggested by the present research stems from the safety vs. security 
dichotomy. This investigation has highlighted that a sharp divide between these two areas should 
not be traced. However, from an operational perspective, categorisation of safety disruptions and 
security disruptions could help preserve and visualise the case-specific capabilities and skills 
required for intervention (risk treatment or incident response/investigation). The following tables 
provide examples of risk assessment documents (Table 6.3101) and incident reporting systems 
(Table 6.4) elaborated based on the SSD classified in the present research. 
                                                 
 
101 Table 6.3 is elaborated utilising the Risk Framework adopted in one of the airports. Likelihood can have the 
following values: 1 – Rare; 2 – Unlikely; 3 – Possible; 4 – Likely; 5 – Almost Certain. Consequences can be: E – 
Insignificant; D – Minor; C – Moderate; B – Major; A – Catastrophic. Risk Rating can be: Extreme Risk; High Risk; 
Moderate Risk; Low Risk. For further details, see Appendices 03, 04 and 05.   
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Table 6.3: Example of Suggested Risk Assessment Document based on Classified SSD 
Risk 
Category 
Risk Area of 
Operations:  
Saf./Sec. Owner Initial 
Likelihood 
Initial 
Consequences 
Initial 
Risk 
Rating 
Risk 
Treatment 
Residual 
Likelihood 
Residual 
Consequences 
Residual 
Risk 
Rating 
Ramp 
Safety 
Issues  
Airbridge 
impacting an 
aircraft 
Airside Safety Name 
& Title 
3 
Possible 
A 
Catastrophic 
3A 
Extreme 
Risk 
Ramp 
Operations 
(training) 
Etc. 
1 
Rare 
A 
Catastrophic 
1A 
High Risk 
 
Landside 
Safety 
Events 
Slip, trip or fall 
by passenger in 
the terminal 
Landside Safety Name 
& Title 
5  
Almost 
Certain 
D 
Minor 
5D 
High 
Risk 
Insurance 
(liability) 
Etc. 
5  
Almost 
Certain 
E 
Negligible 
5E 
Moderate 
Risk 
Airside 
Breaches 
Unauthorised 
Airside access  
Airside Security Name 
& Title 
4 
Likely 
B 
Major 
4B 
High 
Risk 
CCTV 
Coverage 
(technology) 
Etc. 
3 
Possible 
C 
Moderate 
3C 
High Risk 
Etc. Etc.           
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Table 6.4: Example of Suggested Incident Reporting System based on Classified SSD 
Date Incident Category Area of 
Operations:  
Saf./Sec. Involved 
people 
Description Actions 
20 August Unattended Items  Landside Security Name & 
Title 1 
Name & 
Title 2 
Security officer found an unattended bag at check-in area 
under an escalator. Tried to reconcile item with people 
around, but failed. Requested AFP intervention. 
Security officer to write report of what 
happened and handle to AFP. 
7 
September 
Bird and Wildlife 
Management 
Airside Safety Name & 
Title 1 
Name & 
Title 2 
Name & 
Title 3 
Name & 
Title 4 
Airside safety officers’ intervention requested by flight 
XX123 because of presence of ibises on Taxiway C7 
prior to take off. 
NOTAM dispatched. Bird strike log to 
be drafted and reviewed by Airside 
Operations Coordinator. 
25 
December 
Traffic 
Management Front-
of-House  
Landside Security Name & 
Title 1 
Name & 
Title 2 
Name & 
Title 3 
Fight between a passenger and a taxi driver for 
undisclosed reasons at long term parking area (sector 
W4). AFP intervention requested. 
Request report from AFP Commander. 
Follow-up with Security 0fficers. 
Etc. Etc.      
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6.3 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY TWO (RQ2A) 
This thesis aimed to provide an enhanced understanding of organisational 
vulnerability as a determinant of SSD in the explored airports. In particular, SSD in 
the investigated aerodromes (Study One) were considered potential consequences of 
a series of individual and organisational factors generated by the airport system itself 
(Study Two). As illustrated in Chapter Five, these factors aggregate around specific 
pathways of vulnerability and constitute the components of organisational 
vulnerability. In order to identify these components, the present investigation made 
use of the Macroergonomic Approach (MeA), an interpretive framework utilised to 
assess the safety and security performance of airports. Use of the MeA in the context 
of airports as sociotechnical systems is a new contribution to the literature. Data were 
organised around the following macroergonomic categories (Carayon & Smith, 
2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007): individual, task, tools and technology, 
environment, and organisation; the latter in turn divided in communication, culture, 
policy, structure, implementation, and strategy. Study Two (RQ2a) addressed the 
following research question: 
RQ2a: How do individual and organisational factors contribute in 
generating the safety and security disruptions highlighted in Study One and 
increase the level of organisational vulnerability in the explored airports? 
The following sub-sections provide an overview of the theoretical significance 
of Study Two with regards to RQ2a. Practical contributions produced by addressing 
RQ2a merge into the practical significance of RQ2b, which was specifically intended 
to elaborate operational suggestions for improvement deriving from the findings of 
Study Two. Theoretical and practical contributions from RQ2b are further discussed 
in Section 6.4. 
6.3.1 Theoretical Contribution: Organisational Vulnerability and Pathways 
of Vulnerability  
Gaps in the literature. From a theoretical perspective, RQ2a of Study Two was 
intended to address several gaps in the crisis management literature presented in this 
dissertation. First, in the complex sociotechnical systems theory, the role of human 
interaction with system components and organisational context of crises is seen as 
under-investigated (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1978; Weick, 1990). Study Two of this thesis has addressed this 
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gap by examining the interplay between the macroergonomic factors of 
organisational vulnerability, which have individual and organisational origins. In 
particular, data revealed that operators and managers in airports are under the 
constant pressure of the systemic features characterising airport organisations. These 
pressures, associated with the interplay of individual and organisational determinants 
of OV have emerged as aggregating around specific pathways of vulnerability, 
potentially leading to sub-optimal safety and security performance in airports. 
Second, the crisis management literature urges academics and practitioners to 
elaborate additional knowledge about the concept of vulnerability as a key causal 
factor in crisis incubation. This is due to the inflation of studies adopting a business 
continuity management approach that on the contrary focuses on resilience and the 
ability of complex systems to maintain operations after crises occur (Lewis, 1999; 
McEntire et al., 2010). The present investigation has addressed and successfully 
filled this gap by exploring the concept of OV as an intrinsic characteristic of 
Australian airports, generated by individual and organisational factors. The 
vulnerability analysis conducted in this research has complemented the traditional 
hazard-centric approach (Bouchon, 2006) by focusing on complex systems’ 
characteristics (individual and organisational factors in airports) rather than on the 
nature of the external hazards. A hazard-independent approach has therefore been 
developed by this dissertation. According to the stance adopted in this study, OV is 
predominantly interpreted as a factor of input for crises to occur, rather than an 
output that can be assessed after a crisis manifests (Bouchon, 2006). 
Third, a series of authors have recommended academics to further produce 
holistic studies focused on the analysis of vulnerability determinants by reaching out 
to organisational and inter-organisational factors (Cardona, 2004; Kraemer, Carayon, 
& Clem, 2009; McEntire, 2001, 2003; Pearson & Clair, 1998). The macroergonomic 
approach adopted in this research is holistic by definition. In fact, it provided a 
framework for analysis of all organisational components capable of impacting the 
performance of complex work systems (such as airports). Furthermore, this thesis has 
considered airport management to be the focus of investigation and explored its 
organisational constituents in depth. Moreover, airport management operations have 
been constantly explored within the airport complex sociotechnical system, casting 
light on some of the inter-organisational dynamics taking place between airport 
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management and other players (AFP, security screening providers, contractors, 
airlines, etc.). Further research is suggested in the field of stakeholder management in 
airports with regards to safety and security functions. Future studies in this field 
could reach out to more external functional layers and organisations having a 
potential to impact on airport performance. 
Pathways of vulnerability. By exploring RQ2a of Study Two, this thesis has 
enhanced the understanding of the concept of organisational vulnerability as a 
potential determinant of SSD in Australian airports. At the beginning of this 
exploration, the definition of organisational vulnerability adopted by the present 
research was as follows: 
‘Result of flawed organisational policies and individual practices whose 
origins are deeply rooted within early design assumptions and managerial 
decisions.’ (Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009, p. 510) 
Although somewhat generic, the previous definition fits perfectly with the 
concept of OV emerging from the present investigation. In the explored airports, 
managerial practices were explored by means of the macroergonomic approach, 
(which has also accounted for the early design assumptions in place in the 
aforementioned aerodromes). These assumptions were highlighted in particular 
within the environment factors102 and the tools and technology factors103. In addition, 
organisational policies constituted the object of investigation of the category policy 
factors104 and the individual practices were examined in the individual factors sub-
section105. Thus, the present thesis has demonstrated the value of the previous 
operational definition of OV. 
As for the determinants of OV, individual and organisational factors emerged 
as potential antecedents, stemming from the 10 macroergonomic categories: 
individual, task, tools and technology, environment, and organisation (the latter 
divided in communication, culture, policy, structure, implementation, and strategy). 
In spite of the necessity for further research to deepen the comprehension of the ways 
in which these factors interact and influence each other, the concept of pathways of 
                                                 
 
102 Sub-section 5.2.4. 
103 Sub-section 5.2.3. 
104 Sub-section 5.2.8. 
105 Sub-section 5.2.1. 
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vulnerability was utilised in Study Two in order to provide an illustration of the 
dynamics that increase OV. Macroergonomic factors for OV were found to converge 
along preferential development corridors, where one or more factors generate 
another one (or others) until impacting individuals’ performance and ultimately 
creating conditions for SSD. An example of this were the Airside breaches, a 
category of security disruptions potentially deriving from a combination of 
individual factors (complacency by operators), task factors (task repetitiveness), 
environment factors (design of LS/AS transit points), and culture factors (an 
organisational culture of complacency towards security doors left open).106 This last 
example (together with the others illustrated in Sub-sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3) supported 
Kraemer and Carayon’s illustration of the individual factors as the closest 
determinants for human error leading to SSD in complex systems (2007). 
The findings emerged from this investigation confirm the potential impact that 
airport characteristics (organised in this thesis around the macroergonomic 
categories) can have on safety accidents, as indicated in the literature. These 
characteristics include in particular infrastructural features that influence the severity 
of safety occurrences (Wilke et al., 2015), company management and regulations 
(Johnson & Holloway, 2004), organisational change and structure (e.g., the role of 
sub-contracts in maintenance operations) (Herrera, Nordskag, Myhre, & Halvorsen, 
2009), etc. Furthermore, major past security accidents such as the Glasgow 
International Airport attack in 2007 featured the airport structure (the proximity of 
the front-of-house access road to the main terminal building) as a potential co-factor 
in accident causation  (Hannah, 2013). 
Smith’s concept of pathways of vulnerability (2004, 2005) has found support in 
the present thesis. The interplay of specific individual and organisational factors 
belonging to the macroergonomic categories creates conditions for the generation of 
SSD if organisational defences are not in place (or are by-passed). Section 5.3 has 
depicted the pathways potentially leading to disturbances such as ramp safety issues 
(Group One), Airside breaches (Group Two), and disruptive behaviours by 
passengers and the general public, prohibited items violations and LS security 
breaches (Group Three). Nearly all of the individual and organisational factors were 
                                                 
 
106 See Sub-section 5.3.2. 
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found to be involved within the aforementioned pathways. The review of the 
scholarly literature conducted in Sub-section 2.3.5 emphasised how the concept of 
vulnerability has attracted little attention in crisis management literature (D. Smith, 
2005). In particular, the concept of pathways of vulnerability was developed as an 
attempt to illustrate the dynamics that characterise crisis incubation, in a stream of 
literature originating from the early works of Turner (1976), Reason (1997), and 
Perrow (1999). Apart from the previously mentioned cases, other pieces of research 
have attempted to provide empirical evidence of the existence of the aforementioned 
pathways of vulnerability by conducting an assessment of the organisational factors 
that create the conditions for their development (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; D. 
Smith, 2005). However, this field of investigation remains largely under-explored 
and one of the goals of the present study was to address such a gap in the literature.  
The concept of pathways of vulnerability was empirically investigated in the 
present study, which has cast light on the ways in which the macroergonomic factors 
emerged in the explored airports interact to create corridors of vulnerability. Results 
emerging from Study Two of the present thesis (Section 5.3) have confirmed the 
stance adopted by Smith (2005) and further developed by Kraemer and Carayon 
(2007), according to which holes and weaknesses in the organisational practices, 
attitudes, and behaviours can create the potential for organisational defences to be 
by-passed. This thesis has therefore demonstrated that the concept of pathways of 
vulnerability can be fruitfully applied to different sociotechnical systems, in order to 
provide insights on how specific disturbances (in the case of this investigation, SSD) 
may incubate and manifest. After further research in this field of study, theoretical 
frameworks for a diagnostic assessment of pathways of vulnerability can be 
elaborated. 
The graphic representation in which the identified pathways of vulnerability 
have been depicted107 was inspired by the accident causation models present in the 
literature (Salmon et al., 2012; Underwood & Waterson, 2014). In spite of the fact 
that the present thesis was not aimed at applying such models to the case of airports, 
their grid-type of representation can be fruitfully utilised to map the macroergonomic 
factors that have the potential to generate organisational vulnerability in complex 
                                                 
 
107 See Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 6.1 for further reference. 
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sociotechnical systems (see Figure 6.1). This representation has proved particularly 
effective in highlighting interactions among the individual and organisational factors 
and in formulating hypotheses about their relationships. 
 Safety and Security Disruption 
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Figure 6.1: Model to Map and Illustrate Pathways of Vulnerability in Sociotechnical Systems 
 
The present research has also highlighted that the pathways themselves are not 
a condition sufficient to the creation of disruptions. Triggering events such as human 
errors or criminal intentions have to occur in order to lead to an actual disturbance in 
the airport system. In this last case, latent pathways are exposed after the event has 
occurred, making prevention efforts useless.  
Another objective of the present research was to expose these pathways before 
the actual events (SSD), in order to improve prevention and mitigation capabilities in 
the explored airports. Improvement was emphasised in the present investigation by 
underlining practical suggestions towards the betterment of safety and security 
systems in Australian airports (RQ2b). 
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6.3.2 Theoretical Contribution: A Revised Macroergonomic Approach (R-
MeA) 
The application of the macroergonomic approach to the environment of 
airports is a novelty in the literature and constitutes a first step towards the 
development of a macroergonomic model specific to this type of critical 
infrastructure. The appropriateness of the adopted model has been supported by the 
present investigation. Collected data could in fact be fruitfully organised around the 
aforementioned MeA categories of individual and organisational factors. Findings 
emerging from the collected data could be naturally organised around the recurrent 
macroergonomic themes: individual, task, tools and technology, environment, and 
organisational factors (communication, culture, policy, structure, implementation, 
and strategy). The MeA has provided an effective comprehension of the dynamics 
that regulate the safety and security performance in the explored airports by touching 
on the individual and inter-organisational constituents of airport management 
organisations. 
Nevertheless, this investigation has demonstrated that the MeA falls short in its 
comprehension of airports as complex sociotechnical systems for one aspect: HR 
practices in general and training in particular. As illustrated in Chapter Two of the 
present thesis (and in particular in Sub-section 2.4.2), the MeA originally elaborated 
by Carayon and Smith (2000) and by Kraemer and Carayon (2007) marginally 
discusses the impact that HR practices have on the performance of a work system. In 
particular, the impact of human resource practices is assessed either among the 
generic organisational factors (Carayon & Smith, 2000) or among the individual 
factors (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). In the first case, research provides little detail 
about how HR practices elaborated and implemented at the organisational level 
influence the performance of the work systems under scrutiny. In the second 
instance, the organisational perspective of HR practices is downsized and human 
resources factors (e.g., recruiting, training, skill development, etc.) are only explored 
from the viewpoint of the single operator. 
In several instances, the findings from Study Two of the present thesis have 
emphasised the impact of HR practices (e.g., selection process, reward systems, etc.) 
and training (induction and ongoing training) on the safety and security performance 
of the explored airports. Data analysis conducted in this study included HR practices 
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and training in the organisational factors: culture category108, which was 
conceptually considered the closest one. This choice was justified by the fact that HR 
practices (and training in particular) were conceived as common practices to shape 
the organisational culture in airport organisations. However, the specificity and 
relevance of these two emerging nodes suggests the creation of an additional 
category of organisational factors to add to Carayon and Smith’s framework 
(Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007): organisational factors: HR 
practices. 
In addition, through the exploration of pathways of vulnerability, the present 
investigation has underlined the crucial role of the organisational factors as potential 
determinants of other elements of the MeA (individual, task, tools and technology, 
and environment) and ultimately of the safety and security levels in the explored 
airports. The findings of the present study suggest a new classification for the 
macroergonomic factors compared to Carayon and Smith’s model specification 
(Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). This new classification 
identifies the individual, task, tools and technology, and environment factors under a 
common macro-category called direct factors. This is deemed to better distinguish 
the direct factors from the organisational factors and emphasise the latter’s role as 
precursors of the former.  
Lastly, this investigation has highlighted the role played by external factors in 
influencing the organisational and direct ones. Generally speaking, these factors lie 
outside the scope of the MeA in Carayon and Smith’s formulation (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007). Carayon and Smith focused on internal 
factors of the explored work systems and did not reach out to external environmental 
characteristics. Literature on complex sociotechnical systems theory nonetheless 
includes interpretive frameworks elaborated by other authors that did account for 
extrinsic factors in their assessment of organisational vulnerability. Pasmore (1988) 
and Trist (1981) referred to these factors as environment. So did Rizzo, Pasquini, 
Nucci and Bagnara (2000) who included political, economic, social and cultural 
factors among their characteristics. Hendrick and Kleiner (2001) and Kleiner (2004) 
referred to them as to external environment. Moray (2000) referred to external layers 
                                                 
 
108 See Sub-section 5.2.7 for further details. 
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(legal and regulatory rules, societal and cultural pressures) and Rasmussen (2000) to 
elements such as regulations, associations and government. Lastly, Wilson (2000) 
defined external factors as composed by society, finance, and politics.109  
The present thesis maintains Carayon and Smith’s argument (Carayon & 
Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007) that an organisational focus should be 
localised within the organisational boundaries. The risk of extending the assessment 
of complex sociotechnical systems’ performance to outer layers is that of a 
potentially infinite process, where macro-determinants constantly sum up and 
organisational focus is lost. However, this dissertation warns researchers of the 
existence of external factors and suggests their consideration, as a complement to the 
internal organisational investigation (external environment). 
The following figures provide a comparison between the traditional model of 
MeA adopted in this study (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 2007) (see 
Figure 6.2) and the new version (R-MeA) proposed based on findings from this 
thesis (see Figure 6.3, innovative elements of this model are underlined and in bold). 
                                                 
 
109 Sub-section 2.4.1 provides further details. 
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Figure 6.2: Macroergonomic Approach model 
Figure 6.3: Revised Macroergonomic Approach model (R-MeA) 
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The R-MeA is proposed in the present investigation as an interpretive 
framework to enhance comprehension of organisational vulnerability in complex 
sociotechnical systems such as airports. In order to verify the robustness of the R-
MeA, further research is necessary in other airports (in Australia, as well as overseas) 
and also in other work systems (e.g., other critical infrastructures, for example: 
power plants, complex railway stations, hospitals, etc.). 
In Study Two of the present thesis, discussion around RQ2a has expanded the 
theoretical understanding of organisational vulnerability as a key factor of crisis 
incubation through generation of SSD. Data revealed that the macroergonomic 
factors of OV aggregate and follow specific pathways that have the potential to 
create SSD. Furthermore, a revised version of the macroergonomic approach has 
been proposed to better reflect the phenomena observed in airports. Practical 
implications deriving from RQ2a have been merged with those deriving from RQ2b. 
This last research question also belonged to Study Two and specifically revolved 
around operational solutions for the improvement of safety and security systems in 
Australian airports. The following section provides an overview of the conclusions 
drawn from RQ2b. 
6.4 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY 
TWO (RQ2B) 
The first part of Study Two of this thesis addressed the individual and 
organisational determinants of organisational vulnerability in Australian airports. 
Practical contributions of Study Two have emerged from this investigation by 
expanding knowledge around RQ2b, which was aimed to provide suggestions for the 
improvement of the safety and security systems in place in airports. In particular, 
addressing RQ2b enabled the researcher to highlight some open issues in the aviation 
sector, as demonstrated by the collected data. Operational solutions to prevent SSD 
from occurring or to limit the impact of individual and organisational factors of OV 
were organised around the categories of the MeA. Considered altogether, these 
solutions involved some recurring themes in airport management practices, attitudes 
and behaviours unveiled by addressing RQ2b: 
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RQ2b: How can the impact of the highlighted individual and organisational 
factors for organisational vulnerability be limited and safety and security 
disruptions prevented in airports? 
The following sub-sections depict the theoretical and practical contribution of 
Study Two (RQ2b). 
6.4.1 Theoretical Contribution: Safety and Security in Australian Airports 
One of the central tenets around which the present investigation revolved was 
the distinction between the concepts of safety and security. This research singled out 
these concepts as key elements to the comprehension of organisational vulnerability 
in airports. Safety and security were considered as the starting point for classification 
of disturbances in airports (Piètre-Cambacédès & Bouissou, 2013). Fieldwork 
conducted in the three data collection sites demonstrated the relevance of these two 
tenets in exploring the mechanisms that govern aviation operations. Examination of 
airport operations through the lens of the macroergonomic approach revealed an 
environment where safety and security emerge as two separate entities: different 
regulatory bodies (Civil Aviation Safety Authority – CASA and Office for Transport 
Security – OTS)110, different regimes111, different organisational cultures112, different 
implementation practices and operations, different communication styles113, etc. In 
addition, Workplace Health and Safety was highlighted as a further organisational 
category, either considered as a sub-component of the safety regime, or as a 
standalone category placed under HR management114. Figure 6.4 summarises some 
of the characteristics of the concepts of safety and security, as operationalised in the 
airports, illustrated by respondents in the semi-structured interviews and depicted in 
Chapter Five. 
                                                 
 
110 For further information on this, see Sub-section 2.5.2. 
111 See Sub-section 5.2.8 for additional details. 
112 For further reference, see Sub-section 5.2.6. 
113 See Sub-section 5.2.5. 
114 Appendix 11 provides an overview of the organisational arrangements found in the three airports as 
for the safety, security and Workplace Health and Safety functional areas. 
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Figure 6.4: Safety vs Security Regimes 
 
This thesis adopted the definition of safety and security elaborated by Piètre-
Cambacédès and Bouissou (2013, p. 111), according to which safety refers to 
‘…accidental risks (without malicious intent)’; whereas security refers to ‘…risks 
originating from, or exacerbated by, malicious intent.’ Based on its findings, the 
present research argues that the theoretical difference between safety and security, 
referring to the absence or presence of human intent behind operational disruptions, 
is also operationally valid. Collected data emphasised that the safety/security 
dichotomy in airport organisations is clearly perceived and reflected in daily 
operations. Security screeners operate in completely different ways than safety 
officers and interviewed operators and managers proved to be aware of this. This 
dichotomy is further strengthened by other systemic elements such as the nature of 
some of the contracts in place in airports (e.g., use of contracted security screening 
operators as opposed to Airside officers directly hired by the airport operator, etc.). 
However, whether a neat separation between these two modi operandi is the most 
effective solution to ensure safe and secure operations is still debatable. The 
following sub-section discusses this last point by introducing several practical 
suggestions for improvement that address safety/security dilemma in airports. 
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6.4.2 Practical Contribution: Towards a ‘Safecurity’ Approach in Landside 
and Airside Operations in Australian Airports  
Safety and security have emerged from the present thesis as two strategic 
priorities that are translated into operational practices in airports (safety management 
and security management). Data drawn from the semi-structured interviews held with 
managers from the leadership level provided contrasting evidence to determine 
which of the following is the most effective approach: ‘A sharp separation or a 
combined perspective between safety and security functions?’ On the one hand, a 
clear-cut distinction between safety and security operations is considered a guarantee 
towards the development of specific capabilities that improve performance. The 
diversity of approaches is deemed essential to ensure the development of the 
strategic capabilities typical of these two areas (implementation of policies, 
understanding of the underlying environment of safety and security, necessary skills, 
etc.). On the other hand, a sharp boundary is deemed to strengthen a silo approach 
potentially detrimental to the systemic nature of airports. In particular, 
communication issues may arise from differences in organisational cultures and 
attitudes, especially with regards to information-sharing. This may translate into 
arising parochial interests at the expense of airports’ strategic objectives. Further 
research is suggested to examine potential operational solutions to solve this 
dilemma. Nevertheless, two alternative directions have emerged from the present 
investigation.  
The first suggested solution recommends airport operators de-emphasise the 
safety and security dichotomy, especially at the managerial level. Indeed, a systemic 
approach capable of focusing on the airport as a whole (and not as the sum of its 
components) is particularly necessary at the managerial level. This solution would 
preserve the peculiarity of safety and security operations at the lower levels of the 
organisations by improving the specific capabilities and avoiding sub-optimal 
performance. At the same time, a more strategic approach would be adopted at the 
higher levels (e.g., corporate management level, leadership level) where information 
sharing and close communication among functional areas (operations, HR, finance, 
etc.) are reputed more crucial115. 
                                                 
 
115 One of the explored airports has demonstrated to act in this direction by planning the physical 
integration of the safety and security functions into the same building. See Sub-section 5.2.8. 
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The second proposed solution advocates integration not around the safety and 
security functional levels, but around the areas of operations highlighted in the 
present thesis. Data underlined that a sharp divide between safety and security 
operational attitudes can be a hurdle towards systemic integration. Thus, the present 
investigation has demonstrated that organising airport operations around the areas of 
LS and AS operations can more fruitfully lead to a compromise between specificity 
and integration. Specificity derives from the practices, attitudes, organisational 
culture, and behaviours typically enacted in the LS or AS areas of operations. 
Integration stems from the common safety and security approach adopted in every 
area of operations.  
According to this proposed solution, LS and AS operations would be the two 
macro-categories around which safety and security of airport operations are 
organised. As the present research has shown, LS operations mainly involve security 
issues (e.g., security screening), whereas AS operations generally refer to safety 
problems (e.g., ramp operations). However, LS operations may be impacted by 
safety events (e.g., Workplace Health and Safety) and similarly AS operations may 
be affected by security incidents (e.g., Airside breaches). An example of this mixed 
perspective can be drawn from the SSD illustrated in the present investigation, where 
elements of safety and security coexist. 
The proposed organisational solution stems from a common operational 
perspective revolving around the concepts of safety and security in LS operations 
and safety and security in AS operations. This thesis suggests enforcing a combined 
safety-security approach in LS and AS operators, coupled with the specificity of the 
involved areas of operations (front-of-house, terminal building, and sterile area in the 
case of LS operations; Airside security restricted area, ramp and back-of-house in the 
case of AS operations). This common approach could be denominated ‘Safecurity’, 
as Figure 6.5 illustrates. 
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Figure 6.5: Airside and Landside Safecurity Approach 
 
 
The Safecurity approach is intended to provide an integrated vision of safety 
and security in LS and AS operations by shaping operators’ and managers’ working 
practices towards the achievement of a 100% safecure environment. The presence of 
the intrinsic differences between the safety and the security regimes (Figure 6.4) 
makes the integration process a complex task. In particular, the macroergonomic 
analysis conducted in Chapter Five highlighted that organisational factors (policy, 
structure, implementation, and strategy) exist that naturally limit the exchange 
between safety and security, especially when these factors are not under the control 
of the airport operator (e.g., the role of the Office for Transport Security and the 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority as regulators, the presence of contracted security 
screening providers, the influence of organisational strategic goals, etc.). 
However, this investigation revealed that other factors can be more effectively 
influenced and shaped by the airport operator. The ways in which airport 
organisations communicate and the organisational culture that underlies their 
practices, attitudes, and behaviours, can both be modelled by means of training. 
Training (induction and ongoing) is deemed to be the most effective instrument to 
harmonise organisational communication and culture towards an integrated 
Safecurity approach. Training can therefore be considered as an effective starting 
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point in the assimilation process between safety and security conducted by the airport 
operator. The following sub-section is intended to further explore this last point as an 
additional practical contribution of the present thesis. 
6.4.3 Practical Contribution: Training 
The value of training as a way to decrease complacency and diffuse good 
practices was highlighted throughout the data collection and analysis processes. The 
results underlined the validity of training as a complement to the safety and security 
regimes in place in airports, especially in cases of uncertainty or potential for 
interpretation around policies. In several instances data demonstrated that training is 
an area for improvement in the three explored airports. Where findings did not 
explicitly prove the need for improvement in training practices, continuous effort to 
maintain adequate training levels was nonetheless urged. Training emerged as a 
powerful tool to influence the communication styles enacted by airport operators and 
to shape organisational cultures. As a result, this thesis suggests specific training in 
order to diffuse a Safecurity approach in the management of aviation operations, with 
reference to LS and AS operations. Results produced by the present thesis suggest 
that a Safecurity training program could touch on the following, hypothetical key 
subjects: 
 Safety and security awareness (LS and AS operations) 
 Identification of pathways of vulnerability (LS and AS operations) 
 Workplace Health and Safety (LS and AS operations) 
 Effective communication towards Safecurity (LS and AS operations) 
 Security screening processes and sterile area integrity (LS operations) 
 LS passengers and general public safety (LS operations) 
 Aviation and ramp safety (AS operations) 
 Airside security and security restricted areas integrity (AS operations) 
This Safecurity training program is a mere proposal based on this 
investigation’s conclusions and needs further testing for pertinence. Furthermore, use 
of external trainers could be suggested as particularly effective in providing operators 
and managers with an outsider perspective on airport operations. This is in turn 
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deemed to break the complacency chain highlighted by the present investigation as a 
potential factor of vulnerability in the explored airports. 
During the present research effort, training aspects were revealed incidentally 
as recurrent themes from respondents’ words. As illustrated in the previous Sub-
section 6.3.2, training is not codified in the macroergonomic approach as a 
standalone organisational factor (Carayon & Smith, 2000; Kraemer & Carayon, 
2007). Training issues were therefore classified within the organisational factors: 
culture factors116 category, which was considered the most suitable. Results from this 
research nonetheless suggest including training within the autonomous category of 
HR practices. This category is classified in the revised macroergonomic approach 
proposed by the present dissertation and discussed in Sub-section 6.3.2.  
Additional practical contributions deriving from Study Two of this thesis 
involve specific themes emerging from aviation operations at the explored airports. 
The following two sub-sections address suggestions for improvement with regards to 
general aviation (Sub-section 6.3.4) and the low cost business model (Sub-section 
6.3.5).  
6.4.4 Practical Contribution: General Aviation 
Analysis conducted in the present investigation has stressed the relevance of 
general aviation for safety and security reasons in the explored airports. In particular, 
data revealed that general aviation enjoys a limited security regime, less restrictive 
than regular public transport. On the one hand, this allows general aviation 
businesses to operate more smoothly, without the hurdles represented, for example, 
by security screening activities. The latter are expensive and time-consuming, which 
naturally clashes with the profit-oriented attitude of general aviation. However, on 
the other hand, the watered-down security regime in place in general aviation 
constitutes a potential systemic flaw, not only for general aviation itself, but also for 
the aerodromes that host it. Furthermore, the physical position of general aviation 
facilities emerged from the present research as an additional point of attention. 
Excessive separation from the main airport terminals (and, consequentially, from the 
airport operator’s control rooms or police offices) may lead to the reduced possibility 
of supervision by airport management in an already de-regulated sector. The fact that 
                                                 
 
116 See Sub-section 5.2.6 for further details. 
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general aviation in one of the airports was colloquially called ‘the dark side’ has 
further witnessed this last point and general aviation’s crucial position within the 
airport security system.117 
General aviation can be considered a potential pathway of vulnerability due to 
its security regime. However, as it was mentioned previously, in order for this 
pathway to lead to a security disruption, a triggering event has to occur. The present 
investigation emphasised that the vulnerability constituted by general aviation in 
some airports may have the potential to be exploited by malicious individuals. 
Data have revealed that the regulatory regime governing the safety and security 
of general aviation activities is outside the control of the airport operators. At the 
same time, a change in regulations towards a more restrictive security regime for 
general aviation operations is not likely to occur in the short term, especially due to 
economic and time issues. Thus, in order to reduce risks associated with the presence 
of under-regulated safety and security practices at the general aviation, findings 
emerging from the present thesis suggest airport operators: 
 Revise and assess the current safety and security practices implemented in 
general aviation operations; 
 Increase supervision and control over general aviation operations by means of 
more frequent AS inspections; 
 Strengthen CCTV coverage over general aviation facilities; 
 Involve general aviation players in voluntary training activities, especially in 
the case of refresher training or induction to new practices (e.g., institution of 
the Safecurity regime). 
6.4.5 Practical Contribution: Low Cost Business Model 
One of the recurring themes in the present investigation was associated with 
the progressive implementation of a low cost business model by some airlines. The 
research demonstrated that this business model is also particularly attractive to 
traditional carriers, apart from the low cost carriers whose value proposition naturally 
revolves around this operating framework. The present investigation emphasised that 
                                                 
 
117 See Sub-section 5.2.4 for further reference. 
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the low cost business model yields significant cost savings for the airlines, but has 
also the potential to entail practices that may be sub-optimal in terms of safety and 
security performance. Under-staffed operations, cost-saving aeronautical practices, 
use of contractors, etc. may ultimately contribute to generating elements of 
organisational vulnerability. This research demonstrated that the impact of the low 
cost practices can be exacerbated by the pressure on time and economic performance 
existing in the explored airports. Complacency in operators can be potentially 
generated when more focus is placed on ‘getting things done’ than on totally safe 
behaviours. Under-staffed operations have been highlighted as possibly affecting 
security performance, as in the case of passenger marshalling or security doors 
supervision. 
Study Two revealed that airport operators have little say in the ways airlines 
organise their businesses. Moreover, airport management sits in a particularly thorny 
position, in that it has to balance multiple sources of pressure: governmental agencies 
(e.g., Civil Aviation Safety Authority and Office for Transport Security) urge 
compliance to safety and security regulations; airlines push towards facilitation of 
smooth business practices in exchange for money (e.g., landing rights, facility 
charges, etc.); passengers require quality services and time-saving procedures (e.g., 
security screening) in exchange for money (e.g., security fees and taxes) and 
reputation (e.g., positive feedback on the airport). As a result, airport operators have 
little chance to influence the low cost business model implemented by some airlines.  
However, the following practical suggestions to better manage the potential 
consequences of this business model are proposed, based on conclusions drawn from 
Study Two: 
 Strengthen interaction with contractors (e.g., ground handlers) in order to 
emphasise safe and secure practices by means of enhanced communication or 
training on situational awareness; 
 Increase audit and inspection with particular reference to ramp operations; 
 Diffuse Safecurity as a fundamental tenet for aviation operations and 
prioritise it over economic objectives. For example, this could be done by 
means of training. 
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6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Due to the adopted research design, the present investigation had some 
acknowledged limitations. First, a methodological issue arose from the adoption of a 
qualitative research design, which intrinsically suffers from limited generalisability 
of findings (Yin, 2009). This dissertation did not provide statistical value to its 
results, which limits its scope of application outside the airport environment. In order 
to address this generalisability limitation, the adopted research methodology has been 
described in detail (Chapter Three). This is expected to provide essential information 
regarding how to carefully replicate this study in other settings (Shenton, 2004). 
Therefore, the transferability of results drawn from this research is still possible in 
other contexts, such as other complex sociotechnical systems (e.g., hospitals, power 
plants, ports, etc.) (De Bruijne et al., 2006; ICAO, 2011; Wheeler, 2005). 
Application outside the airport environment could be intended as a test for the 
robustness of the findings of this thesis.  
Another methodological limitation associated with the previous one stemmed 
from the utilised sample. The data collection sites selected for the present research 
were three Australian airports, servicing both domestic and international passengers. 
As a result, the sample did not represent the entirety of Australian airports (mainly 
small, regional aerodromes), nor could it be considered a valid sample to extend 
results to foreign airports. Generalisation of findings from this thesis cannot be 
applied to airports abroad without further testing, although the three explored airports 
are classified among the 11 biggest Australian airports in terms of passengers. 
Additionally, they have similar ownership arrangements (privatised airports) and 
governance structures. This increases the generalisability of the findings from the 
present research to other Australian airports similar to the selected sample in terms of 
size, passengers, governance, and organisational structure. 
A third limitation of this study consisted in the purposeful sampling technique 
(Patton, 2002) utilised for data collection. This technique implies that only the 
investigator is responsible for selecting respondents in the semi-structured 
interviews, examining documents in the document analysis, and the contexts of field 
observation. The impact of the potential bias resulting from this sampling technique 
has nonetheless been limited by adopting two expedients. First, constant feedback 
was sought by the researcher from members of the research supervisory team prior to 
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the interviews, the document analysis, and the observation. Advice produced by the 
supervisors was translated into a more detached attitude by the researcher towards 
his samples. Second, a preliminary meeting was held with a key contact in each 
airport before data collection. The identified manager helped the researcher to 
determine a list of appropriate candidates for the interviews, suitable documents for 
the analysis, and adequate operational settings for the field observation. In turn, this 
enhanced reciprocal trust between the investigator and the involved airport 
organisations.  
A fourth limit resulted from the sensitive nature of the information collected 
and treated. Confidentiality of sources (respondents in the interviews, documents in 
the document analysis, and data derived from the field observation) had to be 
maintained throughout the research, due to the commercial-in-confidence nature of 
information regarding SSD. Furthermore, several investigations on safety and 
security events that occurred in the explored airports were still running during data 
collection. This was an additional reason for the researcher to protect the identity of 
airports, respondents, documents, and participants. Confidentiality is an 
acknowledged limitation of the present study, as it reduces the amount of information 
that can be used (job title, age, and gender of interviewees, exact titles of airport 
documents, etc.). However, continuous consultation with this thesis’ supervisors and 
with key contacts has enabled the investigator to ensure rich and detailed 
information, whilst maintaining confidentiality. Additionally, direct quotes from the 
interviews have been provided in the present thesis in order to depict a more detailed 
illustration of the airports’ context. In addition, a separate written log of the collected 
data was kept by the researcher, complementing the collected data. 
A fifth limitation of this thesis was identified in the focus of attention of RQ1, 
which addressed and classified existing categories of SSD. This approach excluded 
from the investigation safety and security events that have not yet occurred but may 
still have the possibility to develop in the future. 
A sixth limitation consisted in the bounded scope of investigation of this thesis, 
which only marginally assessed the role that external environmental factors 
(economic, social and legal issues) can have in contributing to organisational 
vulnerability. This was primarily due to the predominant focus adopted in this 
investigation, the managerial and operational levels within the explored airports. 
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From this, the decision of adopting a theoretical model (the Macroergonomic 
Approach) which does not explore the external environmental factors impacting 
sociotechnical systems. 
6.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Several suggestions for further research have been provided throughout the 
present chapter. This sub-section is intended to organise them around four main 
areas. First, a structured, quantitative assessment of the risk management practices in 
Australian airports could be produced by conducting specific research focused on 
risk management. In particular, the value added produced by risk assessment 
activities in national aerodromes can be fruitfully examined in order to better 
comprehend and define its nature. The research question underlying this additional 
investigation could be: ‘Do risk assessment practices (risk analysis and risk 
documents) in Australian airports have a practical application, or does their purpose 
stem purely from compliance and liability issues?’ This investigation is deemed to 
produce an enhanced understanding of the extent to which risk assessment practices 
can be operationalised beyond the compliance and liability priority. An evaluation of 
the impact of these practices on safety and security performance can be elaborated. 
 Second, linked to the previous point, further research is recommended in order 
to gain a better understanding of the ways in which airport management 
organisations use data and statistics to inform their safety and security decisions. 
This thesis recommends additional examination of the incident reporting systems in 
place in Australian airports to cast light on their use as statistical tools or as sources 
of strategic information. The sample of explored organisations could be extended to 
include the Office for Transport Security for security and the Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority for safety. By so doing, a more complete understanding of the mechanisms 
that regulate informed policy-making could be achieved and ultimately, aviation 
safety and security improved.  
In order to gain support from profit-oriented organisations (e.g., airlines, 
retailers, ground handlers, etc.), further research is specifically urged in the field of 
the economics of safety and security. Recent literature has focused on understanding 
if, and how, improved safety and security practices can translate into better economic 
performance (Drennan & McConnell, 2007). An investigation of this research topic 
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in Australian airports is expected to provide a potential argument to raise 
stakeholders’ awareness around safety and security. Endorsement by airlines, 
retailers, ground handlers, etc., could also translate into financial support, and thus 
limit the economic constraints by which airport operators are bounded. 
Another field for future research refers to the areas for improvement indicated 
in the present thesis. In particular, some of the identified potential countermeasures 
(see Chapter Five) appear to address specific components of airports as 
sociotechnical systems (e.g., individual complacency, training issues, strategic 
attitudes, etc.). Further research could explore the adoption of an integrated system of 
countermeasures, which would holistically address organisational vulnerability and 
reduce the number and impact of SSD. Further studies are for example necessary in 
order to test the robustness and feasibility of the Safecurity practical solution, with a 
specific focus on Landside (LS) and Airside (AS) operations. Their specificity can be 
fruitfully investigated in order to provide additional support to the Safecurity 
solution. This could be achieved by examining the HR practices (recruiting, reward 
systems, training, etc.) currently in place in LS and AS areas of operations. The 
scope for harmonisation of safety and security management techniques within the LS 
and AS areas of operations should be explored. After preliminary investigation, 
quasi-experiments could be conducted LS and AS. These could be aimed at testing 
the impact of a full program of conjunct safety-security training on operators’ 
performance. Furthermore, differences in performance emerging from LS and AS 
could be analysed in order to identify their causes. 
Further tests for robustness of the revised macroergonomic approach (R-MeA) 
proposed in this thesis are urged. In order to assess the appropriateness of the R-MeA 
interpretive framework, Australian international airports that differ from the three 
aerodromes explored in this investigation could be researched. A second stage of 
further research could then involve a range of smaller regional airports in order to 
apply the R-MeA to a different aviation context. Another stage would include the 
investigation of overseas airports in order to assess the applicability of findings from 
this thesis to other aeronautical environments. Research conducted in settings other 
than the three data collection sites selected for this dissertation could also produce an 
enhanced assessment of organisational vulnerability to SSD. The applicability of the 
R-MeA and assessment of organisational vulnerability in other types of complex 
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sociotechnical systems could also be tested in research on critical infrastructures such 
as hospitals, power plants, ports, etc. 
As an additional recommendation for future research expanding the scope of 
Study One of the present thesis, more studies should be conducted adopting 
formative modelling approaches to identify potential SSD that have not yet occurred 
(Walker, Salmon, Bedinger, & Stanton, 2016). This, coupled with the testing of 
accident causation models aimed at understanding the causal processes behind the 
SSD identified in this study, could expand the scope of the findings highlighted in 
this investigation. 
A final suggestion for future research refers to the possibility of providing a 
more complete assessment of the factors impacting on the vulnerability of airports by 
expanding the analysis beyond the organisational levels. Economic, social and legal 
issues, for example, could be included in the resulting investigation, by adopting the 
R-MeA, which includes an additional layer of analysis called ‘external factors’ (see 
sub-section 6.3.2). 
6.7 SUMMARY 
The present chapter has closed this research by summarising and discussing the 
key themes emerging from Study One (RQ1) and Study Two (RQ2a and RQ2b). In 
particular, a review of the components of organisational vulnerability to SSD in 
Australian airports has been provided. 
First, SSD were defined and classified and their potential for further escalating, 
addressed (Study One). The associated theoretical contribution resides in an original 
classification of 15 SSD potentially characterising Australian airports. Furthermore, 
the use of the aforementioned SSD as macro-categories of risks and incidents for the 
risk assessment documents and incident reporting systems utilised in the explored 
sites was proposed. 
Study Two of the present thesis provided an enhanced understanding of 
organisational vulnerability by means of macroergonomic analysis. This led to an 
enhanced comprehension of the safety vs. security dilemma in airports, which in turn 
became the foundation for an innovative Safecurity approach to be adopted in the 
explored airports. Training issues, general aviation, and low cost business model 
finally emerged as crucial themes in the field of aviation safety and security. 
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In conclusion, results emerging from the present thesis suggest that the 
explored Australian airports feature excellent levels of safety and security 
performance. However, as complex sociotechnical systems, these airports may 
incubate conditions of organisational vulnerability potentially leading to increased 
chances of SSD. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 01: Script for the Semi-structured Interviews 
 
AIRPORTS OF THE FUTURE 
“An Assessment of Vulnerability to Safety and Security Disruptions in Australian Airports. A 
Complex Sociotechnical System Perspective” 
DATE/TIME:  
Introduction: “My name is Ivano Bongiovanni, I’m a Phd student at the QUT School of Management and 
I’m very grateful you agreed to participate in this research, which is conducted within my Phd. So, first of 
all, let me thank you for you collaboration.” 
 
Section 1: “This first part of our interview will focus on those safety/security disruptions that are reputed to 
be the most relevant within the airport, in particular, in the area within which you operate [which you 
manage/supervise]. Objective of this first part will be to highlight such disruptions, in order to define how 
they incubate, develop and manifest.” 
 
Q1: What are the most common and relevant Safety and Security Disruptions (SSD) to normal business 
operations that manifest and develop in your area of operations? 
 
Q2: Why do you think the aforementioned disruptions are the most common and relevant ones? 
 
Q3: What are the organisations operating in the airport mostly involved in such disruptions? 
 
Section 2: “This second part of our interview will focus on the individual and organisational factors that can 
contribute to the aforementioned disruptions and the ways in which they can be tackled.” 
 
Q1: How do individual and organisational factors contribute in generating the Safety and Security 
Disruptions (SSD) highlighted in the previous answers? I kindly ask you to focus on the organisational side 
of operations, not the passengers’ side. 
 
To help you, you may consider organising your answers around the following categories: 
 Individual 
 Tools and Technology 
 Tasks 
 Environment 
 Organisation (Communication, Culture, Policy, Structure, Implementation, Strategy) 
 
Q2: What suggestions for improvement can be produced in order to limit the impact of the highlighted 
individual and organisational factors and prevent Safety and Security Disruptions (SSD) from occurring? 
 
THE INTERVIEW IS OVER. THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND COLLABORATION! 
IF YOU ARE INTERESTED AND STILL HAVE TIME, WE CAN REVIEW TOGETHER THE 
DIFFERENT POINTS YOU TOUCHED ON. 
Code: 
 Appendices          372  
Appendix 02: Authorised Data Collection Agreement for the Airports of the Future Project 
                                                                   
              To whom it may concern 
 
By being signatory to the Airports of the Future Linkage - Projects Scheme Collaborative Research Agreement, airport 
partners (as part of their in-kind contribution) have authorised data collection on their sites and have consequently 
agreed to make available personnel and facilities in order to facilitate a large range of data collections and methods. 
Individual interest and participation in any particular data collection and research is negotiated prior to confirming case 
study airport sites - as will be the case in Mr Ivano Bongiovanni’s research. 
 
Part of this agreement is that QUT researchers maintain confidentiality of collected data and findings, and all forms of 
research publication are approved by the necessary partners prior to distribution.  
 
Airports of the Future Partner Groups 
 
Industry Partners 
1. Brisbane Airport Corporation 
2. Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
3. Melbourne Airport 
4. Cairns Airport Pty Ltd 
5. Rockhampton Airport 
6. Capital Airport Group 
7. Queensland Airports Ltd (Gold Coast Airport) 
8. ISS Security Pty Ltd 
9. Mackay Airport Pty Ltd 
10. Sunshine Coast Airport 
11. Airport Coordination Australia 
12. Australian Airports Association 
13. Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
14. Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
15. Westralia Airports Corporation Pty Ltd 
16. South Burnett Regional Council 
17. Tourism & Transport Forum (TTF) 
18. Department of Infrastructure. Transport, Regional Development and Local 
Government 
19. NT Airports Pty Ltd 
20. Australian Federal Police 
21. Emirates Group Security 
22. Newcastle Airport 
23. IATA - Simplifying Passenger Travel (SPT) 
 
University Partners 
1. QUT 
2 University of Technology Sydney 
3. Edith Cowan University 
4. Massachusetts University of Technology 
5. Delft University of Technology 
6. University of Melbourne 
Regards, 
(signature) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 03: Frameworks for Risk Assessment in the Three Airports 
LIKELIHOOD Minimum – 1 2 3 4 Maximum – 5
Airport X Rare 
(Exceptional circumstances 
- 1 in 10 yrs) 
Unlikely 
(Could occur at some time - 
1 in 1-5 yrs) 
Possible 
(Might occur at some time - 
1 in 12 months) 
Likely 
(Will probably occur - 1 in 
months) 
Almost certain 
(Expected in most 
circumstances - imminent) 
Airport Y Rare 
(Exceptional circumstances 
- less than 1 in 100 yrs) 
Unlikely 
(Could occur - between 1 in 
100 yrs and 1 in 10 yrs) 
Possible 
(Should happen – between 1 
in 10 yrs and 1 in 5 yrs) 
Likely 
(Will probably occur – 1 in 
5 yrs and 1 per yr) 
Almost certain 
(Expected in most conditions 
- 1 or more per yr) 
Airport Z Rare 
(Exceptional circumstances 
– 1 in 20 or more yrs) 
Unlikely 
(Might occur at some time – 
1 in 15 yrs)
Possible 
(Might occur often – 1 in 10 
yrs)
Likely 
(Will probably occur at least 
once – 1 in 5 yrs)
Almost certain 
(Expected in most 
circumstances – 1 per yr)
CONSEQUENCES Minimum – E D C B Maximum – A 
Airport X Negligible 
(Negligible impact, low 
financial loss, negligible 
damage, no injuries) 
Minor 
(Minor impact on 
operations, temporary 
disruptions) 
Moderate 
(Moderate impact on 
operations, damage to 
aerodrome assets) 
Major 
(Major impact on 
operations, significant 
damage to assets) 
Catastrophic 
(Extensive impact on 
operations, severe damage to 
assets) 
Airport Y Insignificant 
(Negligible impact, loss < 
$90,000, negligible damage, 
no injuries) 
Minor 
(Loss $90,000-$900,000, 
minor damage, small 
number of injuries, minor 
disruptions) 
Moderate 
(Loss $900,000-$4,5M 
moderate to high damage, a 
number of injuries, serious 
disruptions) 
Major 
(Loss $4,5M-$18M, 
significant damage, 
significant injuries, major 
disruptions) 
Catastrophic 
(Loss > $18M, widespread 
damage, large number of 
injuries and fatalities, long-
term impact) 
Airport Z Insignificant 
(Minor impact, loss < 
$500,000, no service 
interruption)  
Minor 
(Loss $500,000-$3M, minor 
incident, localised 
disruption) 
Moderate 
(Loss $3M-$10M, notifiable 
incident, operational 
disruption)  
Major 
(Loss $10M-$30M, 
operations disruption from 
2hrs, significant incident) 
Extreme 
(Loss >$30M, operations 
disruption >1day, disaster) 
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Appendix 04: Classification of Risks in the Three Airports 
Airport X 
Risk Rating (Likelihood x Consequences) Risk Interpretation 
5A – 5B – 5C – 4A – 4B – 3A HIGH RISK: Unacceptable risk under the existing circumstances. Immediate action 
required. 
5D – 5E – 4C – 4D – 4E - 3B – 3C – 3D - 2A – 2B – 2C MODERATE RISK: Acceptable based on risk mitigation. Senior management 
attention needed. 
3E – 2D – 2E – 1A – 1B – 1C – 1D – 1E LOW RISK: Acceptable risk. Manage by routine procedures. 
 
Airport Y 
Risk Rating (Likelihood x Consequences) Risk Interpretation 
5A – 5B – 5C – 4A – 4B – 3A – 3B – 2A EXTREME RISK: Immediate action required 
5D – 4C – 4D – 3C – 2B – 1A – 1B HIGH RISK: Senior management attention needed. 
5E – 4E – 3D – 2C – 1C MODERATE RISK: Management responsibility must be specified. 
3E – 2D – 2E – 1D – 1E LOW RISK: Manage by routine procedures. 
 
Airport Z 
Risk Rating (Likelihood x Consequences) Risk Interpretation 
5A – 5B – 4A – 3A VERY HIGH RISK: Immediate action required 
5C - 5D – 4B - 4C – 3B – 2A – 1A HIGH RISK: Executive management attention needed. 
5E – 4D – 3C - 3D – 2B - 2C – 1B MEDIUM RISK: Management by reviewing and monitoring of procedures. 
4E - 3E – 2D – 2E – 1C - 1D – 1E LOW RISK: Manage by routine procedures. 
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Appendix 05: Risk Assessment Matrices in the Three Airports 
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Appendix 06: Overview of Task Factors as Potential Determinants for Safety and Security Disruptions 
 
Security Screening 
Providers (SSP) 
Contractors/Ground 
Handlers (GH) 
Airlines 
Airport Operator 
(AM) 
Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
Time is the issue 
AM has no control role 
on task allocation. 
Contract issues 
AIRLINES may 
impose stringent 
deadlines to reduce 
time 
GH allocate tasks 
accordingly 
 
Task allocation may 
become an issue: too 
many things, too short 
time 
 
RAMP SAFETY 
ISSUES 
 
Repetitiveness is the 
issue 
Work stress is the 
issue 
SSP STAFF - Task 
allocation overwhelming 
 Not used working at 
night 
 Working too many 
days straight 
SSP STAFF – Potential for 
task repetitiveness: 
• Vehicle access points 
• Screening in low 
periods 
• Low interaction 
POTENTIAL 
COMPLACENCY 
 
SECURITY AND 
STERILE AREA 
BREACHES 
 
PROHIBITED 
ITEMS 
VIOLATIONS 
 
AIRSIDE 
SECURITY 
BREACHES 
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Appendix 07: Overview of Tools and Technology Factors as Potential Determinants for Safety and Security Disruption
Airlines 
Airport Operator 
(AM) 
Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
Government 
AIRLINES largely 
rely on AM Tools & 
Technology 
Governmental attitude 
sometimes slow in 
enforcing 
technological change 
 
CONGESTION IN 
THE TERMINAL 
 
Government does not 
mandate minimum 
security screening 
equipment 
 
Innovations 
mandated by 
regulations 
 
Innovations 
NOT 
mandated by 
regulations 
 
AM 
recover 
cost from 
passengers 
AM can 
recover 
cost only if 
Airlines 
agree 
Innovation 
withdrawn 
Further risks 
in case of 
emergency 
 
SUB-
OPTIMAL 
CONDITIONS 
FOR 
SECURITY 
SCREENING 
(POTENTIAL) 
 
DISRUPTIVE 
BEHAVIOURS 
 
PROHIBITED 
ITEMS 
VIOLATIONS 
 
STERILE AREA 
BREACHES 
 
In some areas, 
missing international 
and national 
regulations 
Limited role by Australia 
in high level strategic fora 
on security screening. 
Lack of harmonisation 
in international 
practices 
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Appendix 08: Potential Time Gaps in Communication and Information Sharing within the 
Security Function 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SCENARIO 
Governmental Security Intelligence 
Potential Slow Reaction in 
Information Sharing 
Office for Transport Security 
Potential Organisational 
Culture of Secrecy 
Potential Slow Reaction in 
Procedural Adjustment 
AM – Security Function 
Security Screening Providers - SSP 
Screeners 
Airport Operator 
(AM) 
Security Screening Providers Government 
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Appendix 09: Potential Safety Training Issues and the Effect of Refresher Training on Complacency 
 
Contractors/Ground 
Handlers (GH) 
Airlines 
Airport Operator/AM 
Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
Retailers 
SAFETY TRAINING 
MAY BE DE-
PRIORITISED AND 
COMPLACENCY 
Casual workers require 
constant induction and 
training 
Safety training 
expensive and 
time-consuming 
Low Cost Model by 
some AIRLINES 
GH may 
employ 
unexperienced 
operators 
RAMP SAFETY 
ISSUES 
Core Safety 
Training left to 
Contractors/GH 
AM only trains 
on Safety 
Induction 
AM has limited control 
on GH/Contractors 
training 
Some businesses have 
safety less engrained 
Refresher Training 
Complacency 
Time 
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Appendix 10: Differences in Safety and Security Organisational Cultures and their Potential Impact on Safety and Security Disruptions 
Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
External Factors: 
Security 
External Factors: 
Safety 
Airport employees 
Security Complacency 
Safety Complacency 
RAMP SAFETY ISSUES 
 
SAFETY EVENTS LS 
 
FIRE ALARMS 
STERILE AREA BREACHES 
 
PROHIBITED ITEMS VIOL. 
 
AIRSIDE BREACHES 
Safety Culture easy 
to understand 
because of clear 
consequences 
Safety Training: 
training on the REAL 
In 2015 passengers 
still not aware about 
security screening Australians less 
prone to full 
screening
Security Culture hard 
to understand 
because of unclear 
consequences 
Security Training: 
training on the 
POTENTIAL 
Australia perceived 
as intrinsically secure 
Some employees perceive 
themselves as above Safety 
/ Security 
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Appendix 11: Organisational Chart of the Safety, Security and Workplace Health and Safety (WHS) functions in the Three Airports 
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Appendix 12: Contractual Arrangements between Airlines and Ground Handlers and their Potential Impact on Safety Disruptions 
Contractors/Ground 
Handlers/GH 
Airlines 
Airport Operator/AM 
Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
Passengers 
Low Cost 
Model by 
AIRLINES
Ground operations 
outsourced 
Ownership of 
duties/responsibility 
potentially watered-
down 
Reduced 
controls by 
AIRLINES 
Reduced 
passenger 
marshalling 
by 
AIRLINES  
Issues pushed 
back to 
AIRLINES 
Issues pushed 
back to 
AIRLINES 
Passengers’ 
complaints 
about service 
Potential for Sub-
optimal service and 
safety 
RAMP 
SAFETY 
ISSUES 
AM complaints and 
investigations 
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Appendix 13: Contractual Arrangements between the Airport Operator and Contractors and their Potential Impact on Safety Disruptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Contractors/Ground 
Handlers/GH 
Airport Operator/AM Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences Subcontractors 
AM contracts 
out 
maintenance 
and repairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RAMP SAFETY 
ISSUES 
 
 
 
MISMANAGEMENT  
OF  
MAINTENANCE 
WORKS AND 
REPAIRS 
Contractors execute 
the work or… 
…subcontract 
the work. 
Subcontractors 
execute the work or… 
…subsubcontract the 
work. 
Subsubcontractors 
execute the work. 
AM (WHS) 
verifies 
compliance 
and job safety 
Project 
Manager 
Execution 
Controls and 
Compliance  
Additional contractual levels increase OV 
Additional contractual levels may decrease effectiveness of Controls 
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Appendix 14: Contractual Arrangements in place between Airlines and Airport Operator in one of the Explored Airports and Potential 
Impact on Decision-Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
T
e
r
m
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Safety and 
Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
afet  a  
ec rit  
isr ti  
Airlines 
Potential 
Lack of 
coordination 
NATURAL 
HAZARD ISSUES 
RAMP SAFETY 
ISSUES 
DISRUPTIVE 
BEHAVIOURS 
PROHIBITED 
ITEMS 
VIOLATIONS 
Potential 
Lack of 
situational 
awareness 
Potential 
confusion in 
screening 
operators 
Frustration in 
passengers 
 
3 Decisions on 
when to stop 
operations 
because of 
storms 
Increase of casual 
staff on site 
 
Gaps in 
Prohibited Items 
requirements 
AIRLINE 1 Storm Warning System 
AIRLINE 1 Ground Handlers 
AIRLINE 1 Prohibited Items 
AM Storm Warning System 
AM Ground Handlers 
AM Prohibited Items Requirements 
AIRLINE 2 Storm Warning System 
AIRLINE 2 Ground Handlers 
AIRLINE 2 Prohibited Items 
 
 
AIRLINE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMON 
AREA/AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIRLINE 2 
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Appendix 15: An Overview of the Potential Impact of the Low Cost Business Model on Safety and Security Disruptions
Low Cost 
Model of 
Airlines 
GH 
selected 
based on 
price 
GH poor 
safety 
performance 
More GH 
than in the 
past 
Sub-optimal Safety 
RAMP SAFETY ISSUES 
Increased 
complexity and 
more difficult 
audit by AM 
LCC less 
accountable. 
Reduced 
ownership 
over issues 
LCC hit the 
duress alarm 
more than 
traditional 
carriers 
SERVICE 
DISRUPTIONS 
Baggage 
restrictions 
initially weakly 
enforced 
Baggage 
restrictions 
today strictly 
enforced 
DISRUPTIVE 
BEHAVIOURS 
Need to 
save money 
in 
operations Airlines not 
starting their 
engines when 
pushing back 
Airlines 
discourage 
Reverse 
Thrust 
More difficult to 
recognise aircraft 
movements 
More brake failures 
in aircrafts 
AIRCRAFT 
EMERGENCIES 
 
Reduced 
passenger 
marshalling 
Time 
constraints 
on GH 
Sub-optimal Safety 
RAMP SAFETY ISSUES 
RAMP SAFETY ISSUES 
LCC may be 
under-
staffed 
Reduced 
customer 
relationship 
Sub-optimal problem-
solving by airlines 
Poor decision-
making in 
smaller 
airports 
Less staff 
and more 
tasks 
Reduced 
knowledge/expertise 
RAMP SAFETY ISSUES 
SAFETY EVENTS LS 
Contractors/Ground 
Handlers/GH 
Airlines/Low cost 
carriers (LCC) 
Airport Operator/AM 
Safety and Security 
Disruption 
Consequences 
AM Areas for 
intervention 
Rear-stair 
boarding 
preferred to 
airbridges 
Need for 
quicker 
ground 
operations 
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